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Abstract 
This thesis is a quantitative study of the effect of ownership – by state, private and foreign 
shareholdings – on innovation by China’s solar photovoltaic (PV) firms. Using the country’s solar PV 
industry, I seek to explain the impact of proportions of these different types of shareholding (and 
within the state category shareholding by central, provincial, and municipal governments) on 
innovative capacity. This capacity is measured by firms’ rates and qualities of patenting.  
As Chinese economic growth falters, amid the “re-shoring” of certain manufacturing capabilities, the 
role of the state, and whether it is helping or hindering its economy’s – and Chinese firms’ – 
technological upgrading, is a vital question. This is particularly true in high-tech sectors, including solar 
PV, which the Chinese government deems essential for the country’s continuing economic growth. 
Through the solar PV industry, we investigate the role of the state, and how it is helping or hindering 
Chinese companies’ innovation. 
We employ a dataset covering 150 solar photovoltaic firms. This combines current and historical 
shareholding data for each firm, R&D expenditure data, and the firms’ patent output (all Chinese-
registered patents and their related foreign registrations).   
The thesis employs a principal-agent theoretical template for the unique Chinese politico-economic 
context, developing this theoretical approach for the particular “multi-principal” scenario in Chinese 
high-tech firms (here we refer not only to the combinations of private and state principals, but also to 
the impact of local against central government). We demonstrate that higher state shareholding leads 
to higher R&D spending relative to the size of solar PV firms; among state shareholding, local state 
ownership is shown to be better than central state ownership at generating innovation (which we 
measure as patent performance). Firms that combine private and state shareholding, especially 
minority state-owned firms, are superior innovators than purely private or purely state-owned firms.  
For particularly innovative patenting, foreign shareholding was found to be beneficial, and finally, 
central state ownership was more likely to lead to the generation of the less challenging types of solar 
PV technologies, whereas local state ownership was more likely to lead to “core” PV technologies 
being patented.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the thesis 
China, for the first time in its history, is investing huge sums in innovation in an attempt at 
technological catch-up with the West. Whether and where it is succeeding is a question of the 
foremost importance for us all. So too is how its political structure may be affecting this catch-up. 
Despite China having embarked on the process of reform from the latter half of the 1970s, the Chinese 
state still has more control over the economy – and more ownership of the economy – than any 
previous successfully developing economy. Perhaps the most important question to ask therefore for 
China’s prospects of “catch-up” is how this power is exercised, or more exactly what effects it has, on 
the prospects for China’s economic development, through its impact on the outcomes of Chinese 
firms, seen through different levels and types of state ownership.  
As we will discuss, the sector that is most vital to China’s catch-up is its high technology firms, a fact 
recognised by its government at the highest level. However, while China’s development is highly 
dependent on it, achieving innovation in high-tech sectors is also widely recognised as being the 
greatest challenge for Chinese firms.  
As a sector through which to study these dynamics, solar photovoltaics provides a field in which 
Chinese firms have become successful volume manufacturers on international markets. This provides 
a reasonable number of firms with different underlying levels of innovation. It also includes a 
considerable variety of ownership types, providing us with an unusual opportunity to assess their 
different results for innovation.  
We will see that China’s process of industrialisation has not yet created strong innovation capability 
in Chinese firms, in contrast with Japan and South Korea where bulk manufacturing-led periods 
preceded the successful creation of innovation-led economies. China still specialises in low value-
added manufactures, frequently with profit margins of 2-5% or less. Failure to increase the capacity 
for in-country innovation is seen as a particularly important factor where middle income countries 
have proven unable to enter the developed country bracket (Vivarelli, 2014; Kang et al, 2015). Should 
this remain the case in China, it is doubtful the country will be able to escape the “middle income 
trap”.  
The rationale for this study is manifold. First, a quantitative dissection of a question of the effects of 
financing and corporate governance on innovation output cannot be undertaken in a national context 
such as China without understanding how the effects of ownership are determined by the mechanics 
of the state. With this in mind, the theoretical framework is informed by detailed analysis of China’s 
state apparatus and policy framework in this area. Although much western scholarship addresses 
crude distinctions between “private” and “state” ownership, in fact the proportions of state and 
private ownership vary on a continuum from 0 to 100%, allowing the emergence of a large number of 
hybrid firms. Furthermore, within state ownership, the effect of different levels of the state (central 
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government, followed by the provinces, the provincial-level “super-municipalities” such as Beijing and 
Shanghai, and the smaller municipalities) on the innovation success of China’s high-tech firms remains 
virtually unaddressed. Although the industry is now the subject of a considerable trade dispute, the 
role of foreign shareholding in Chinese solar PV firms in particular has been little discussed.  
 
 
1.2 Innovation and entrepreneurs in the Chinese economy 
Since the beginning of economic reform in 1979, China’s economic growth has been founded on the 
labour-intensive bulk manufacturing of products for export. Numerous reports, including from the 
Chinese government itself, now suggest that this scenario must change if China is to become an 
economically developed country in the foreseeable future (discussed below). Rising labour costs, 
competition from other emerging markets, unstable demand from developed countries since the 
financial crisis, plus other factors such as the appreciating renminbi (RMB), suggest that the point is 
being reached at which China must fundamentally change its economic model. 
In 1957, Robert Solow calculated that labour and capital, the two factors which had been assumed to 
drive economic growth, together accounted for only 13% its total, and that 87% of growth per worker 
in fact came from “technical change” (Solow, 1957). Studies of South Korea and Japan (below) 
demonstrate that to avoid the middle income trap, innovation within economies is needed, which 
requires conducive institutional conditions. Meanwhile it appears China’s new Premier Li Keqiang 
wishes to continue the transition to “market mechanisms”, meaning in effect breaking state control 
over industry. Li published a report in 2012 arguing that China must embrace a free market model, 
stating: “innovation at the technology frontier is quite different in nature from catching up 
technologically. It is not something that can be achieved through government planning” (Li Keqiang, 
in McGregor, J., 2012b).  
However, while economic reform from the 1980s allowed the growth of private firms and closed many 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private entrepreneurs continue to face obstacles to growth 
(McGregor, J., 2012b). SOEs still employ a large proportion of the workforce, private firms face higher 
interest on loan repayments, and SOEs are favoured for infrastructure contracts, receiving various 
subsidies and benefiting from government guanxi (networks).  
Indeed in Chinese techno-economic studies, the decade to 2012 has been described as guojin mintui: 
“while the state advances, the private retreats”, a reversal of the economic trend of the 1980s and 
1990s. We will describe the relationship between reform, innovation, and the generation of patent 
intellectual property (IP) in greater detail; since around 2003 however, in fields of strategic 
technological importance including in alternative energy, defence, water, and biotech, China appears 
to have concentrated investment into the largest SOEs. A June 2011 study by independent Beijing 
think tank Unirule stated that the “total profits of China Mobile and Sinopec [two large SOEs] in 2009 
surpassed the combined profits of China’s 500 largest private enterprises” (Unirule Institute of 
Economics, 2012). It also found that if the subsidies are deducted from SOE profits between 2001 to 
2009, their real average return on equity becomes minus 6.29%, and these “soft budget constraints” 
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may disincentivise innovation. SOE managers meanwhile may frequently be promoted elsewhere in 
the state in a short time period, harming their incentives to invest in innovation for later pay-offs.   
Lacking these constraints, the managers of private firms appear to have a greater financial incentive 
to innovate. However, despite China’s broadly modern patent system, evidence suggests that 
numerous factors are hindering firms’ ability to protect patents, and to profit from them through sales, 
factors which may disincentivise innovation generally. A recent example, Cathay Industrial Biotech, 
was a private firm established in 1997, which became a leading nylon producer using a proprietary 
bio-fermentation method. A competitor, Shandong Hilead Biotechnology, began producing the same 
product more cheaply; Cathay suspended its planned listing to file a lawsuit, alleging an employee had 
stolen intellectual property, founding Hilead with a retired member of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences and an entrepreneur with provincial government links. Hilead gained over $150m investment 
and a $300m loan from the China Development Bank, taking over 10% of the global market in a year 
(New York Times, 2011). With Hilead’s factory given “national security status”, Cathay cannot gather 
evidence.  
In his magnum opus Science and Civilisation in China, Joseph Needham (1954) suggested that China’s 
relatively poor technological progress was caused by the phenomenon of “bureaucratic feudalism”, 
whereby the state has hindered innovation since at least the fourteenth century. Qualitative 
reportage also suggests the dominance and hindering of innovation and growth by the contemporary 
state. Using solar PV firms as our study, in this thesis we will formally examine to what degree, if any, 
this may be the case today.  
 
1.3 The international market for solar photovoltaics and the position of Chinese firms 
Solar PV is not simply set to be a major component of the energy mix in China and globally, or a 
technological field in which the Chinese government wants its firms to succeed. Solar PV is an excellent 
field for the study of Chinas’ high-tech firms’ innovative success or otherwise. Although photovoltaic 
processes have been known since 1839 (when Alexandre Becquerel observed the photovoltaic effect 
in an electrode under a conductive solution when exposed to light), the field continues to show a very 
high rate of technological learning (Stone, 2012), combining mechanical, physical, and chemical 
advancements. Solar PV thus provides us with a particularly accurate means to assess the innovative 
capability of firms in a national innovation system, and of assessing the state’s relative success in 
managing this system.  
Having benefitted from forms of subsidy designed in part to increase the Chinese global market share, 
the solar PV sector is now at the centre of a trade dispute involving European and US tariffs on Chinese 
imports. Non-Chinese firms meanwhile must adapt to an environment in which the best route for the 
uptake of their technologies is now by predominantly Chinese “systems integrators” (Nolan, 2012), 
the makers of cheap finished products for installation. Most Chinese firms lack much patented IP 
however, with most of the technologically advanced firms in the solar PV sector being in the US, 
Germany, the Benelux countries, Japan, and South Korea.   
The manufacture of solar PV products has been driven thus far primarily by developed-world demand, 
mainly in grid-connected installation (de la Tour et al, 2011). Developed-world subsidies have helped 
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create a large market for PV modules, while Chinese firms have increased production capacity to 
dominate these markets with cheaper products. Subsidies in the main consumer nations are now 
being cut, and innovation encouraged by the introduction of higher technical standards (such as in 
Japan), with demand for higher-specification products therefore set to grow. To both maintain market 
share and drive indigenous innovation to increase profit margin, Beijing now favours producers with 
higher technological capability, encouraging patent registration as a means of fostering, protecting, 
but also rating Chinese firms’ technological innovation. 
Thus competition in solar PV increasingly revolves around who can produce modules (and module 
components) that convert photons to electricity both efficiently and at competitive prices (allowing 
kit purchasers to produce electricity either to sell to consumers, or for households and businesses with 
solar equipment to sell it back to the grid). Manufacturers are competing to reduce “balance-of-
system cost” (which includes maintenance and components), to reach grid parity (equal to or less than 
the price of conventional electricity from the grid) and drive uptake. This is the cost per delivered 
kilowatt hour (kWh), and varies depending on life of the system, both on installation costs and the 
amount of electricity a module produces. This price ultimately determines the uptake of solar 
products. The producers who win market share must also provide innovations for environments 
varying in light intensity, heat, cloud cover, safety requirements, and taste in appearance. Although 
China currently dominates manufacturing market share, as other countries compete to produce solar 
PV modules, and in the innovations that differentiate them, Beijing has recognised the need for 
Chinese firms to move up the value chain from cheap bulk manufacturing to patent-based innovation.  
 
This introductory section began by placing the research in the proper context, this being China’s 
particular “moment” in economic development, giving the beginning of an understanding of China’s 
challenges for growth, and the place of China’s technology firms in these challenges. We have also 
discussed the gaps in current knowledge that we aim to address. Before a more detailed analysis later 
in the thesis, we have also begun to discuss both the development of the Chinese solar PV industry in 
particular, and the place of entrepreneurs in China’s technology economy in general. In doing so we 
have highlighted what Chinese economic growth has not yet achieved, and what may be the relevant 
institutional constraints on innovation and growth generally, and particularly within our chosen 
technological sector of solar PV firms. The structure of the thesis to come is as follows.   
The literature review below will outline the theoretical template through which we seek to understand 
the Chinese state’s influence on innovation outcomes among solar PV firms, analysing principal-agent 
theory in particular. This theoretical approach will allow us to better understand the effects of the 
reform of China’s national innovation system, detailed in the section following the literature review. 
As such we will build an understanding, through principal-agent theory, of the impact of China's 
national innovation system on solar PV firms’ management and thus innovation outcomes, in 
particular its impacts on managers’ innovation investment decisions. These will be assessed by 
category of firm, these categories being defined by their relative levels of shareholding (by 
shareholding by central versus sub-central, plus different levels of the state, private, and foreign 
shareholding). 
The thesis asks how share ownership of firms in the Chinese system influences innovative output, 
through its impact on the innovation decisions of company managers. It does this through an 
17 
 
understanding of how the principal-agent relationships between shareholder principals and manager 
agents vary, dependent on the relative proportions of these ownership types, in China’s politico-
economic system. 
This study does not use straightforward distinctions between entirely state and entirely private 
ownership, but investigates the results of the continuum of state and private ownership, which vary 
from 0 to 100% of shareholdings. It also investigates the impacts of different levels of the state (by 
central government, then provincial, then provincial-level “super-municipalities” including Beijing and 
Shanghai, and finally the smaller municipalities themselves) on innovation quality and direction. 
The thesis aims to contribute to principal-agent theory within institutional contexts, not simply by 
applying this theoretical template, developed in and for western contexts, to a general Chinese 
context, but through developing it for a more specific politico-economic theoretical instance. The 
agent-managers with whom we are concerned act in a multi-principal environment, combining state, 
private, and foreign shareholding. While some foreign and private shareholder principals exist and act 
privately, without owning firms in tandem with the state, others are combined with state principals, 
while state principals also act alone in entirely state-owned firms. This spectrum of principal-agent 
relationships, in a politico-economic environment in which principals employed by various levels of 
the state are also employed by the legal arbiter of disputes, and the owner of most financing 
institutions, is a very particular context for principal-agent theory; in analysing outcomes for firms 
attempting to innovate in a new technology industry, we seek to create a novel development of 
principal-agency theory.     
Having applied a principal-agent theoretical understanding to the Chinese national innovation system 
to discern the management outcomes of different shareholder categories, we will discuss what firms 
are trying to achieve in terms of their patenting, and in which types of solar PV technology they seek 
to innovate. We will then generate the theoretical framework, which allows the theoretical literature 
and technical knowledge of the field to generate the hypotheses.  
Next, we will outline the methodology, including how the qualitative and quantitative data was 
obtained, the different types of quantitative data, and the construction of variables. The methodology 
section will outline the data types used, but we should describe here how the choice of data, between 
qualitative and quantitative, changed as the research progressed. The intention as the study began 
was to base my research on interviewing, including within the Chinese solar industry, for 
predominantly qualitative research. However during my early fieldwork in China it became clear that 
this method would not bear fruit, due not just to the relatively low-trust business culture, and other 
factors. I changed my methodological approach radically as a result. This required interviewing in and 
outside China in order to generate a strong background to the national innovation system and general 
strategy in the solar PV industry, but also a core quantitative dataset with which to demonstrate my 
hypotheses. The dataset I chose was broadly divisible in two, involving the assembly of data on the 
current and historical shareholding of a sample of China’s solar PV firms, and on the patenting 
outcomes of the same firms.  
The different types of evidence used to inform each chapter of the thesis are broadly as follows. 
Chapters 3-5 are underpinned by qualitative sources and information. Chapter 2 details qualitative 
information gathered on the functioning of innovation systems, their understanding through principal-
agent theory, and draws the two areas together to analyse how these power structures and 
18 
 
relationships, the information phenomena they create, help us understand high-tech innovation. The 
qualititaive information in Chapter 3 consists of an analysis of the Chinese structure of state, detailing 
the relevant principals and agents, and employs legal and economic research to understand what the 
impacts of state demands, standard-setting, and cadre observation and management are likely to be 
on innovation outcomes. This chapter also uses evidence about R&D spending patterns and the 
functioning of China’s patent system to describe as completely as possible the role of the state in the 
development of China’s technology firms. Chapter 4 applies the most qualitative sources – the 
theoretical literature from chapter 2 – to China’s innovation system specifically, using the evidence 
gathered about the working of the Chinese system, and state, to describe what this will mean for 
principal-agent relationships, for the management of technology firms, and for the country’s 
innovative output (including quantifiable outputs). Although most of the evidence in chapter 5, on 
China’s solar PV industry, is qualitative, this chapter also places the thesis in the context of this 
particular industry by detailing the scale, technological level, and growth trajectory of this industry. 
Chapter 6, the methodology, outlines all the other areas of evidence that are used to research this 
thesis. The qualitative area, data from interviewing, meant evidence from semi-structured interviews 
carried out in the early stages of research, that guided both the formulation of my research question, 
and the quantitative data I used to research and demonstrate the hypotheses. This quantitative data 
is divisible into four areas: patent data, shareholding, R&D data, and control data. The chapter 
describes why they were chosen, how they were obtained and processed, the construction of 
variables from the data, and their treatment in regressions (limitations are discussed in the final 
chapter).   
The methodology section is followed by the description of the specific hypotheses themselves, and 
the hypotheses-specific data analysis in preparation for the hypotheses regressions. The output from 
each regression is then set out. This is followed by the concluding section, which discusses the results, 
their limitations, and future avenues for research. We begin with the literature review.     
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Aims of the literature review 
The literature review that follows aims to describe the relevant theoretical literature as it stands; to 
discuss what the literature has to say about the research question; and to discuss where our approach 
lies in the general conversation that the literature constitutes, summarising how this literature has 
informed the theoretical template that follows (in other words helped us understand which “inputs” 
lead to which “outputs”).  
This review is divided as follows. The first sub-section addresses the institutional-theoretical area of 
national innovation systems; the second is a general introduction to principal-agent theory in general; 
and the third sub-section discusses principal-agent theory in high-tech innovation. Next, there follows 
Section 3 of the thesis, the analysis of China’s own innovation system. Following this we return to the 
theory to analyse principal-agent theory in high-tech innovation in China. Ultimately, we will explain 
how we adapt principal-agent theory to a non-western, state-led innovation system, featuring a 
specific high-technology. We will analyse how the literature overall has helped inform the hypotheses 
(explaining what the theory has to say about these specific governance questions, explaining for 
example why career bureaucrats may differ to other managers in decision-making around investing in 
innovation). We then generate the theoretical framework. 
The review aims to be critical of research findings and to highlight gaps in knowledge as it stands. 
Although we cannot cover every work that comments on the subject, we aim to cover the widest 
relevant sweep of scholarship, including demonstrating what is not sufficiently understood. 
Categorising literature thematically, the review is qualitative and discursive, not a list of sources. 
 
2.2 National Innovation Systems 
In the following subsection, we will discuss the origins of the area of institutional theory broadly 
known as “innovation system” theory, outlining the main different approaches to this institutional 
field; how they see the role of the state (in particular its positive and negative role in innovation 
outcomes); these approaches’ perceptions of “institutions” (especially “hard” formal institutions, or 
“soft” institutions in the more conceptual sense); and we will explain which conception of innovation 
system we apply for our case, and the rationale behind this.  
Questions of “institutions” have in recent decades become gradually more important in theoretical 
approaches to innovation. Indeed, having been a peripheral concern to economists, the role of 
institutions has arrived at the centre of dissections of how innovation occurs. Nonetheless, institutions 
can be seen as helping or hindering innovation, and as existing in a better or worse match with the 
relevant technologies.   
Renewed interest in institutions in innovation has followed the renewal of attention to institutions in 
economics generally. According to North (1990, 3), “Institutions are the rules of the game in society 
or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence 
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they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic”. Innovation 
systems theory can thus be understood as consisting of attempts to deduce the outline of the relevant 
institutions shaping innovation, be this in a particular state, region, or technological sector.    
The concept of innovation system specifically was moulded out of institutional theory in an attempt 
to establish which “institutions” are the important factors in innovation processes. Systems of 
innovation approaches therefore need to take into account all the necessary factors that influence 
innovation, to grasp the dynamics within the structure. The “national system of innovation” approach 
was first coined by Lundvall (according to Freeman, 1995; and Edquist, 1997), while it was first 
published in Freeman (1987) (in another East Asian study, of the Japanese economy and technology 
policy).  
Freeman (1987, 1) defined a national innovation system (NIS) as a “network of institutions in the public 
and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new 
technologies”; Zhong and Yang have defined it as “a network of institutions, policies, and agents 
supporting and sustaining the scientific and technical advance” (Zhong and Yang, 2007, 2). However 
different approaches to national systems of innovation soon emerged, and to place our contribution 
we need to appreciate their differences. Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) edited two particularly 
influential studies, to which we can also add Carlsson (1995). The core differences between the 
approaches are as follows.  
 
2.2.1 Core approaches to innovation systems 
Lundvall’s approach, crystallised in National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation 
and Active Learning (1992) is more “thematic” (Edquist, 1997) than geographically- or country-
oriented. Emphasising learning processes and interactions between users and producers, Lundvall 
analyses specific innovation themes across national boundaries, instead of how a nation state in 
isolation deals with that question (while also dealing with specifically theoretical questions in relative 
isolation). Finding that a NIS cannot be strictly defined, Lundvall states that it means, broadly: “all 
parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning as well as 
searching and exploring – the production system, the marketing system and the system of finance 
present themselves as subsystems in which learning takes place” (Lundvall, 1992, 2). The implication 
is even that “technological trajectories and paradigms”, which guide the activities of individual 
innovators, should be seen as “one special kind of institution” (Lundvall, 1992, 2). 
Lundvall suggests that we also seek to understand the historical causes of these cross-national 
phenomena:  “Determining in detail which subsystems and social institutions should be included, or 
excluded, in the analysis of a system is a task involving historical analysis as well as theoretical 
considerations [which means] a definition of the system of innovation must be kept open and flexible 
regarding which subsystems should be included and which processes should be studied” (Lundvall, 
1992, 14). 
Although Freeman (1987) describes the Japanese national innovation system’s four central pillars as 
being the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI); company R&D, particularly around 
technology imports; education; and industry’s conglomerate structure, Nelson (1993), delineates 
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more clearly the exact institutions, country by country, responsible for innovation in an active and 
political sense, stressing empirical evidence-gathering and creating a national case study-based 
approach. It is worth highlighting tendencies evident in this approach. Nelson (1981) discussed 
evolution-based approaches to technological change as superior methods of understanding processes 
of innovation than established neoclassical economic theory. Although Nelson (1993) does not 
describe evolutionary theory in this work on NIS, he had argued previously that “in capitalist countries, 
technical change is set-up as an evolutionary process” (Nelson, 1988, in Edquist, 1997).  
Yet the idea that the evolutionary process of technical change is “set-up” itself demonstrates two 
assumptions: intentionality on the part of institutional actors, especially those in higher positions of 
power, and that any evolutionary process can be set-up at all. This assumption is repeated: “This book 
is about national systems of technical innovation [and] the studies have been carefully designed, 
developed, and written to illuminate the institutions and mechanisms supporting technical innovation 
in the various countries” (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993, 5; my italics. This is an assumption that is 
common to much work using this perspective). However it is possible that institutions may not 
support, but hinder, innovation. 
Nelson and Rosenberg also differentiate quite clearly not only between different nations’ systems, but 
different sectoral systems within nations: “The system of institutions supporting technical innovation 
in one field, say pharmaceuticals, may have very little overlap with the system of institutions 
supporting innovations in another field, say aircraft” (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993, 5). That this can 
be a useful approach for a specific sectorial focus is demonstrated in studies such as Sagar and Holdren 
(2002) on energy innovation systems. No clear definition of a NIS is given by Nelson and Rosenberg 
however. Neither do they address organisational, social, or institutional innovations in great depth 
(which is challenging when dealing with reform). While the authors above do not give a clear definition 
of “institutions”, Edquist (1997) suggests that firms and industrial research laboratories are the most 
important institutions for innovation. Edquist also suggests that there are good reasons to discuss 
systems in the national sense, with clear differences even within regions (such as East Asia, or 
Northern Europe), such as in R&D investment, institutions, and overall performance (Edquist, 1997). 
Edquist and Lundvall (1993) give the example of Denmark and Sweden, whose differences are 
“remarkable”. Furthermore most innovation policies are made nationally, so the rationale for these 
policies, and their impacts nationally, must be understood: “the state, and the power attached to it, 
is also important” (Edquist, 1997, 12).  
According to Edquist (1997), a third approach is seen in Carlsson et al (1992), whose “technological 
systems” perspective addresses theoretical questions of technological systems, which they suggest 
are specific for different areas of technology, emphasised above the national. Hence Carlsson’s 
“technological system”, rather than strictly national, is “a network of agents [my italics] interacting in 
a specific economic/industrial area under a particular institutional infrastructure or set of 
infrastructures and involved in the generation, diffusion and utilisation of technology” (Carlsson, 1995, 
14; the later sections in this literature review will delineate this). The infrastructure affecting a sector, 
according to Carlsson et al (1992), can be divided into four: industrial R&D, academic infrastructure, 
other institutions, and state policy. 
The “institutional infrastructure” of each technological system refers to the “institutional 
arrangements (both regimes and organisations) which, directly or indirectly, support, stimulate and 
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regulate the process of innovation and diffusion of technology” (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1995, 45) 
(we note that this is implies assistance to, rather than hindrance of, “the process of innovation”). This 
means a wide range of institutions: “The political system, educational system (including universities), 
patent legislation, and institutions regulating labour relations” (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1995, 45), 
which in our case includes governmental and patent-related institutions.  
More recently, various scholars have analysed the mechanisms for the diffusion of renewable energy 
technology specifically, and innovation systems’ role therein. At the end of the 1990s, Jacobsson and 
Johnson (2000) presented a framework to analyse renewable energy technology diffusion (other 
scholars include Wang, Qin and Lewis (2012), to be discussed below). This context already seems very 
different from today’s however, with the authors analysing an increase in nuclear power installations 
from 1980, adding that of the small increase in renewables installations, “it is primarily the renewable 
energy sources that were already established at the beginning of the period (hydro power, geothermal 
power, and combustible renewables and waste) that have contributed to this increase”, and that “new 
renewables (wind and solar power, etc.) have not yet reached a widespread market” (Jacobsson and 
Johnson, 2000, 626).  Wind energy at the time was “probably the fastest growing renewable energy 
source in the world”, although “it seems possible that solar cells will become attractive in one (or 
several) larger market segments(s) in a not too distant future” (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, 626-8). 
The diffusion of solar PV in particular was hindered at the time partly by high cost, unlike in the current 
paradigm.  
Within innovation systems generally, Jacobsson and Johnson (2000, 629) proposed certain “elements” 
to help understand the transformation of an energy system. Taking into account the neo-classical 
economic approach, which sees technology choice influenced by relative prices, and the individual 
firm perspective in which “the entrepreneurial act is the central feature of innovation and diffusion”, 
they emphasise, first, an “innovation and diffusion process [which] is both an individual and collective 
act” (Saxenian (1994) in Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, 629), and second, the determinants of 
technological choice being found in an “innovation system” as well as in individual firms (Jacobsson 
and Johnson, 2000, 629). As this system includes “a large number of variables apart from prices”, firms 
respond to price, but also many other factors.  
Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) also draw on the technological specificity of Carlsson and others, 
especially Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991, 111): “networks of agents interacting in a specific 
technology area under a particular institutional infrastructure to generate, diffuse, and utilise 
technology. Technological systems are defined in terms of knowledge or competence flows rather 
than flows of ordinary goods and services. They consist of dynamic knowledge and competence 
networks”. Some actors however will be “prime movers”, so “technically, financially and/or politically” 
powerful that they have a considerable influence over a new technology’s development or diffusion. 
Meanwhile “networks” of firms influence the perception of “what is possible and desirable”, which 
“guides specific investment decisions” (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, 630). Finally, as discussed by 
Edquist and Johnson (1997), institutions affect the path a technology takes. So any new technology 
system increases technological “diversity”, but is “path-dependent” (David, 1988) on both actors and 
associated institutions. Jacobsson and Johnson (2000, 630) suggest this is especially true for 
renewable energy, where new technologies “substitute rather than complement” existing 
technologies, threatening the real or perceived interests of dominant actors, in the state or elsewhere.       
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Among innovating firms themselves, Dosi (1988, 225, in Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, 631-2), points 
out that “the search process of industrial firms to improve their technology is not likely to be one 
where they survey the whole stock of knowledge before making their technological choices. Given its 
highly differentiated nature, firms will instead seek to improve and to diversify by searching in zones 
that enable them to use and build upon their existing technological base”. Thus in any system, “firms, 
which are aware of a new technology, may pursue risk assessments that are biased in favour of the 
prevailing technology” (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, 632). A system can therefore exacerbate firms’ 
tendency to the pursuit of particular technological fields.  
To summarise these more recent approaches to adjusting innovation systems for renewable energy 
development, “the rate and direction of technical change – the process of technical choice – is decided 
in competition between various technological systems” (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, 633), but the 
authors add that “the construction of a new system often involves the destruction of an alternative 
system”. With institutional change and policy closely related, in adjusting an institutional system to 
favour an emerging technology, “policy makers need to be patient”. 
Johnson and Jacobsson (2001, 95) suggest that if they are not – or if they are influenced too strongly 
by interests that have become dominant in an industrial system – institutions may fail to usefully shape 
a new one. For instance, legislation can direct the “search process” in the direction of an ‘incumbent’ 
technology by influencing the prices of the alternatives, and as a result capital markets may not 
respond to a new technological system’s needs (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997b). This is likely to affect 
the supply of “capital and competence” (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001, 95); a new technological field 
may also have badly organised actors, which may mean limited ability to advocate legislative change 
and a lack of organisational nous which may retard acceptance of a new technology. (The scholars 
thus present a solid framework of institutional problems, but mine is both a new field with particularly 
dominant politico-economic interests which both ‘own’ the legal system and parts of economic 
production, and in which the power relationships can be much more clearly understood through a 
principal-agent framework).      
Meanwhile Johnson and Jacobsson (2001, 96) describe a case where the “technological strength of 
Sweden is now negligible, however”, as opposed to a country become technologically more advanced. 
And although, like in China, some actors had weaker “organisational power”, with more power with 
bigger firms, the state’s actions were different, with government putting money into a specified area: 
large-sized wind turbines. Different forms of “unlocking” were also needed in Sweden (Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001, 106), specifically the need to unlock the “nuclear trauma”, i.e. the influence of the 
nuclear industry. 
However in their continuing analysis of the failure of the Swedish institutions and innovation systems 
to help build a strong wind turbine industry, Bergek and Jacobsson (2003) provide a useful 
supplement. Although neo-classical economics uses the phrase “market failures”, Johnson and 
Jacobsson (2001, 93) suggest “it is not meaningful to refer to deviations from a (neo-classical) 
“optimum” in an uncertain, dynamic and complex world”. Their objective instead is to study 
“obstacles” to development, or factors that “tilt the selection environment in favour of incumbent 
technologies” (in our case however this may mean simpler PV technologies, as we will discuss). 
Johnson and Jacobsson (2001, 95) suggest these obstacles may come in the form of legislation, the 
education system, the capital market, and weakly organised actors, but our analysis requires an 
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understanding of other obstacles that we will discuss, and ultimately of agency relationships in the 
politico-economic system itself. 
Scholars have approached national innovation systems from numerous other perspectives. These 
include Thailand’s NIS as a case of a “less successful” developing country (Intarakumnerd, Chairatana 
and Tangchitpiboon, 2002); outlining, for the Indian case, the main elements of the NIS (Herstatt et 
al, 2008); analysing specific elements in national systems, such as biotechnology in Taiwan (Dodgson 
et al, 2008) or R&D laboratories in general in the US (Crow and Bozeman, 2013); regional systems as 
elements in the national system (Cooke et al, 1997; Chung, 2002); global interdependence of national 
innovation systems (Niosi and Bellon, 1994; Carlsson, 2006); and the historical approach to national 
innovation systems in general (Godin, 2009). We will draw on various China-specific studies written 
from such perspectives in the following section.  
For our purposes the differences between Nelson’s and Lundvall’s approaches are, first, in the 
organisation of central actors. Lundvall’s approach allows more discussion not simply of how a system 
is managed effectively state-by-state, but at how it may be managed to malign effect (which includes 
dealing with finance for example). The thematic rather than geographical approach (of both Lundvall 
and Carlsson) also allows more breadth than Nelson et al.  
 
2.2.2 Innovation systems, the state and reform 
We have established that some institutions regulate and control competition and conflict among 
groups. For our study, we need to understand the actions of state institutions, because the presence 
of state management does not necessarily imply success, even if this fact has not always been 
emphasised. Edquist (1997) has suggested institutions may be “obstacles to innovation”. Therefore a 
“historical perspective”, as Edquist (1997) states, “is natural”. This is how we appreciate the current 
form of the relevant institutions in any given NIS, then uncover their impacts. As we have discussed 
through Solow (1957), an economy being capable of continued growth depends on its capacity for 
technical change, which means it depends on its ability to “adapt and renew its institutions to 
support... innovation” (Edquist, 1997, 55). Thus national economic stagnation can be caused by the 
institutional structure’s failure to adapt (Freeman and Perez, 1988). This mismatch of “radical 
technical change” with the institutional structure “may lead to periods of economic stagnation until 
new institutions and institutional restructuring establish a new match” (Edquist, 1997, 55). Although 
Edquist uses the phrase “institutional drift” for institutions’ attempts to carry out new tasks, in our 
case this means Marxist-Leninist institutions being applied to attempts to drive innovation in high-
tech firms for the purpose of economic renewal. As such “institutional mismatch” may be a better 
description here.  
Lipsey (2009, 3) states: “invention and innovation are risky and costly; people will usually only engage 
in these activities if they anticipate a gain that exceeds the expected personal cost”, or in our case in 
the absence of “institutional disincentives to growth”. These are not “either-or characteristics but 
matters of degree... as long as some innovation is tolerated and rewarded, there is a wide range of 
institutional arrangements that are compatible with growth”, including the various innovation policies 
in “market economies that are currently growing”. However according to Lipsey (2009, 6), “new 
technologies require new institutions to support them. Wu and Tu (2007) demonstrated how 
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managers perceive considerable downside risk associated with R&D investment; it thus takes the right 
institutional innovations to prevent growth slowing to a halt, because, if new technologies are not 
exploited, further inventions and innovations that build on them are unlikely to occur”. This means 
that “technology and institutions are linked in a system of mutual interaction”.  
This question has been addressed by scholars such as Lundvall, Intarakumnerd and Vang (2006, 1, 2, 
8), who describe Indonesia as one case where “the need for a transition is obvious but where it 
remains blocked by established power structures and institutional inertia.” They agree that analysis 
of innovation systems may be at its most valuable in countries attempting to escape the middle 
income trap, as “the transition perspective may be seen as a necessary complement to prevailing ideas 
of catch-up economic growth”. Growth can only be maintained if systems within nations “from time 
to time [go] through a process of qualitative change affecting institutions, organisations, and 
relationships between organisation.” They add that: “In China [the challenge] is to build institutions 
that help firms out of an imitative mode in many fields of technology but also to build institutions that 
make growth sustainable”. While some suggest that it is more important to study technological 
globalisation per se, the very fact that firms must compete in a globalised technological marketplace 
means the impacts of national innovation systems on their success within it is more important than 
ever.  
Lundvall, Intarakumnerd and Vang (2006, 2) suggest that the NIS concept is “dialectical”, given that 
“innovation signals discontinuity while “system” tends to be associated with a stable structure”, 
resulting in more attention to current institutional setups than to changes therein (the continuation 
of Marxist-Leninist institutions and their impact is one of the themes that runs through this thesis). 
Lundvall, Intarakumnerd and Vang (2006, 4) add that: “contingency mismatch” exists where 
“situations where the environment changes so that the prevailing institutional set-up becomes ill-
suited for the problems that the environment raises”, such that a limit to growth emerges (which may 
necessitate more radical change). We will return to Lundvall (e.g. Lundvall and Gu, 2006) and other 
innovation system scholars in analysing the Chinese innovation system, its organisation by the state, 
and its reforms, in the following section. 
Some critics of the NIS approach have suggested that regional entities have become more important 
than national, as “sub-national entities”, including provinces, cities, and districts become more 
important than the nation state, with Silicon Valley a case in point (Sun and Liu, 2010). However this 
also reveals why we need to understand the specifics of the Chinese example. Reforms to the Chinese 
NIS have been “controlled and directed” by the central government (Sun and Liu, 2010, 1311), 
meaning the concept of the state “is far more complex than that of a geographical space, as it also 
embraces the prime unit of public policy” (Sun and Liu, 2010, 1312). However one should not neglect 
the regional dimension, and we will return to the role of Chinese regions in discussing the innovation 
effects of central versus non-central governments, and of regional industrial agglomeration.       
This innovation system in China differs from most developed countries’ equivalents in various aspects. 
The first is the context, specifically the level of marketisation. More developed nations will usually see 
the NIS in a market context, with interactions between innovative actors, and with government policy 
promoting the interactions (Sun and Liu, 2010). China's NIS however emphasises the leading role of 
the state in the “transition process from a planned to a market-oriented economy” (Sun and Liu, 2010, 
1313). Furthermore, although an “enterprise-centred innovation system” is Chinese policy-makers’ 
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stated aim (Sun and Liu, 2010, 1313), many of these enterprises remain wholly or partly state-owned, 
with the rules governing how this transition takes place also decided by the state. 
The next difference is how states govern interactions in the system. While developed country 
governments may usually aim to optimise interaction between the systems’ actors, in China the 
government aims to build an innovation system that is “enterprise-centred” but with the state as a 
major spender (Sun and Liu, 2010), establishing R&D laboratories, centres, and suchlike. Finally, Sun 
and Liu (2010), suggest that the Chinese state’s leading role in restructuring the innovation system 
differs from the more autonomous, market-led phenomena in developed countries.    
 
2.2.3 Innovation systems and agency theory 
The idea of institutions can be further developed by seeing them as “routines”. Lundvall (1992, 10) 
states: “institutions may be routines, guiding everyday actions in production, distribution, and 
consumption”, a clearly different meaning to the more strictly organisational delineation of Nelson 
and Rosenberg, referring to organisational structures. Edquist (1997) suggests that Nelson and 
Rosenberg’s approach may require more focus on “things that pattern behaviour”. But to Lundvall’s 
perspective “more weight to organisations” could be added (Edquist, 1997); these are questions we 
seek to address in this thesis.   
All perspectives agree that actors’ behaviour is influenced by a “network of institutions” (Freeman, 
1987), these institutions being “crucial” to understanding the innovation process (Edquist, 1997). But 
it is this “system” that means we look at an NIS in particular, not institutional theory in general: we 
follow Edquist’s (1997, 15, 13) definition of system as “including all important determinants of 
innovation”, and more exactly as a “set of institutional actors that, together, play the major role in 
influencing innovative performance”. In other words the NIS is a system in which the principal-agent 
relationships we discuss below exist, and a system that is capable of directing them. 
This cuts to the quick of what kind of theory the systems of innovation approach is. Appreciative theory 
involves an empirical focus and uses explicit causal arguments (Nelson, 1995), while formal theory is 
expressed in stylised form (Edquist, 1997), and can be used to “discipline and sharpen” theories such 
as appreciative theory (Nelson, 1995, 5). The systems of innovation approach is not a formal theory, 
lacking “convincing propositions as regards established and stable relations between variables” 
(Edquist, 1997, 28), and is simply a “conceptual framework”. Although the NIS approach suggests a 
“structure”, it lacks focus on actor orientation within this structure. Edquist (1985, 1997) suggests that 
an approach that combines this structure with actor-orientation is needed: the conceptual framework 
needs to be “disciplined and sharpened” by this explanation of why actors behave as they do within 
it. We suggest that without this it is liable to give the impression of the existence of institutional “black 
boxes” within the institutional framework, leaving “causal gaps”. The gaps thus need to be filled by an 
explanation of the patterns of behaviour within the institutional framework, hence our choice of 
principal-agent theory, which we will describe in the following sub-section.  
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2.3 Principal-Agent Theory Introduction 
2.3.1 Principal-agent theory 
This subsection will plot the outlines of principal-agent theory in some detail, to explain how these 
relationships operate in, and impact, the Chinese national innovation system. We will begin by 
describing the functioning of principal-agent relationships, and the types of phenomena they can 
create. This includes the possession of information between the partners in these relationships, how 
imbalances in information possession affect behaviour, and the incentives that principals attempt to 
set to rectify this, with varying degrees of success. 
Defining an agency relationship as a contract whereby one person or more (the principal/s) hire 
another (an agent) to carry out a task on this principal’s behalf, this implies the delegation to the agent 
of some level of decision-making authority (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus the principal-agent 
problem typically involves one party, an agent, acting for another party, a principal. Traditionally used 
as an analytical tool to study questions around western shareholding, the central problem addressed 
is how to induce or motivate the agent to behave in the interests of the principal. (Outside the western 
shareholder-principal and manager-agent context, principal-agent questions in general have mainly 
been analysed in insurance provision, and in political contexts of relationships between voter-
principals and elected politician-agents). Indeed, Arrow’s (1963) insurance industry research is 
regarded as the classic principal-agent study. Having paid for insurance, patients chose doctors based 
on their ability to provide services, with insurers picking up the cost. This may include each of the core 
concepts of: informational asymmetry (between patient and insurer), adverse selection (with people 
more prone to illness more likely to seek insurance), and moral hazard (when the agent, in this case 
the insured patient, in taking more risks with his or her health, carries out actions which are not 
optimal for the principal, here the insurer).  
Moral hazard therefore refers to the insured person taking more risk than he would were he not 
insured, which may mean more risk than is optimal for the insurer and insured together (i.e. post-
contract hidden actions). Adverse selection is when people who know they are highly risky are more 
likely to insure themselves than people who know they are low-risk (a pre-contract hidden situation). 
So if principal-agent questions address one party acting for another, incentives questions ask how this 
agent can be incentivised to act in the principal’s interests. Asymmetric information meanwhile exists 
between principal and agent (as to the actual behavior of the agent, and how he uses the resources he 
is provided); the specific actions that may be hidden from the principal as a result therefore constitute 
the moral hazard. 
The indirect origins of principal-agent analysis appear in Adam Smith (1776, 44). Seeing the need for 
delegation within firms, in the contractual relationships between masters and workers Smith noted 
conflicting interests, and the uneven distribution of bargaining power (here the masters were 
principals and the workers agents). To Smith the masters usually had most of the bargaining power:  
“What are the common wages of labour, depends everywhere upon the contract usually made 
between those two parties, whose interests are not the same. The workmen desire to get as much, 
the masters to give as little as possible” (Smith, 1776, 44).  
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Smith also appealed to noneconomic motives: “The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and 
nothing mortifies him so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors” (Smith, 1776, 
89). Thus Smith understood that the aims of principals and agents should not be seen in purely profit-
oriented terms, and they may have other goals for which they direct their choices.  
The concept that the growing complexity of specialised labour relations defines economic 
development (and that applying knowledge also grows more complex) can be traced back to Smith 
(Gu and Lundvall, 2006), so any discussion of principal-agent theory must also trace these roots. For 
Smith, the most serious problems that arose were lack of investment by tenants in the land, and in 
the (unmonitorable) misuse of farming instruments: “In France [proprietors] complain that [tenants] 
take every opportunity of employing the master’s cattle rather than in cultivation; because in the one 
case they get the whole profits for themselves, in the other they share them with their landlords” 
(Smith, 1776, 277), in Laffont and Martimort, 2002. In other words the optimal use of resource differs 
between principal and agent, which may lead to conflict between them. In this way is misalignment 
between the aims of principal and agent created. 
Smith (1776, 124) also explained the general result of these situations, by which we mean moral 
hazard, suggesting that within the joint-stock company, in which management and shareholders are 
separate: “[the] directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s 
money than of their own, it cannot be well expected, that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own”. 
Smith deduced that “Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company” (Smith, 1776, 239). The “agency problem” occurs 
because principal and agent have different goals, and principals cannot know for sure whether agents 
have behaved “appropriately” (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
We will thus create a proper understanding of principal-agent theory by discussing first the types of 
“post-contract problems” that principal-agent relations can create. Understanding principal-agent 
relationships as contractual relationships involving a principal attempting to induce agent behaviours 
that meet the requirements of a principal’s own interests, we go on to analyse the core phenomena 
these relationships generate, and the reactions they require. The central questions then, are: the 
structure of principal-agent relations themselves, which create information asymmetry, leading to 
moral hazard, which principals attempt to address by giving incentives, but which may have side-
effects depending on their rewards and time-horizons1.   
Before considering the question of using incentives to align principals and agents, we should ask the 
nature of the costs agency problems can impose, as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The 
assumption that each party is a “utility maximiser” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) means agents will not 
always act in principals’ interests. As we discuss in the subsection below, principals may be able to 
control departures from their interests through giving agents incentives, and/or taking on “monitoring 
costs”, which may limit agents’ undesirable behaviour. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that it is 
                                                          
1  Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that many researchers work almost entirely on the particular principal-agent 
relationship involving the owners and managers of large public corporations (leaving much work to be done on 
cases such as ours). For example Jensen and Meckling (1976) analysed corporate ownership structures, with 
equity ownership aligning manager and owner interests, with “positivist writers” almost exclusively interested 
in the example of owner-CEO relations in corporations. 
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impossible to optimise agent decisions from the principal’s point of view at “zero cost”: there will be 
financial or non-financial “monitoring and bonding costs”, besides which there must still be “some 
divergence” between decisions optimal for agent and principal welfare. 
Thus they define these agency costs as the combination of: principals’ monitoring expenditures, 
including attempts at controlling agents’ behaviour via spending controls and suchlike; expenditure 
on “bonding”; and any residual loss. But it is the desire of each party to maximise utility, in particular 
the agent, and the presence of information asymmetry that makes moral hazard itself possible.    
Eisenhardt (1989) therefore summarises agency theory as being concerned with relationships 
whereby one party (the principal) delegates work to another party (the agent). The theory then 
attempts to address the two obstacles that can arise in these relationships: the agency problem, when 
the goals or preferences of principal and agent come into conflict, and that it is difficult and/or 
expensive for principals to check on what agents are actually doing, in other words moral hazard. 
 
2.3.2 Moral hazard 
Problematic private information involves an agent taking actions unseen by a principal. This means 
hidden action, or moral hazard, springs from this asymmetric information problem. Thus moral hazard 
is a consequence of information asymmetry, expressed in actions by the agent which are not optimal 
for the principal. It can also be the result of one party in a relationship or transaction having more 
information than the other, with the party with the information making himself more insulated from 
risk, with the latter more likely to pay for the consequences; shirking, or “negligence and profusion” 
can also arise through this scenario, as can excessive risk avoidance by agents, and short-termist 
behaviours that are costly in the long-run. Thus we aim to describe what we mean by moral hazard 
itself, the part it plays in the principal-agent context, and how it relates to our case.  
The origin of moral hazard theory, despite its development through insurance analysis in the 1960s, 
may in fact be in Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature, 1738, 239). “Two neighbours may agree to drain 
a meadow, which they possess in common; because it is easy for them to know each other’s mind”. 
This meant “that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is the abandoning the whole 
project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou’d agree in any 
such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for 
them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and wou’d 
lay the whole burden on others”. This is the core moral hazard problem: in the presence of ignorance, 
one party may carry out non-useful (or risky, or detrimental) actions when they will not feel the results 
of these actions, but instead the other party will.  
The moral hazard area has been studied in the contexts of team management, team production, 
contract design, and more recently risks in financial products. In contracts though, moral hazard arises 
in situations involving “hidden actions” (asymmetric information), specifically shared risk under 
conditions whereby actions taken privately affect the probable “distribution of outcomes” 
(Holmström, 1982), and managers can shield higher-ups from the results of bad decisions. Yet moral 
hazard is also visible in other contexts. Holmström (1982) suggests that these include when managers’ 
success, real or apparent, is unconnected to how the business really fares; when a failure has limited 
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effect on the company; when managers have secure tenure and are hard to remove; when they are 
connected nepotistically to “higher-ups”; when employees below managers may be blamed; and 
when it is unclear who is really responsible for successes. 
The phrase itself also appears first to have been used in insurance, specifically Britain’s early 
nineteenth-century insurance industry (Baker, 1996), during the study of probability in marine 
insurance. For insurers, moral hazard meant the combination of bad character and/or temptation that 
needed to be prevented in contracts (the moral element implied contracts that would discourage the 
bad-intentioned from applying, and not tempt the good to do wrong for financial gain). Moral hazard 
became a question for economics generally in the 1960s when economists analysed how the very 
existence of insurance may, through moral hazard, increase the occurrence and cost of the 
phenomena insured against (Baker, 1996). As we have seen, this began in Arrow’s 1963 analysis: the 
“adverse selection” meant taking out insurance if you know you are “riskier” than others in your 
category, and “moral hazard” referring to those insured possibly taking less care. Pauly suggested that 
moral hazard applied to all forms of insurance, yet Arrow realised that moral hazard may exist in any 
principal-agent situation. Later scholars have developed greater analytical sophistication. In his most 
detailed moral hazard study, Stiglitz (1983) stated that virtually all economic relations “are affected 
by risk and by the problems of insurance and incentives to which this gives rise” (which for our 
purposes includes the risk of innovation failure when “insurance”, in the form of future state 
employment, is given to those agents who are making R&D investment decisions).  
This information problem gives rise to the principal’s desire to monitor agents’ behaviour. Following 
Smith, Babbage (1835) studied both such conflicts of interest, and how the monitoring of agents they 
necessitated might proceed. Babbage (On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, 1835) 
developed Smith’s understanding of contract problems, suggesting that precise performance-
measurement was needed for profit-sharing contracts, i.e. the monitoring of agents to make sure they 
did what principals wished. Babbage wondered that “It would [be] of great mutual advantage to the 
industrious workman, and to the master manufacturer in every trade, if the machines employed in it 
could register the quantity of work which they perform, in the same manner as a steam engine does 
the number of strokes it makes”. Removing disagreement between parties by mechanically recording 
work, reducing disagreement between them, Babbage thought, would give “a greater stimulus to 
honest industry than can readily be imagined” (Babbage, 1835, 297)2. (Asymmetric information may 
not only affect a relationship between a principal and his agents but also “plague the relationship 
between agents” (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, 5), highlighting a multiple-agent, if not yet a multiple-
principal context.) 
However effective monitoring must deal with time horizons, in other words whether the principal only 
monitors behaviours effective in the short-term, or understands which agent behaviours are actually 
in their long-term interest. Aulakh and Gencturk (2000) suggest behavioural controls reward long-
term outlooks, as they remove the pressure to jeopardise long-term success for short-term results. If 
the desired agent behaviour is monitored by the “mechanisms of social pressure”, the ability to 
achieve long-term economic targets may be enhanced (Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000). Yet this requires 
principals to know in advance the best means towards an end, in other words what behaviour they 
                                                          
2 By 1822, pursuing the recording of such information by a machine, Babbage had already begun developing the 
Difference Engine, arguably the first mechanical computer. 
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should be seeking. And in China, mechanisms of social pressure over state agents are likely to impose 
other social goals, such as maintaining employment, or the quantitative patenting we shall discuss, 
which may not be enhancing to firm economic outcomes. Ultimately, we shall examine a clash of time-
horizons in our case: although innovation requires long-term investments with delayed payoffs, 
managers may be assessed such that they are more likely to make investments with faster – visible – 
payoffs.   
 
2.3.3 Incentives 
According to Miller (2005) for example, principal-agent models should have six features. Agent impact 
means agents take independent actions impacting principals’ payoffs; information asymmetry has 
principals observing outcomes, but not agents’ actions; asymmetry in preferences meanwhile sees 
agents and principals having different behaviour preferences for their respective wellbeing. But Miller 
adds a unified principal having initiative, i.e. principals acting rationally based on coherent 
preferences, and acting first by offering contracts; backward induction based on common knowledge 
means principal and agent share knowledge of effort costs, other parameters, and agent rationality. 
Finally ultimatum bargaining assumes the principal has all the bargaining power, so can make a “take-
it-or-leave-it” offer to an agent. To Miller (2005) these assumptions lead to two “primary results”. 
Principals use outcome-based incentives to partly overcome moral hazard problems, so despite having 
an informational disadvantage they transfer risk to the agent; but an efficiency tradeoff sees agents 
demanding higher compensation for this risk, cutting principals’ profits. So the best trade-offs see risk-
averse agents paid an outcome-based bonus.  
We note however that our case may have differences to this more conventional formula: although 
outcomes may be observed as suggested, this observation can only be in the short-term, and this can 
lead to the creation of incentives that create problems later on. Regarding backward induction, the 
relevant form of agent rationality may be hard to ascertain, rationality being focused towards different 
goals, which makes this assumption too strong to be realistic. Finally, the assumption of a unified 
principal requires a majority shareholder, otherwise “take-it-or-leave-it” offers are impossible. We 
now address the possible side-effects of these tactics in general in our discussion of incentives.   
If an agent had some different objectives, but no private information, principals could propose 
contracts that perfectly control the agent, so incentive questions would not arise (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002). But given both regularly different objectives, and private information, incentives 
are often necessary. Yet delegating tasks to an agent in the presence of some lack of information about 
them is problematic, which means decentralised information can create incentive conflict. Akerlof 
(1970), Spence (1974), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) demonstrated how asymmetric information 
created a problem for incentives, given that the unknown aims of agents make providing appropriate 
incentives difficult (i.e. the problem of incentives with asymmetric information).  
In other cases however, agents may have different aims to principals, and stand to gain less from the 
investments the firm needs, making them liable to “shirking”. In such cases, profit-related bonuses 
can be used to reduce shirking problems.  
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Agents’ rewards can be decided, at least to a degree, by whether they reach set standards, as Babbage 
(1835) demonstrated (and patent measures may be one of these). But another question is the degree 
to which these outcomes can – or should – be measured (we shall discuss how patent measures may 
be an example of a poor proxy for what may really interest a principal). Indeed, far from being simple 
to measure, many tasks take a great deal of time, require team effort, or produce “soft” outcomes 
that are difficult to measure effectively (Eisenhardt, 1989). Incentives can also worsen the problems 
that they are established to combat. A clear case of this is when the tight monitoring of behaviour 
produces short-termism, for example through the use of short-term weighted profit-related bonuses 
mentioned above. In innovation, we will see examples of how attempts to deal with shirking can cause 
other moral hazard problems. A more conventional instance is the use of stock options to incentivise 
managers (meaning a manager has the right to exercise the option, and own stock in the firm, if the 
share price rises above the call price in the future, giving them an incentive to help boost the firm’s 
value). However unless stock options are both sufficiently long-term they are liable to create short-
termism (Smithers, 2013). Despite being designed to deal with shirking and risk avoidance, stock 
options are liable to exacerbate the short-termism problem, by intensifying the drive to increase 
immediate profit. Dealing with short-termism, shirking, and risk avoidance can arguably be seen as 
the three central concerns of the incentives literature, and we shall return to them in discussing their 
impacts on innovation.  
Although the intensive scholarly study of incentives is relatively recent (and Schumpeter (1954) did 
not mention incentives in his history of economic thought), today for many economists the discipline 
is largely a series of incentive questions, such as how to design institutions that “provide good 
incentives for economic agents” (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, 1). This is why the incentives field 
appears with Adam Smith’s division of labour and exchange, and the need to delegate (the first 
contracts appearing as landlords contracted with tenants in agriculture). Babbage himself suggested 
two principles to remunerate labour such that agents would act in principals’ interests. First, a 
considerable part of each person’s wages should depend on the profits made by the firm; and second, 
that every person within it should derive more advantage applying any “improvement he might 
discover” than he could by any other course (Adam Smith, 1776, 177).  
In the round, in principal-agent scenarios, incentive questions ask how it can be made in agents’ 
interests to behave as the principal desires, in other words how a system of rewards can be structured 
so that an agent gains from doing so. But if an agent responds to incentives such as Babbage (1835) 
suggested, it does not necessarily follow that the principal’s desired outcome – such as improved 
innovation – is met, simply that the agent is persuaded to act as the principal believes will help achieve 
that end. 
We will see how with (sometimes innovative) tasks too complicated or costly to do oneself, principals 
hire particular agents (with specialised skills) to carry them out. The core question is how this principal 
can best motivate the agent to perform as preferred, despite difficulties in keeping track of this agent's 
activities. These are the fundamental incentive problems – the need to motivate and monitor – arising 
both in the simplest agency relationship and more complex organisations such as corporations (and 
we will structure our theoretical framework by asking how this incentive problem informs the 
outcome of each hypothesis). Therefore without considering incentives, the firm may still remain a 
“black box”, without appreciation of how owners align the objectives of various members, “such as 
workers, supervisors, and managers” with profit maximisation (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, 2), in 
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particular over the long-term. (Although we rarely describe stock markets as individuals, we frequently 
describe firms as if they were individuals with “motivations and intentions” (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). To understand outcomes, we need to consider the agents in these organisations.) 
Thus incentives also represent a way of dealing with informational asymmetry, and the moral hazard 
that as we shall see is at the centre of concerns for innovation in China. If the asymmetric relationship 
is one where authority is on one side and information on the other (Weber, 1925), principal-agency 
studies mean this asymmetry exists in a relationship where agents have an informational advantage 
over principals, then analyses an area where the principal has authority, namely the ability to impose 
incentives on agents. So the incentives should give informationally disadvantaged principals leverage, 
inducing the (more informationally expert) agents towards actions the principal would have them 
take. By manipulating agents’ incentives, principals seek to minimise agency costs, or the losses 
imposed on them by any inability to align an agent’s self-interest with his own (Miller, 2005). These 
“losses” typically mean reductions in profit, but in our case, as we will see, will imply innovation failure.  
Having discussed the problems of principal-agent theory as it stands, we will apply principal-agent 
theory first to high-tech innovation in firms, before then going on to discuss the application of these 
phenomena to Chinese high-tech innovation in particular. In particular, under principal-agent theory 
we will apply the concepts of information asymmetry and moral hazard, the use of incentives to affect 
the choices of agents, and the possible side-effects of these incentives, and the impact of cases where 
instead of a unified principal, mixed principals exist. 
Arising with the context of the landowner-tenant relationship in an agricultural economy, principal-
agent questions are becoming increasingly important as more complex organisations work on 
innovative tasks, requiring distant management of teams, and investment by large organisations or 
shareholder groups, who cannot constantly check on individual behavior. Thus successful innovative 
output depends a great deal on successfully structured principal-agent relations. In other words, while 
Sappington (1991, 45) suggests that the phrase “if you want something done right, do it yourself”, 
encapsulates the major concerns of incentive theory, how to get something done right if you cannot 
do it yourself is the real question at hand. 
 
 
2.4 Principal-Agent Theory in High-Tech Innovating Firms 
Before we consider the way in which an agent is tasked with carrying out innovation activities within 
a firm, we should pause to consider how firms generate knowledge, and the theoretical understanding 
of the rationale behind this.  
 
2.4.1 The generation of capabilities by firms 
Although many mainstream twentieth century economists saw companies as institutions that were 
straightforwardly defined by their obvious production capacities, it became clearer that these 
production functions did not explain the behaviour and direction of these firms, or indeed their limits. 
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A newer literature of dynamic capabilities began in the evolutionary and behavioural theories of Cyert 
and March (from 1963), and Nelson and Winter (1982).  
In the Behavioural Theory of the Firm, Cyert and March’s (1963) refined definition of firms saw 
companies as unique entities distinguished by hard to imitate “standard operating procedures”, or 
heterogeneous characteristics, making the performance of any given firm broadly determined by its 
capacity to match operations to its environment, and to changes within its environment. Yet in their 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Nelson and Winter (1982) advanced a more dynamic 
approach to company strategy, asking how firms were capable of evolving in line with their 
environments. In describing their “standard operating procedures” as “routines”, Nelson and Winter 
stated these routines governed a company’s adaptation to its environment, as its “genetic material”. 
Subsequently Teece et al (1994), among others, built on this dynamic scenario for firms’ strategy.  
However the still dominant neoclassical view implied that firms had both perfect information and 
certainty of environmental outcomes, and lacking problems of adaptation or of internal resource 
allocation were able to straightforwardly maximise profit. Firms’ internal workings were therefore left 
neglected. Cyert and March’s theory however took first, “the firm as its basic unit; second, the 
prediction of firm behaviour with respect to such decisions as price, output, and resource allocation 
as its objective; and third, an explicit emphasis on the actual process of organisational decision-making 
as its basic research commitment” (Cyert and March, 1963, 19). This depiction of the firm as an entity 
constituted by its own goals and standard operating procedures allowed a fundamental understanding 
of the firm’s heterogeneity. It was this heterogeneity which created disparities in firms’ performance 
over the long- and short-term. Some routines in turn change firms’ operating procedures over time. 
According to Nelson and Winter however, “search routines” direct firms towards innovation, but 
innovation that will be compatible with their current knowledge or approach.  
Drawing on Nelson and Winter, Teece’s (1988) resource-based approach sees firms as collections of 
both tangible and intangible assets, competencies, or resources, which are hard for other firms to 
imitate, and are the foundation of firms’ respective competitive capabilities. So should a competitor 
be able to uncover and copy a “competence-forming routine”, the originator company may be able to 
use IPRs in order to protect itself. The capacity of firms to develop the appropriate resources however 
is in considerable part dependent on the ability of the firm to find, then assimilate, the necessary 
information from its environment (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).  
Firms must also find new pathways in both their own research and the research of others (Teece, 
Pisano, and Schuen, 1997), and as we will see, the relevant managers need to have an incentive to 
find and act on them. Much research has been undertaken on the impact of systems of management, 
and systems of management within particular national innovation systems. Their impact on firm 
innovation outcomes specifically, some of which can be placed in a principal-agent framework, we 
discuss in the following subsection.  
 
2.4.2  The role of the principal-agent relationship in innovation in high-tech firms 
We have asked about the core principal-agent dynamics of firms in general, of which we shall now 
remind ourselves; following this, we shall enquire about the peculiarities of principal-agent dynamics 
in innovating high-tech firms in particular.   
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Principal-agent relationships involve information asymmetry, as to goings-on within a firm, between 
agent and principal, which helps create moral hazard. Principals use incentives to push agents towards 
certain choices the principals prefer, but these incentives can have side-effects. 
The peculiar categories of phenomena that apply to high-tech innovating firms are as follows. Agents 
need to have or learn some technological expertise to be effective managers of high-tech firms, but 
this expertise among agents is liable to create a particularly pronounced information asymmetry 
between them and principals. As a result, high levels of moral hazard are possible, because there are 
more ways in which an agent, potentially, could misspend without the knowledge – or understanding 
– of the relevant principals. Other special factors also create a high level of moral hazard, such as the 
complexity of innovative activity and the need for constant work within teams, the nature of which 
cannot always be communicated upwards. We will explore below tactics principals dealing with high-
tech firms employ to deal with this risk. There are also particular peculiarities that arise for incentives 
and assessment of agents.  
In technological innovation, manager success can be difficult to measure: the first area of this is simply 
measuring the technical achievement itself. Assessing technical outcomes not only requires skill on 
the part of principals, but establishing a level of what constitutes quality technical output can be 
arbitrary to some degree. Second, it may require knowledge of the market to compare one’s agent’s 
technical achievements relative to the market in which they compete. Third, short-term assessment 
of agents may both ignore their likelihood of more important long-term success, and the side-effects 
of measuring agents in the short-term may even harm their management over the long-term (a 
question we will analyse in the Chinese context). The implication of these challenges is that it is hard 
for principals to use incentives if it is hard to find appropriate assessments against which to measure 
agents. 
 
2.4.3 Information asymmetry and moral hazard 
As investment in R&D is a vital element of technology firm growth – and economic growth (Malecki, 
1997; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2004; Griliches, 2007) – it is vital to appreciate how firms’ 
governance affects their R&D investment, with considerable new research analysing this impact 
(Munari et al, 2010; Driver and Coelho Guedes, 2012). The high information asymmetry of innovative 
firm cases, and the resulting moral hazard, means that principals are less likely to know how R&D 
investment is carried out.  
In innovation cases, where an agent is charged by a principal with successfully carrying out innovation 
activities in a firm, strong informational asymmetry usually stands out because of the complexity of 
the activities required in any innovating unit, whereby a number of opaque technical processes imply 
a principal cannot know exactly how innovation investment is spent. Indeed, the situation may be 
worse. Principals cannot usually know that money has been spent on innovation at all, as even R&D 
staff may carry out tasks like fixing products or processes, which is not actually innovation. 
Shareholders may thus suspect management are wasting money that they say is being spent on R&D. 
The moral hazard lies in the principal being unable to know precisely what a manager will do with this 
investment. As we will see in the subsection below, this can result in wasteful expenditure. For an 
investor of any type, the two other problems caused by informational asymmetry, after moral hazard 
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(that one cannot know what managers are doing with money), is the adverse selection problem. 
Management has different responses to this, including the monitoring of agents.  
Nooteboom (2010, 1) finds that “trust is especially needed as well as especially problematic. One 
needs trust under uncertainty and in innovation uncertainty is high”. More precisely, trust implies a 
lack of information, since it involves risking vulnerability to others’ actions; in the presence of certainty 
about them there will not be risk. As such, uncertainty is particularly high in early exploration, where 
trust is thus “incalculable”. At this point, being unable to know what may happen, one often cannot 
know what actions one would carry out oneself. By implication where trust ends control is needed. 
However if, lacking trust, one imposes contracts on agents, this will limit improvisational scope and 
the changes of direction that innovation may need (also, when it comes to innovation, regarding 
contracts or hierarchical control, Nooteboom finds monitoring “relatively difficult”). By implication 
trust can reduce moral hazard, and it may be found where principals and agents already know each 
other better, such as in a smaller local community, where moral hazard may be controlled by 
reputational concerns. To a conventional single principal-agent model we can add the consideration 
of relationships between principals and agents changing over time, so that understanding how their 
politics change gives a more reliable understanding (Waterman and Meier, 1998).  
There is also the difficulty of assessing innovation outcomes however. For example, principals may 
sometimes be able to detect systematic shirking by agents eventually, by comparing average output 
with that predicted for the best effort level per period (Radner, 1980; Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983). 
However this approach assumes information on agents is constantly available, output is predictable, 
and sets out a straightforward contract in which agents are offered the best sharing rule in the final 
period if average performance from the first to the final period has been acceptable, or a penalty 
sharing rule if performance has been unacceptable (Lambert, 1983). However there are two other 
moral hazard problems related directly to innovation: managers’ tendency to underspend on high-risk 
investments, and their tendency to underspend on longer-term investments, notably intangible ones 
like R&D. (Agency theory tends to regard shareholders as being “risk-neutral”, in that they should be 
able to spread investments around various firms; managers however are seen as being “risk-averse”, 
given that they have only a single job. In innovation, this means averse to the risk of spending money 
on long-term projects from which they may not gain.) 
To deal with difficulty assessing outcomes, or the wisdom of investment in various types of innovation 
process, contract-design may require applying an “informativeness principle” (Holmström, 1979), 
stating that any performance measure that reveals information on agents’ chosen levels of effort 
should be mentioned in pay contracts. Yet making incentives as tough as possible is not always in 
employers’ interests. A problem in achieving innovative outputs, in western contexts at least, is that 
creating reward systems for managers will in the real world always imply rewards for various different 
targets, whereby innovation, if encouraged at all, must be balanced against other (often shorter-term) 
achievements and metrics. Financial performance-based remuneration for managers has been found 
to be negatively correlated with intensity of R&D (Hall, 1993). In these contexts, the mechanisms that 
are designed for financial markets’ short-term demands appear to be harmful to longer-term R&D 
investment. In other words, capital markets systematically undervalue investment in R&D, thus 
denying managers sufficient investment incentive, pushing them to make more “noticeable” 
investment choices that may have little or nothing to do with innovation; we shall return to a 
fundamentally similar question in the radically different managerial context of China.  
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2.4.4 Measurement responses and incentives 
The implication of the high-tech innovating firm context is that principals will want to give particular 
attention to either reducing the asymmetry of information, or creating incentives for management 
behaviours that – they intend – will compensate for the asymmetry. The first tactic means principals 
providing themselves with more information about the firm, with information on particular agent 
behaviours around R&D investment and activities that lead to successful innovation. The second, 
which may be complementary or done in the absence of this information, means that managers will 
be rewarded for the behaviours that managers believe lead to better innovation.  
High-tech innovating firms have particularly high demands in terms of the level of technical 
understanding within them, which can create a severe “gradient” of information if principals are 
relatively lacking in technical understanding (agents are either selected for, or expected to apply, 
specialised knowledge or management skills, so “the principal can never hope to completely check the 
agent’s performance” (Arrow, 1963a, 147)). If principals lack information and/or technical expertise, 
the alternative is that one needs to have the expertise required to pick the appropriate people with 
the expertise, i.e. those who can be effective agents. This is the method of one form of technology 
investor in particular, venture capitalists, as they structure management to possess the needed 
expertise. However, venture capital firms will also reduce information asymmetry by placing their own 
members in the management of their portfolio firms as a monitoring device, reducing the moral 
hazard that can occur through the wasteful spending of principals’ resources.  
If principals cannot reduce the information gap in this manner, they may make efforts to measure 
agents, such as creating measures of successful innovation (in China this can take the form of 
measuring patent output, but this risks creating various side effects as we will discuss). Some contexts 
have revealed the problems that poorly-conceived agent assessment creates, and why innovation is 
hard to assess. Prendergast (1999) found that the one-time practice at AT&T of compensating 
programmers per line of code created excessively long programmes, a “multitasking” problem 
whereby some tasks were neglected simply because others were rewarded (Holmström and Milgrom, 
1990). (We shall see that China may face a similar problem: once patenting per se is rewarded, firms 
may patent uselessly.)  
Drago and Garvey (1998) found that placing agents on individual performance-related pay structures 
led them to help colleagues less than previously, an effect that seems especially strong amidst “team 
production” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). With teams, output results from numerous actors, and 
performance-related pay raises the free-riding incentive, raising positive externalities of individual 
team members’ work while lowering returns to individuals (Fama (1980, 301) suggested that “in the 
team or nexus of contracts view of the firm, each manager is concerned with the performance of 
managers [both] above and below him since his marginal product is likely to be a positive function of 
theirs”). And although Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggested that peer pressure can help deal with the 
problem, this relies on oversight by peers having low costs. While some have found that performance-
related pay has positive effects when work involves repetition (for example the work of Groves et al, 
1995), for tasks requiring creativity, its effects appear to be negative. For instance, there appears to 
be little correlation between CEOs’ performance-related pay and their firms’ success (Drago and 
Garvey, 1997). 
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Various examples for principal-agent theory assume that principals have knowledge of an agent: 
Sappington’s (1991) example of principals making “take-it-or-leave-it” offers to agents is one, and the 
principal taking most of the resources is subject only to agents’ rationality constraints; Holmström’s 
(1979) “informativeness” solution requires contracts to cover “relative performance evaluation”, 
measured against similar employees (or agents). Not only does the knowledge assumption sometimes 
fail (Fehr et al, 1997), but principals often do not expect agents to behave rationally, and many agents 
do not (state Miller and Whitford, 2002). Some studies have experimented with principals offering 
outcome-contingent bonuses to deal with the irrationality of agents, designed to transfer enough risk 
to these agents to make it in their interests to give high effort, although in many cases principals offer 
bonuses too small to eliminate moral hazard (Miller and Whitford, 2002).  
Incentives are created through rewarding agents for meeting various forms of target. Because 
innovation projects’ value will be uncertain at first, with more information arriving as they develop 
(Bergemann and Hege, 1998), in the venture capital example, entrepreneurs control fund allocation, 
so investors cannot see “investment effort”. As entrepreneurs control the flow of information in the 
project, so an “optimal contract” should reward entrepreneurs only following successes, with the 
investor keeping a “hard” claim in case of failure. Introducing incentives is only sometimes possible 
however.  
Incentives will typically include managers owning a significant number of shares in a firm for a 
minimum time, whereby they are paid partly in shares that they are not allowed to sell for a specified 
time. Managers may also have stock options. These incentives are optimal if the share price when the 
managers are allowed to sell accurately reflects the firm’s value including the innovations in which 
they have invested. But it is improbable that the value of these innovations will yet have been fully 
realised, so this requires shareholders to monitor, and to understand, their remaining future value. If 
this does not happen (because of low “monitoring intensity”, or monitoring quality) then the 
managers will be incentivised to neglect innovation as this point approaches, squeezing out profits in 
a more short-termist manner. This means intensive incentives require intensive monitoring (or high 
quality monitoring). (The “incentive-intensity principle” of Milgrom and Roberts (1992), sees 
incentives’ optimal intensity resting on four elements: incremental profits made by additional effort, 
accuracy of assessment of desired activities, the risk tolerance of agents, and how they respond to 
incentives.) 
We shall return to how our particular principals try to guide agents towards various types of activity; 
in innovative activities however, even if information on within-firm agent behaviour is available, 
profits for additional effort are always uncertain. This can mean that if agents are to be guided more 
effectively than they would be able to direct themselves, considerable sectorial or technical expertise 
may well be required.  
Should shareholders desire improved R&D investment (by volume or efficacy), they will need 
corporate governance mechanisms which incentivise managers to maximise the investment’s value 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Some managers may otherwise opt for efficiency-seeking, shorter term 
behaviour, instead of – or even at the cost of – longer term firm success. Venture capitalists also use 
incentive measures, which include making sure their agents have “skin in the game” (or stand to 
benefit personally from later firm success), creating high incentive-intensity (a subject we will address 
in the Chinese context). When the external markets around corporates are highly developed, these 
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selected outside directors should also be disciplined by the market, which can price them according 
to their performance. Fama (1980, 288) suggests: “the market for outside takeovers [provides] 
discipline of last resort”, and agents are incentivised by the quality of future employment should they 
manage innovation well (however, as we will discuss, the Chinese context may not follow this pattern, 
with other state employment opportunities for many agents regardless or even because of poor 
investments in innovation).  
 
In summary, the strong informational asymmetry present in innovation contexts is compounded by 
agents knowing that their investment of funds into innovative activity has very uncertain payoffs, 
which creates plenty of leeway for the misuse of funds. To compensate, there is dependence among 
principals on strong technical monitoring capability, or if picking outside managers, using the pre-
existence of good labour market incentives to control agents’ managerial behaviour, by placing the 
innovative success of a firm in their interests. We have alluded to the differences in the Chinese 
context, and the manner in which the institutional structure, and its control system and incentives, 
may affect the principal-agent relations required for successfully innovating firms. So that we can 
examine this more explicitly, the next Section (3) will analyse China’s innovation system, before we 
apply the theory we have discussed to this innovation system specifically in Section 4.    
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3. Discussion of the Chinese innovation system 
 
Before we can create a picture of its interactions with the management of firms, we should outline 
the origins and development of China’s innovation system. Although a system of government, 
institutions, and laws is not innovation itself, it does largely determine how this innovation takes place, 
particularly where the state is as powerful as in China.  
To better understand how this occurs, we will detail the Chinese innovation system by describing the 
relevant apparatus of state; the impact of the state’s innovation plans (especially the “Medium- to 
Long-term Plan” since 2006); the state R&D funding system; the State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO) and IP law; the assessment of state cadres as enterprise managers; and government 
procurement and technical standard-setting. We will then summarise these institutions, before in the 
following section we bring together this analysis with the principal-agent relationships described in 
the theoretical literature review, and create a theoretical template for the hypotheses.  
 
3.1 Structures and systems of state control 
Although some of our firms will benefit from connections to institutes and universities, the innovators 
with which we are concerned are Chinese companies, some of which are owned by the state, some of 
which are private, while others have various hybrid forms. As such, we outline the patterns of state 
control in the economy, and its impact upon the environment in which innovation occurs. 
 
3.1.1 Proportions and trends of ownership 
In starting with the broad proportions of ownership (and trends therein), we note that the state, in 
both its central and local forms, still directly owns a large proportion of the economy. Although the 
period since Deng Xiaoping began economic reform around 1979 has been marked by encroachment 
by private and semi-private companies into an economy that was almost entirely state-owned, 
authors describe the decade to 2012 in particular as “the state advances, the private retreats”, or 
guojin mintui (McGregor, J., 2012a), and report that SOE dominance over private firms has become 
particularly entrenched in sectors the state regards as strategic.  
In 1997, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji launched the “Grasp the big, let go of the small” 
(zhuanda fangxiao) policy, by which the state let go of 117,000 SOEs, allowing them to sink or swim. 
This was the peak of the sacking of almost 50 million workers (40% of the SOE workforce) over ten 
years. The central-state owned urban SOE workforce fell from its 76 million peak to 28 million by 2003, 
intended by Beijing to allow the “party leadership dream” of turning the large SOEs into internationally 
competitive “national champions” (McGregor, J., 2012b), technologically able to compete with leading 
foreign firms (after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came to power in 2003, the number of centrally state-
owned SOEs fell from 196 to 153 by 2006).  
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However, while many foreign scholars saw this 1997 announcement of “ownership diversification of 
the state sector” as being “a green light to massive privatization”, in fact it cemented the dominance 
of state ownership in Chinese industry. Specifically, decisions of the 4th Plenum of the 15th Party 
Congress (1997), then the State Development Planning Commission in January 2000 (merged with the 
State Planning Commission in 2003 to create the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), sitting below the Politburo) confirmed that while state ownership would be cut in some 
sectors, it would stay dominant in “industries of strategic importance” (Atkinson, 2012). Few practical 
measures for divestiture have since been formulated: the 16th Congress of 2002 called for a new 
system of managing state assets, “unifying the duty of managing assets, personnel and affairs”, but 
since 2003 the system has reaffirmed the state’s controlling role. 
State shares in firms are held by central and local governments, which “are represented by local 
financial bureaus, state asset management companies, or investment companies” (Qu, 2003). In the 
case of subsidiaries, state shares can also be held by the “parent of the listed company, typically an 
SOE. They are not tradable”. Another form of share, “legal person shares”, may be owned by 
“domestic institutions” including industrial enterprises, securities firms, investment trusts or 
companies, foundations, funds, construction firms, real estate companies, transport and power 
companies: these may be SOEs, state-owned non-profits, collectively or privately owned firms, or joint 
stock companies. However, the important point is that although many SOEs have become PLCs, 
“ultimate state ownership is retained, so they also retain the same flaws of old SOEs” [my italics] (Qu, 
2003, 775). This means that even when state-owned enterprises are listed, “controlling authorities”, 
in other words “central government, ministries and local government” have de facto ownership rights 
“over PLCs [and] in reality do not bear any residual risks over control and use” of SOE assets (hence in 
our study of the effects of shareholding on innovation, we will trace the ultimate share owners, 
classifying shares accordingly).  
Within one month of Hu and Wen taking office in 2003, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) was created, bringing central SOEs apparently under direct 
control by a body reporting to the Politburo. SASAC was then ordered to “enhance the state-owned 
economy’s controlling power”, concentrating state capital in major industries and fields relating to 
both national security and “national economic lifelines”, speeding the formation of a group of 
enterprises “with independent [IP] and strong international competitiveness” (McGregor, J., 2012b, 
25).  
As well as classification by percentage of state ownership, state-owned firms can be classified as being 
at different governmental levels. SASAC’s website (August 2012) states that there are now 117 central 
SOEs, down 14% from 136 in 2009 (SASAC, 2009b); meanwhile, by end 2008, the total number of SOEs 
in China was 110,000 (SASAC, 2009), indicating that the huge majority of SOEs are owned by some 
level of sub-central government (Mattlin (2010) however shows that central SOEs account for around 
70% of all SOE profits, or 20% of government revenue).  
 
3.1.2  The state’s management of its firms 
Aware of the faltering performance of many of its SOEs, and amid growing global competition in 
innovative products, Beijing is placing growing emphasis on the subject of corporate governance (Li, 
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2003). The diagram below outlines the broad state management of SOEs. Although SASAC is in theory 
“the world’s largest shareholder”, according to analysts it functions as “little more than the SOE 
secretariat”. This is because the Communist Party manages all “significant policy decisions” through 
the Central Organisation Department (McGregor, J., 2012b), taking charge of appointing hundreds of 
SOE bosses, regularly switching them “back and forth between government and party posts” 
(McGregor, J., 2012b)3: we will see how this may deny them a long-term interest in investing in 
innovation at the SOE to which they are currently posted.  
 
Figure 1: Structure of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions (SASACs), 
Government, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (sources: SASAC, 2005; State Council, 2003) 
 
SASAC states it is “neither a governmental administrative organ to provide public administration of 
enterprises… nor an ordinary enterprise or institution, [but] is a special organ of ministerial level 
directly under the State Council” (SASAC, 2005, 6). Yet despite its high level, official documents 
demonstrate the limits of SASAC. The Measures for the Supervision and Administration of State-Owned 
Assets of Enterprises (SASAC, 2003) states that central SASAC has a “guiding and supervising” 
                                                          
3 An equivalent US entity “would oversee the appointment of the entire US Cabinet, state governors and their 
deputies, the mayors of the major cities, the heads of all federal regulatory agencies, the chief executives of GE, 
ExxonMobil, Wal-Mart, and about fifty of the remaining largest US companies, the justices of the Supreme Court, 
the editors of the New York Times and the Washington Post, the bosses of the TV networks and cable stations, 
the presidents of Yale, Harvard, and other big universities, and the heads of think tanks like the Brookings 
Institution and the Heritage Foundation” (McGregor, R., 2011, 54). 
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relationship for local SASACs. Central SASAC only exercises direct ownership over the 117 central SOEs, 
delineating central SASAC’s limits. The Measures also make clear that SOEs that are not on the central 
SASAC list are outside central SASAC control, primarily answerable for their investments and 
management to local governments (the Measures also clarify that provincial and city governments can 
act as investors).  
Meanwhile, of the 53 most important of the 117 central SOEs under SASAC, the Central Organisation 
Department directly appoints their three highest executives, usually the Party Secretary, Chairman, 
and CEO. While their deputies are officially appointed by SASAC, its personnel division is not permitted 
to carry this out, and they are chosen instead by a branch of the Organisation Department within 
SASAC (also known as the “Party Building Bureau”). Equivalent positions in smaller central SOEs are 
decided by SASAC’s “Second Bureau”, first consulting “supervising ministries” and “Party organs” 
(McGregor, J., 2012a), and must be approved by the State Council (however, at sub-central level, local 
Organisation Departments are answerable to local government to varying degrees).  
Various scholars have therefore asked how much SASAC actually controls central SOEs. One SASAC 
Vice-Director stated that personnel appointments (and sackings), and payment systems of various 
central SOEs, are controlled by the State Council and the Organisation Department (Chen, 2013). 
SASAC’s SOE management therefore appears not to be administrative, but involves performing as 
investor (while higher powers control appointments of managers). As we will describe, this means the 
oversight of central SOEs is split between various “principals”, diluting oversight in a long control 
chain. Although Wang et al (2012) suggest effective investors should have financial return rights, 
decision rights, and rights to choose managers, the Interim Measures demonstrate that SASAC lacks 
the right to appoint, and ultimately control, managers. Although it is clearly stated that “SASAC 
appoints and removes the top executives of the supervised enterprises, and evaluates their 
performances through legal procedures [and] grants rewards or inflicts punishments based on their 
performances” (State Council, 2003, 4), Wang et al (2012) state that the reality also differs at sub-
central levels. For instance, some local governments’ Organisation Departments do not wish to 
transfer to SASAC the power to appoint, remove, or assess top SOE executives (the ramifications of 
which we shall explore). SASAC lacks other powers that should be enjoyed by investors, including 
unclear investment return rights for SASAC, and unclear rules on supervising income distribution in 
firms, plus unclear shareholder rights (Wang et al, 2012). This introduces the dispersal of both control 
and responsibility through the state ownership system, and we shall go on to ask the relevance of the 
dispersed control of these state firms to the execution and outcomes of R&D. 
While SASAC also manages “supervisory panels” for firms on the State Council’s behalf (SASAC, 2009), 
these are mainly charged with supervising SOEs’ finance, internal supervision, and risk control, but the 
official investor is given little scope to encourage R&D in firms’ day-to-day management (we will 
describe below how the organs in charge of appointments assess managers’ activities). An anonymous 
official in a provincial SASAC stated that SASAC’s investment rules are nominal, and it acts mainly as 
supervisor, overseeing the operation of state assets, while the upper echelons of state keep political 
control over its firms, especially in centrally-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, the more profit SOEs 
generate, the easier it is to channel money into “private coffers”, to be spent at the whim of senior 
employees (Gong, 2013).  
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With limited, unclear shareholder rights, SASAC lacks leverage over SOE managers; the Organisation 
Department appointment procedures, especially in central SOEs, imply that even if a manager 
succeeds in making an SOE innovative, considerations such as “loyalty assessments”, as we will 
discuss, can take precedence, disincentivising such efforts.  
 
3.1.3 Cadre assessment 
The methods by which agents are monitored and assessed should thus first be understood, in order 
to understand innovative behavior in this system, and likely outcomes for our sector. Firstly, China’s 
lawmakers appear to have an “ambivalent” position towards the depoliticisation of firm management: 
Article 14 of China’s Company Law still calls for the supervision of enterprises by “government and 
masses”, while the presence of firms’ “three old political committees” (party and labour committees 
and trade union) continues, meaning the old political organs have not been abolished (Nee and Opper, 
2007), and although the “old three” have lost a large amount of their control rights, they maintain 
some political influence. By implication, their persistence helps the continued political monitoring in 
the government’s assessment of cadres in firms.  
Mechanisms of governance among SOEs may have various handicaps specific to technological 
capability. Most have an arms-length relationship with their supervising officials, but managers 
maintain guanxi with bureaucrats, often for easier access to finance or intelligence on new policy. Few 
expect officials to go out of their way to monitor firms or oversee their R&D, and most lack the 
expertise to do this anyway (Da, 2010), while their supervision responsibilities, as we have seen, are 
split between SASAC and other organs. As state managers’ most important relationships are with more 
senior officials, the attention they can give their firm’s innovation (or a competitor’s) is limited (Da, 
2010). Although Beijing’s drive to enhance technological competitiveness has pressured officials to 
develop the technological capabilities of firms they oversee (indeed SOE managers are sometimes 
tasked with tech-transfer ahead of profit-making (Haley and Haley, 2013)), lacking engagement or 
expertise they are often satisfied with technology and rankings that give high and rapid visibility; 
patenting may have become used to these ends. 
Meanwhile, political connections between firms and government appear especially strong when a 
firm’s chief executive is a current or former bureaucrat in either central or local governments (which 
can also help secure R&D funding). In a survey of 19 listed firms in highways and transportation, 17 
had chief executives who were former directors of the transport bureau in their local government 
(First Financial Daily, 2011, in Li and Qian, 2013). These CEOs with ongoing political employment are 
also incentivised to improve their political record generally for promotion (zhengji) (Li and Qian, 2013). 
The regulations forming the updated CRS were passed in 1993: principal criteria for cadre evaluation 
are formulated in general terms, applying across departments, levels and regions. These are political 
integrity (de), competence (neng), diligence (qin) and achievements (ji), with emphasis on “actual 
work achievements”. One handbook states that “work achievements should account for 60 to 70%, 
and political integrity, competence and diligence should together account for 30 to 40% of the 
evaluation” (Edin, 2003, 37). Yet the work achievements on which managers are assessed are also 
blended with rewards such as those for “operational growth” (in the short-term) and “contribution to 
society” diluting incentives for managers to prioritise innovation. Cadres are graded as excellent 
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(youxiu), competent (chenzhi) or incompetent (bu chenzhi). Edin adds that capacity to control does 
not necessarily “translate into implementation of all their policies”.  
Managers’ achievements in firms are graded on achievements that may not only distract from, but 
conflict with innovation. Higher levels of the party-state try to improve monitoring and strengthen 
political control by promoting successful cadres (such as township leaders) to hold concurrent 
positions at higher levels, “rotating them between different administrative levels and geographical 
areas” (Edin, 2003, 35). However, the definition of “success” of the units under them that leads to 
manager-cadres being promoted is complex, with development and innovation forming only 15% of 
the “Managerial Performance” component of assessment, itself only 30% of the whole. Although local 
SASACs can make adjustments, this is outlined for central SOEs below.  
Financial Performance (70%) 
Managerial 
Performance (30%) 
Content and 
Weight (%) 
Basic indices 
Weight 
(%) 
Reference 
indices 
Weight 
(%) 
Assessment 
Item 
Weight 
(%) 
Profitabilit
y 
34 
Net asset 
earnings ratio 
20 
Sales profit rate 10 Strategic 
management 
18 
the surplus cash 
cover ratio 
9 
Development 
and 
innovation 
15 
Return on asset 14 
Profit/cost of 
capital (EVA) 
8 
Rate of 
earnings on 
equity 
7 
Asset 
quality 
22 
Total asset 
turnover 
10 
NPL ratio 9 
Operational 
decisions 
16 Current asset 
turnover 
7 
Acct. receivable 
turnover 
12 Cash/asset 
ratio 
6 
Risk 
management 
13 
Debt risk 22 
Asset/liability 
ratio 
12 
Quick ratio 6 Basic 
management 
14 
Cash ratio 6 
Human 
resource 
management 
8 Paid 
interest/debt 
10 
Ratio of 
liabilities to 
interest 
5 
Contingent 
liability ratio 
5 
Operationa
l growth 
22 
Sales growth 
rate 
12 
Sales profit 
growth 
10 Influence in 
the industry 
8 
Growth rate of 
total asset 
7 Ratio of value 
maintenance 
and 
appreciation of 
capital 
10 
Contribution 
to society 
8 
Technological 
input ratio 
5 
 
Table 1: Performance assessment criteria in SASAC central SOEs (source: SASAC, 2010) 
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Furthermore, according to measures for assessing “persons in charge of central enterprises” (CEOs 
and COOs) (Li, S. 2007) if in three years a firm does not reach SASAC’s target (for these cadres 70% of 
the target consists of financial indicators and under 5% is based on innovation performance), the CEO 
or COO is at risk of actually losing his or her job.  
Also, according to Li (2007), stock options are extremely unlikely in the cases of central SOEs and fully 
state-owned firms of all government levels; a core difference for MISOEs however is that these options 
are very possible for their senior managers. Meanwhile, many senior managers running MISOEs run 
them for a considerable time. ZTE Corporation for example was founded in 1985, listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1997, then Hong Kong in 2004.  
Having begun as a wholly state-owned enterprise, with the state share dropping below 50% in 2003, 
ZTE has long seen a major stake in managers’ hands. Four managers led by founding CEO Hou Weigui 
established a company named Zhongxing-Weixian Telecommunication Equipment Co Ltd (ZXWXT) in 
1992, and this took over ZTE’s management through a contract stating “that ZXWXT take charge of 
the business with their assets as mortgage. If they achieve all the goals, they could earn more; 
otherwise, they would pay for the losses” (internal memorandum, in Li S., 2007).  
As “state capacity” (in this case the ability to monitor and control agents at lower political levels) has 
increased, any failure in innovation outcomes is due more to the centre’s conflicting priorities than 
“inadequate control over local leaders” (Edin, 2003, 36). The contemporary cadre responsibility 
system (CRS) is not simply a means to improve government efficiency, but a monitoring and incentive 
method of higher-level political control over agents. By implication, when placed under these political 
pressures managers may follow aims which conflict with innovation outcomes.  
The state may thus be hindering its own innovation aims, by directing innovation resources to SOEs 
and by providing their managers with contradictory management goals in promoting innovation4. 
Meanwhile private firms have a stronger budgetary need for competitive products as they lack soft-
budgets, but appear, as we will discuss, to receive less legal protection by the state regarding their IP. 
 
3.1.4 State listing and management of firms 
Since the beginning of reform, Beijing has listed a large number of SOEs, which post-IPO have generally 
remained in state hands via state-owned funds5. We will address the differences between listed and 
non-listed firms in terms of their innovation outcomes in more depth in the later quantitative analysis; 
at this stage we should discuss how the mechanisms of state ownership continue to permeate 
management – and the selection of cadre-managers – in these listed state firms, as the achievement 
of innovation is one area in which the nature of state ownership may prevent listing functioning as 
expected. As the state relies on these firms to maintain employment and industrial output, their 
                                                          
4 In considerable part due to this state dominance, unlike elsewhere in Asia, the shareholdings of listed firms in 
China are characterised by the relative absence of families as major shareholders or managers (Li and Qian, 
2013). 
5 Even as 2005 reforms saw state shares become traded on the secondary market, this did not fundamentally 
change state funds’ positions as the firms’ largest shareholders. 
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corporate governance model remains essentially the same as the model of control used for the 
unlisted SOEs (Li, 2003). 
One hindrance is therefore not simply in the cadre assessment discussed above, but in cadre selection 
itself. Top managers’ appointments in these firms are still decided by the different levels of SASACs 
and party committees. The majority of candidates for the top management roles have also worked 
previously in connected agencies of the government (Li, 2004), with many having been officials in 
government departments that have been closed; this means not only a lack of relevant experience, 
but that they are likely to have other roles available to them regardless of their firms’ performance, 
which many need simply to not fall severely (Li, 2003), at least on their watch. 
Taking the board of directors as the highest management level in a given firm, Chinese Company Law 
of 2006 states that boards take the executive role. Meanwhile the state (Li, 2003) has maintained its 
control of boards of directors via the appointment procedures described. In general, in listed majority 
state firms at any level, the chairman, vice chairman, and CEO are appointed by the firm’s Party 
committee. After this, SASACs mandate that the state funds that represent their ownership (often the 
largest shareholders) will organise firms’ shareholder meetings, and draft the shortlist of candidates 
for these board positions (Li, 2003). (On these boards, it is also commonly required that a firm’s 
chairman must be Party vice-secretary, and the vice chairman be Party secretary, or vice-versa.) 
Meanwhile, the appointment of independent directors in those listed firms with major state 
ownership also appears to be under state influence. The Guidelines on the Establishment of the 
Institution of Independent Directors in Listed Companies (China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), 2001) state that independent directors must be elected through listed firms’ shareholder 
meetings, meaning any level of state which is the largest shareholder (even if indirectly through a 
state-owned fund) effectively decides on independent directors’ appointment. 
Aside from the board itself, supervisory committees’ main function is to monitor the top managers’ 
behaviour in line with shareholders’ interests.6 Supervisory committee members are usually hired, 
first, from the state-owned funds that are state-owned listed firms’ biggest shareholders, and 
recruited through meetings of shareholders. Their backgrounds tend to be similar to the board 
members, as described, and they will have good relationships with government (we will discuss in our 
hypotheses why it may be preferable for them to have working relationships with local rather than 
central government). They also frequently recruit secretaries of the Party committees and “worker 
representatives” in these firms (Liaoning Securities Bureau, 2012). Thus the committees further the 
government monitoring of these listed firms’ managers methods at all levels (Li, 2003), furthering a 
model of corporate control over managers, one of whose central goals is the implementation of 
government policies, the results of which we shall seek to establish.  
 
3.1.5 Government procurement and standard setting  
The Chinese government has created demand-side innovation policies to help give indigenous 
innovators a favourable environment, including procurement preference for domestic innovative 
products, and technical standard-setting. We will outline the intentions and possible effects of these 
                                                          
6 Stated in Chinese Company Law, Article 54, 2006. 
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policies; in the round, the national IPR strategy that they complete aims to “increase patents”, using 
“IPR tactics”.  
In 1992, Beijing published the Government Procurement Law, mandating (with exceptions) that 
government procurement purchases should be limited to domestic products 7 , with support for 
enterprises used to support those which purchase domestic high technologies (Dewey and LeBoeuff, 
2012). In public procurement, the World Trade Organisation’s Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA) does not apply to all government procurement, and GPA coverage to each member state is 
based on negotiation (WTO members are not yet required to join the GPA, and China is currently 
negotiating GPA accession, meaning it can include preferences for domestic goods and companies in 
state procurement practices (US-China Business Council, 2009)).  
The Government Procurement Law was updated in 2003, while the Bidding Law (2000) states that 
various construction projects should allow bidding to take place (including for surveying, design, 
construction, supervision, and procurement of the important equipment and materials). The projects 
involved are large-scale infrastructure and utilities concerning social and public interests and public 
safety; those entirely or partly employing state funds; and those using funding or loans from foreign 
governments or international organisations (thus the Bidding Law affects construction in general and 
potentially solar PV projects in particular). This extends domestic demand-side preference as an aid 
to procurement; crucially, it may also mean that within state procurement, projects will see 
“preference given [to] large companies” (Da, 2010, 41).  
Procurement policy was reinforced from January 2005, as the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) issued the Opinion on Accelerating the Large Company Strategy in the Electronics 
and Information Industry, stating that support should be provided “to the leading large companies”. 
Although it is common for governments to set minimum requirements in procurement, China is 
unusual in stating “large companies” will be given priority (Prud’homme, 2012), which leaves the door 
open for SOE preference. In 2009 the Circular on Carrying out the Work on Accreditation of National 
Indigenous Innovation Products, (a.k.a. Circular 618, by MOST, the NDRC, and the MOF) created a 
national-level “catalogue” of preferred procurement products in the six high-tech areas of computing 
and application equipment, communications, modern office equipment, software, new energy, and 
high-efficiency and energy-saving products (broadly matching the MLP’s own list). An upgraded 
catalogue (from MOST, MOF, MIIT and SASAC) following the Circular listed 240 forms of industrial 
equipment in 18 areas that Chinese firms are encouraged to manufacture, to upgrade China’s 
manufacturing base (Atkinson, 2012), including solar PV. Participating firms were offered subsidies 
and tax incentives, alongside priority in procurement. The result of this policy framework appears to 
have been that a larger market was created for the firms which were already well placed to benefit 
the most from their connection to the state as manifested in antecedent R&D funding.  
The MIIT Planning Release Restructuring and Revitalisation of Planning for the Equipment 
Manufacturing Industry (2009) encouraged using domestic manufacturing equipment, and the 
structuring of insurance to favour their products. This was followed in November 2009 by the 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Policy, whereby state-procured products had to contain 
                                                          
7 Government procurement refers to all purchasing through fiscal funds by organs of state (guojia ji guan) at all 
levels and institutions (shi ye danwei), plus social organisations (tuan ti zuzhi). Goods, construction, and services 
are listed in the central procurement catalogue. 
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Chinese IP. Beijing’s municipal procurement catalogue contained 42 products and just one from a 
foreign-invested manufacturer; Shanghai’s had 258, with two from foreign-invested firms; Nanjing’s 
list had none (Atkinson, 2012).  
These initiatives have been pursued in different ways by different levels of state. Beijing municipality 
appears to have taken a particular lead in procurement, with its high-tech Zhongguancun district 
becoming the proving-ground for indigenous innovation procurement (even before the Suggestion on 
the Pilot Testing of Government Procurement of Indigenous Innovation Products at Zhongguancun 
Science and Technology Park by Beijing Municipal Government (2008) was published) (Xie, 2011). 
Beijing’s municipal government spent RMB3.3bn to that point on procurement featuring indigenous 
innovation by Zhongguancun firms (Xie, 2011). Procurement has built a platform to take Chinese firms 
from early innovation to market entry, and demonstrates a more direct approach among local 
government, and province-level cities in particular (the four major municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Chongqing) in supporting their high tech firms. This is relevant because this combination 
of creating a demand-side environment, as well as funding innovation, but apparently with the closer 
monitoring of their managers’ firms’ product development than among centrally-owned firms, may 
have made these local firms more inventive than central firms (to which we shall return in the 
hypotheses).   
Indigenous innovation was officially disconnected from government procurement in 2011, but the 
“essence of the indigenous IP system, in setting out controversial IPR requirements linked with 
financial incentives” (Prud’homme, 2012, 8) appears still to be active. These requirements are covered 
by remaining policies for “indigenous IPRs”8 (IP owned by a domestic organisation, defined as one 
without majority foreign ownership), and still include having indigenous IP as a prerequisite for 
receiving subsidies from multi-billion dollar foreign trade funds, plus renewed 2011 sub-central rules 
subsidising firms meeting indigenous IP requirements through sci-tech funds. 
Meanwhile, procurement rules appeared to have been scrapped after foreign pressure, but 
documentation and interview data suggests the picture is complex, not only for foreign but also 
domestic private firms. “The indigenous IP issue fizzled out rather a lot in 2011, but people didn’t 
realise that although de-linking was taking place, the concept had already been around the state 
system for some time. So it had become rather entrenched in many people’s minds” (anonymous 
interviewee, October, 2012). Although a State Council directive in November 2011 ordered all 
provinces to scrap their procurement catalogues, other commentators suggest their intent “likely 
remains latent” (Atkinson, 2012). Since the 2011 directive, reports have appeared that some coastal 
provinces are still giving procurement preference to local manufactures, while demanding other firms 
source raw materials and/or equipment locally 9 . Instead of putting these “encouragements” in 
writing, reports state they are made through personal state contacts (Global Trade Alert, 2012; 
anonymous interview data, 2012).  
Indeed, the value of central state procurement does not appear to have been high in real terms: RMB 
20.5bn in 2012 (Government Procurement Information, 2012), which is low compared to both 
                                                          
8 Zizhǔ zhīshi chǎnquan (自主知识产权)  
9 Unlike the USSR, in which the centre sent economic plans directly to enterprises, China’s system even pre-
reform allowed localities some decentralised administrative power. 
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provincial and much city procurement (in 2012 Nanjing procured RMB 30.922bn, similar to Wuxi, 
Suzhou, and Wenzhou). However, the rescission did not apply to purchases made by SOEs, or to the 
“major projects” covered by the MLP (Atkinson, 2012), preserving benefits for the solar firms dubbed 
“indigenous innovators” (Atkinson, 2012). 
Technical standard setting is another recent development. Regulators often employ SOEs, with 
considerable resources at their disposal, to draft national technical standards (interview data, 2012), 
creating clear conflicts of interest; however this is not yet believed to have happened in solar PV, 
where the industry remains considerably export-focused. In the round, although scope for large, 
central SOE preference appeared through the “large companies” measures above, this remained 
limited because of local state dominance in procurement. Despite official measures for discriminatory 
domestic procurement no longer being in place, having some connection to the state, especially at 
local levels, still appears to help firms secure domestic supply contracts (especially given exceptions 
to the rescission of procurement rules, implying firms will still benefit from having particular state 
connections). 
 
 
3.2 Impact of Reform and the Medium- to Long-Term Plan 
The reform of China’s NIS began shortly after the dawn of economic reforms in agriculture during the 
late 1970s (Xue, 1997), although the early reforms were on a trial-and-error, local basis. Centre-led, 
systematic reform began with the Central Committee document, Structural Reform of the Science and 
Technology System, in 1985 (CCCPC, 1985). This document and its principles formed the core of 
reforms to the national innovation system in the decade that followed, to around 1997; the reforms 
centred on the proposal that “economic development must rely on science and technology, while S&T 
research must render services to economic construction” (CCCPC, 1985, in Xue, 1997, 73). 
Before these reforms, public research institutions (PRIs) conducted most basic and applied research: 
among them, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and its local branches carried out most basic and 
some applied research, with the PRIs under various ministries in charge of applied research and 
development, in their own areas (Xue, 1997). The main role of universities was to train scientists, 
although they also carried out some research. SOEs’ own R&D departments carried out “downstream” 
work. The majority of reforms in this period were to the PRIs, which were encouraged by government 
to broaden their funding sources, in preparation for a reduction in their funding by the government 
(at least directly). PRIs were also increasingly expected to compete with each other for grants.  
The concept that arose in the 1980s around this development effort was the “three-tier” science and 
technology development strategy (Xue, 1997). The first tier, or “main battlefield” saw the investment 
of around two thirds of China’s sci-tech resources through the decade, and involved the establishment 
of a number of nationwide programmes from the late 1980s, in particular the Key Technology R&D 
Programme; the Spark Programme; and the National S&T Achievement Spreading Programme. 
The second tier aimed to develop high tech capacity in China in conscious competition with product 
developments being monitored on the global market. This involved two other programmes, the High-
Tech Research and Development Programme (or “863 Programme”), and Torch Programme. The third 
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tier involves the most advanced research areas, which began in the 1992 creation of the National Basic 
Research Priorities Programme (a.k.a. the “Climbing Programme”).  
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) found that in-house R&D improves firms’ absorptive capacity via learning; 
however in catching-up economies, in-house R&D needs to be accompanied by spending on 
technology assimilation for this absorptive capacity to be really effective. This has been shown by the 
experience of Korea and Japan. While in-house R&D expenditures among medium- to large-sized 
Chinese firms rose considerably through the 1990s, spending on technology assimilation fell behind, 
with its ratio to in-house R&D decreasing after 1995. Crucially, this was not the case for Korea and 
Japan in the early stages of their technological catch-up (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
Compounding this, the percentage of medium and large firms carrying out “sci-tech activities” also 
fell, from 56.9% to 30.7%, from 1995 to 2003, their “R&D intensities” (R&D/sales ratio) stayed below 
0.8% until 2005, retarding the development of “endogenous technology capabilities” (Lan and Zheng, 
2010). The implication is that China’s much-vaunted trajectory of economic growth through the 1990s 
belied a worrying lack of comparable technological catch-up. The continuing lack of indigenous 
technological development formed part of the rationale for the tranche of policies that followed. 
A historic distinction had existed between “generators of science” (broadly institutions) and 
“generators of technology” (generally firms), two groups that created distinct types of output, with 
universities producing scientific papers, firms producing technology in the form of new products and 
processes, frequently protected through patents (Fai, 2005). Yet research (e.g. Pavitt, 1991) 
demonstrated not only how “science” often drove “technology”, but that new technologies could spur 
novel scientific research areas, with feedback loops occurring. In May 1995, the Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee (CCPCC) and the State Council thus issued the Decision on Accelerating 
Scientific and Technological Progress, to “revitalise the nation through science, technology and 
education” (kejiao xingguo). The government ensured an increase in investment on basic and high-
technology research, while such activities as applied R&D were pushed into the market more 
aggressively (Lan and Zheng, 2010, 89). To use scientific and technological education as a tool for 
economic development, this took the form of a three-pronged approach: first, to drive growth in 
scientific and technological capabilities “primarily on (their) own indigenous efforts”, second, train a 
qualified “scientific and technological contingent” to achieve scientific and technological capacity in 
some disciplines at, or near, advanced global levels; and third, foster cooperation and exchange 
through international cooperative research, joint laboratories, and sending Chinese to work overseas 
in academe and high-tech enterprise (Fai, 2005, 58). This initiative would drive the R&D funding 
programmes that followed10.  
In 1997, CAS published a research report entitled Welcoming the Era of a Knowledge-Based Economy 
with the Construction of a National Innovation System (Sun and Liu, 2010). This was followed in 1999, 
                                                          
10 In contrast to the previous decade, the driving idea of this initiative was to allow the “transformation and 
commercialisation of sci-tech achievements”. The Science and Technology Findings Conversion Law passed in 
1998 was in some ways similar to the American Bayh-Dole Act; researchers could use sci-tech findings as an 
investment of up to 35% of start-up capital, and if their findings were transferred to other organisations, at least 
20% of net income from the technology transfer had to go to these “performers”; academics were also allowed 
to have part-time jobs in companies (Lan and Zheng, 2010). 
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as President Jiang Zemin officially stated that China’s goal was the establishment of its own scientific 
and technological innovation system (Sun and Liu, 2010), a point some authors consider to herald the 
beginning of a true NIS in China. Promotion of science and technology has thus grown as a central 
state cause, especially since 2003, and we will discuss the resulting adjustment of the state apparatus, 
and the interplay of state/private dynamics; of particular importance are the Medium- to Long-Term 
Plan (MLP), plus the “Indigenous Innovation” goals, and Beijing’s Strategic Emerging Industries (SEIs) 
initiative.   
Hu and Wen’s 2003 Guiding Opinion on Promoting the Adjustment of State-Owned Capital and the 
Reconstruction of State-Owned Enterprises described an aim of the revamped SASAC as being to help 
form “predominant enterprises with independent [IP]”, beginning the controversial “indigenous 
innovation” (zizhu chuangxin) campaign. On coming to office, Hu and Wen agreed that the state of 
Chinese technological innovation was “bleak”, putting “scientific development” at the top of 
government’s agenda. Wen also stated that China had “missed four opportunities for technological 
modernisation [since] the Age of Enlightenment” (McGregor, J., 2012a, 36), and used his position 
heading the Party Leading Group on Science, Technology, and Education to coordinate a Soviet-style 
“big push” campaign” (Atkinson, 2012).  
Other authors date the strategic decision to “establish an innovative society” to between 2003 and 
the beginning of 2006, when the State Council and Central Committee heard Hu Jintao’s Speech in the 
National Scientific and Technological Meeting11 (Hu, 2006). The “big push” nationally was launched in 
a document entitled The National Medium and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology, 2006-2020 (MLP) (with the subheading, “the grand blueprint of science and technology 
development [for] the great renaissance of the Chinese nation”). The MLP stated: “despite the size of 
our economy, our country is not an economic power, primarily because of our weak innovative 
capacity”. The MLP outlined general goals, specific targets and methods to upgrade Chinese 
innovation. It also stated that the NIS of China included four “subsystems”: the technological 
innovation system, the knowledge innovation system, the national defence innovation system, and 
the regional innovation system (Sun and Liu, 2010, 1313). 
The plan’s explicit goal was to transform China into a technological powerhouse by 2020 and a “global 
leader” by 2050, through “innovation with Chinese characteristics”. The document stated that a 
central method of generating IP would be “enhancing original innovation through co-innovation and 
re-innovation based on assimilation of imported technologies”, and stated explicitly that a central 
“tool for China to create its own intellectual property and proprietary product lines will be through 
tweaking foreign technology”, and that Beijing seeks to “enhance the absorption, assimilation, and re-
innovation of imported technologies” (McGregor, J., 2012b, 4). A blueprint for this contemporary 
Chinese stance can be found in the protectionist policies of the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), in particular from a 1992 official Party translation of MITI and the Japanese 
                                                          
11 An apparently unconnected policy that followed this slogan was the amendment of the Partnership Law to 
introduce Limited Partnerships. However, as the law states (in Article 61 of the Revised Partnership Enterprise 
Law) that “a limited partnership enterprise shall be established by not less than two but not more than fifty 
partners, unless it is otherwise provided by law. A limited partnership enterprise shall have at least one general 
partner”, this appears to have hindered fundraising capacities other than from the state (McGregor, J., 2012a, 
32). 
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Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (by Johnson, 1982). China’s Outline for Industrial 
Policy of 1994 was crafted from this document, mimicking directly Japan’s choice in the 1960s of 
electronics, machinery, construction, petrochemicals, and automobiles as pillar industries.  
In this vein, Mahmood and Rufin (2005, 339) argued that in states that remain a long way from the 
technological cutting edge, centralised political and economic control by government can drive 
economic development: government, they suggest, “can promote industrialisation by actively 
directing the flow of resources to firms and encouraging firms to invest such resources in technology 
upgrading”. However as a country gets closer to the frontier of technology, the government should 
allow “political and economic freedom”. Yet in China, “strategic” industries, as the focus of indigenous 
innovation assistance, were still intended to remain “state dominated” through sole state ownership 
or direct state control. This broad area includes armaments, power generation and distribution, oil 
and petrochemicals, telecoms, coal, aerospace, and air freight. The slightly more peripheral “pillar” 
sectors would remain largely in state hands, implying majority ownership, and including equipment 
manufacturing, automobiles, electronic communications, architecture, steel, nonferrous metals, 
chemicals, surveying and design, and “science and technology”.  
In 2009, Wen began a series of meetings involving the NDRC, Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 
aimed at combining the government’s various “megaprojects”, “strategic industries”, “pillar 
industries”, and “emerging industries”, to focus on economically vital and technologically novel areas 
that still lacked obvious global leaders, allowing China to take the lead. As MOST officially controls not 
only science and technology policy but also R&D budgets (Zhong and Yang, 2007), working with MOST 
and the Ministry of Finance appears a natural decision. The State Council’s solution was the “Strategic 
Emerging Industries” (SEI) focus.  
Meanwhile the State Council’s overarching control of the major organs of the Chinese state is 
delineated as follows:  
 
Figure 2: State Council control and Chinese institutions (source: Zhong and Yang, 2007) 
 
This rationale is explained by Perez and Soete’s (1988, 459) Catching up in technology: entry barriers 
and windows of opportunity: “improvements are achieved slowly at first, then accelerate and finally 
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slow down again, according to Wolfe’s law of diminishing returns to investment in incremental 
innovations”. The phenomenon is illustrated thus:  
 
Figure 3: The technology improvement curve (source: Perez and Soete, 1988) 
 
This group of industries would be funded to develop advanced “next-generation technologies and 
products”, with estimates of up to $2.2 trillion of investment for seven industrial areas of clean energy, 
alternative energy, next generation IT, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new 
materials, and clean energy vehicles (sub-divided into thirty-seven sub-industries). These seven are 
ranked in order of importance, with clean energy featuring highly because of environmental risks to 
China (and, states Atkinson (2012), to the Party’s survival). Responsibility for SEIs is shared between 
the NDRC and MIIT, with the NDRC in charge of clean and alternative energy (more detail regarding 
the effects on solar PV is below). The SEI initiative however remains focused on maintaining the 
dominance of SOEs as the right vehicles to lead innovation (McGregor, J., 2012b, my italics), to whose 
innovation implications we shall return. The sectors and sub-industries relevant to us are: 
1) Clean Energy Technology: high-efficiency and energy saving technologies, advanced 
environmental protection, recycling, reusing waste. 
2) Alternative Energy: nuclear power, solar power, wind power, biomass power, smart grids. 
3) Clean Energy Vehicles: electric-hybrid cars, pure electric cars, fuel cell cars. 
Firms’ percentage of state ownership broadly reflects their perceived strategic importance. The goals 
of “indigenous innovation” are thus “implicit and clear”, being to capture market share for Chinese 
firms, with SOEs given a favoured position (McGregor, J., 2012b). Majority state ownership is common 
in industries deemed important, and in other industries’ “core” firms. However, minority state 
ownership is more common in sectors which have been seen as not strategically vital, and/or not 
planned by the state. Although solar PV has come to be considered technologically vital, the sector (as 
we will discuss) was not planned by the (central) state.  
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3.2.1 The continuation of state ownership and R&D 
Foreign and Chinese authors describe a re-inflation of SOEs’ role in China’s economy through these 
structures. Spending on buildings, plants, machinery and infrastructure now makes up 48% of Chinese 
GDP, ten percent above the peak in Japan and South Korea; most of this money flows through SOEs 
(McGregor, J., 2012a). More detailed evidence of SOEs’ special position is from The Nature, 
Performance and Reform of State-Owned Enterprise (Unirule Institute of Economics, 2011). This found 
that the recorded performance of SOEs is not a reflection of real performance, but results from 
“numerous preferential policies and an unfair business environment”, including fiscal subsidies from 
central government, different financing costs, and subsidised land and resource rents. If total subsidy 
and foregone costs (RMB 7.5 trillion) were taken off SOE profits between 2001 and 2009, average 
return on equity for SOEs is minus 6.29% (Unirule Institute of Economics, 2011).  
The implication is that, while funding and other preferences for SOEs have given them a central role 
in innovation, despite their operating advantages over private firms, innovation may have been 
disincentivised through the creation of “soft budget constraints”. This financial cushion that means 
should managers fail to carve out new market share for their firms and instead make losses, they are 
likely to be kept from bankruptcy by the state. (Although this may lower risk aversion, and this is a 
theme to which we shall return in which types of technology R&D is employed to pursue.) 
As we will also describe, SOEs that register numerous patents (regardless of quality), receive still more 
subsidy (Atkinson, 2012); meanwhile, despite being barred from many sectors and having harder bank 
finance terms, private firms have been found to create 90% of new jobs, 65% of patents, and 80% 
percent of technological innovation (Atkinson, 2012). We describe the funding and legal mechanisms 
through which state preference is manifested, and how the state gives a superior resource 
environment to those firms whose managers (agents) know they will survive without successful 
innovation; we also describe how the system appears to be tilted against the firms whose survival may 
depend more on innovating competitively for superior product.  
Furman, Porter and Stern (2002) looked at R&D publication rates to measure “emerging-technology” 
capabilities, meaning a nation’s capabilities in technologies which could have an economic influence 
over the following fifteen years (these being computer hardware, optical communications, advanced 
computing materials, software, and biotechnology). Judging these capabilities on numbers of 
publications, China came between fourth and seventh in these technologies, among 33 countries. Fai 
(2005) states that this places them with the UK, France, and Germany as “research powerhouses”, 
behind only Japan and the US as “superpowers”, and that “this is also reflected by Chinese patent 
data”. We will discuss below why the crude measures used here may be misleading, however. 
Furthermore, while high-tech exports in total Chinese exports rose from 5% early in the 1990s to over 
30% in 2005, China was unique in that the majority of high-tech exports were accounted for by foreign-
invested firms, usually using imports of components. (In 2005 foreign companies accounted for nearly 
90% of high-tech exports, and had even lower R&D intensities (R&D/value added) in these fields than 
private firms or SOEs (Lan and Zheng, 2010).) Overall, this suggests difficulties in upgrading from “high-
technology product assembling industry” (Lan and Zheng, 2010, 90).  
Meanwhile, as we will discuss in our own quantitative study, a variety of patent-holders, including 
SOEs and high-tech companies, some of whom have relied on academic spin-offs, have been either 
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insensitive to the market or lacking in commercialisation capabilities (Lan and Zheng, 2010). Rare non-
state-owned companies like Huawei have advanced R&D capabilities, and can now employ these 
resources globally (Lan and Zheng, 2010). Yet even Huawei, for example, announced in an internal 
memo that over the past eighteen years it has made no “original inventions”, with all its core 
technologies obtained via M&A or patent licensing (Lan and Zheng, 2010). Thus while the MLP agenda 
has accelerated funding for selected technological areas, whether it has succeeded in driving high-
tech innovation to a significantly faster pace remains unclear.  
 
 
3.3 R&D funding patterns and firm innovation outcomes 
We thus describe how the political control mechanisms and programmes above may affect R&D and 
innovation in firms. In sum, a cluster of programmes have remained the main funding routes, being:  
1) The Key Technologies Programme (since 1982), which deals with core science for 
development, involving over 1,000 institutes. Supervised by MOST, it funds 20% of Beijing’s 
science and technology spend. 
2) The National High Technology Research and Development Programme (“863” for its March 
1986 founding), promotes IT, aeronautics, biology, energy, automation, and materials. 
Initiatives typically connect SOE-only R&D groups, state institutes and university departments. 
3) The Torch Programme (1988), under MOST, has overseen the construction of over 50 national-
level high-tech zones, providing infrastructural funding for indigenous innovation in materials, 
electronics, mechanical-electrical, and energy technology. 
4) The National Key Laboratories Programme (1994) aims to raise technological capabilities 
through constructing R&D facilities with world-class equipment. RMB 1.3bn was spent in its 
first ten years on 153 labs, which collaborate with selected Chinese firms. 
5) The National Basic Research Programme, since 1997 (the “973 programme”), carries out 
strategic research in energy, IT, healthcare, agriculture, and materials, receiving 
approximately 10% of Beijing’s sci-tech funding. 
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The division of spending until 2010, including both main funding programmes and other smaller, more 
sector specific programmes, is as follows: 
 
Research 
Programme 
2001 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
        
National Natural 
Science Fund 
1598.35 2701.28 3620.14 4330.96 5358.51 6426.97 10381.09 
National Basic 
Research 
Programme of 
China (973 Plan) 
589.30 982.97 1354.19 1645.81 1900 2600 4000 
Key Techs R&D 
Programme  
1053.40 1624.40 2887.90 5423.37 5065.56 5000 5000 
National Science 
and Technology 
Infrastructure 
Programme 
N/A 573.30 753.65 685.55 23.47 21.27 N/A 
State Key 
Laboratory 
Construction 
Programme 
130 133.60 216.40 1600 2167.74 2916.95 2759.22 
National 
Engineering 
Research 
Centres 
50 59.50 83.50 85.50 N/A 103 105 
S&T Basic Work 199.68 N/A 102.74 178.43 150 150.48 155.15 
Spark 
Programme 
100 117 101.60 150 200 218.92 200 
Torch 
Programme 
70 70 108.25 138.75 151.76 227.65 220 
National New 
Products 
Programme 
140 140 139 140 150 200 200 
Innovation Fund 
for Small 
Technology-
based Firms 
(“Innofund”) 
783.30 988.48 842.88 1256.20 1621.09 3483.57 4297.09 
Agricultural S&T 
Transfer Fund 
400 300 300 300 300 400 500 
International 
S&T 
Cooperation 
100 180 300 300 400 500 1301.77 
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Programme 
Special 
Technology 
Development 
(R&D 
Institutions) 
158.30 186.04 200 250 250 250 250 
 
Table 2: Spending by central government on main R&D programmes by million RMB (source: China Statistical 
Yearbook of Science and Technology, 2011; Gong, 2013) 
 
Overall, these funds helped to push China’s R&D expenditure to RMB 706.26bn for 2010, up by RMB 
126bn from 2009. The following graph therefore shows China’s overall R&D spend in the decade to 
2010.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: China’s R&D Expenditure (2000-2010; RMB 100m) (source: MOST, 2012; Gong, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1 R&D funding through central and local governments 
Having seen how R&D funding has been targeted primarily at SOEs (McGregor, J., 2012a), we should 
understand how science and technology spending can be divided between central and local 
government (by local we mean non-central government, i.e. provincial and below). This broadly shows 
that local spending, less than half central government spending in 1990, overtook central government 
in 2007 (excepting 2009), suggesting substantial local ability to direct funds. Indeed, some studies that 
suggest the state’s retained shareholdings in listed firms have been responsible for their poor 
profitability, do not fully distinguish between different types of owners (Wang 2003, in Chen et al, 
2009).  
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Year Total govt 
budgetary 
expenditure 
Appropriation 
for science & 
technology 
Central govt  Local  govt  Percent of 
total govt 
budget 
expenditure 
1990 3038.6 139.1 97.6 41.6 4.51 
1991 3386.6 160.7 115.4 45.3 4.74 
1992 3742.2 189.3 133.6 55.7 5.06 
1993 4642.3 225.6 167.6 58.0 4.86 
1994 5792.6 268.3 199.0 69.3 4.63 
1995 6823.7 302.4 215.6 86.8 4.43 
1996 7937.6 348.6 242.8 105.8 4.39 
1997 9233.6 408.9 273.9 134.0 4.43 
1998 10798.2 438.6 289.7 148.9 4.06 
1999 13187.7 543.9 355.6 188.3 4.12 
2000 15886.5 575.6 349.6 226.0 3.62 
2001 18902.6 703.3 444.3 258.9 3.72 
2002 22053.2 816.2 511.2 305.0 3.70 
2003 24650.0 944.6 609.9 335.6 3.83 
2004 28486.9 1095.3 692.4 402.9 3.84 
2005 33930.3 1344.9 807.8 527.1 3.93 
2006 40422.7 1688.5 1099.7 678.8 4.18 
2007 49781.4 2133.5 1043.0 1070.5 4.25 
2008 62592.7 2581.8 1285.2 1296.6 4.12 
2009 76299.9 3224.9 1648.6 1576.3 4.23 
2010 89874.2 4114.4 2046.4 2068.0 4.58 
 
Table 3: Government expenditure for science and technology by RMB100m (source: China Statistical 
Yearbook of Science and Technology, 2011; Gong, 2013) 
 
 
The chart below illustrates that “enterprises” are the main sector in which R&D money is spent, 
making up 73.4% of R&D spending; following them are R&D institutions, with 16.8%, then higher 
education institutions at 8.5%. Of total R&D expenditure by 2010, government spent RMB 169.63bn, 
or 24%, while enterprises spent RMB 506.31bn, or 71.7% (MOST, 2012). This places China’s total R&D 
expenditure at number three worldwide, spending 25% of the US, or 3/5 the spend of Japan (MOST, 
2012). Meanwhile, as a proportion of GDP, China’s R&D spend (at 1.76% in 2010) remains behind the 
US (at 2.9%), Germany (2.82%), Japan (3.36%), France (2.26%), the UK (1.85%), and the EU 25 average, 
at 1.95% for 2009.  
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Figure 5: China’s overall R&D expenditure by performer (2010) (source: MOST, 2012) 
 
In the round, the changes that have taken place in the Chinese innovation system since the mid-1980s 
are clear. In terms of the volume of spending, the strongly centralised innovation system of 1985, built 
around institutes and some enterprises, had been replaced by 2006 by one structured around 
enterprises (Xue, 1997). Between 1987 and 2003 the employees of PRIs declined drastically, as 
enterprises’ R&D staff numbers increased. Universities meanwhile have also become a base for 
significant R&D (Zhong and Yang, 2007).  
There is a number of causes for the growth of R&D staff and spending among enterprises. The first 
(according to Zhong and Yang, 2007), is that among the 1149 reformed research institutes, 1003 
became enterprises or departments thereof, increasing enterprises’ R&D staff by 102,000; enterprises 
affiliated with universities and PRIs in high-tech fields have increased the R&D intensity of the 
enterprise category (Zhong and Yang, 2007). University-affiliated enterprises have expanded since the 
early 1990s, with 4593 such firms and a total income of RMB 97bn by 2004. The second factor is 
stimulation of R&D among enterprises by the increased competition caused by market reform in 
general since the 1980s; and the third factor, according to Zhong and Yang, is the reforms’ creation of 
a more favourable environment in general for R&D (Zhong and Yang, 2007). 
Table four demonstrates the decline in direct government R&D funding, from 79% of R&D funds in 
1985 to 29.9% by 2003, as enterprises have become the dominant R&D investor.  
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Table 4: R&D funding in China by source: selected years from 1985–2003 (%) (source: Zhong and Yang, 2007) 
 
However, because much of the volume for “enterprises” includes SOEs, a large proportion of this – 
and total – R&D funding originates with the state. Thus Zhong and Yang (2007) do not appear to 
demonstrate the disappearance of the fact of state dominance in China’s R&D, or innovation system: 
simply that most state R&D funding is now channelled through SOEs. It is therefore imperative to 
understand the effects of this scenario on innovation outcomes.  
 
While we describe in the theoretical literature review how agency-chains between these principals 
and agents may affect outcomes in our firms, we outline here what appear to be the different patterns 
of R&D and innovation, through funding, between broad firm types. The Chinese situation means 
funding appears to interact with ownership in various ways, creating different outcomes. Throughout, 
it is worth bearing in mind the potential for mismatch between the long-established expectations of 
western social science and this context: Hill and Snell’s (1988) study of external control and firm 
strategy and performance in research-intensive industries employs the “long-established practice” of 
using R&D expenditure as a proxy for the importance of innovation. In China however, R&D 
expenditure can be caused by other, political, factors.  
 
Many firms in China find access to state finance sources is vital to the funding of R&D, and this is in 
turn vital to patenting and innovation; both suffer without this support (Prud’homme, 2012). 
However, it appeared by 2008 that 80% of large SOEs still had no R&D team at all (Girma and Gong, 
2008b), while SOEs’ operations usually focus on short-term performance instead of the riskier 
investments needed in long-term R&D (Chan and Daim, 2011). Guan et al (2006) and OECD (2007) find 
that in general that SOEs which do carry out R&D are inefficient at using R&D expenditures to actually 
innovate. This is because, as with internal R&D, firms - and managers - may need incentives to apply 
this knowledge to real commercial ends.  
 
Dong Mingzhu, CEO of social media firm Gree, also states numerous companies produce reports on 
their innovation efforts to suit the funding application process, but R&D stops after funds have been 
obtained (Gong, 2012). According to the Audit on Central Budget Implementation and Other Financial 
Revenues and Expenditures (National Audit Office, 2011) meanwhile, 93% of central sub-projects that 
should have had acceptance checks by the end of 2011 went unchecked; it thus appears that sub-
central support may better monitor specific firms, compared to central programmes, caused by closer 
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monitoring and greater reputational concern in smaller governmental areas. Overall, as discussed in 
section 3.1.5, the implication is that although central government is better able to provide large-scale 
R&D funding, local government allows the closer monitoring, relationships, and reputational 
incentives between principals and agents that are liable to see what R&D resource locally state-owned 
firms can acquire being used more efficiently for innovation. 
 
 
3.3.2 State versus private ownership in R&D and innovation outcomes  
Regarding more specific mechanisms for IPR funding, the revised administrative measures in the 
National Science and Technology Support Plans (September 2011) state that the “project carrier” 
needs to specify who will own the IPR that will be generated by the project. These projects normally 
have a short timeframe of 3-5 years. Projects regarded as being particularly important for China’s 
economic development, that will considerably raise an industry’s global competitiveness, or will lead 
to new technological standards for a strategic industry, are generally most likely to be given support: 
yet these are generally the fields dominated by SOEs, allowing them to perpetually dominate R&D 
funding access. 
In general, despite government support, SOEs appear to perform sub-optimally in producing patented 
products and services. In 2009, of all medium and large domestic-funded Chinese entities, SOEs made 
up only 10% of all patent applications, and just 9% of all the higher quality invention patent filings we 
will describe below (Prud’homme, 2012). In 2009 (the last year with a study of this scale), 65% of 
patent applications by medium-to-large SOEs were for the lower quality utility and design patents, 
and only 35% for invention patents (Prud’homme, 2012), a higher percentage of utility and design 
patents than other types of enterprise. Despite their support, actual R&D spending also remained 
lower than enterprises with different legal registrations.  
This may be caused in part by differences in management. The governance of SOEs appears very 
different to other types of firm, with top executives “appointed by the government and their 
experiences in these companies [continually] building part of their political careers” (Girma and Gong, 
2008a, 581), the effects of which we will address in depth. Thus managers tend to focus on the short-
term economic performance that provides a direct reward, rather than “risky long-term strategic 
investment in R&D”. In various studies, most SOEs had spent a large proportion of innovation funds 
on acquiring technological equipment from foreign countries (Guan et al, 2006; Girma and Gong, 
2008a), as SOEs prefer “material technology to immaterial elements”. There then appears a lack of 
innovative fruit (China’s 54 government-sponsored high-tech zones for example seeing unsatisfactory 
“general innovation performance”) (Girma and Gong, 2008b). Thus SOEs “have more research 
capacity, but not as good incentives” (interviewee Minnan Wang, BNEF Beijing, November 2012).  
China’s financial system does not meet private firms’ funding requirements, however, especially for 
SMEs (OECD, 2008, in Girma and Gong, 2008b), and with the capital market underdeveloped, these 
firms, which are mostly small or medium, are hard-pressed to obtain loans, as banks favour larger 
firms, especially SOEs. This means small private firms must often be self-funded. However, despite the 
resulting relative lack of resource, this means private firms do not have soft budget constraints, and 
often see the urgent need for innovation (they are simply relatively “starved” of the capital needed). 
Hutschenreiter and Zhang (2007) find that pro-SOE policies have withheld support for private firms 
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with considerable potential. Chinese companies’ innovation activities appear to be aimed mainly at 
quality improvement, and those SMEs which have government support generally perform better 
(Guan et al, 2006).  
For a better innovation return on investment, Beijing has begun using a “patent indicator system” to 
reward patenting firms in general. However, combined with the “revolving-door” management 
problem, by which SOE managers are disincentivised by being transferred to other firms before R&D 
investments will bear fruit, incentives to register patents may lead to an incentive to register low 
quality patents quickly, particularly in the SOE case (or to infringe the IP of other firms). For China as 
an innovation system, “large amounts of money will be wasted” (Atkinson, 2012, 68), a hazard 
compounded by subsidised SOEs’ dominance, plus governmental reluctance to allow the “creative 
destruction” of firms it owns, which may retard the growth of disruptive, innovating firms. One 
government cadre stated: “We want to identify large flagship enterprises to be the model for 
innovation, [but] the role played by [SMEs] is seriously undervalued and they are facing severe 
problems in market access” (Atkinson, 2012, 68). As SOEs receive funding relatively independently of 
their innovation success, oligopolies which should be made temporary by disruptive “Schumpeterian 
entries” in innovative product markets are protected from competition that would otherwise reward 
innovators (and the changes that should occur when firms that cannot keep up with the pace of 
technical progress see their markets shrinking rapidly (Dosi, 1981)). 
China-listed firm data has been used to find a negative effect of state ownership on firms’ innovation. 
Xie (2011) stated that state control overall has a “significantly negative effect” on the performance of 
R&D investment. Xie (2011, 235) speculates that this is because state control weakens governance, 
with owners absent in state-owned firms, “so managers lack sufficient incentive to manage R&D 
investment”12.  
To see the effects of the system more clearly, context via international comparison is useful. One study 
of over 200 South Korean firms showed how their more dynamic companies had several 
characteristics which differ from Chinese SOEs. First, they emphasize their own technological efforts 
in combination with foreign technological input; second, they monitor development of the “world 
technological frontier”; third, “they are committed to training workers, thereby developing human 
resources; fourth, entrepreneurs play a key role; and fifth, they use crises as an effective means to 
expedite technological learning” (Kim, 2007, 232). Other sources also find a lack of innovation in 
Chinese SOEs, particularly those owned by the central state (Feng, 2010). As the Unirule study 
suggested, SOEs’ actual performance has often remained hidden, with these firms appearing 
successful in many analyses. Chen et al (2009) found that operating efficiency of Chinese listed firms 
varies by type of controlling shareholders. Their “SOECG controlled firms” (SOEs affiliated to central 
government) performed best, while SAMB (State-owned Assets Management Bureau, the predecessor 
of the SASAC) and privately-controlled firms performed worst, with “SOELG (SOEs affiliated to local 
government) controlled firms” in the middle. Although their classifications of SOEs are now considered 
outdated, the study established a connection between performance and level of SOE ownership. 
However, their definition of “operating efficiency” refers to labour productivity, and SOECGs’ labour 
                                                          
12 However we will also investigate the possibility that government may encourage firms to invest in projects 
with “longer payback cycles” (Gong, 2013, leading to speculative innovation (such as thin film technologies in 
solar PV which as yet lack commercial payoffs.) 
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productivity has been raised by their generous supplies of cheap capital, hence private enterprises 
scoring relatively low.  
Meanwhile the conflicting findings of various authors suggest that the impact of corporate governance 
on innovation within enterprise performance, particularly among SOEs, is more controversial (part of 
the rationale for this thesis). Xie (2011, 234) uses Chinese listed firm data to demonstrate a negative 
effect state ownership imposes on firm innovation: state control “has a significantly negative effect 
on the performance of corporate R&D investment”. They suggest the possible reasons are that the 
state’s control “weakens the corporate governance, and owner is absent in state-owned firms [sic], so 
managers lack sufficient incentive to manage R&D investment” (Xie, 2011, 234).  
Management problems however may also affect outcomes for purely private Chinese firms. 
Ownership and management are usually not separated, with financing coming from relatives or 
friends (Li and Xia, 2008).  
Li and Xia suggest that such corporate governance arrangements are outmoded. This family 
management, despite helping speed development in the first stages of growth, comes to retard it later 
through its problems integrating human capital and external financial capital. They also refer to the 
effects imposed on family owners’ behaviour by the fear of bad treatment by the state, and in our 
case this likely includes a (relative) failure of entirely private firms to generate IP, due to the risk of its 
infringement by firms with the protection of the state (Atkinson, 2012). As a result, working 
relationships with state-owned firms become a vital project for many private firms, which also 
cultivate close relations with various government officials, levels, and departments, which are seen as 
helping them deal with pressures that may arise from the state/legal system. One of the legal 
challenges these firms face is the need to access unofficial sources of finance without prosecution; 
Ong (2004, 379) states that “it is well known in China that bank managers have a disincentive for 
lending to private enterprises because they could lose their jobs if a loan to a private company goes 
under, but not if it's a state-owned firm”. This makes securing financing for R&D, for example, more 
difficult. And while Aulakh and Gencturk (2000) suggest that in employing social controls that sanction 
instead of punish risk-taking, agents may be encouraged to attempt innovative ways of achieving 
performance objectives, many agents in our context will not have this luxury. 
Ong (2004) also suggests private firms, lacking the need to carry out administrative work, have fewer 
agency problems than their state-owned counterparts, but more concern over legal system risk and 
lower provision of resource from the government, which he suggests makes it rational to pursue 
market goals. While private firms’ investments are generally less long-term focussed, the investments 
they make in innovation are more often market-oriented (this may also mean quicker revenue 
generation ahead of long-term research).  
The majority of research however has investigated Chinese firms’ access to international knowledge 
sources and R&D connections, but much evidence shows Chinese companies benefit more easily from 
domestic than foreign knowledge sources (Li, 2010). Foreign companies are also often unwilling to 
give Chinese partners access to their advanced technology without an ownership stake. International 
R&D collaborations’ effects have thus been found to be insignificant, with firms protecting IP to 
minimize “outgoing spillovers” (however, these are commercial entities, and foreign universities have 
a different remit); yet the implication is that the most important determinants of innovation outcomes 
are domestic.  
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We should therefore summarise the likely positive and negative roles for innovation of state and 
private shareholding. The managers of SOEs appear likely to aim at “quick wins” in the form of buying 
in visible kit for technology manufacturing, especially because of the time pressure felt by “revolving-
door” cadre-managers. The better innovation performance of SMEs (which tend to be private firms) 
provides some evidence for this phenomenon (Hutschenreiter and Zhang, 2007). But the state’s 
keeping poor innovators afloat (through SOEs’ soft budget constraints) is likely to harm the innovation 
system as a vital driver of economic growth: the soft budget constraint does damage because the firms 
it keeps alive use resources and occupy market space that would otherwise go to firms with more 
potential. This could even be called a pillar of the innovation system, with one cadre stating that “large 
flagship enterprises” are the “model for innovation” (Atkinson, 2012). In a relatively straightforward 
comparison of state-owned and private firms, Xie (2011) suggests that these innovation problems in 
SOEs are real. Yet Li and Xia (2008) and Ong (2004) demonstrate that those private firms are unable 
to secure the necessary resources; this means the Chinese national innovation system appears to be 
systematically depriving the more effective innovators of the resources they need. The overarching 
implication is that those firms which will currently be able to innovate most successfully in China’s 
national innovation system may be those which have the incentivised management that comes from 
(majority) private shareholding, but also have the favour of the state, implying (minority) state 
ownership. Meanwhile the level of state shareholding that may be preferable, non-central instead of 
central state, is described above). 
Moral hazard is a profound risk in the Chinese innovation system. Agents, as we have seen, may lack 
incentives to deploy factor resources in the most efficient way. Li and Xia (2008) found that resources 
are unlikely to be used for market-oriented criteria, but in administrative tasks and for empire-
building. SOEs are required to assist government in its goals to continue being granted state resources, 
instead of simply making profits. Zhang (1998) however provides some analysis of this phenomenon 
at different state levels, and having established the outline of the principal-agent chain, we should 
analyse how different government levels in the chain create varying moral hazard. Zhang moves from 
descriptive institutional work (e.g. of Qu) to an attempt to model the principal-agent relationship for 
such “monitoring-incentive problems of the public economy” (although Zhang did not apply this to 
technological innovation).  
On SOE performance, Zhang describes the “naive argument” in China that Singapore’s state-owned 
enterprises (e.g. Singapore Airlines) are efficient, “so Chinese state-owned enterprises can also be 
efficient”, noting one cannot make simple analogies between public enterprises owned by small 
populations with those owned by large populations, as increases in degree of publicness and economy 
size increase layers of hierarchy, thus the distance between “original principals” and “ultimate 
agents”, making monitoring less effective. This means a public economy where agents “claim de facto 
the residual” instead of the principals (Zhang, 1998). If socialist economies become corrupt because 
“bureaucrats can afford to buy out”, this is likely to hinder wise re-investment of company revenues 
for innovation. Like their private counterparts, SOEs have decision-making, producing, and capital-
owner members. Producing members are insiders, capital-owner members may be insiders or 
outsiders, but decision-making members may not be insiders, unlike in private companies. Zhang 
proposes four effects on the principal-agent relationship.  
First, the original principal’s “optimal incentive to monitor” may increase or decrease with the size of 
the economy. We add that “incentive to monitor” may also depend on what kinds of “success” are 
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needed and low quality patent filings - possibly via IP infringement - may provide the necessary success 
metrics). Second, for any given size of economy, a smaller “community of ownership” will increase the 
“principal’s monitoring incentive” and the “agent’s monitored work incentive”. For our purposes this 
can refer to smaller state owners (local rather than central), such as provinces. In other words, 
principals outside the central state create a greater incentive to monitor output, and greater work 
incentives for agents.  
The third effect is that original principals being residual claimants are Pareto-dominated by lower 
actors. This means that because of skewed incentives up the chain, the lowest level of agents 
dominates decision-making (in a state context). This is connected to proposition four, which supposes 
that lower agents hold decision rights, and Pareto dominate the higher actors. The results of this 
situation are that the monitoring incentive of the original principals and work incentive of the ultimate 
agents decreases “with the degree of publicness and the size of the public economy”, and that splitting 
up a public economy of a given size increases “the monitoring incentive of the original principals and 
work incentive of the ultimate agents” (Zhang, 1998, 232). The implication is improvement of agent 
output in a mixed state-private shareholding context, and at lower levels of state; for example the 
“principal-agent chain” in township and village enterprises (TVEs) is much shorter than in SOEs, so the 
original principals (the “town government”) can better monitor the TVE’s management. As the size of 
TVEs expands, the “principal-agent chain becomes longer, and monitoring by the original principals 
and the central agent [town government] less and less effective” (Zhang also believes that “for TVEs 
to remain efficient, the privatization of TVEs is inevitable”; however in terms of principal-agent 
relations TVEs appear more “private” already, with their close principal-agent monitoring being similar 
to private firms (Zhang, 1998, 233)). Local government as a major shareholder has an interest in 
maximising profitability and dividends, and is represented on the board. A pure SOE manager may 
conceal profit, “or absorb it in operation costs” (Nee, 2005, 57), but the cadre-entrepreneur benefits 
from a profitable firm. 
 
3.3.3 Levels of state ownership and firm performance 
An account of incentivisation and constraint in firms by ownership types comes from Da’s (2010) study 
of the relationship between state ownership and corporate objectives (although this does not apply 
ownership to innovation outcomes). Firm objectives are more economically oriented for local than 
central government-controlled firms: listed firms’ chain of control is traced to owners; those whose 
largest shareholder is central government (or its agencies such as SASAC or ministries) are “central 
government controlled companies”, firms whose largest shareholder is a provincial government (or 
one of the four provincial-level cities) are “provincial government controlled”, followed by “municipal 
government controlled companies”.  
Yet although Beijing controls local officials via promotion or demotion, local governments have 
considerable autonomy in economic decisions (Chung, 2000), due partly to the hazy division of duties 
we have described between central and local government (Qian, 2002). Here, it is possible that the 
combination of local government autonomy with the central government’s demands that they provide 
improvements in local GDP would lead to even less effective treatment of firms, with demands from 
local government that they invest resource not in longer-term innovation, but in unsustainable 
immediate increases in output and employment. Increases in construction and infrastructure, and in 
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the output of firms providing for these local projects (Chang, Wong and Scott, 1999), appears to give 
some evidence for this, especially in the localities where state economic dominance is most marked 
(however we will discuss the peculiarities of the most “agglomerated” areas for solar PV).     
Yet the reform period gave sub-central government economic incentives to become entrepreneurial, 
especially in the reforms that let them retain tax revenue (Davis and Vogel, 1990, in Da, 2010). Da 
perceives that moving down the political hierarchy from central to municipal government is equivalent 
to reducing government control and transferring state shareholdings from social-political orientated 
to market-orientated organisation (Da, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Level of government ownership and market orientation (source: Da, 2010) 
 
Predominant provincial government ownership has thus become seen as “best practice” in company-
state relations (although these firms seem to be maintaining competitive superiority, the continuation 
of solely centrally-owned firms in strategic areas suggests this ownership forms will be maintained for 
Party security reasons, including employment). In provincial government-owned firms, management 
often resists government, fearing firms may return to unprofitability (conversely, provincial 
government-run firms receive less political and financial support) (Da, 2010). 
As we have seen, municipal governments have provided a superior “stable institutional infrastructure” 
(for their firms and their hybrid firms), a framework of which managers under municipal government 
control have taken advantage (Qian, 2002). One head of a municipal city SASAC stated: “One hundred 
percent state ownership cannot produce desirable [results]. Private and foreign investors can be fresh 
blood for our city and companies. There are no political or any kinds of constraints for them... in 
contrast, we can provide a stable institutional infrastructure for their development, because we can 
benefit from their development as shareholders. [A] good investment principal does not necessarily 
have to operate the business; rather, we can receive fruitful results through effective governance and 
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active guidance” (Qian, 2002, 4). By implication, different principals (local and central government) 
create different outcomes, as do mixed state and private shareholdings. 
Kumar et al’s (1992) study of models of organisational effectiveness identifies two control effects, 
which have clear ramifications for government effects on agency relationships. The first deals with 
“agent compliance”, which is regarded as being the reception an agent gives the policies which 
emanate from the principal. This is regarded as being a core objective for agent-control: Kumar et al 
study marketing programmes, where agents can sabotage a programme by refusing to market 
products as required. Innovation however can also be sabotaged. The second area, “relationship 
flexibility”, is the degree to which principal and agent are prepared to adjust to fluid, changeable 
circumstances. We suggest that this will be easier with the closer, more intimate principal-agent 
relations brought about by local government scenarios. As Kumar et al suggest, agents should not only 
better appreciate the way principals come to their decisions regarding rewards, but greater similarity 
in agents’ self-perception of their effort or performance may exist to a principal’s own evaluation. 
Ideally, monitoring should take place via personal and social interaction, which implies local relations 
will be superior. Repeated interaction and the shared decisions it allows lead to more “systematised” 
organisational values (and this is a better description of local government than central government 
interaction with firms in China). Securing principal-agent relationships for long periods allows 
principals to invest in agent “socialisation”. Bello and Gilliland (2002) argue that those directives that 
influence an independent agent’s market behaviour can then come from a principal’s experiences. 
Helping us understand the phenomena at work here, Feng (2010, 255) describes the management of 
technological learning for product commercialisation, comparing “Group-A” firms (mainly centrally-
owned SOEs) with “Group-B” firms (every other sort, whose emergence surprised central planners, 
not being state-supported, at least early on). Group-A firms had not made in-house technological 
learning for “systemic product and complex technology development” part of collective learning, and 
remain dominated by managers from marketing, manufacturing, finance, and “political work 
divisions” (Feng, 2010, 268). Top committees had few product engineers, hindering innovation for 
systemic product development, an organisational style poor at “rapid and large throughput knowledge 
creation” (Feng, 2010, 268), making many of these firms simply MNCs’ manufacturing bases.  
Group-B firms insisted on building in-house innovative capacity, investing in complex product 
technology development despite resource constraints. Managers generally had backgrounds in 
product technology, and these firms have organised investments around such projects. Unable to 
bring political benefits to JVs, early on these firms were not generally MNC partners, as policies 
protected Group-A companies’ advantages. Thus unable to become technological “dependents” 
(Freeman, 1982), Group-B firms had to become “self-dependent” (Feng, 2010), pursuing in-house 
development instead of JVs, the root of their product-oriented competitive tradition. The connection 
between state ownership and firm performance, according to Zhang (1998), means the state as 
“ultimate shareholder of most Chinese listed companies” creates ineffective corporate governance 
and unsatisfactory performance. Thus despite apparently having a superior environment for IP 
protection, the performance of SOEs has fallen below government expectations, with SOEs’ facilities 
– and technology – out of date (Wei and Geng, 2008, 936). 
Through our principal-agent theoretical template, we shall return to likely outcomes of the R&D 
funding and management scenarios for state, private, and hybrid state-private firms. At this stage, for 
69 
 
a fuller picture of the innovation system in which actors in these firms operate, we will go on to 
describe the patenting and legal environment in which different types of firm exist, attempt to 
innovate, and to register patent IP. 
  
 
3.4 China’s intellectual property system 
3.4.1 The development of China’s intellectual property system 
We shall return to state/private dynamics in describing the theoretical template, but we should now 
outline the legal system in which each type of ownership will operate. An IPR system is now usually 
seen as one of the most important innovation-facilitating regulative institutions for competitiveness 
(Acemoğlu et al, 2003). Lan and Zheng (2010) describe the accepted understanding of IPR as being 
that strong IPR protection creates incentives for investment in R&D, thus allowing technological 
progress for economies more broadly (Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1967).  
Before the twentieth century the Chinese state legislated for commercial and industrial practice in a 
more detailed manner than often realised, but “comprehensive, centrally promulgated, formal legal 
protection for either proprietary symbols or inventions” was lacking (Alford, 1998, 15). During the 
Mao era meanwhile, the Socialist Education Campaign of 1962 created an intensive totalitarian 
period, aimed at the very “eradication [of] material incentives” and other “reactionary” tendencies, 
in politics, ideology, organisation and the economy (thus the Campaign’s alternative title, “the four 
cleanups”). During the Cultural Revolution that followed (1966-76), IP specifically was described as a 
“hopelessly reactionary” concept. As the Cultural Revolution got underway in 1966, even the 
compensation for inventors that had been permitted by the Regulation on Invention Reward (1963) 
was abolished. Thus any incentive for technological achievement as eradicated, and innovation now 
gave virtually no financial reward. From 1966 to 1978, only 7,700 “items of scientific and technological 
achievement” were registered by the government (Lan and Zheng, 2010). 
It was only with Mao’s death in 1976, then the reform period under Deng Xiaoping (from 1978), that 
embryonic patent law began, as Deng decreed that China should have patent laws to give inventors 
rights to their innovations, but “without undercutting their responsibilities to the state” (Alford, 1998, 
69). This formed a core part (if a relatively little discussed one) of the economic reforms that Deng 
placed at the top of the national agenda during the Third Plenum of the Communist Party's Eleventh 
Central Committee (December, 1978). In particular, Deng’s reforms would allow the construction of 
IP laws by making them a constituent part of the “Open Door” policies (kaifang zhengce) which 
allowed access to both foreign capital and advanced technology.  
China’s first Patent Law was thus established in March 1984 (China’s State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO) was founded shortly before the drafting of this law). Yet during the period of the first patent 
law, SOEs could not handle their patents autonomously, and had to gain the permission of the 
authorities to license them out (Lan and Zheng, 2010), regulations which limited SOEs’ engagement 
with, and enthusiasm for, IP (this extended to their R&D staff). Furthermore, by design the first patent 
law did not cover chemical, pharmaceutical, alimentary, or process inventions, to keep foreign 
investors out of sectors intended to be the preserve of domestic industries. According to Lan and 
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Zheng (2010), in the latter half of the 1980s, although Chinese firms (mainly SOEs) imported large 
numbers of production lines, their in-house R&D capabilities (and product development in particular) 
did not improve, even deteriorating in some regards, while large profits were made by accessing 
“updated” technologies and assembling imported components.  
As such, before 1992 there occurred a rapid increase in total applications (with domestic applications 
leading, peaking in 1992). However the ratio of invention applications to others fell from the beginning 
(in 1985) to a low of 21.46 percent in 1992 (more recent figures are described below). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Stages of the development of the Chinese patent system (adapted from Lan and Zheng, 2010; and 
SIPO, 2010); note the trend of inventive patent applications as a proportion of all patents, in particular since 
the Indigenous Innovation plan.  
 
The evolution of China’s IPR protection model has occurred in part through pressures exerted by other 
states, in particular via the mechanisms of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). During the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986–94) for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT, now the WTO), members negotiated the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), setting out minimum standards of IP protection for most economies. 
Changes to the patent law were made in 1992, when the need for strengthened market reform and 
critical foreign commentary on the IP system saw the lifetime of invention patents lengthened from 
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fifteen to twenty years, with utility models and designs extended from five to ten years. Providing 
agreements were made with their employers, individual employees also became permitted to own 
patents; a rapid rise in overall applications followed (although foreign applications exceeded domestic 
at the time). The changes in 1992 made food, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals patent-eligible. SIPO 
allows three forms of patent to be filed: invention patents, utility models, and designs, and there are 
marked differences between the types. These changes were consolidated in 1993, when inventors 
were given improved financial incentives. The types of patent differ as follows. 
Invention patents are granted for both products (goods and services) and processes, and must meet 
a novelty standard (and be unknown to the public in China or elsewhere before filing). They must also 
show a standard of both inventiveness and practical use. Their award requires a detailed substantive 
examination. If maintained, they give maximum 20 years’ protection.  
Utility models can be awarded for a product’s shape and/or structure. They do not require substantive 
examination, and although they need to be novel they require a lower “inventiveness” threshold, 
being required to show “practical use” or “functionality”. This means they may simply improve 
product functions without offering a truly new solution. With less inventiveness, they also have 
shorter lifecycles. They generally take 8 to 12 months to be granted, receiving only 10 years’ maximum 
protection if maintained, and give broadly the same legal rights as invention patents (before the 1992 
amendments mentioned above, “invention” patent rights had 15 years’ protection, while utility 
models had 5 years’). 
Finally, registered designs are granted for the aspects of a product’s appearance that make it 
recognisable. They need no substantive examination, nor need to meet technical or functional 
standards, and must only be distinct from previous designs while not conflicting with others’ rights. 
These receive maximum 10 years’ protection if maintained.  
Unlike China, most countries only consider the “invention” type worthy of being called a patent. Only 
forty countries use utility models, and fewer still have designs (Kardam, 2007). The rationale for this 
is that China’s IP system, unlike that of the United States for example, was established with the 
intention of facilitating the diffusion of new technologies (Lan and Zheng, 2010), hence the use of 
design and utility models, their relatively short protection periods, and the use of the “first-to-file” 
(instead of “first-to-invent”) principle of protection. The period 1992 to 2000 saw the strong growth 
of invention applications, more than tripling from 14,409 to 51,747. Utility model applications grew 
more slowly, from 44,369 to 68,815, while designs grew most rapidly, from 8,357 to 50,120. However, 
while utility applications fell from 66.99% to 40.32% of the total, invention applications have remained 
a minority, increasing from 12.45% to 29.36% of total patents (Lan and Zheng, 2010). 
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Figure 8: Timeline of China’s major intellectual property rights (IPR) laws and regulations (to 2005) (adapted 
from Lan and Zheng, 2010; Dimitrov, 2009) 
 
With SIPO and MOST both responsible for IPR, the area is dealt with at a very high strategic level (Kong, 
2005). Patent law renewal was included in the State Council’s first National IP Strategy (2008), which 
led to the National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020) by SIPO in 2010, then the Promotion 
Plan for the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy, 2012. These have been 
referred to collectively as the “2012 National IP Strategy”. SIPO and the State Council stated the 
revisions would promote “indigenous innovation”, part of a broader initiative to develop domestic IP 
by accelerating China’s own innovative capacity.  
Patent granting and a relatively new enforcement system have seen various problems arise however. 
A developed system should have enforcement that is “consistent, transparent, and procedurally fair” 
(Dimitrov, 2009, 6). Yet instead of seeing the state as enforcing laws directly, it is useful to understand 
that it creates and maintains institutions to enforce when necessary (Dimitrov, 2009). Three 
enforcement channels exist: civil law courts, administrative agencies, and the criminal justice system 
(although the Customs Administration also provides some border enforcement, making IP a rare form 
of property protected through all four channels, giving a particularly comprehensive insight into state 
activities).  
Considering the relative youth of the Chinese system, development has been rapid, with the quality, 
cost and timeliness of (invention) patents comparing well globally, while enforcement is “cheaper and 
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faster” than in most developed countries (UK Intellectual Property Institute, 2010). Courts, including 
the highest, the IP Tribunal of the Supreme (Appeal) Court, hand down “some very sophisticated 
judgements”, although ability to enforce “varies in different localities in China” (UK Intellectual 
Property Institute, 2010). However the quality of first level courts varies: 60% of their 1000 judges 
have no IP training (as such Beijing has encouraged foreign firms to use the IP Tribunal of the Supreme 
(Appeal) Court). Domestic firms invariably have to use local courts, however, and corruption remains 
problematic, especially in less developed provinces, as is the political independence of the judicial 
system. Appeals meanwhile are costly and courts do not yet award the damages that would justify 
them. Interviewees have raised cases where powerful local firms, usually SOEs, hold sway over local 
courts (on which more detail below).  
However, as domestic firms’ IP registration has increased, these firms appear to be pushing 
government to strengthen the IP regime. According to the Chinese Supreme Court, in 2005 over 
16,000 civil cases and 3,500 criminal cases related to IPR violations were handled by Chinese courts, 
with over 2,900 people jailed (Kshetri, 2009). Cases involving IPR protection rose 21% that year, with 
95% of China‘s IPR cases brought by Chinese firms.  
Yet firms using the enforcement system have raised particular concerns about three of its aspects: 
insufficient compensation, high requirements for obtaining injunctions (to stop production of 
infringing goods), and difficulty enforcing awards. Firms claim it is hard to obtain damages sufficient 
to provide deterrents: a ceiling of around RMB 1m exists in practice (Atkinson, 2012). Without 
evidence discovery, evidence preservation orders are the method whereby firms prosecuting IP 
infringers may gain evidence. However, if a defendant does not co-operate with a court imposing an 
evidence preservation order, there seems little IP owners can do (Atkinson, 2012). According to the 
OECD, “failure to follow a court order is not regarded as a crime, and few penalties exist for non-
enforcement… It is not worthwhile to pursue every [IPR] case, as the amount of compensation relative 
to the damage incurred and the costs involved may not justify pursuing juridical enforcement... In 
addition, there is a chance that even when the case is successfully pursued, the pirates may close 
down a “busted firm” and open a new “firm” and continue in the same vein.” (OECD, 2008, in Lan and 
Zheng, 2010, 90). 
Meanwhile, a number of patent litigation cases have been brought by domestic against foreign 
companies, with some apparently involving patents filed with the intent of use for litigation. Sources 
suggest over 50% of patents filed at SIPO are of foreign innovations, “with the sole intention of suing 
the same for patent infringement” (Atkinson, 2012, 37). Reports describe the role of the utility model 
in this emerging problem. For our purposes, this may also create domestic-to-domestic conflicts, 
exacerbating any politico-economic-related patenting problems. Indeed, interviewees state that in 
provinces with more SOE-dominated economies, judicial independence is more commonly 
compromised. This is hard to avoid, as “the reality is that you have to pursue your counterparty in the 
local court of its home jurisdiction” (Townsend, M., interview, 2011). Although the “traditional 
problem” of provincial court corruption is becoming less severe “the further up you go in the court 
system”, higher up cases become political, often being bracketed as a “social stability” question, by 
which actors can use a place in the broader state system to avoid prosecution for infringement (Duke, 
interview, 2012). This “institutional location” may also influence whether the managers of the firm 
feel they should register their IP with SIPO in the first place, which depends on whether they feel able 
to protect it from infringement by firms which are more favoured by the state. 
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The specifics of the patenting and enforcement system have led to varying patterns of use by patent-
registering firms, and the system appears to have marked interplays with, and impacts on, firm 
innovation behaviour. China is simultaneously “one of the largest IPR pirates in the world”, while “no 
country in the world devotes as many resources to IPR enforcement as China” (Dimitrov, 2009, 17) 
(who adds that as IP in China represents an especially complex case, it, “allows us to get a deeper 
grasp of state capacity” in general)13. An alteration to Article 9 of Implementing Rules of the Patent 
Law (January 2010) stated that if a patent application “may relate to the security or vital interest of 
the State and is required to be kept secret” (Prud’homme, 2012, 15), it may not be published even if 
approved by SIPO, or filed abroad. This ambiguity means a wide range of patents might be blocked 
(Prud’homme, 2012), with the information they contain remaining in state hands. This helps highlight 
the nature of China’s simultaneous promotion of the concept of IP to and by domestic firms, the IP-
related pathologies that we suggest the Chinese state creates, and the environment in which private 
firms and shareholders must compete.  
 
3.4.2 Patent Quality Trends 
According to the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), China became the world’s leading patent 
filer in 2011, overtaking US and Japanese domestic filings. Yet sources have questioned how much this 
represents a comparable increase in what would be seen as patent-quality material in developed 
countries, and whether a largely quantitative increase is being spurred by rewards for patenting. In 
particular, there appears to be a role for utility and design models in the increase. 
Socioeconomic factors such as a growing educated workforce may have driven some patenting. Yet 
China has constructed a range of “quantitative patent targets” which despite their ambition may not 
encourage quality - or spur innovation - as intended (Prud’homme, 2012). Indeed these may actually 
discourage highest-quality patenting, and at worst actually encourage development and filing of low-
quality patents (Prud’homme, 2012). Some scholars have stated utility models have become less 
popular than others (Huang, 2013), but in 2010 and 2011, domestic filings of utility models exceeded 
invention patents, against the previous decade when invention patents had steadily overtaken utility 
models (Prud’homme, 2012). This happened despite the invention patent examination period having 
been reduced from 53 months to less than half in 2010. Thus a disproportionate growth of low quality 
patenting seems to be underway. By 2009, Chinese nationals filed 877,611, nearly 90%, of the 976,686 
patent applications to SIPO; of these, 230,000 were invention patents, with utility patents numbering 
308,861 and design patents 339,654 (SIPO, 2010). Thus almost three quarters of patent filings fell in 
the “junk” class. One Beijing-based IP lawyer stated: “the government targets deprive firms of an 
incentive to really innovate”, and another claimed: “the utility aspect is making the junk patent 
problem worse. If you subsidise people they will register rubbish” (interview data, September, 2012). 
Chinese patents also show relatively low patent citation scores (one of the quantitative indicators of 
quality we will analyse), compared to developed world filings, as filing targets that seem to be driving 
filings may be overshadowing the “nuances underlying creativity”, seen as the foundation of the 
innovation that creates quality patents (and ultimately innovation-led growth), as most scholars agree 
                                                          
13 Dimitrov (2009) also adds that studies “typically examine only one subtype of intellectual property rights”, 
instead, for instance, of the implications of the IP system on the innovative development of firms. 
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that the innovation that leads to the highest-quality patents is usually achieved after the right inputs 
“in the mid- to long-term” (Prud’homme, 2012). However domestic filers’ invention patents appear to 
be falling proportionally, and utility models rising, with utility filings set to further exceed inventions. 
Scepticism is growing about how much innovation underlies broad patenting growth. Chinese patent 
examiners are paid more if they approve more patents, and generosity of incentives for patent-filing 
may make it “worthwhile for companies and individuals to patent even worthless ideas” (The 
Economist, October 2010). Meanwhile, the reward system for firms to patent appears developed and 
precise. Subsidy programmes reward patenting predominantly by paying lawyer and patent filing fees; 
the main reward schemes being the Patent Gold Award (varying slightly between provinces), the 
Patent Excellence Award, the China Patent Leader Award, and the China Technology Patent Award. 
Reforms are underway (such as requiring firms to have patents granted before receiving rewards, 
instead of needing only to apply), although few qualifying requirements for these subsidies have 
existed until now. Theoretically, any firm can benefit from the patent subsidy system, but although 
rewards are not open exclusively to state-owned enterprises (and a specific SME Technical 
Development Fund for IP exists in most provinces), it is “probably easier for SOEs to win these awards” 
(Prud’homme, interview, 2012). Thus SOEs, whose managers may be under pressure to apply for 
patents, may also be more strongly incentivised to register them with less regard to actual quality. It 
should also be taken into account that growing technological competence often denotes 
improvements in the Chinese context alone (Fai, 2005), while a much stronger test of rising Chinese 
technological competence would be whether companies have been able to register patents in foreign 
jurisdictions, especially the USPTO, regarded as having the most stringent technical standards (and we 
will return to this question in our quantitative analysis).   
The ways in which managers who are also cadres in state employ are assessed, and the differences 
this creates between their choices and the choices of private managers, may be responsible for a good 
deal of the patent-quality patterns we have described. In other words, the dynamics created by 
government control of cadres may actually hinder their innovation success, which is one of their main 
tasks. As discussed in the theoretical literature review, this would mean a monitoring method imposed 
by principals is hindering the performance of agents due to its creation of inferior incentives to agents 
in a private principal-agent structure (despite the latter’s relative lack of R&D resource).  
Meanwhile, the Cathay Industrial Biotech case illustrates the institutional risks for innovation in 
entirely private firms, demonstrating how China’s innovation policy gives investment and legal 
security to firms with (at least some) ownership by the state. Although, like many scholars, Lan and 
Zheng (2010, 91) suggest that the “IPR system in China [has faced] the double challenges of meeting 
the demand of multinational companies which required strong IPR protection while at the same time 
satisfying domestic companies which favoured an IPR regime conducive to technology transfer and 
knowledge diffusion”, this does not mention the private firms whose interests may lie in a differently 
administered IPR system.  
Bureaucracy may avoid investigating “difficult” IP cases, such as “when counterfeiters are in cahoots 
with the local government” (Dimitrov, 2009, 21), which means any increase in enforcement may 
simply result from better enforcement for well-connected firms. This example demonstrates how 
studies that portray the Chinese state as “weak” or “strong” miss its simultaneous weakness and 
strength (Dimitrov, 2009), affecting the simultaneous weakness and strength of the innovation 
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system. Associates at a Chinese private equity firm (interview, May 2012) advised: “investors should 
choose a large market company, not a new market entrant- the latter will be ripped off by the big guys 
because they have the power… Private companies lack the capacity to protect IP”. These interviewees 
believed minority state-owned enterprises (MISOEs) may thus be well positioned for innovation, 
granting both incentivised private management and some state protection.  
We have traced how the Chinese state, through its basic political structure and policy framework, has 
created a legal system and reward system that financially support and reward the IP generation of 
state firms. This IP generation is “re-incentivised” through apparently advantageous IP protection in 
the courts, yet greater budgetary cushions and supports are provided that deny these firms as great a 
commercial incentive as their counterparts with more private shareholding.  
 
 
3.5 Summary 
Understanding the link between ownership structure and firm objective/s can also reveal the logic 
behind their activities. Comparing firm types reveals how SOE management must live under multiple 
pressures on their firms’ objectives (Kornai et al, 2003). While growing competition at home and 
abroad demands rapid product improvement capacity, state-owned firms are frequently expected to 
generate profits, help industrialise the country, develop technology, create jobs, and cut regional 
inequality. Therefore, although Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the effectiveness of large 
shareholders’ control is tied to their ability to exercise their control rights, should they control 
enterprises but give them conflicting tasks, outcomes may be harmed in a given single field, such as 
innovation.  
We will now apply the principal-agent theory we have discussed to the Chinese innovation system, to 
understand how this system shapes principal-agent relationships, and how these are likely to affect 
innovation in different types of Chinese firms. 
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4. Application of theory to the Chinese innovation system 
 
4.1 Applying Principal-Agent Theory in High-Tech Innovating Firms in China 
The following subsection will apply the principal-agent theory described above to the Chinese 
innovation system, analysing what the theory has to say about the working, and outcomes, of the 
innovation system. Fundamentally, the principal-agent problem we address is one whereby the 
workings of the principal-agent chain mean what the top principals want to achieve may not happen, 
because of the desires of other principals, and agents, further down the political chain.   
 
4.1.1 Outline of principals and agents 
In different types of emerging economies, the institutional context imposes numerous costs and 
problems on the enforcement of agency contracts (Young et al, 2008). As such we should understand 
who in the system we have described are the principals and who are the agents. Rhetorically, the 
Politburo are the agents of the principal, the “people of China”, but in reality this organisation (or its 
seven-man Standing Committee) is the system’s highest principal level. These principals sit at the head 
of a chain (or chains), including the ministries, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (or SASAC, the official owner of most SOEs under the State Council), and the Organisation 
Department (essentially the human resource monitoring organisation of state)14. The managers of 
Chinese firms are the agents, which in the case of SOEs means managers who are also party member 
cadres, and answerable to the various principals of the state. In the case of central ownership, they 
answer to central state principals, and in local they answer to local state principals, who in turn are 
accountable to principals of the central state. For the agents (managers) of entirely private firms, they 
are accountable to different private owners (but usually in China the managers of POEs are themselves 
sole or part-owners); the agent managers of firms of mixed shareholding have a combination of 
principals to which to be accountable (and again in China they are nominally part of this combination).   
The government wants to achieve more successful innovation by the firms it owns, and it does this (as 
we have seen in Chapter 3) by such actions as providing innovation targets and measures with which 
to assess firms’ achievements, by providing selected firms with investment, and by procuring 
innovative products from certain preferred firms. In other words, the principals attempt to induce pro-
innovation management decisions among agents through a combination of funding, monitoring, 
assessment, and incentivisation.  
The relevant policies of the state (especially the Medium- to Long-Term Plan (MLP)) are thus an 
expression of concern by the top principals about agent performance, and an attempt to create a 
more successful innovation environment by bringing about the necessary changes in agent managerial 
behaviour. However, they do this while maintaining the preferences for state firms that the Party’s 
                                                          
14  These chains are generally several in parallel, for centrally-owned SOEs – ministries, SASAC and the 
Organisational Department. 
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top principals deem necessary to maintain their power and economic primacy, in particular in strategic 
technological industries. We will understand the functioning of this system more clearly by breaking 
down the system along principal-agent lines, including agent incentivisation, assessment, principal 
and agent goals, inter-principal conflict, and the effects of the length of the control chain between 
original principals and agents.  
 
4.1.2 Incentivisation and assessment 
The major problems we observe with salaried managers are in shirking, risk avoidance and short-
termism; as we have seen, risk avoidance and short-termism are serious problems in relation to 
innovation. In the previous chapter, the discussion of cadre assessment demonstrated how in some 
ownership contexts, these salaried managers are largely assessed, and may be rewarded, on the basis 
of metrics such as financial performance, which can deal with shirking; but largely does not deal with 
risk avoidance or short-termism. 
In the round, the state wants its managers to innovate successfully, but also appears to embed them 
in a system that cannot provide the necessary long-term incentives for them to make the decisions 
required. Indeed, we have seen in the way they are assessed they are in some ways actually rewarded 
for not doing so.    
The conflicts between longer-term and shorter-term career issues can create mixed and confusing 
incentives for agents. Scholars have considered that long-term contracts dependent on provision of 
“additional information on current activities”, are more important for managerial contracting than for 
short-term work, for which “current observations” are sufficient for performance evaluation 
(Fudenberg, Holmström and Milgrom, 1990), although conclusions drawn from single-period 
scenarios cannot always be applied to multi-period relationships (Lambert, 1983). The actual forms of 
assessment in our case (and the monitoring required for them) create various conflicts that hinder 
state principals’ innovation aims. Although the grand innovation aims of the top principals are 
encapsulated in specific innovation policies, different principals in the chain assess agents for different 
things, giving agents a variety of goals to meet. In essence, using the example of the western venture 
capital case we have mentioned, it appears to be more difficult for state-appointed and state-
monitored managers to safely invest in research typified by severe informational asymmetry and 
uncertain outcomes (compared to venture capitalists who are better able to devise mechanisms to 
reduce risk).  
As a shareholder SASAC’s role as investor meanwhile is broadly nominal, which gives managers more 
opportunity for wasteful projects in their own interests (often at investors’ expense). Furthermore, 
although innovation itself is assessed by patenting output, the Organisation Department also assesses 
agents on a range of other issues, such as “loyalty”, and other markers of firm productivity. 
Meanwhile, using patenting output as a measure for agent assessment is liable to lead to the 
registration of low quality patents. As such, assessment (a form of monitoring), appears to hinder top 
principal aims in many respects, with agents given conflicting assessment by different principals in the 
state principal-agent chain.   
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Although Schumpeter (1942), described consumer “wants” as guiding choices by “the people who 
direct business firms”, in our context what is prescribed for these managers is not simply by the 
“wants” of consumers, but by the principals of the Chinese state, including the considerations the 
party deems useful, which is liable to lead to adverse selection regarding innovation. While standard 
economic theory also stresses managers responding rationally to “wants”, this is limited by the 
assumption of straightforward “rational” frameworks of action. On this point, it is less likely an agent 
will apply any “improvement he might discover” for innovation, rather than “any other course” 
(Babbage, 1835), because of disincentivisation via these assessments. Fama’s (1980, 301) discipline by 
competition “from other firms”, creating “devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the 
entire team and its individual members” is also lacking in the state model, as agents’ activities become 
skewed towards meeting other the assessments of these other monitoring “devices”.  
While listing SOEs was one device designed to secure investment, certain unforeseen consequences 
have arisen in the action of incentives on innovation outcomes. One was the introduction in the 
Company Law of 2006 of manager stock options. Some had doubted before whether this security 
would function in the desired manner, and options have not had the predicted significant positive 
effect on investment in R&D (Li, 2004) (we may speculate that state firms’ soft budgets giving 
continued income have limited their impact). Furthermore, while Chinese Company Law in 2006 
allowed the use of stock options, in 2008 SASAC suspended stock option schemes in listed state firms 
(Caijing Online, 2009), to “strengthen its control” (as we discussed above, stock option schemes were 
not permitted in wholly- and majority- state-owned firms).15 This appears now to apply regardless of 
the level of state with a shareholding (e.g. central, provincial, etc.) (Caijing Online, 2009). 
Although a politico-economic environment will ideally allow the assessments and incentives that 
facilitate innovation, given not only the resource disadvantages that private firms appear to have in 
China but also the soft budget constraints that allow many SOEs that fail to innovate to continue, 
combined with the mixed incentives and assessments state ownership creates, technological change 
in China is likely to be hindered. 
 
4.1.3 Principal-agent conflict 
First, to the problems of the principal-agent chain we should add the conflict that is liable to exist 
between the principals themselves in this multi-principal scenario. As we will see for solar PV, within 
the state the top principals set innovation targets, but also allow principals lower down, such as in the 
Organisation Department, to assess agents in ways that are not conducive to their being met (such as 
the other care assessment metrics we have seen). Furthermore, local vs. central government conflict 
can occur. Local governments have been told by central government both to raise their own GDP and 
their tax take, which can make long-term innovation spending burdensome, on the assumption that 
local government time horizons are shorter than the time to pay-off. Some local governments 
however will help their innovating firms get access to resources, so the effect for agents of local 
                                                          
15 This arose because some of these firms began using stock options without asking SASAC’s approval; assuming 
its control had been threatened, SASAC suspended all stock option schemes for listed firms with state ownership 
(Caijing Online, 2009). 
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principals in the chain may vary. Innovation can be a good medium-term way of raising GDP, but this 
is unlikely to mean “blue sky research”, which has particularly risky and distant payoffs.  
Meanwhile, the principals themselves also exhibit political behaviour problems, which appear as a 
bureaucracy tries to manage an innovation process that would otherwise be more reliant on the 
private sphere. This involves Organisation Department principals not allowing agent-managers to 
remain too long in any single company to stop them “going native”, but which also stops them 
developing a deep technical knowledge of company processes (Da, 2010) – or having the necessary 
long time horizons. “Though some argue that the nature of those principal–agent problems may differ 
little depending on whether ownership is public (state) or private’’ (Stiglitz, 1994, 30, in Qu, 2003), Qu 
(2003, 776) thus states that “property rights theory generally suggests that state ownership is 
inefficient”.  
Qu (2003, 776) finds the “top priority of government” to be “preserving and increasing the value of 
state properties”, despite it being difficult to verify “which management decisions are actually value-
increasing or not”. There also exist the short-termist assessments determining the next career posting 
of an official, and in applying these to technology investment, officials may lack incentives to invest 
long-term in R&D: “especially in the state-dominated PLCs, most board members and managers are 
still having a corresponding status of civil service, their remuneration promotions are still relying on 
the assessments of their superiors in the political and administrative hierarchy”. Managers need not 
worry that bad management will lead to their firm being taken over, as holders of public shares cannot 
“vote with their feet” (Qu, 2003, 778); this also implies that managers have little incentive for the long-
term investments required to stimulate emergence of unexpected types of new knowledge (Edquist 
and Johnson, 1997), as this is liable to go unnoticed. In other words, the government wants R&D but 
the long chain may prevent it, through actions such as cadre assessment (and the demands of mixed 
principals). The relationships in this hierarchy also lead to the particular problems of information 
asymmetry.  
 
4.1.4 Information asymmetry and moral hazard in the Chinese innovation system 
Unlike private venture capitalists at the other extreme, the monitoring principals lack the needed 
technical expertise discussed. State principals are also likely to have low engagement, given their other 
responsibilities. These factors create massive potential information asymmetry and resulting moral 
hazard. Thus in place of expertise and real monitoring ability they use the superficial targets we have 
described for agents to meet. In reality (suggest scholars including Da, 2010) this may mean spending 
enough of their (plentiful) state investment on R&D to quickly acquire low quality patents, while also 
spending on IP licenses, and bundled technology, plus turnkey equipment, for rapid new products and 
processes. For agent-cadres, a bonus leading to the innovative output principals desire would have to 
involve a long-term payoff, but it may be more “rational” for cadres as individuals to focus on the 
short-term benefits to their state career. Chinese cadres also face a problem of diluted responsibility, 
knowing that a single business unit will have little impact on overall state innovation goals.  
If incentives remain unaligned, delegation itself remains problematic, because of the existence of 
different objectives (as we described in Arrow, 1963a). The problem here is not simply the concern 
about what the agent’s incentive may be, but how an agent’s incentive to drive innovation can be 
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aligned with their other incentives (e.g. to maintain employment) in SOEs, compared to the incentives 
for managers who only have to answer to private, commercially-focused principals. This implies that 
adding principals (creating a multi-principal situation) through private shareholding (or foreign private 
shareholding) may actually simplify incentives if the private/foreign shareholder, and reduces the 
impact of the superfluous goals set by the state.   
The very existence of moral hazard may imply that giving agents incentives gives only limited 
correction for information asymmetry problems. Studies have thus replaced incentives with coercive 
systems of rules and supervision (again in insurance, Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) showed how 
incentives only reduce moral hazard). By implication, without constant agent monitoring ability, strong 
incentives will be needed. Essentially the Chinese state tries, via the Organisation Department’s cadre 
promotion mechanisms, to do both, but does so via monitoring performance for a range of conflicting 
achievements: demanding R&D but assessing short-term outputs (like new production facilities), and 
seeking creative destruction technologically but demanding a mindset which is loyal to the party. 
We saw (in section 2.4.4) that what incentives managers have to carry out R&D do not necessarily 
take into account that these investments are often long-term. The particular version of this 
phenomenon in China is that the grading of managers by the state along numerous other metrics is 
likely to create disincentives to carry out R&D. Furthermore, in China the state creates innovation 
incentives such as patent metrics that may distract from proper long-term R&D horizons, such that 
the very act of trying to close the informational asymmetry gap creates a problem for the direction of 
R&D investment.  
As we have seen, private ownership does not generally attempt to operate the same way: for example, 
the “directors of a firm clearly specify to the CEO that they expect profits—but they do not constrain 
the CEO by specifying a particular procedure” (Miller, 2005, 215), which would constrain the CEO’s 
profit-oriented work, and require “constant monitoring”. It is the market that is expected to discipline 
managers (which also, ideally, applies to rewarding R&D spending in new product markets). The 
Chinese state however urges tech firms to innovate, then constrains agents’ actions by ranking them 
on such markers as indigenous IP registrations, including utility patents. These incentives are an 
attempt to overcome informational asymmetry by directing agent actions, but may skew the direction 
of effort towards low quality innovation. It has been stated that this “procedural-control” argument 
“represents a discontinuity with [principal-agency theory], rather than a simple extension of it” (Miller, 
2005, 215), but it can be seen as an attempt to deal with the principal-agent problem itself.  
 
4.1.5 The divergence of our case from classical theory 
At this point it is worth referring back to Miller (2005), to see how our case differs from the classical 
theoretical norms he has described. Regarding information asymmetry, state principals may not be 
able to observe outcomes (or agent actions), which involve long-term innovation output, so they 
cannot reward agents accordingly. As for initiative being with a unified principal, we have another 
problem. The principal’s preferences may not allow them to act rationally for innovation- the state is 
not unified, but consists of different groups with different aims, the aims of the Organisation 
Department, being different to those of SASAC. Backward induction based on common knowledge is 
also very doubtful, with the state simply having too many agents to monitor (however, as we will 
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discuss, smaller numbers of agents may be found at lower, local levels of government, allowing better 
knowledge of firms’ innovation). But if the state lacks this knowledge of agent response function, the 
state principal must also lack a swathe of bargaining power. Regarding “results”, it is precisely the first 
result that demonstrates that attempting to impose outcome-based incentives for firms’ innovation 
may not overcome moral hazard problems. Demanding innovation from (short-termist) cadres may 
lead them to simply buy the latest equipment, not make long-term investment from which they 
personally will not benefit. Thus the agents resist risk being transferred to them. Outcome-based 
bonuses to control the efficiency tradeoff are thus hard to secure, and judging firms by patent output 
to achieve this may lead to lower grade patenting. 
Here we should also refer back to Smith, in asking whether principals – the masters he described – 
actually have most of the bargaining power in our case. Just as performance-related pay has been 
discussed in classical contexts, principals try to promote agents according to achievement, but this 
creates problems in their behaviour that differ to those found in previous contexts.  
While our context differs, it also suggests that principals have difficulty directing agent behaviour. We 
saw that Holmström’s (1979) “informativeness” solution required contracts covering “relative 
performance evaluation”, measured against other similar agents, but in our context the “noise” 
effects in cadre evaluation, in the other performance areas demanded of them, are liable to be severe. 
Many assume “classical forms of economic behaviour on the part of agents within the firm” (Fama, 
1980, 301), but we deal with agents in a more complex career situation.  
Principal-agent theory allows powerful insights into how a particular economic system actually 
functions, and offers a correction to neoclassical economic models for our case. Scholars have 
hypothesised that the market will help innovation through companies orienting themselves to 
consumer choice: we discussed Schumpeter (1911, 41), who foresaw a “decentralisation of power to 
consumers”, whereby “people who direct business firms [execute] what is prescribed for them by 
wants”, because “individuals have influence [as] consumers”. Yet we have seen that the efficient 
market system that enforces competition between agents is often severely hindered by the apparatus 
of state. These ownership structures will dictate just how much any given principal gains from the 
success of agents below him, or how much an agent gains from his firm’s success under his 
management. As we discussed (in section 2.4.4), In the nexus of state management, Fama’s (1980, 
301) insight, that “in the team… each manager is concerned with the performance of managers above 
and below him since his marginal product is likely to be a positive function of theirs”, is dependent on 
how strongly particular aspects of “success” can be rewarded, and how much one firm affects the 
success that a “shareholder” seeks.  
 
4.1.6 Ownership, governance and innovation in different Chinese enterprise types 
At this stage we should consider how the range of different forms of ownership affect corporate 
governance, and in doing so impact R&D in Chinese firms. We will consider the main principal-agent 
phenomena that we have described, and suggest their application to the broad Chinese ownerships 
types.  
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Comparable enquiries have been pursued in other non-Chinese contexts, with authors connecting 
R&D and patenting to corporate governance, and ultimately to principal-agent questions. We have 
referred to Driver and Coelho Guedes (2012, 1575), who investigated corporate governance and 
ownership effects on R&D. Their evidence suggested that greater governance reduces R&D activity, 
although a CEO ownership stake (giving CEOs “skin in the game”) supported it, to which we shall 
return. Their evidence for the negative effect of high governance on R&D contradicts the “good 
governance” view, but supports “the importance of managerial security and autonomy” in sustaining 
potentially hazardous investments: firms with strong governance may ration R&D expenditure to 
increase dividends, or divert spending to projects with faster payback, while large institutional 
holdings also appear to hinder R&D. The phenomena that may be at work in this context – the impact 
of risk aversion and particularly short-termism – were considered by scholars we have also discussed.  
As well as beginning the formal study of labour relations in general, Smith for example noted that 
managers may neglect attending to the requirements of principals, “because in the one case they get 
the whole profits for themselves” (Smith, 1776, 277). Managers are liable to invest with an eye to their 
own advancement, and therefore to the appearance of actions beneficial to the principals; “being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot be well expected, that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance” (Smith, 1776, 124), in other words they are likely 
to consider their own gains first. His suggestion of “performance measurement”, is a reaction that 
governance can increase. However this may simply skew performance towards risk-averse and short-
termist choices by managers that appear useful to principals.  
According to the theory, risk-aversion and short-termism are two of the major factors affecting 
investment decisions. For any manager to invest in R&D requires a risk, in that this money will take a 
considerable time to create any noticeable result, if any, which means this investment could be made 
elsewhere to more immediate gain for a manager – either in financial return, or success that is 
immediately visible to a principal. Thus risk-aversion and short-termism are closely connected. Firms 
in China, but also elsewhere, thus follow short-term horizons, which can harm long-run R&D projects. 
Although studies of the determinants of R&D expenditure are still relatively rare, questions this has 
raised about the effects of corporate governance and finance on innovation have led authors to use 
principal-agent theory to test what channels of influence exist from corporate governance to R&D 
spending.  
It therefore follows that, in China, investments in R&D will be more successful in the corporate 
governance situations where managers, first, have an incentive to make them at all, and to invest in 
innovation over the long-term (rather than for apparent short-term “display”) such as benefitting by 
reimbursement or reputation. Further, investments will be more successful when principals will 
benefit from the innovative success of a single firm, requiring both some level of technological 
expertise (for successful, qualitative monitoring), and presumably being able to focus on the 
monitoring of a smaller number of firms, instead of a huge spread. These factors for agents and 
managers can express themselves in different forms.  
Managers need to see that the legal environment will make such investments worthwhile, by allowing 
them to protect any patents that arise (Driver and Coelho Guedes (2012) described a theory of 
investment under uncertainty where signals for profitable investment are given when the marginal 
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addition to “firm values accruing from the investment” is above incremental cost: in other words 
managers need to know they can reap gains from investments).  
Managers as we have seen also need the prospect not just of protection for innovation, but of reward: 
otherwise they are liable to spend money on projects that give more immediate personal gain. While 
managers may wish to use resources productively, agency problems see them often lacking the 
incentives for these resources’ efficient deployment. Li and Xia (2008) found that resources are 
frequently used instead for “empire building”.  
Meanwhile, the problem of principals with a lack of technological expertise leads to adverse selection 
in innovation. China experiences clear cases of this problem (as distinct from moral hazard), and it is 
one that is best revealed through understanding the actions of venture capitalists (VCs). If funders are 
ignorant of the technology or at least the more advanced technologies in an industry, high information 
asymmetry with respect to “technology-intensive” firms exists. Should they choose to invest in firms 
planning to make money out of advanced technologies in the industry, they may be unable to tell good 
from bad (we assume that the agents – prospective managers – can). Here we should start to consider 
how different types of ownership among Chinese firms affects information asymmetry, risk-aversion 
and short-termism in particular.   
In the information asymmetry above, in some cases state investors may not be concerned, because 
with soft budgets the main question is to fund well-connected state-owned or state-backed firms 
(which they know will have better survival prospects). In this case they may fund mainly poorer 
technology-intensive firms, while the better ones are acquired by foreign VCs, which are more 
concerned with recognising their quality and will thus offer a better deal. (Sometimes state-owned 
VCs may “piggy back” on the foreign VCs, leading to MISOE ownership as opposed to pure private.)   
In other cases they may need to make income more urgently, leading to the choice of “technology-
light” firms: “trying to be first to market with a certain business model or service new to China or at 
least slightly differentiated from what was already on the market… [or] start-ups trying to survive by 
taking advantage of connections to the state to feed at the trough of state procurement” (Fuller, 2008, 
21). Either option leaves relatively little innovation, or patenting, even if in the first case there may be 
a lot of R&D. Fuller (2008, 22) has carried out research in IT-related start-ups, which found that among 
foreign VCs’ investments, a higher proportion were technology-intensive investments than among 
domestic VCs. In fact, almost all the tech-intensive investments done by the latter (16 out of 18) were 
done through “piggy backing” on the foreign VCs. This is to say that lacking the means to reduce 
informational asymmetry themselves, state investors rely on combining with domestic private and/or 
foreign investors.  
In the western context, various scholars’ work suggests no firm conclusion about whether more 
principal involvement is beneficial for R&D (Lhuillery (2011) finds that principals involved in 
governance had a positive impact on R&D intensity; Kor (2006) found that outsider investors had no 
effect on either R&D intensity, and Baysinger et al (1991) found negative relationships). In China 
however, the most important difference appears to be the short-termism that some types of principal 
involvement, and oversight, can create.    
As we have seen, with state ownership, a principal being composed in theory of the entire Chinese 
people means a principal with extremely poor monitoring ability. We have seen that their more 
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immediate monitoring principal, SASAC, has a very limited, if not entirely nominal, place as investor, 
and instead managers must keep in mind the assessments of the Organisation Department. Instead 
of allowing the longer-term investments required for successful R&D, the Organisation Department 
often cycles managers between SOEs over short periods of time, meaning they are more incentivised 
to buy in equipment that is immediately visible to the principals who assess them (creating Freeman’s 
“technology dependency” described above), or pursue quantitative patenting strategies, which may 
mean applying for numerous lower-value utility patents. Accordingly, Zhang (1998, 232) finds that as 
“ultimate shareholder of most Chinese listed companies”, the state creates ineffective corporate 
governance and “unsatisfactory corporate performance”. According to Wei and Geng (2008), SOEs’ 
performance falls below government expectations, with their facilities and technology “out-of-date” 
even by 2008, suggesting their R&D spending and/or its direction has been sub-optimal. (Although Li 
and Xia (2008) do not have an R&D or patent focus, they state that since reforms began, SOE managers 
have gained autonomy through decentralised control, but to continue obtaining state resources, they 
pursue government-mandated goals, as SOE managers are also government officials.) 
Thus state ownership, as we have seen, may provide superior resources in some cases, but hinders 
successful R&D by creating short-termist goals among its agent-managers. Meanwhile private firms 
often have managers with strong personal incentives for successful R&D investment, but lacking other 
investment they must often rely on resources, especially finance, from a network of family and friends 
(Li and Xia, 2008), while they also lack the legal protections for innovations that are enjoyed by state-
owned firms. This leads us to suggest that hybrid ownership, combining some state and private 
shareholding, will allow management to benefit from private incentives, without the state control 
over agent assessment that creates short-termist investment choices around R&D (particularly if state 
shareholding is in the minority), but with both the legal protections and resource provision of state 
ownership. The remaining question is around the impacts of shareholding by different levels of the 
state, being central or sub-central government.  
Wang (2005, 149) finds that some research suggests “that the state’s retained shareholdings in listed 
firms have been responsible for their poor profitability. However, these studies have shortcomings as 
they fail to properly identify and distinguish among the different types of owners” (my italics). Another 
study, by Chen et al (2009), also analyses the efficiency of state and private holdings of listed firms by 
subdividing ownership by the state into its various agencies. This shows how “operating efficiency 
[varies by] type of controlling shareholders. SOECG [central government-affiliated] controlled firms 
perform best and SAMB [the State-owned Assets Management Bureau, i.e. SASAC’s predecessor] and 
private controlled firms perform worst. SOELG [local government-affiliated] controlled firms are in the 
middle” (Chen et al, 2009, 171). This admittedly outdated subdivision of state-owned enterprises 
demonstrated that different ownership levels within the state generate (or help to generate) 
divergent levels of “performance”. We should note however that this study and others deal with 
“operating efficiency” (referring to labour productivity), and as the “SOECGs” are provided with large 
supplies of cheap capital, unlike private firms, they will more easily register high labour productivity. 
In terms of the success of R&D investment in creating innovation meanwhile, more local state 
ownership is likely to allow better oversight, with principals responsible for fewer firms, meaning they 
will be more concerned by any given firm’s ability to sell innovative product, and better able to 
monitor agents’ R&D investments, plus increasing agents’ concern for their reputation in a smaller 
locality.   
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We have brought together examples of how the standard principal-agent theory is lacking for our 
context, and how China’s state structure creates very particular principal-agent and moral hazard 
problems. Conversely, and as we saw in our discussion of the levels of government above, the further 
away from central state majority ownership one goes, the smaller the investment sums available 
appear to be, but with reduced moral hazard, and less muddled aims among agents. The implication 
is that the incentives of management can be better aligned with pro-innovation decisions.  
 
In summary, we have seen how state ownership seems likely to grant more resource to firms for 
innovation, but concurrently the monitoring and incentive system for example may also harm 
incentives for them to innovate; private ownership however is liable to do the reverse, while also 
presenting privately owned firms with a risk of having their IP infringed, given that they lack the same 
protection as state firms. We have also covered the difference in the principal-agent relations 
between central and local levels of the state. Meanwhile it appears that some combination of state 
and private management may be to the advantage of innovation.   
Having begun by outlining the accepted premises of principal-agent theory, we applied the theory first 
to high-tech innovation in general, then having described China’s innovation system, applied theory 
to high-tech innovating firms in China, demonstrating the areas of better and worse fit for our context. 
This subsection has explained how we are adapting standard principal-agent theory to a non-western, 
state-led, multi-principal innovation environment. As we are employing patenting as a metric with 
which to assess Chinese firms, we now discuss the use of patenting and R&D data in such studies. 
 
 
4.2 Discussion of patent studies 
4.2.1 Rationale for the study of patents 
In the following section we will explain the aims behind the study of patents and firms’ patenting in 
general, how patents and collections of patents can be valued, the connections between both R&D 
and patenting and litigation and patenting, and what patent studies can tells us about the relative 
technological abilities of firms. For despite what Nesta and Saviotti (2004) call a general awareness of 
the increasingly important position of knowledge in development (following Schumpeter, 1911), 
economics has a comparatively limited range of “analytical tools” for the systematic analysis of the 
dynamics of knowledge creation and utilisation (Nesta and Saviotti, 2004). 
Patents have thus come into common use in judging specific instances of innovation, but also as 
indicators of innovative ability within organisations. Thus patent data provides a resource for analysing 
technological change, and can be used to study more long-run, between-firm differences in inventive 
activity. This can be in tandem with, or should it be lacking, as a substitute for, R&D information 
(Griliches et al, 1986). One may, for example, use firms’ patenting distribution (by technological field) 
to establish their position in a “technological space”. As we will discuss, various lines of inquiry have 
also asked how to assess the value of patents, then what they may tell us about the capabilities of 
patent-registering firms. 
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The study of patents is driven by the broad desire to find indicators of innovative activity, and Griliches 
(1986) describes a patent as a “minimal quantum of invention”, as approved by a patent office, which 
indicates “a non-negligible expectation” about the marketability of an invention; the limitation of 
course is that not all inventions can be patented, because some may not be made public, while there 
are huge quality variations within patenting. This has led to much debate about how to value patents 
themselves (as we will discuss below). 
Schmookler (1952) used patents as an index of inventive “activity”, being an index of input, rather 
than inventive output. Like Solow, Schmookler saw the study of patenting as part of the study of 
drivers of economic growth (Griliches, 1990), but adopted a narrow interpretation of inventive 
activity, excluding research, which he considered to be the search for new knowledge generally. He 
also excluded development, which he saw as the refinement of existing inventions. In other words, 
the study of patenting as an R&D indicator has since broadened considerably from Schmookler’s input 
definition, or “work specifically directed towards the formulation of the essential properties of a novel 
product or process” (Schmookler, 1966, 8) (yet we should recall that R&D and technical workforce 
statistics as alternative input indicators were very limited before the 1950s).   
Broadly, patents have steadily become used as measures of general technological change in an 
economy, and of innovative capacity within specific firms (and of the connection between the two). 
Studies have for example used patents as technical change indicators and related them to sales in 
firms (e.g. Comanor and Scherer, 1969). This study related pharmaceutical patents both to number of 
new chemical entities and to all new products introduced by different firms in the following years, 
finding a closer relationship between patent applications (instead of grants) with all new products 
(instead of just number of chemical entities). Other early examples include Scherer (1965a), who 
demonstrated a relationship between patenting rates and profitability in a cross-section of companies. 
Although patents cannot represent all inventions (von Graevenitz, Wagner and Harhoff, 2011), patents 
have been found to be a useful proxy of innovative output at multiple levels over time, with citations 
also found to correlate to a useful degree with actual knowledge flow (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 
2000). They also suggested that studies now need to go deeper, but also wider, for example analysing 
past practice using such sources as USPTO data (for depth), then linking to other sources (for width), 
which our study does. 
Broadly, there are now two main quantitative data sources in innovation studies, R&D expenditure 
and patents, with R&D usually seen as a proxy indicator for input, with patents used as a proxy of 
technological output, although their merits as proxies have been debated. The use of patents has been 
criticised on the grounds that changing motives for patent applications over time may affect rates of 
patent applications (Fai, 2005), because of varying patenting propensity between firms and across 
industries, and variation between jurisdictions in the quality requirements for patent registration. That 
Schumpeter regarded invention simply as an idea or knowledge preceding product development has 
also caused some critics to suggest that patents only capture the former (Fai, 2005). We follow Fai’s 
view, that as long as the “pattern of knowledge requirements” reflects a real underlying pattern of 
technological capabilities, patents can be used as a proxy for underlying realities of technological 
change, not simply as a crude measure of “inventions”, meaning motivations for patent application 
become irrelevant. Also, if just one national system is employed for comparison between patent-
registering firms or other entities, the potential problem of differences in patent standards between 
jurisdictions is very much reduced. 
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Patent data is also increasingly commonly used to study national competitiveness, constructing 
technology advantage indexes and analysing the global locations of inventive activity for various 
industries (e.g. Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 1990); patents have also been used by economic historians to 
analyse regional economic growth patterns (Griliches, 1990). In particular, a significant independent 
effect by patents on firms’ market value has been established (e.g. Griliches, 1981). It is to valuing 
these patents specifically that we now turn.  
 
4.2.2 Approaches to patent valuation 
It is important to understand the background to valuing patents in order to build our own method. 
Studies in the 1950s continued to try to establish patent values for companies, or as Griliches (1981) 
put it, the average value of the inventions represented by patents. One of the early sources of data on 
this area was through surveying patent owners, in particular the 1957 survey by Barkev, Sanders and 
associates at the Patent and Trademarks Foundation (US). The authors conducted a 1957 postal survey 
of the owners and assignees of a 2% sample of all the patents issued in 1938, 1948, and 1952, with 
two major findings: first, the majority of all sampled patents had been “used” commercially (at the 
time or in the past), at over 55% of respondents (the percentage in use was higher for small firms, 
although so too was rate of non-response). This contradicted the idea that most patents were not 
used, or not connected to notable innovation.  
Discussion of how to establish the value of patents for firms was continued by Nordhaus (1967), in 
analysing observable and latent patent value. The use of patent renewal information to establish 
patent value was pioneered by Pakes (1986), and Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam (1998), and backward 
citations have been used since Carpenter et al (1980): the former refers to patents being renewed as 
an indication of their usefulness to the owner, and the latter to other patents cited in the application, 
demonstrating that it draws on other innovations. Backward citations are also seen as a way of 
assessing patents’ technical novelty: Carpenter et al (1980) for example found that references to 
scientific literature correlate to patent value. Questions of patent breadth, and their impact on patent 
value were introduced by Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990). Breadth of a patent has 
been used by Lerner (1994) and others, who showed how the value of American biotechnology firms 
rises with patent scope (measured by number of IPCs, or International Patent Classifications, the 
technological fields a patent covers). The next stage was the discussion of patents’ inventiveness in 
the form of “technical non-obviousness”, by Greene and Scotchmer (1995), followed by Gallini (1992), 
who found that a good deal of patent value could be determined by the difficulty of “inventing 
around” the patent.  
A range of other valuation methods have been introduced, such as forward citations, by which later 
applications cite the patent, suggesting that it is genuinely useful innovation (since Trajtenberg, 1990), 
patent scope (or the technological area it claims to cover, since Lerner, 1994), and family size (Putnam, 
1996 and Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004), while number of claims (i.e. the technical extent of the 
protection sought by the application (Tong and Frame, 1992)), are also employed in patent value 
studies. Less commonly the legal arguments used in a patent application have also been used (by 
Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004, and Harhoff et al, 1999). Although related to non-obviousness, 
Greene and Scotchmer (1995) first used the term “novelty” in an economic context, taking the degree 
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of novelty needed to meet the requirements to receive a patent as determining patents’ value for 
holders (Reitzig, 2003).  
It now also seems clear that the “difficulty to invent around” also affects patent value, given that 
patents are intended to block competitors’ research (i.e. minor improvements to a previous patent 
imply a patent is easier to invent around). In discussing “disclosure”, Greene and Scotchmer (1995) 
introduced another value parameter. They assume that disclosing technical information gives 
competitors information, which may mean inventors choose secrecy instead of patenting. However, 
it may be that the confidence needed to disclose demonstrates a genuine innovative lead. In the 
round, there is no official measure of patent value, although these general parameters are seen as 
being useful, and inform our own choice of parameters.  
For firms themselves, Pakes’s (1986) paper also suggests that firms will apply for patents early in the 
process of invention, a point at which uncertainty around returns is severe: thus patenting firms later 
gain more information on patents’ real value. Most end up being of little value, although the 
occasional winners still justify the investments needed to launch them. Indeed, Griliches (1998) also 
finds that the majority of individual patents have little value, and that most “inventiveness” comes 
from a small proportion of the most valuable patents. This means the ability to find (and to generate) 
genuine inventiveness is what counts among the mass of patents. Although Griliches (1981) finds this 
leads to relatively pessimistic implications for using overall patent counts as indicators of short-run 
changes in the output that comes from R&D input, the implication for this thesis is that inventive 
patenting provides a good general indicator for a firm, if not of year-on-year changes. 
Firms’ competitive use of patent data also suggests the usefulness of patent valuation. Firms now use 
patent data in intelligence gathering: Rivette and Klein (2000) show that firms had started using USPTO 
patent registration information to understand acquisition targets’ technological capability, and to help 
set prices for intangible assets (e.g. IP) which did not normally enter accounts. So patents provide “the 
best means of measuring the concepts of accumulated technological capabilities and competences” 
(Fai, 2005, an insight which has also been used to update the competence- and resource-based 
approach to the firm). Griliches (1990) states that no other method rivals the data volume available, 
or its technological and industrial detail. Indeed, as some investment into China by foreign 
multinationals is moving from being market-seeking to competence-seeking, scholars have asked 
what Chinese patent data can tell us about the location of the domestic firms in which these 
competences are located (Fai, 2005). 
Comanor and Scherer (1969) asked how well an invention patent count could act as a surrogate for 
two other measures of technological change: R&D staff (an input measure), and new product sales (an 
output measure). Their conclusion was that patents were more closely correlated with the number of 
R&D staff than with the number of professional staff in general. It therefore appears that the 
companies which have more R&D staff and more new product launches also apply for and are granted 
more patents. A combined “research productivity” measure is therefore generally created by the 
patents-to-R&D ratio, and simply counting overall patents can lead to a misleading impression of real 
research output, which Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) state may be used alongside a model of 
patent quality which, they suggest, uses four separate indicators: number of claims, forward citations, 
backward citations, and family size.  
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4.2.3 The connection of patents to R&D 
Any study employing both metrics should understand the relationship, if any, between the two. 
Research into the connection between R&D and patenting has been growing since the 1960s, Scherer 
(1965a) and Schmookler (1966) being early examples. Although it remains concentrated in certain 
technological sectors, especially pharmaceuticals, and is mainly focused on the Anglo-American 
shareholder context, research falls into various streams, especially: analysing possible links between 
R&D and productivity growth (e.g. Griliches, 1986a and Bronwyn Hall, 1993); using patents as 
indicators of the effort that goes into R&D to understand patterns in knowledge-production (Griliches 
et al, 1990; Kortum, 1993); and analysing movements in patents, R&D, and market value (Pakes, 1985, 
and Cuneo and Mairesse, 1983). 
In the first area, Griliches et al (1986) find that when a firm alters its R&D expenditures, parallel 
changes occur in patenting levels. This varies however: industries with higher than average patents-
to-R&D ratios were chemicals, drugs, petroleum, engines, construction/farm machinery, aircraft and 
electrical equipment, but other industries patented less than average for firms doing equal amounts 
of R&D. For larger firms in the sample, patenting was broadly proportional to R&D (although smaller 
firms showed somewhat more patenting per unit of R&D, these were a smaller group). Cockburn and 
Griliches (1987) observe that industries with a lower tendency to patent per unit of R&D include large 
R&D-spending industries with considerable support from government for research, including motor 
vehicles and aircraft. However this may be less applicable in China, with patenting encouraged by 
government.     
So although patents represent by no means all R&D output, with only some appearing as patents, a 
rather strong relationship exists between R&D and number of patents granted, across industries and 
firms (Pakes and Griliches, 1984), with patents a good indicator of “unobserved inventive output”. 
Bound et al (1982) demonstrate that this relationship is not just due to size differences, plotting 
patents and R&D per unit of firm assets. Within-firms time-series show a median R-square around 0.3, 
yet the evidence remains that a change to R&D expenditures results in a change to patent numbers 
(Griliches, 1998). 
In western contexts overall however, the relationship appears a close one. While differences between 
industries in terms of patenting propensity exist, with electronic firms using patents to protect 
innovations more often (while mechanical industries favoured secrecy), Mansfield (1986) found that 
firms apply to patent 66-87% of all patentable inventions, and Archibugi (1992) found 40-60% of all 
patented inventions will become (commercial) innovations.  
Patents are usually applied for relatively early in research projects (hence the use of studying patent 
applications), and as most of the R&D spend goes on development itself, most time-series variance in 
the variable comes from differential success in developing existing projects, not starting new ones. 
King (2004) also notes it is important to recognise input-output time-lags in R&D. Leydesdorff and 
Wagner (2009) find that a two-year time lag between input and output is appropriate for highly 
aggregated data, while Prodan (2005) showed that a 1-3 year time-lag between input and output gives 
solid “explained variance in technology output” (as we will discuss later). 
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Studies of firms’ size, R&D and patenting have found that both very small and very large companies 
are generally more R&D-intensive than average sized companies. Bound et al (1982) found that a 
strong relationship between R&D and patenting exists, particularly among small firms, where those 
which carry out R&D patent more on average per unit of R&D spend than larger firms (in their US-
focused sample, these authors found that firms with R&D programmes over $1-2m have an almost 
constant patenting to R&D ratio, save for firms at the top end of R&D programme size; the study 
differs from Scherer (1965), who focused only on the largest corporates). Both Scherer and Bound et 
al find slight diminishing returns at the highest intensity of R&D inputs. Bound et al also point out that 
much work (notably Pakes and Griliches (1980)) has generally shown a marked contemporaneous 
relationship between R&D and patent applications, although there also appears to be total elasticity 
nearer one if lagged R&D is included. Some surveys have also found that patent-to-R&D ratios seem 
dominated by what could be mainly irrelevant fluctuations in R&D numbers (such as the Yale Survey, 
in Levin et al, 1987, which found little relevant cross-industry variability). 
Authors have asked how R&D as a “competence” can benefit firms. For “organisational competences” 
to be sources of competitive advantage they must meet three conditions: be heterogeneously 
distributed within an industry, impossible to buy or sell in the available factor markets at less than 
true marginal value, and be difficult to replicate (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). There are many 
possible causes of heterogeneity, but authors (e.g. Dierickx and Cool, 1989), suggest that having 
unique R&D capacities fits this model. Numerous studies have now demonstrated that there are 
severe differences between firms in ability to conduct R&D into new product lines (e.g. Henderson, 
1993).     
Organisations’ “architectural competence” meanwhile allows them to use “component 
competencies”, integrating them in new ways. For our purposes this is clearly connected to firms’ 
locations in the Chinese state structure. This architectural competence has various aspects. Research 
performance seems to be associated with an ability to “span the boundaries of the firm” (Henderson, 
and Cockburn, 1994, after Allen, 1977): hence firms that develop “gatekeepers”, or individuals who 
bridge the gap between firm and environment (so stimulating information transfer between them) 
are likely to outperform others. However, it may be difficult for Chinese private firms to do this safely. 
Yet the ability to cross these boundaries appears increasingly important, with the technological 
paradigm changing from a closed to open innovation system (Chesbrough, 2003). Although firms 
gained an advantage in closed systems by funding R&D units to launch new technologies, in an open 
innovation system, firms may buy others’ technologies, and apply their IP in other markets (Lee and 
Lee, 2008). China’s need for firms with the architectural competence to both integrate and protect 
new knowledge is clear16.  
 
4.2.4 Firm protection and infringement 
Scholars have noted that patents’ effectiveness as an appropriability mechanism affects firms’ 
incentives to carry out R&D (Levin et al, 1987). By implication, an environment that hinders the ability 
                                                          
16 Notably there are also constraints on R&D data in the Chinese case: Boeing et al (2013) find comprehensive 
data on R&D expenditures to be unavailable for listed Chinese firms, meaning even listed firms (as well as 
unlisted) present data obstacles in this regard. 
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of some firms to protect patents will harm this incentive. Overall, patents’ effectiveness as an 
appropriation mechanism for R&D returns is not constant, and firms’ returns on patent protection will 
differ depending on industry and firm conditions even in western contexts (Cockburn and Griliches, 
1987). However, as Cockburn and Griliches point out, environment, through level of appropriability, 
does determine the returns patenting can produce: thus the politico-legal environment will influence 
firms’ decision to innovate in the first place, by carrying out R&D.  
As we have seen, a firm’s ability to protect its patents appears strongly to influence its decision to 
carry out R&D, and to apply to patent. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) find that risk of litigation is 
higher if patents are owned by firms with smaller patent portfolios, and small patentees have a 
notable disadvantage in protecting patent rights, because their greater risk of being litigated is not 
balanced by faster resolution of suits (it is also less costly to protect a given patent if it is in a larger 
portfolio). Thus risk appears to be increased by the ability of larger state entities to use the legal 
system. 
This portfolio effect also seems stronger for smaller firms (measured by staff). For them, having a 
patent portfolio is likely to be a central method of avoiding litigation, while bigger companies are 
better able to depend on repeated interaction with other firms - in both IP and product markets - to 
discipline behavior (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). Although these authors have found that in 
more concentrated technology areas, where patenting is dominated by fewer firms, companies are 
also less likely to become involved in infringement suits (and will more likely encounter the same 
disputants over time, predicting higher inclination to settle). Large Chinese state conglomerates’ 
power to circumvent infringement rules may limit other firms’ willingness to patent however, which 
may hinder in particular the innovation output of private competitors.   
Indeed, small firms seem to actively avoid R&D in areas where litigation threats from bigger firms are 
more severe (Lanjouw and Lerner, 2004). Even when firms can settle patent disputes without suits, 
the threat of being able to litigate will influence settlement terms – thus affecting incentives to do 
R&D. Levin et al (1984) also find that the ability to appropriate the returns from R&D is essential if 
firms are to have the incentive to invest in it. Cockburn and Griliches (1987) used the Yale survey 
measures of the appropriability environment in which firms find themselves to gather evidence of 
interaction between industry level measures of patents’ effectiveness, and market valuation of firms’ 
R&D and patenting level (as R&D capital is around 14% of total value of other assets, by implication 
such a change in appropriability environment would nearly double valuation). Given that companies 
with bigger portfolios are more likely to patent innovations, they could have more patents that are 
not worth litigating. Despite this, it seems there is no evidence that average patent quality falls with 
larger portfolios (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). However, poor appropriability or ability to protect 
can lead to underinvestment in developing technology. With technical change the leading cause of 
economic growth, this means firms’ access to reliable protection if they are to apply for patents has 
serious ramifications for China.  
Patents for products have been considered more effective than for processes, but in protecting 
products generally, lead times, learning curves, and service or sales efforts have been seen as more 
effective still than patenting (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). In these authors’ sample, only 20% 
thought product patents were as commercially effective as sales or service efforts; indeed, the 
perceived ineffectiveness of patents in numerous industries leads us to ask why firms apply for them. 
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Here, executives describe two motives for patenting: one is measuring R&D employees’ performance, 
and the second is for gaining access to foreign markets, including to permit licensing. Investment in 
these R&D staff however is affected by the extent that rivals can learn about innovators’ technology, 
knowledge of which may assist rivals’ R&D effort by enhancing productivity. Nelson and Winter, and 
Spence, are among those who have created models to establish the different offsetting effects: Spence 
(1974) called these the “incentive and efficiency effects of interfirm spillovers”. Although in various 
categories of innovation, some industries reported that patents actually reduce costs and/or time 
needed for duplication, Chinese firms still need to be able to patent to enable them to compete at the 
domestic and foreign level, which as we have seen provides a major patenting incentive.  
Despite the correlation between patent effectiveness and costs of imitating patented products, in 
several industries patents were relatively ineffective, but duplication costs remained high. In this case 
products’ complexity may make reverse engineering more costly even with weak patent protection 
(although given its wide technological scope, the effect for solar PV will vary. Studies by Mansfield, 
Schwarz and Wagner (1981) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) have all found that patents 
generally raise imitation costs, and that the costs and time required for duplication are related to 
patent effectiveness. Meanwhile, many firms believe that only a few competitors are capable of 
actually duplicating new processes and products (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004): this may also be 
the case in China, but if these competitors have state backing their existence may still be very 
problematic for other innovators. Small private start-ups in particular need protection, for whom 
patents may be even more important, providing a tangible asset to sell later on. 
Investigations of the link between firm size and R&D intensity (the “Schumpeterian hypothesis” that 
size helps R&D) have found that the effect of firm size on R&D intensity is in fact statistically 
insignificant (and that industry effects in types of business in fact explain half of the variance in R&D 
intensity). This implies that China’s creation of giant SOEs may not ultimately be worthwhile in driving 
innovation; indeed, large firms can suffer a general loss of managerial control in their resource 
allocation (Driver and Coelho Guedes, 2012), which leads us to consider how principal-agent theory 
questions influence our approach to these measures.     
 
We will now outline the development of China’s solar PV sector to date, the purpose at this stage 
being to illustrate how this follows the national innovation system in funding, and how the sector and 
its R&D must compete in the changing international market. This will ultimately inform the hypotheses 
for solar PV firms in China’s national innovation system.  
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5. The Chinese solar PV industry 
 
5.1 Introduction to solar PV technologies 
5.1.1 Solar PV: production process and technology types 
Solar PV production falls into the two broad categories of crystalline silicon and thin film. The vast 
majority of global commercial production (80-90%) is based on crystalline silicon (Solarbuzz, 2012). In 
crystalline silicon PV, production involves four main steps (de la Tour et al, 2011): 
1) Purification of silicon from silica (Si02) found in quartz sand. The very high purity required 
for the PV industry (over 99.999%) is obtained via energy-consuming processes with high 
technical requirements. 
2) Ingot and wafer manufacturing. An ingot is a cylinder of this pure silicon. If this is a single 
crystal, it is called monocrystalline silicon, or if it consists of multiple smaller crystals it is 
polycrystalline silicon (monocrystalline leads to more efficient power conversion in PV 
cells, but its production is more energy-intensive, thus more expensive). “Doping” is then 
carried out, whereby impurities in the form of atoms such as boron or phosphorus are 
added, to create n-type (negative) or p-type (positive) silicon (see Functioning below). 
Using a saw, ingots are then sliced into thin layers called wafers, and polished. 
3) Cell manufacturing. To create the cell, one n-type and one p-type wafer are layered 
together to create the p-n junction which converts light energy to electricity. The top and 
rear conductive metal contacts are also applied. Various design modifications can increase 
efficiency.  
4) Module assembly. With electrical junctions created, cells are encapsulated together in 
glass sheets to form larger modules which will be cooked in laminating machines. PV 
systems are structured around the modules, which are assembled into an Array, and with 
the addition of ancillary equipment to the module (mounting systems, inverters, wiring, 
junction boxes, batteries and charge controllers) a complete system is created.  
Thin films meanwhile are potentially cheaper than c-Si because of their lower materials costs, but 
remain less efficient than silicon (thin films hold a niche position in low power and consumer 
electronics applications).  
Thin film manufacturing primarily uses amorphous silicon (a-Si), cadmium telluride (CdTe), and copper 
indium gallium selenide (CIGS). One possible route is the development of amorphous silicon using 
microcrystalline silicon, which seeks to combine the high efficiencies of c-Si technology with the 
simpler and cheaper manufacturing of amorphous silicon. This is not yet widely produced however. 
Broadly, thin films are manufactured through thin film layer materials being deposited onto substrates 
of glass or plastic; a transparent conductive oxide layer forming the front electrical contact, and a 
metal layer forming the rear contact.  
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Figure 9: The solar photovoltaic value chain (source: Green Rhino Energy, 2012) 
 
5.1.2 Functioning of a solar PV cell 
Solar photovoltaic cells are in essence semiconductors that function through illumination. They consist 
of two (or occasionally more) layers of semiconductor material (usually silicon) called “wafers”. One 
layer is positively charged (p-type), the other is negatively charged (n-type). Sunlight, generally 
accepted as consisting of energy particles called photons, is absorbed by the cell (some photons will 
be reflected or pass through cells, which are textured to increase absorption).  
Once sufficient photons are absorbed by the n-type layer, this increases the energy of the electrons in 
the layer (which is negatively-charged because of its high electron concentration), freeing them from 
the material, thus leaving a “hole”, into which flow the electrons of neighbouring atoms. Electrons 
move to the p-type layer (positively-charged because of its low electron concentration), creating 
charge flow. Metal contacts placed on both the p-type and n-type sides transfer energy into the circuit. 
Electrons then re-enter the n-type layer to re-join the previously created holes.  
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Figure 10: Functioning of a solar photovoltaic cell (source: Joaqium Nassar, Paris Tech, 2011) 
 
As a group four element (in the fourth column of the periodic table), silicon has four external electrons 
which it likes to share with neighbouring atoms to build covalent bonds. This forms a tetrahedrally-
bonded crystalline structure. Quantum mechanics demonstrates that this crystalline structure has 
special electronic properties; briefly, this means electrons can only be released within specific “band 
gaps” (of energy). These determine whether a material is a metal, insulator, or semiconductor: while 
semiconductors have insulator-like bands, the gaps between these bands allow the controlled release 
of electrons, such as in a particular range of wavelengths of light.    
 
 
Figure 11: Tetrahedrally bonded crystalline silicon (source: Joaquim Nassar, Paris Tech, 2011) 
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Small amounts of selected impurities are added to the silicon (“doping”). N-type doping usually uses 
phosphorous, from column five of the periodic table, meaning it has five outer electrons. Four 
electrons take part in bonding with neighbouring silicon atoms, leaving one spare electron: this creates 
a negative charge, hence n-type. Boron is used for p-type doping, being from the third column of the 
periodic table, with three outer electrons. This means one electron is “borrowed” from a Si-Si bond, 
which bonds the boron atom to four neighbouring silicon atoms. The borrowed electron leaves a 
“hole”, creating a positive charge.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Silicon doping with phosphorous and boron (source: Joaquim Nassar, Paris Tech, 2011) 
 
A particular wavelength of light can be understood as a flow of photons of a given energy-intensity. 
The band gap that allows the release of electrons corresponds to a particular energy-intensity. For 
silicon, this band gap is a wavelength of around 1107 nanometres (nm): this is infrared light. 
Most commonly, efficiency is determined by using materials that adjust the band gaps through which 
electrons can be released by photons (photons at energies above or below the band gap cannot do 
this: they generate only heat when absorbed, which decreases efficiency). Different materials and 
processes allow the capture and conversion of more photons within a band gap, and from more band 
gaps.  
Solar cell efficiencies now range from 6% for amorphous silicon to over 40% for multiple-junction 
research lab cells. However, higher efficiency cells have generally been less economical: a 30% 
efficient gallium arsenide cell currently carries one hundred times the price of an amorphous silicon 
cell (in commercial production). Meanwhile, concentration systems (CPV) boost light intensity and 
have been effective on larger installations (“solar farms”), requiring larger up-front investments. As 
well as the efficiency of the solar cell itself, the technical specifications of other components such as 
wiring, inverters, charge regulators and batteries also have an effect on the PV system as a whole.    
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Figure 13: A solar photovoltaic system (source: Paris Tech, 2011) 
 
 
5.2 Chinese solar production and innovation 
The first Chinese PV research appeared in 1958, with small pilot projects beginning in the early 1970s 
(Yang et al, 2003). By late in the decade, three state semiconductor factories, in Yunnan (Yunnan 
Semiconductor), Ningbo (the Ningbo Solar Cell Factory), plus Kaifeng (Kaifeng Solar) underwent 
conversion to monocrystalline solar cell factories (Dai et al, 1999). Late in the 1980s, these 
manufacturers updated their production facilities, with four new firms founded (Marigo, 2006). These 
were: Non-Ferrous Academy, a Beijing-based SOE connected to the Beijing General Institute for Non-
Ferrous Metals, which closed by 1999; Qinhuangdao Huamei, which shut down in 2003; Yunnan’s Yu 
Kang Solar, a joint venture of the provincial government with a Korean and one other foreign investor 
which closed in 1997 (due apparently to marketing problems); and Harbin-Chronar, a Sino-US joint 
venture which closed in 2003 (Dai et al, 1999).  
While two firms, Harbin-Chronar and Yu Kang Solar, were foreign/state joint ventures, the others were 
SOEs. All these firms’ production facilities were funded via either state R&D programmes or via 
international, mainly western, aid (Li, 2004b). American suppliers provided much of the production 
equipment, sometimes the entire production line (which included ingot pulling and squaring gear, 
wafer slicing, cell and module manufacture (Yang et al, 2003)). Only in 2000 did China begin to 
manufacture capital equipment for solar PV (Yang et al, 2003).  
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Table 5: Early Chinese solar photovoltaic cell manufacturers: equipment sources, technology and production 
(1995) (source: Dai et al, 1999) 
 
China-made PV cells averaged 10-12% efficiency in 1999, with a maximum of 13.5%, while foreign 
manufacturers’ cells averaged 14-15% efficiency (Dai et al, 1999). Their cells’ lower efficiency generally 
saw Chinese firms unable to generate profits, or to invest in expansion as a result. Production capacity 
rose from 4MW in 1998 to 5MW in 1999 (Dai et al, 1999; Zhao, 2001), while Zhao et al (2006a) called 
the 1990s a decade of importing, digesting, absorbing, and innovating for the Chinese solar PV 
industry, which led to capability and capacity improvement.  
The period immediately after 2000 saw a cluster of new cell and module manufacturers, in particular 
Shanghai Topsol (2000), Suntech, Trony, and Yingli (2001), Topray and Tianjin Jinneng (2002-3), and 
CEEG Solar in 2004 (a joint venture between the Chinese Electrical Equipment Group of Jiangsu and 
the University of New South Wales). From its founding, Shanghai Topsol also established a technical 
collaboration with Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Institute of Solar Energy, which helped build a 
crystalline silicon cell production line (some production machinery was built to in-house designs (Yang 
et al, 2003)). The firm became an early example of how to achieve (some) technological take-off in the 
Chinese industry, building collaborations with other research institutes and firms nationally.  
Yingli (a conglomerate known formally as Baoding Tianwei Yingli) was established in 2001, and began 
making cells two years later, becoming China’s first cell and module firm also to manufacture 
multicrystalline ingots in-house (Schmela, 2005). Yingli bought Swiss wire saws for ingot cutting, plus 
Italian module production equipment, while virtually all its materials were bought from the United 
States or Europe. Yet only in 2006 did production reach 77 MWp (one large solar farm being around 
50 MWp), the firm taking considerable time to make its production line function efficiently to scale. 
Meanwhile CEEG Solar, with University of New South Wales academic Dr Zhao Jianhua as General 
Manager, saw capacity reach about 300 MWp by the end of 2005, with production at approximately 
150MWp (Schmela, 2005) (we shall return to R&D in the PV industry later in this section). 
China is now the world leader in cell production and module assembly. Over 50% of PV panel 
production by 2011 was in China, with seven of the global top ten cell manufacturers and eight of the 
Company Starting Date Equipment Technology 
Production Capacity 
1995 Production 1995 
Harbin Chronar 1991 All imported a-Si 1 MW 200 kW 
Non-Ferrous 
Academy 1987 All imported mc-Si 100 kW 20 kW 
Qinhuangdao 
Huamei PV 1990 Key imported sc-Si 1 MW 200 kW 
Kaifeng Solar 1975 (new line 1998) Key imported sc-Si 300 kW 180 kW 
Ningbo Solar 
Cell Factory 1976 (new line 1998) Key imported sc-Si 300 kW 300 kW 
Yunnan 
Semiconductor 1983 (new line 1987) All imported sc-Si 500 kW 300 kW 
   Total: 3.2 MW 1.2 MW 
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top ten module manufacturers (China Greentech Initiative, 2011). China’s market share in upstream 
segments is lower, although Chinese firms have carried out capacity increases, producing 15% of 
global silicon in 2010. The pattern is similar for ingots and wafers, with China representing a minor but 
growing part of world production (we shall explain below how ownership patterns may affect the 
direction of Chinese PV firms’ innovation). 
Downstream cell and module segments have lower technological barriers to entry, and Chinese firms 
have also used manufacturing cost advantages: by contrast, silicon purification requires more 
advanced technologies and specific know-how. Cell production technology is relatively accessible 
because, unlike in more complex upstream segments, turn-key production lines can be bought and 
run with little experience. However, Chinese production increases have seen their cell/module 
manufacturers’ profits slump, compared to the upstream segments in which China does not (yet) 
dominate. Beijing now sees solar PV manufacturing as a vital industry, falling under the aegis of an SEI, 
and excess capacity is partly caused by considerable central, but also local, government subsidy.  
Numerous reports now point to a change in political direction for the industry. Competition for market 
share between numerous companies has resulted in production of cheaper, but less efficient products 
(Wang X., interview, 2013). Higher-efficiency products have had relatively little uptake, but analysts 
believe that as Beijing tries to drive mergers by reducing subsidies, this will change. Consolidation 
appears likely “from the second half of 2013, but especially in 2014” (Wang X., interview, 2013).  
However central and local government attitudes differ: Beijing seeks industry consolidation while 
provincial governments try to support local firms to help them win out in the same process. Yet it 
appears that with local governments in budgetary trouble since 2010, this cannot last: “there simply 
isn’t enough money”. Indeed, Beijing is aiming to provide more money for “bigger firms which can 
show they have a tech advantage”, and will keep providing credit lines only to some firms (Wang X., 
interview, 2013). Thus an ability to produce and register IP is now seen as crucial to survival.  
Although studies of innovation in China’s solar industry are at a relatively early stage, these can be 
outlined briefly. The only substantial review of Chinese solar patent data thus far is de la Tour et al 
(2011, 767) (although this did not analyse state ownership by firm and across technology types, 
dealing instead with international comparisons and tech transfer). The authors compare international 
patent data, finding that Chinese producers have acquired “technologies and skills to produce PV 
systems” mainly via buying manufacturing equipment and recruiting from the Chinese diaspora. 
Meanwhile, Marigo (2006) has described the growth of Chinese state R&D funding for PV 
technologies, with the period since 2006 seeing China become one of the top five national spenders 
on PV R&D. In her study of clean technology in general in China, Sims Gallagher (2014) suggests that 
the strength of barriers to technology transfer has been exaggerated. Sims Gallagher also suggests 
that technology acquisition in China’s solar PV field is a “success”, and states that Chinese firms 
generally face few barriers to finance (Sims Gallagher, 2014). Tyfield et al (2015) focus on low carbon 
innovation around Chinese urban transport in particular, especially electric vehicles (EVs). Tyfield et al 
demonstrate that while government (and corporate) innovation efforts have focused on electric cars, 
the simpler electric moped (or electric two-wheeler, E2W), has seen much quicker uptake, with global 
production now dominated by Chinese firms. Altenburg, Bhasin and Fischer (2012) have also described 
the balance policy-makers must achieve between climate change mitigation, industrial 
competitiveness and technological development. Fischer (2012) also focuses on China’s solar PV 
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specifically, in particular the area of domestic installations, and their slow growth compared to 
domestic manufacturing.      
In silicon, ingot and wafer manufacturing, de la Tour et al (2011, 767) found China’s patenting to be 
higher than its contribution to world production, yet the reverse is true in downstream segments, 
where China is the leading manufacturer but generates only 15% of worldwide patents (de la Tour et 
al do not mention the patent quality differences however, below). Patenting in silicon production 
shows an effort to break a “technological lock”; Beijing wants China’s industry to move into higher 
value innovation-based manufacturing, explaining why solar PV cell and module innovation has also 
been chosen as an indigenous innovation target, with support for firms with “innovative capability”. 
The NDRC has stated: “By 2015, average total power consumption shall be lower than 120 kWh/kg [in 
silicon production], conversion efficiency for monocrystal [cells] will reach 21%, polysilicon [cells] 19% 
and amorphous silicon thin-film cells 12%”. Also, “new types of thin-film will be industrialized”, 
“technological advancement and industrialisation of silicon-based thin-film cells and copper indium 
gallium (di)selenide (CIGS) thin-film cells” promoted, with “improving conversion efficiency of thin-
film cells” (NDRC, 2012, in Wiley Rein, 2012, 4).  
The precise sectors Beijing is targeting are: high purity polysilicon, through “solar-level polysilicon 
production technology involving low energy consumption and low cost” (an interviewee, Eric Peters, 
also emphasised China’s desire to “build up” polysilicon); silicon ingots and silicon wafers, by 
supporting “high-efficiency, low-cost, large-size ingot technology, focusing on the development of 
[quasi-mono] crystal ingot technology; achieve breakthroughs in key technologies for new-type slicing 
below 150-160 micron, such as cutting technology for silicon carbide and steel wires, in order to 
improve the quality of silicon wafers, the number of wafers per unit of silicon materials, and to reduce 
silicon material losses during slicing”. In crystalline silicon cells: “aggressively develop and industrialize 
crystalline silicon cells with a high conversion rate and a long service life. Provide key support for the 
research and application of low-reflectivity texturing technology, selective emitter technology, 
electrode alignment technology, plasma passivation technology, low-temperature electrode 
technology, and full back junction technology. Pay attention to key technologies of thin-film silicon, 
crystalline silicon heterojunction solar cells, as well as other new types of solar cells”; finally, thin-film 
cells, by focusing on “development of laminated and multi-junction [cells], which combine amorphous 
and microcrystalline [silicon]. Reduce light-induced degradation of thin-film cells. Encourage 
enterprises to research and [develop] high-efficiency and large-area silicon thin-film cells. Develop 
roll-to-roll production techniques for flexible silicon-based thin-film solar cells” (NDRC, 2012, in Wiley 
Rein, 2012, 3). 
In sum, China’s solar PV sector has grown enormously from being an entirely state-run set of research 
institutes, to being a substantially private commercial industry. However, both state ownership and 
state R&D demands still have a heavy influence of the sector.   
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5.3 China’s institutional governance of the solar PV sector 
We have seen alternative energy’s priority place in the Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI) programme 
under the ongoing Medium- to Long-Term Plan (MLP). One interviewee (Eric Peeters, Dow Corning, 
2012) stated: “Solar [PV] is strategic as an industry for China… it is about energy independence, 
especially to a country with fast rising energy consumption”. However solar also represents an area in 
which China aims to outpace the rest of the world in innovation, and dominate its home and global 
manufacturing markets. To this end China has passed laws for installation, and used stimulus money 
for R&D. We will discuss how these may affect innovation by different types of firm.   
The Solar 12th Five Year Plan of September 2012 implemented new standards and increased 
government control over the industry’s technological direction, including in advanced thin films, 
where Chinese production costs (as of 2012) remain above the leading US producer (First Solar) (it is 
unclear whether Chinese thin-film cells have seen efficiency rise sufficiently to make them cheaper 
than silicon cells on a cost-per-kilowatt produced basis (Dewey and LeBoeuff LLP, 2012)). It also aims, 
by 2020, for PV power generation to become economically competitive in China, with the cost of PV 
modules to fall to RMB 5,000/kW, of PV systems to RMB 10,000/kW, and of power generation to RMB 
0.6/kW17. The plan specifies products, technologies and processes to be supported.  
The plan also directed the industry to “support R&D and industrialisation of key production equipment 
used for polysilicon, silicon ingots/wafers, cells and modules, thin-film cells, and power generation 
applications” (Wiley Rein LLP, 2012, 3). Meanwhile the “localisation rate of production equipment and 
auxiliary materials for PV cells will reach 80%, and Chinese enterprises will master key technologies 
involved in PV grid connection, manufacturing energy storage equipment, and system integration”. 
The institutional situation that has allowed the manufacturing industry its growth is due considerably 
to local government, and its relations with Beijing. Beijing wants consolidation, but as we have seen, 
provinces want to support their local firms, which “can’t last, there simply isn’t enough money, so 
there is a big consolidation coming soon. Central government is now providing more money for the 
bigger firms which have a tech advantage, so it still provides credit lines, but only to some firms” 
(Wang Xiaoting, interview, December 2012). This suggests that without subsidy, firm survival depends 
on competitive ability though innovative manufacturing.  
Beside firms’ actual shareholding, Metaal (interview, 2012) stated that although Chinese companies 
can get some government support “if they are private”, other state or military connections via 
shareholding or state-connected CEOs are especially important: “JA Solar is partly owned by the army 
[and] Yingli’s military connection is their CEO being former PLA [People’s Liberation Army]”. In sum, 
while the central government both originates funding and attempts to drive consolidation, and with 
it restore industry profitability, the importance it has placed on GDP growth for its provinces has 
created a conflict that may have prolonged this process. However solar PV firms understand that 
generating more patent IP will help secure their position in a solar value chain that the government 
                                                          
17 This seems to indicate that Chinese producers are selling solar modules below cost: a stated goal is reducing 
the PV module cost to RMB 7,000 per kw ($1,100 per kw or $1.10 per watt) by 2015, however the current price 
of Chinese PV modules is already below this.  
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appears to be trying to “sinocise”, while the primary source of R&D funding and support continues to 
be the state.  
 
5.3.1 Resulting R&D patterns in the Chinese solar PV industry  
We should note at this point another reason why our choice of sector is important. In industries 
featuring stable product and process technologies, innovation will usually grant little strategic 
advantage, so R&D expenditure will in consequence usually remain low. However in those industries 
in which product and process technologies change constantly, innovation has much higher strategic 
importance, with R&D expenditure being high. Thus R&D expenditure is a strategically relevant 
variable in a research-intensive environment (Hill and Snell, 1988).  
As well as expenditure itself, having connections with research institutions, complemented by in-
house R&D, are seen as the most useful technology sources. The Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) remains in charge of most R&D programmes (including the “National R&D Project”, and the 
863 and 973 Projects (Marigo, 2006)). The 863 Project has been focussed on supporting research into 
Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) and Cadmium Indium Gallium Arsenide (CIGS) cells, and the 973 Project 
funds thin-film, polymer, and dye-sensitized cell research. Meanwhile R&D funding has supported 
solar PV since 1981 (ad hoc funding then being brought first into the Key Technology R&D Programme 
in the late 1980s), with funding going to projects including upgrading manufacturing lines (early on 
these were at Kaifeng and Ningbo), amorphous, mono- and polycrystalline silicon cells, and cell 
measuring equipment (Zhao et al, 2006b; furthermore, the government funds R&D in institutes and 
universities, in particular CAS and its branches).  
Until 2005, the firm Suntech had received the largest single government commercialisation grant 
(RMB 4m, to commercialise crystalline silicon cells). However, since this time a consensus has emerged 
that too many state bodies have been providing support to the PV industry (Dai et al, 1999), meaning 
inefficient resource use, badly organised R&D programmes, firm projects that fail to achieve their 
potential, and under-commercialised research. Indeed, in 2005 over forty universities and institutes 
were involved in PV R&D, almost all aimed at cell efficiency and module structure improvement. More 
recently however, firms’ in-house R&D has grown, but is supported by local and national levels of 
government 18 . According to Zhao et al (2006b), despite much improved commercialisation and 
industry-academic connections, R&D is still affected by relatively poor human capital, especially in 
training and technical education, in research institutes and firms.   
Parts of the technological context in which R&D takes place are described by de la Tour et al (2011). 
In 2007, although China had already become a world leader in cell production and module assembling 
(then at 27%), its market share upstream, in global silicon production, was just 2.5%. As described, 
Chinese firms increased capacity, producing 15% of global silicon by 2010, and a similar trend is taking 
place in ingots and wafers. China is now especially strong in the downstream segments where 
technological entry barriers are lower (although so too is profitability). Here, production technology 
is relatively accessible, because unlike in upstream, “turn-key production lines can be bought and run 
                                                          
18 In the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), the MOST PV R&D budget was approximately RMB 120m ($16.4m). In 
2005, Germany spent $30.3m, Japan $60.5m, and the US $86m on R&D in the area (Marigo, 2006). 
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without much prior experience in manufacturing”. Module assembly is (relatively) technologically 
straightforward and labour-intensive, giving competitive advantage to Chinese companies. Upstream, 
silicon purification demands advanced technology and know-how.  
An anonymous interviewee (2012) stated that although he is not certain when “the innovation will 
really take off”, Chinese customers now also have IP “on the sales side, meaning module 
manufacturers” (indicating that it is increasingly worth defending in China, and that firms are now 
aiming to compete with more advanced product internationally). This implies “IP is getting broader. 
More firms have IP on their designs, and Chinese firms also have design patents on cell designs now” 
(we will discuss this pattern below).  
However one interviewee (Macdonald, Wall Street Journal Asia, May 2012), believes that entirely 
private firms may not feel it is worth innovating because their IP may be infringed by SOEs. He believes 
this demonstrates how China’s politico-economic structure “must be starting to hinder innovation”, 
and with it China’s ability to “move up the value chain”. Another interviewee (anonymous) highlights 
the DuPont titanium oxide case, where process technology was stolen by an SOE, which is now mass-
producing the product, yet the Chinese government denies the firm infringed. This form of apparent 
infringement is “more hazardous than the process technologies developed and owned by [solar PV 
firms including] Manz. This is because in solar you can stay ahead by continuing to innovate, as solar 
manufactures are changing. But innovation won’t save you if titanium oxide is the same thing in 10 
years’ time”. Thus “the SOE issue exacerbates the risks here regarding simple technologies”, i.e. 
infringement of their IP. So more straightforward materials, possibly including silicon, may be riskier” 
(the implication is that majority private firms may be more successful if they develop more complex 
technologies which majority state-backed firms may be unable to infringe): conversely, it is possible 
that state ownership may assist the long-term, slow pay-off investment that more complex 
technologies require.  
Metaal (interview, 2012) states that Beijing “wants companies with at least some Chinese money gone 
in”, then to see that “Chinese companies are innovating, even if they can’t make much money because 
it is expensive to produce. They want Chinese companies to be getting into positions to lead on 
innovation, because the money in manufacturing itself is [terrible]. They must keep ahead on IP”. 
However, “if western companies keep innovating” states Metaal (2012), “they will be OK. Chinese 
companies… may buy foreign innovators in their space then leave them alone. It’s hard to integrate, 
just look at Jili and Volvo. It is in general very hard for Chinese companies to integrate foreign 
companies. So they may very well just buy them and leave them as their international arm”. 
The R&D scenario for the industry in China is thus one of very specific R&D demands and guidance 
from government, but with funding skewed towards firms with closer state relationships in various 
forms. Pressure to innovate and own patent-IP is intensifying with the pressure of industry 
consolidation in China; we will return in the hypotheses to how different firms’ ownership will impact 
their ability to innovate in this dynamic environment.  
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5.3.2 The global context of Chinese solar PV R&D 
Meanwhile the solar sector growth trajectory has shifted. The US Department of Energy expects the 
cost of solar power to fall by 75% between 2010 and 2020, and US grid parity with fossil fuels to be 
reached in that period, to be followed by “rapid, large-scale adoption of solar electricity across the 
US” (Dept. of Energy, 2012). Solar is now competitive without subsidy in Japan, South Korea, Israel, 
Australia, Italy, Greece, Spain, South Africa, and Chile, caused partly by a drop in panel price to $0.60-
$0.70 per watt (Thailand, Mexico, Argentina, Turkey and India could reach parity in three years). 
Although a good deal of this drop has been caused by cheap Chinese solar panel production, numerous 
US government-connected laboratories are now at the forefront of research. Thus without successful 
innovation, Chinese manufacturing dominance today may not remain tomorrow. Chinese propensity 
to file abroad also appears relatively low, an indicator of potential innovation problems. Firms must 
compete for market share in an industry of rising technological standards (and for government favour, 
as government support via the NDRC is now considerably influenced by patenting levels in this as in 
other sectors) (Eberhardt et al, 2011). Although a limited amount of Chinese solar innovation is held 
in trade secrets (including in the manufacturing process-innovation that often comes from production 
line “tinkering” rather than R&D departments), such policies are encouraging the growth of some 
patenting (Metaal, interview, 2012), although patent ownership patterns in the different technology 
types across solar PV remain to be seen.  
Globally, significant PV patenting began in the 1950s through space applications, regarded as the first 
PV diffusion phase. The second phase, since 1975, has seen at least 100 patent filings each year. The 
third diffusion phase, on-grid, is evident twice over, first in significant patent growth (always over 
1,000 annually since 1997), and second through PV inverter patenting (always over 20 patents 
annually from 1990, then 50 from 1998). Meanwhile, PV patent filings and production have shown 
similar dynamics. On average, a 50% growth rate in PV sales has seen a 17% growth rate in PV and 
inverter patent filing (Breyer et al, 2012). The ratio of international to national patent families has 
risen from around 15% (in the mid-1980s) to 40% by the late 2000s. Breyer et al (2012) suggest that 
anticipated international markets are reflected in these filings. High R&D growth is also shown in the 
ratio of PV international patent families to international patent families generally: in the decade to 
2009, international PV patent families increased from 0.2% to 0.8% of all international patent families, 
suggesting anticipation of a growing role for PV in global energy supply. In the first diffusion phase, 
most patent families were filed by firms in the US, Germany, the UK and France (the UK and France 
receding during the second and third diffusion phases), but in the last decade some firms from East 
Asia have gained international PV patent families19. China intends to become a player “in all important 
industries, especially [those with] high growth rates and potentially high profit margins” (Breyer et al, 
2012), including PV.  
PV is relatively diversified technologically, with the leading 25 firms making up only 12.7% and 15.5% 
of global national PV patent families for 2000-2008 and 2008 respectively. Some leading patent 
assignees have not yet begun selling products, or are only preparing to enter the PV market (including 
Samsung, LG, Sony, Fuji, Contrel Technology, Emcore, and GE). Around 50% of tech-specific patents 
are for crystalline silicon (c-Si), whose market share is 81%. Globally, public-listed firms invested on 
                                                          
19 Firms in South Korean and Taiwan, having been successful in semiconductor technologies, have employed 
know-how to move into technologically similar growth markets including PV. 
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average around 3.5% of sales on R&D (2009), while the leading ten firms invested 4.6%. PV equipment 
suppliers invest significantly more than average in R&D, usually around 10% (Breyer et al, 2012). 
Breyer et al calculated a global average R&D spend per employee of about €110,000. Chinese firms 
were below that average, but not by over 50% (we will return to variations in R&D expenditure in the 
hypotheses).  
However several PV firms with leading market shares have not invested in corresponding patent 
portfolios; these include the leading Chinese firms Suntech, Yingli, and JA Solar. Breyer et al (2012, 14) 
suggest that some firms believe a non-publication strategy is more advantageous: “valuable process 
IP is not as easy to protect as design IP”. Yet this also suggests patentable IP is not being developed by 
these firms to the same extent; if Chinese firms are focused on process IP, this may also suggest they 
are attempting continued domination of c-Si manufacturing, not more advanced designs such as thin 
film technologies. This implies that, should the market open up for thin film and other more advanced 
silicon technologies, Chinese firms may be at a technological disadvantage. By implication, the state’s 
funding through its indigenous innovation drive would then have helped direct firms to patent in (less 
advanced) c-Si areas, where patents, and the rewards from the state that follow them, are more 
straightforwardly obtained.  
The innovation taking place in China should be seen against the backdrop of increasing innovation in 
solar PV worldwide. In seeking to understand which Chinese firms, by ownership, are most capable of 
innovating, we will next describe how the institutional knowledge we have built has informed the 
construction of our theoretical template, with which we will make hypotheses about innovation 
patterns in the Chinese solar PV industry. 
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6. Methodology 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed, the overall goal of this thesis is to investigate the effect of different forms of 
shareholding (state, private, and foreign shareholding), then different levels of state shareholding (by 
levels of government locality), on the ability of mainland Chinese solar PV firms to generate innovative 
output, as measured by their patenting. More exactly, our analysis concerned the effect of the 
different principal-agent chains manifested in the different shareholding arrangements within the 
context of the Chinese innovation system; this is also an analysis carried out to better understand the 
relative successes and failures of innovation, and innovation-led economic growth, in the current 
Chinese politico-economic scenario.   
From the outset of the research process it was clear that qualitative exploration and investigation of 
the context and technological field would be used to inform a quantitative analysis. The earlier 
qualitative stages involved first gaining a comprehensive understanding of the place of Chinese 
innovation policies in the country’s political system; researching the role of the domestic and 
international IP legal framework in this system; and understanding both solar PV technologies and 
manufacturing techniques themselves, and the domestic solar PV industry as a major global player.  
To outline these qualitative stages, I carried out an early research trip to the solar PV “winter school” 
at ParisTech, which involved a five day intensive course, taught by ParisTech physicists, on solar PV 
technologies, development, and manufacturing methods. This was followed by a research trip to 
Belgium and the Netherlands, to interview employees in significant solar PV manufacturing clusters, 
and in related venture capital firms. These interviews were focused on the trends of technological 
competition from China, and included discussion of the most valuable areas of IP.  
For six months between April and October 2012, I carried out my China-based field research. Based in 
Beijing (with supervision at Tsinghua University), I interviewed employees in solar manufacturing, 
innovation finance, IP enforcement and IP law, as well as domestic and foreign journalists. My 
interviews were carried out in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Jiangsu (as I drew up my list of 
interviewees before travelling to China, and carried out interviews in a wide range of sectors, I avoided 
the “snowballing” of contacts that could have brought in any bias). I also took tuition in the use of the 
Hexun online company search system (discussed below). Although my field research was vital in 
understanding the qualitative background of the innovation system and solar PV industry, it was 
throughout this exploratory phase that it became clearer that due to the unwillingness of solar PV 
executives and staff to disclose their firms’ technological strategies during interviews, I would adapt 
by using quantitative data sources more heavily than originally envisaged (described in the next sub-
section but one).  
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Figure 14: Overview of the research process (adapted from Kim and Miner, 2007) 
 
 
 
6.2 Interviewing methods 
I carried out fifty-eight interviews in total (not counting conference attendance in China and the UK, 
which has provided supplementary information). These interviews have all been semi-structured, and 
I divide them into the following themes: legal, technology, politico-economy, and investor. Interviews 
have been carried out in person in the UK, China, the Netherlands and Belgium, and by phone in 
Switzerland, Germany and the US.   
My interviews began very early in the research process, to help select a specific technology area in 
China, to obtain general guidance on the Chinese innovation environment, and for advice on how to 
source quantitative data. These conversations, though also semi-structured, were generally less 
structured than later interviews. Later, and especially during my China-based research, interviews 
were more focused on specific areas, with more exact informational objectives.  
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Semi-structured interviewing is a tool with which to ask similar types of question to interviewees, 
while accounting for various unexpected tangents they may wish to pursue. Relevant associations 
between interviewees and lines of investigation can then be drawn out. Different methods and 
viewpoints can thus be integrated “to identify and represent, as accurately as possible, the 
phenomena under investigation” (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). This is also necessary to my research, 
to increase confidence in the accuracy of the observations produced.  
The broad reasons for using semi-structured interviews begin with Jones (1985), who states that 
research begins with some knowledge of the subject on the part of the researcher. This leads to 
particular lines of questioning which are seen as particularly central, which can naturally change during 
the interview process depending on new information coming to light. While (highly) structured 
interviewing begins with carefully selected question sets which have been refined through much prior 
analysis, this depends on both sufficient research time to hone these questions, and considerable prior 
knowledge of all question areas (structured interviews are also particularly useful for comparing 
results from large interview samples). None of these criteria apply in our case. Meanwhile, 
unstructured (or “non-directive”) interviews are often believed to be the best means to gain a clear 
picture of the interviewee’s perspective (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). However this method may 
produce no clear understanding by the interviewee of what the researcher is looking for, especially in 
researching complex phenomena.  
Semi-structured interviews are also suitable for other reasons. The semi-structured interview is a 
qualitative one, whose aim is to find not only the respondent’s viewpoint but also why they have it 
(Jones, 1985). In our case, confidentiality is a potentially sensitive issue, and semi-structured 
interviews allow a higher degree, as replies can be more tailored (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). Non-
verbal cues (including facial expression) can also be recorded more freely. For this reason, face-to-face 
interviews are preferable to telephone interviews per se, however telephone interviews formed a 
significant proportion of my own, both by necessity of time constraints and to re-contact interviewees 
to follow up.  
All interviewees were informed that any part of their responses could be anonymous if they wish, and 
that I could be contacted later should they wish to anonymise any response. I also used the term 
“discussion” rather than “interview” when contacting potential respondents, to reduce formality and 
increase the potential for genuine exchange. Some interviews were recorded, but where I judged that 
the very presence of a sound recorder would hinder interviewees’ honest answering (despite 
assurances of confidentiality), hand-written notes were taken instead.  
One technique used to obtain as much detail as possible from interviewees was “laddering” (Baker 
and Knox, 1995, in Easterby-Smith et al, 2008), which involves beginning from more straightforward 
questions of fact, then “posing upwards”, or going into more depth to obtain more detail about their 
reasoning (done sensitively to avoid arousing suspicion). The other techniques I used (adapted from 
Easterby-Smith et al, 2008) are:  
 Basic probes: repeating the initial question if an interviewee goes off the point 
 Focussed probes: used to find specific information, and can often start “What sort of...?” 
 Silent probes: when the interviewee is hesitant, a brief silence can help 
 Giving suggestions: giving the interviewee an idea or theme to ponder 
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 Mirroring: expressing in my own words what the interviewee has just said, prompting the 
interviewee to expand on the answer. To avoid bias, probes should not lead (e.g. “Would you 
say you are happy with...?”). 
The settings for interviews are also influential. As well as telephone interviews, I used a number of 
settings for my face-to-face interviews, by necessity and choice. Bowey and Thorpe (1986, in Easterby-
Smith et al, 2008) described how researchers find unguarded conversations are easier outside the 
formal confines of offices, and I used relatively neutral spaces such as cafés, although in some cases 
interviewees preferred to meet in their offices.  
In sum, the four themes of interviews provided me with guidance as follows: legal interviewing was 
aimed at obtaining advice (and written sources) on the Chinese IP system, and comparing the place of 
Chinese private and state-owned firms within it. Technology-focused interviews began as a source of 
information on which area of China’s cleantech economy would be the most appropriate for study; 
having chosen solar PV, these interviews were used to develop my knowledge on its technological 
areas, helping a qualitative understanding of the Chinese industry, and to structure the patent 
database along technological lines once it was obtained. They also provided detail on likely future 
industry development in China and worldwide. Politico-economic interviews were carried out with 
experts on China’s innovation and IP system, including lawyers, academics, and journalists. This 
information was vital in building the theoretical framework, providing information on how the 
innovation system affects managerial decision-making around R&D investment. They also provided 
data on the development of China’s IP system, trade and commercial laws, and state interactions with 
and development of China’s solar industry. Finally, investor interviews provided actual investment 
experience and preferences (including, like technologist interviews, real IP-related problems 
encountered). They also provided comparative information on other sectors, and more contextual 
information on China’s economy in general.   
In interviewing style, I have divided my interviews into three broad methods, which I have called 
exploratory, focused, and pin-point. The first type was most common in the early stages of research, 
and involved a discussion using a set of points decided beforehand, but allowed to go in different 
directions. These were intended to help set the research direction, find the most appropriate research 
question, and gain as much general information as possible from the interviewee. Focused interviews 
were the most common method I employed in China in particular, by which time I needed more detail 
about specific questions, but where many interviewees’ hesitance to discuss particular aspects of their 
work (due to political sensitivities) prevented a more direct approach. Pin-point interviews were most 
common both later in the research and with technologists and investors, whose expertise on specific 
business and solar technology areas I required. They were frequently used with China-based experts 
in legal and commercial fields, and technologists outside China (please refer to the appendix Interview 
table for full details).  
These semi-structured interviews formed part of a “multi-method” research approach that covers 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Brewer and Hunter (1989, 182) described these multi-method 
approaches as “either single studies or more complex programmes of continuing research, which 
systematically employ various combinations of field, survey, experimental, and non-reactive methods 
to address their research questions”. Combining quantitative and qualitative methods, multi-method 
approaches can help increase the robustness of our findings (Mingers, 2001), helping gather more 
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information on the different aspects of a phenomenon, thus producing more comprehensive 
explanations. Quantitative analysis may obscure important questions, such as how state or private 
owners may address a firm’s corporate governance, how this is related to firm objectives, and how 
this has shaped their technological innovation, as manifested in patenting. This is central to the 
importance of semi-structured interviews. Surveying the theoretical and technical literature also 
helped to focus these interviews, generating additional insights. 
 
 
 
6.3 Methods for obtaining quantitative data 
 
We shall now outline the assembly of the quantitative dataset, before describing the quantitative 
analysis in the following section. I first carried out a search for Chinese solar PV patents via Cambridge 
IP Ltd’s patent landscape system, using the full range of search terms for solar PV (see appendix). This 
is described as follows. 
 
 
6.3.1 Methods for patent search and compilation process 
 
This stage involved the patent landscaping of Chinese solar PV patent ownership. The patent 
landscape study of China’s solar PV patent holders aims to cover every solar PV patent held at SIPO, 
and enables us to establish which firms are innovating to more or less advanced levels in solar PV (this 
is followed by establishing their levels of ownership, explained below). This provides the empirical fit 
with the theoretical framework. The patent landscape process, including the stages of patent search 
and filtration, carried out at Cambridge IP Ltd, is described as follows (also see the Appendices for the 
full list of the information contained within a patent):  
1) The process of accessing and compiling the appropriate patents began with the creation of a 
Mindmap (a diagram used to outline information visually), which is a diagrammatic “tree” 
illustrating the broader and more specific technologies of interest, and the relationships 
between them. The Mindmap allowed me to carry out the patent searches that followed in a 
coherent order.   
 
2) The next stage involved using Cambridge IP’s LexisNexis Patent Search account to obtain all 
the patent data. This involved using a list of search terms assembled using the Mindmap 
technique to obtain every solar photovoltaic patent registered at the State Intellectual 
Property Office (SIPO) in Beijing (this also included all three tiers of patent quality allowed by 
the Chinese system (inventive, utility, and design) and all patent families, including foreign-
registered families, to be obtained).  
 
As such, the Mindmap diagram allowed the creation of a coherent list of search terms. For the 
patent search, please refer to the search terms in the appendices, used in the algorithms for 
Boolean searches for patent titles and abstracts. 
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To use a simple example, one broad search takes the form of the following syntax (see 
appendix for the list of search terms, and the list of the Boolean searches derived from them):  
 
(silicon! W/3 process! AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (silicon! W/3 process! AND solar AND 
PV) 
 
Or 
(silicon! W/3 ingot! AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (silicon! W/3 ingot! AND solar AND PV) 
(ingot! PRE/3 silicon! AND solar AND PV) OR (ingot! PRE/3 silicon! AND solar AND 
photovoltaic) 
 
3) All the patents were then uploaded onto Cambridge IP’s processing system, Delphion, in 
separate lists of the type shown in the generic (non-solar PV) example below: 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Patent uploading (source Cambridge IP Ltd., 2012) 
 
 
The correct “data extract” that would include the data we deemed necessary was included, 
for every patent, as in the list in the following example:   
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Figure 16: Data extracting (source Cambridge IP Ltd., 2012) 
 
 
This search process was repeated, up to a maximum of 5000 patents at a time, for each 
Boolean search algorithm as needed.  
 
As the search inevitably also produced numerous patents which referred to innovations other 
than solar PV, those which referred to solar PV patents were kept, and those with only non-
solar PV codes were removed. Taking some weeks, this had to be done by a hand-trawl of the 
patents. The complete workfiles were uploaded.   
 
4) We then ensured that the sample contained only patents originally registered at SIPO, by 
using a location filter.  
 
5) The next stage, for the approximately 9,000 remaining patents, was namelist normalisation. 
Firms often file patents under different company names (for example the German 
conglomerate Bosch can appear as Bosch GmbH, Robert Bosch GmbH, R. Bosch, and so on), 
and occasional spelling errors can be found in assignee names. Holding companies meanwhile 
will sometimes use the overall holding company name, or that of a subsidiary for different 
technologies, even if the patents are filed under the same inventors’ names. Furthermore, 
Chinese firms sometimes file using their name in Chinese characters, or Pinyin (Chinese 
transliterated into western script), or under a variety of possible English names. As a result, it 
was necessary to hand-check all the names of patent assignees, and normalise them into one 
name per assignee organisation. The exception was for cases where two or more separate 
subsidiaries of a conglomerate appeared, which were listed as separate firms if necessary. 
Following this, the entire list of normalised names was filtered down, from a sample of 
approximately 980 organisations globally, to include only Chinese (excluding Taiwanese) firms 
(and no non-profit institutes or universities, although firms established by these entities were 
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allowed). This produced a list of approximately 600 appropriate assignees (from which the 
sample of 150 would later be taken). Although it is possible to normalise the names of the 
inventors, this was not needed for our purposes. 
 
Following the namelist normalisation, Redeye was used to filter the patents along the 
following general guidelines, which we will describe: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Redeye patent filtration (source: Cambridge IP Ltd., 2012) 
 
 
6) The next Redeye processing stage was to filter the patents for the appropriate International 
Patent Classification codes (IPCs), which classify patents by the types of technology to which 
they refer, allowing us to divide these patents into technology types within the solar PV field 
(to be discussed further in the hypotheses). These categories were: silicon processing; wafers; 
cells; modules and arrays; components; concentrated solar; and thin film and next generation 
(see appendices for an example range of IPCs). For each of these filtering stages, the system 
was used as follows: in the Filters tab, a criteria was chosen from the drop down menu, e.g. 
IPC codes; then the specified filter keyword was entered (e.g. a specific IPC code); “Add” 
clicked; Repeated as necessary; “Render” was selected and the results could be viewed. 
 
7) The next processing stage involved Kind Codes. A kind code usually uses a letter (sometimes 
a letter and a number), at the end of the individual patent registration number, which 
RedEye dataset names – Workflow management 
1st interim delivery 
Dataset 1a 
(Search String) 
 
 
 
 
Dataset 2 (a, b, c – different IPC levels) 
(IPC filter/s) 
 
 
 
 
Dataset 3a 
(Kind code duplicate removal) 
Dataset 3b 
(Family duplicate removal) 
 
 
 
2nd interim delivery 
Dataset 4 
(Category and expert cleaning working sets) 
 
 
 
3rd interim delivery 
Dataset 5 
(Final datasets) 
Analytics 
Final delivery 
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determines the type of patent (in our case inventive, utility, or design) and the level of 
publication (whether the patent has only been applied for, or has been registered). The main 
kind codes used by SIPO in China are as follows (for the list of all other possible Chinese kind 
codes, please see appendices): 
 
A: Unexamined application for a patent for invention 
C: Granted patent for invention 
U: Utility model application  
Y: Granted patent for utility model (since 01/04/1985) 
 
Filtering for kind codes involves removing any patents which have the same registration 
number but a different kind code suffix (in so doing we make sure, for example, that we do 
not double-count an application and the patent that resulted from it). So for example 
CN102055572A and CN102055572C would count only once. Please note also that we count 
only those applications that have been granted.  
 
8) Finally, we filtered by Patent Family. A patent family is a set of different patents taken out in 
various jurisdictions to protect a single invention, or a set of several inventions sharing a 
common aspect that are published at different times in the same jurisdiction (WIPO, 2012). 
Once we have removed non-Chinese entities, filtering by patent family therefore allows us to 
see which Chinese firms are the most successful at patenting overseas, another indicator of 
patent quality.  
The outcome of this filtering process gives us a patent data sample that covers the following data:  
 Number of patents filed by each firm in the sample 
 Number of inventive/non-inventive patents by each firm 
 Number of patents filed by each firm in each category of solar PV technology 
 Size of each patent’s patent family, where one exists 
 From the information on each patent, we also extract the number of forward citations, where 
applicable, for each patent. Forward citations, as described above, refer to a patent being 
cited as prior art for any subsequent patent by any applicant, and is usually taken as an 
indicator of relative quality. 
 
This process allowed me to create a list of firms which had a minimum of one SIPO patent, of any kind, 
in solar PV (from which I then removed firms of which there was no other trace despite their 
appearance as patenting firms with SIPO). This is the whole population from which I drew my final 
sample, and my sampling procedure was simple “decimation”: I went down the list taking every 10th 
firm until I reached my desired total. I then became concerned that this procedure might not have 
given me an adequate number of what could reasonably be defined as high-performing firms. After 
examining the population I decided that I would stratify my sample with a higher stratum of higher-
performing firms (defined as those with at least five SIPO invention patents), and decided that 10 such 
firms would be a sufficient number. I then checked the sample and found that I already had five such 
firms in my sample. Needing five more, I repeated the process of decimation until I had found five 
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more such firms (this also gave me all the listed firms available). I added these to the sample and took 
out the last five firms I had originally selected.  
 
Thus I had combined two strata, both randomly selected:  
1. Firms with at least one SIPO patent of any kind but less than five SIPO invention patents 
2. Firms with at least five SIPO invention patents 
 
Therefore I created a stratified random sample. Clearly I oversampled stratum 2, by doubling its size 
from the original five. Although the sample is thus not precisely representative of the population, it is 
theoretically representative. 
 
6.3.2 Methods and process for establishing firm shareholding levels, R&D, and control data 
Having explained the rationale behind the selection of each of these fields of data, we will describe 
the sources from which they were gathered. Please note that due to the variety of Chinese companies 
we analyse (for example listed, unlisted, and previously listed firms), for many firms we use a 
combination of the data sources below.  
 
Capital IQ: 
The S&P Reuters Capital IQ database contains the shareholding details of every listed company (on all 
stock markets), and allows analysis along a number of planes (this is appropriate because our sample 
includes every currently listed Chinese solar PV firm). First, Capital IQ allows analysis along both 
private and public investments, which can be broken down historically. For each firm, once specific 
shareholders and their shareholding volumes are gathered for each year, these are checked for their 
status as foreign, private, or Chinese state of any type (via Baidu, Google, or annual reports, as below).  
Capital IQ also compiles all annual reports for each financial year that a firm is (or was) listed. These 
typically provide background data on the major shareholders, as well as in many cases all 
shareholders. In the minority of cases where shareholding information was not available in either the 
database or the corporate literature to which databases linked, the firms were called by phone to 
confirm their status. With the exception of many firms listed on the mainland Chinese stock markets 
(Shanghai and Shenzhen), the annual reports also provide some R&D data, in the form of either staff 
numbers or expenditure.  
 
Hexun: 
Hexun.com is an online Chinese business and finance information service which includes the 
shareholding data and annual reports of all the firms listed in mainland China and Hong Kong, as well 
as a considerable range of firms on other stock markets globally.  
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On Hexun, in the homepage search box, a given company’s stock market “ticker” is entered (for 
example JASO for JA Solar). On the following company-specific page, the link “股权分析”, or “equity 
analysis” is selected. From this, the following sub-categories are chosen: 股本结构, 十大股东; these 
are shareholding structure and top ten shareholders. As with Capital IQ, for each firm, once specific 
shareholders and their shareholding volumes have been gathered for each year, these are checked 
for their status as foreign, private, or Chinese state of any type, and whether the shareholders are 
other firms or investment funds. 
Also as for Capital IQ, annual report access is also provided for the listed Chinese firms, and when this 
method also left gaps in the data, firms were called by telephone. The databases also provided access 
to the control data needed. Where possible, all information provided by the databases was checked 
against data provided on individual company websites. Where these were contradictory the data 
provided by the databases was given precedence.  
 
 
6.4 Variables 
6.4.1 Dependent variables 
Our dependent variables are indicators of innovative success as measured by patenting information. 
We distinguish between measures of patenting performance and of patenting productivity. 
Measures of patenting performance are derived purely from patenting data. Measures of patenting 
productivity involve a second stage, and are derived from patenting performance divided by a 
measure of R&D. The patent metrics are collected from a sample (obtained from Cambridge IP, as 
described above) of patent information for 150 Chinese solar PV manufacturing companies, 
comprising all the patenting carried out by this sample of firms, up to and including 2012. Note that 
the years to which patents are allocated are years of application, but to be included in the dataset a 
patent must also have been granted.  
 
We may note at this point that the standard treatment of patent performance in studies of western 
firms is to take patent count weighted by forward citations. There are two problems if one seeks to 
follow this procedure:  
1. We have very different qualities of patent. A patent that has led to a foreign, especially USPTO, 
family registration, is considerably harder to achieve than a SIPO inventive patent, then (at 
the bottom) the SIPO non-inventive patent. From the point of view of this study the USPTO 
patent is the most interesting, but if we were to use only USPTO patent data for the dependent 
variable we would lose most of our information – because USPTO patents have been obtained 
by only a very small minority of the firms in the sample.  
2. The other problem would relate to forward citations. The standard procedure is to take five 
years of forward citations – in other words, for a patent applied for in 2008, to look at citations 
up to 2013 (one could not then consider patents applied for after 2008, because the data 
would not yet be in). However the large majority of patents granted to my sample of firms 
appear to have been applied for after 2008. 
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The most systematic way of addressing this problem is to use factor analysis. Each of the factors 
generated in turn can be used as a dependent variable (Tolmie et al, 2011). So far we have been 
dealing with “patenting performance” (or “PatPer”). Clearly other things being equal, a firm which is 
spending, or has spent more on R&D, will have a stronger patent performance. This effect can be 
modelled by including a measure of R&D as an independent variable in the regression. Alternatively, 
we can define our dependent variable as patent performance per unit of R&D, or “patent productivity” 
(PatPro). An inventive firm would arguably be one which had high patent productivity (which made 
efficient use of its R&D) rather than high absolute patent performance. The dependent variable in 
these cases therefore becomes our measure of PatPer, divided by R&D spend (see below on our R&D 
data and R&D measures). 
 
6.4.2 Independent variables 
The core independent variables are a number of measures of ownership type. They relate to:  
1) Domestic private, central state, and sub-central state, shareholdings. The relevant 
hypotheses do not assert any linear relationship between any of these, and the inventiveness 
or innovativeness of the firm. Instead they make assertions about the effects of different 
categories of ownership, e.g. “Central MASOEs” and “Municipal MISOEs”, etc. The data here 
is therefore used to assign firms (in a specific year) into one of these categories (and thus to 
create dummy variables for four of them). They are defined as follows:  
 
 POE (100% privately-owned enterprise) 
 Central SOE (all SOEs regardless of government level refer to 100% state ownership), Central 
MASOE (above 50% state ownership), Central MISOE (state ownership of 50% or below)  
 Provincial SOE, Provincial MASOE, Provincial MISOE  
 Municipal SOE, Municipal MASOE, Municipal MISOE 
 Super-municipal SOE (super-municipal refers to ownership by the governments of Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, or Chongqing, these being the provincial-level cities of China), Super-
municipal MASOE, Super-municipal MISOE.  
 
The broad point of this distinction is that the state has direct control over a MASOE or SOE 
whenever and however it wishes to exercise it.  
 
2) Foreign shareholding. Since the hypothesis is that the stronger the influence of foreign 
shareholders, the more innovative the firm, this is a continuous variable, i.e. percentage of 
foreign shareholding. (Note that for a large proportion of the sample this value is zero) 
 
3) R&D data. As explained above, R&D plays an important role in the hypotheses and 
regressions. For PatPer it is an independent variable. For PatPro it is the denominator in the 
dependent variable(s), with PatPer for time t divided by R&D for time t-2 (because there is an 
assumed lag of 2 years between R&D input and patent output: see the R&D discussion below). 
R&D data is compiled as annual R&D expenditure.   
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6.4.3 Control variables 
The first two control variables are commonly used in this type of work and also available here: 
1) Age of firm in years since foundation 
 
2) Size of firm in number of staff 
 
3) Location: this control variable should also be used, since there is a substantial body of work 
which claims that (for example) inland firms behave differently from those in the coastal 
provinces, which are more advanced and where accordingly the government is likely to play a 
less interventionist role. That claim implies two simple categorical variables, which would 
reduce to one dummy: coastal (1) or not coastal (0). However there are less crude distinctions 
– coastal, central, western – and the fundamental proposition in most of this work is that the 
more advanced the area, the less interventionist is the state. Thus location is represented by 
provincial GDP per head, making it a third continuous control variable.   
 
4) Agglomeration: the final control variable was assembled for agglomeration. Porter (1998) and 
Krugman (1991), among others, have built on the thesis originally pioneered by Marshall 
(1890), which established the benefits of firm clustering, using the case of metalworking firms 
in Sheffield during the industrial revolution. The concern in our case is that solar firms may 
benefit from proximity to other firms, through interchange of talent within the workforce, and 
the increased efficiency of suppliers and buyers nearby.   
 
In order to be able to introduce this control variable into the regressions, the following 
procedure was undertaken: for each firm in the sample, the location (by city) of its 
headquarters was recorded. A list was then made of all of these cities with HQs of firms in our 
sample, and the number of firms in the sample located within each city (which ranged from 
15 to 1). Each of these cities were marked on a map of mainland China; next, each was 
assigned a number representing its “agglomeration rating”, i.e. the number of firms in our 
sample within 100 miles (meaning how many other patenting firms in our sample would be 
within 100 miles for a single firm in this city, plus the firm itself). As with “location” above, this 
appears to be a superior method to using a cruder dummy.  
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In the maps below, this rating was marked on each city using the following key: red is a city 
with 1 patenting firm; yellow means 2 to 5 patenting firms; and green means 6 or more 
patenting firms: 
 
 
a) Agglomeration: all China  
 
b) Agglomeration: China excluding the periphery 
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c) Agglomeration: coastal China 
 
 
d) Agglomeration: the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai 
 
Figure 18-21: Maps of the agglomeration of patenting solar photovoltaic firms across China 
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6.5 Treatment of data for regressions 
In approaching the relationship between the variables, first we lag the dependent variable by two 
years on R&D, and by a further year on ownership variables (there is no lag on the control variables 
except size, which has a three year lag). As argued in the discussion of patenting, patent output can 
be regarded as mainly an output of R&D, and not an instantaneous one: it is conventional to assume 
a 2-year lag between R&D and patent applications (Leydesdorff and Wagner (2009), Prodan (2005) 
Hall et al (1986)). Likewise, R&D (in quality and quantity) is regarded as determined by size and 
ownership characteristics, again not instantaneously: here we assume a modest one-year lag. The 
following issues arise with such a model: 
1) Sample selection bias. As explained, the sample has been selected on the basis of the dependent 
variable – there must be at least one SIPO patent for the firm to be included (and the sample has been 
stratified, as explained above). This could raise the possibility of selection bias, however a number of 
facts mean this is not seen to be a problem. First, a firm that during the entire period has not gained 
even one SIPO non-inventive patent can be said to be very uninventive indeed. As such, the sample 
still includes a very wide range on the dependent variable(s), thus a very wide range of inventiveness 
within the sample. Furthermore, the sample also contains most of China’s patent-registering 
commercial solar PV firms. Meanwhile, our sample also covers the full range of ownership types, both 
by the proportion of state shareholding and the level of state shareholding between central and local 
governments.  
2) Reverse causation. The assumption expressed in the hypotheses and the model is that the direction 
of causation runs from ownership to patenting. However any correlation that is found could be the 
consequence of causation running the other way: e.g. a strong patenting performance leading to a 
higher foreign shareholding. Again, as with selection bias, the extent of reverse causation is likely to 
be low. In each direction of causation a clear time lag can be assumed. In the expected direction it is 
three years (see below). In the “reverse” direction it seems unlikely to be less than two years. Thus 
where the predicted effect of ownership at time t is on patenting at time t + 3, the “reverse” possibility 
is that ownership at time t is affected by patenting at time t-2 (and before). The “reverse” effect can 
only be mistaken for the first effect if there is quite a high correlation between a firm’s patenting at 
time t + 3 and its patenting five years and more earlier (furthermore there can only be a reverse effect 
if there have been substantial changes in ownership before time t-2). My visual inspection of the 
sample however indicates that there have been very few substantial changes in ownership (for both 
selection bias and reverse causation, see testing below).  
 
6.5.1 Cross-section versus panel data regressions 
From the outset the research has been structured around cross-section regressions. The sample of 
150 is seen to be ample for this purpose, and the variability of the data – independent variables, 
control variables, and dependent variables – across firms is also large. For cross-section regressions it 
is also necessary at times to use averages of the annual data, reducing the noise in the dependent 
variable, for which the annual data is relatively limited. Thus instead of applying the 1 + 2 year lag 
structure to single years (e.g. ownership for 2005, R&D for 2006, PatPer for 2008) ownership can be 
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averaged where necessary for 2004, 2005, 2006; R&D for 2005, 2006, 2007; and PatPer for 2007, 2008, 
2009.   
The possibility of running panel data regressions was also considered: this was possible in principle 
since the data runs from 2000 to 2012.  However many firms in the sample were not founded until 
after 2000, and after 2008 the quality of any dependent variable diminishes because there is less than 
five years for forward citations (as we discussed in section 4.2.2, Griliches (1981) found pessimistic 
implications for using overall patent counts as indicators of short-run changes in the output that comes 
from R&D input). Bearing in mind the three year lag between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable, this did not leave room for the time series element of panel data. Moreover, 
visual inspection of the data suggested that there was little variation over time in most of the 
independent variables. 
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7.  Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
 
7.1 Theoretical framework – resumé  
Our theoretical framework uses a principal-agent model to discern how ownership (specifically state, 
private or foreign) affects a firm’s innovation outcomes, as measured by output and quality of 
patenting. The forms that this principal-agent model will take are specific to the Chinese innovation 
environment, as we shall explain.  We note that the normal aim of the principal is to maximize profit 
over some period, in which case innovation is a means to that end (and in a high-technology sector 
such as solar PV, a rather necessary means).  
In the first category, in which the principal is the private owner of a technology firm, the owner of 
shares is believed to be a person or cohesive group of people. This creates a short chain of agency 
between principal and agent (the manager or managers of the firm). The principals thus have a clear 
commercial incentive for their firm to innovate, in the gain they can expect to realise should this 
innovation be successful. However, we have described the Chinese state’s position of discrimination 
against private firms (in areas such as bank lending, standard setting, and the unofficial realities of the 
legal protection of intellectual property). This means that although private principals’ short chain of 
causation will allow a strong innovation incentive in the form of potential commercial gain, their firms’ 
relative inability to capture the results of this innovation will in turn disincentivise innovation.  
In the second category, in which the whole or majority shareholding principal is the state, the ultimate 
owner is not a single person or cohesive group of people. Ultimately, the state claims to represent the 
people of China; however, just as in the western context the trustees of a pension fund act on behalf 
of the pensioners whom it represents, state ownership creates a longer chain of agency, as the bodies 
of state act as principals on behalf of the Chinese people. Furthermore, the various state bodies that 
control majority or wholly state-owned firms are dispersed, which means that the control of any given 
principal of the principal-agent chain is diluted (as we have seen, at the central level this chain takes 
in the State Council, ministries, and SASAC; at the local level it includes local governments and local 
SASACs). This creates an unorthodox situation, in which there is no cohesive principal at the top of the 
principal-agent chain. This means that although these firms are well-placed in the Chinese innovation 
system (for protection of intellectual property, bank lending, and other resources), their principals 
being dispersed (and having responsibility for many other government units and objectives) 
disincentivises them from carrying out the proper governance or monitoring needed for innovation in 
individual firms, as does their manager-agents being assessed on many different metrics.  
However, this form of principal-agent chain is modified between the contexts of central and local 
government. We have seen that, in addition to the ‘normal’ aims of the principal, which make 
innovation a means to the end of profit, the central government is also interested in innovation as a 
means to another end: the growth of Chinese firms in high-tech sectors. In the case of central 
government ownership, the multiple responsibilities of the cadres charged with responsibility as 
principals (and longer chains of control through successive tiers of state) means they have little time 
to dedicate to any given responsibility, and must rely on indicators such as crude overall patent 
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outputs. The result is likely to be firms whose innovation is relatively poor, at least in relation to the 
resources devoted to it. Lower down the echelons of government however, principals are responsible 
for fewer firms and have shorter chains of control. This means they have a stronger incentive for any 
given firm to innovate, and may dedicate more attention to these firms (in particular, our framework 
implies that municipal shareholding, including provincial-level municipalities, will provide a 
combination of incentivised management and resource capable of achieving superior innovation 
outcomes than other levels of state ownership).      
A third category sees private shareholder principals with majority ownership, and state principals with 
a minority. This is seen to have the following impact: given majority ownership, the private 
shareholders maintain their incentive, as described, to monitor innovation in the firm. With minority 
ownership meanwhile, the state shareholders cannot dominate decision-making, but provide the 
state resource and legal protection that allows the private owner-principals to pursue innovation 
without the threat of state appropriation or hindrance.  
Finally, our framework takes into account the possible presence of foreign shareholding. Although 
Aulakh and Gencturk (2000) suggest that in international principal-agent relationships there will be 
problems of poor control over agents abroad, foreign ownership is still likely to mean superior 
innovation conditions. As principals, foreign shareholders will have similar incentives to domestic 
private shareholders, having a commercial incentive for a firm to be genuinely innovative. While 
investments by a particular foreign fund may be split between numerous portfolio firms, decreasing 
their incentive to monitor any given firm, this is likely to be balanced by their interest in export-driven 
sales, more dependent on a firm’s innovative capacity. As such, foreign shareholding is seen as 
following the innovation-driving rationale of domestic private shareholding. The framework is 
outlined in the diagram below, with different shareholder-principal types, and the forms of agent firm-
by-firm in the environment of the Chinese innovation system.       
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Figure 22: Theoretical framework 
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7.2 The application of the theoretical framework to the different ownership categories 
We now apply the framework to the different ownership categories, defined both in terms of level of 
state (central vs local) and proportion of state shareholding.  
Regarding the effects of central government shareholdings in the majority: 
The length of the chain between agent-managers and principals in the case of state-ownership is 
considerable, compared to private (or foreign) ownership scenarios. Ultimately, the theoretical 
“principal” is the people of China, whose state assets are then overseen by more principals through 
the chain of ownership (State Council, SASAC, the Organisation Department, and ministries), who give 
Party member cadres the task of being agents and managing the actual firms. This longer-chain 
situation creates more obstacles to agents’ incentives to make sensible investments that will bear fruit 
in innovation, and to their monitoring by the principals (in government) who want that innovation to 
occur, and thus increases the moral hazard (or hidden actions) created by agents at the expense of 
principals.  
 
The implication is that central government shareholding is the least conducive to innovation of all 
forms of shareholding. We should add that for the central state, like large SOEs, smaller business units 
or single firms under the state have little effect individually on outcome either for a large SOE, or the 
state’s innovation success as a whole. This is disincentivising both for overseeing principals and agent 
managers (and conversely it makes little difference if they fail). Cadres generally have secure tenure, 
and long-term firm performance after they cease to be managers seems unlikely to improve their 
prospects. While in a private scenario agents could normally expect to benefit from the “profits made 
by the establishment” (from Babbage), which could be through promotion or options, state employees 
know they will likely be transferred to a different location before they can share in profits from 
innovation. This means that the “husbandry instruments” (of Smith), in our case investment, are liable 
to be misused for short-term payoffs.  
 
Although, like other principals, in order to control them the state attempts “measurement of 
performances” for agents, it can only do so by quantifying innovation, leading to R&D focused on the 
Leninist-style output measures that get rewards (which include utility patents for example), but which 
are unsuited to complex, globally competitive innovation. Although Miller (2005) stated that typically 
“directors [do] not constrain the CEO by specifying a particular procedure”, this is exactly what state 
principals are doing through these demands. 
 
The principal-agent chain we have described means state agents are led to make dubious decisions; 
this is because the information asymmetry situation (Miller, 2005) is more severe. The numerous state 
principals to which agents may be answerable will have to oversee numerous agents, and assess them 
on a range of performance metrics as mandated by state rules: demonstrating that a firm is innovating 
successfully will be only one of these. Miller noted that an asymmetry in preferences problem can 
occur, and for state principals this is also more severe. We have described this as meaning that actions 
in a principal’s interest can harm the agent (Miller, 2005). Successful innovation outcomes for instance 
may be conducive to the principal’s wellbeing, but the long-term investment they need is likely to be 
detrimental to an agent if they are graded on outcomes that are measurable primarily in the short-
term. The lack of a “unified principal”, with oversight split between different areas of the state, is also 
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liable in this case to be detrimental: it is not credible that an agent’s “best response function” can be 
known (and matching incentives crafted) by a principal, or set of principals, who are spread through 
various bodies in the state and have large numbers of other agents to monitor. The potential for 
takeovers, which should provide so-called “discipline of last resort” (Fama, 1980, 288) by focusing 
managers on succeeding at market-oriented innovation, is also relatively limited in the state context.  
Beijing also employs “hierarchical control” to direct innovative effort towards technological fields the 
state deems most useful for its defined outcome of China’s economic growth. However the central 
state acts in this manner under the belief that it can know which technological areas will be most 
suitable for achieving this goal (and we have detailed its very specific technological aims), and that its 
rewards will then lead to the best innovation outcomes within these fields. (Furthermore, Nooteboom 
(2010, 7) notes the “revelation problem”, a.k.a. Arrow’s information paradox: “to judge the value of 
information one must already have it, but then there is nothing left to pay for”. In one sense, the state 
behaves as if it believes it has solved Arrow’s paradox, by deciding in advance which areas are most 
valuable on behalf of company management.) 
Nee (2005) describes the motivation problem for central SOE managers, and its relation to innovation. 
Being “professional bureaucrats in a nonmarket environment” makes SOE directors risk-averse: little 
premium is put on “innovation and risk taking when the evaluative process emphasises meeting 
production targets sent down from higher authorities” (Nee, 2005, 59). Nee’s “vice chairman of 
company M” stated: “we do not mind enduring risk if there was a business opportunity. But the 
government officials are less likely to bear the same risk… even if we had a successful risky investment, 
the officials would not benefit from this project. But if the risky investment failed, they could be in 
trouble”. Innovation investment by cadres is unlikely to lead to great wealth, so they “strive to advance 
their careers, to gain higher bonuses, and to expand their organisational power and influence” (Nee, 
2005, 59) (because taking innovative risks may jeopardise their firms’ survival prospects). In summary, 
despite considerable resource from central government, these firms’ principal-agent chains, including 
the monitoring measures therein, increase the costs and reduce the benefits of innovation for agents. 
 
 
Regarding the effects of central government shareholdings in the minority:  
Ming and Williamson (2007) find that most Chinese companies that launch products successfully into 
the global arena (like Lenovo) are “hybrid” firms, with “a mix of public and private ownership”. This 
describes firms in which two types of principal have a similar aim (i.e. for firms to innovate 
successfully), but which create different agency chains between principal and agent, which then have 
different effects on outcomes. We have established in our discussion of China’s institutional system 
of innovation how state shareholding puts firms in a better position to protect themselves from IP 
infringement, thus helping give them an incentive to innovate. Nee (2005, 58) states that “cadre-
entrepreneurs [in hybrid firms] have positive incentives for risk taking and innovation, though they 
are more risk-averse than private entrepreneurs, who stand to profit mightily from successful 
ventures”. 
 
Although, like venture capitalists, state principals wish to monitor agent performance, conflicting aims 
– and intra-Party nepotism – are likely to limit the effectiveness of monitoring (thus Holmström’s 
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(1979) “noise” effects in performance evaluations). This means for MISOEs, where private ownership 
is in the majority, the incentives it provides will help cut these noise effects, because agents will be 
answerable primarily to private principals. Meanwhile, the presence of some state shareholding 
allows more protection of the IP assets generated by better incentivised and monitored agents. 
 
Private shareholding gives better innovation incentives, partly by simply not specifying how innovation 
will be measured and rewarded (which as we have seen can lead to agents registering low-quality 
utility patents and spending money on the appearance of innovation, such as new facilities). This also 
means that agents are more likely to be rewarded for innovations which succeed in the marketplace 
via genuine originality compared to existing products. So if a private shareholder takes majority 
control, a re-alignment of incentives for the managers can occur. This means that this particular multi-
principal scenario actually simplifies incentives for managers, as their most important relationship 
then becomes that with the private principal-owner. This is ultimately why a majority private 
ownership allows agents to follow an incentive structure that is more successful at allowing 
innovation, while the state’s minority stake can further incentivise innovation in this context by 
granting protection in the Chinese institutional system.  
 
Regarding the effects of sub-central government shareholdings in the minority: 
Although most local government-owned firms, or local government shareholding, is shareholding for 
which local governments are ultimately accountable to central SASAC, in reality central SASAC has 
little oversight role through its local branches, with the local government itself the real overseeing 
principal of local shareholdings. This means a shorter principal-agent chain exists than for central 
government shareholdings, making oversight less opaque, and allowing principals more reliable 
information on occurrences in firms. This structure alters the incentives for the principals doing the 
monitoring; having fewer firms to monitor is liable to lead to better investigation and oversight than 
for central principals, whose scope of responsibilities will in many cases be very large.  
For the agents managing firms, this means unwise investments are more likely to be noticed. Local 
government ownership creates a state shareholding mechanism closer to the venture capital type: 
arrangements between firms and their local government in either province or municipality will give 
principals an actual profit incentive (instead of just working for the benefit of “the people”). Besides, 
these principals will be held more directly to account if their locality does not generate income. 
Meanwhile the closer monitoring and feedback for agent waste and failure that the venture capital 
model implies is also present.  
Local cadres’ primacy in overseeing these firms results in the problematic state multi-principal 
situation being better controlled, with a smaller group of local cadres taking the place of SASAC, 
ministries, the State Council and so on. Furthermore, the principals, operating on a smaller scale, will 
not have thousands of agents to monitor, and stand to benefit from these firms’ success. Although 
the populations of the areas in question are still large, we are likely to see somewhat more trust in 
principal-agent relations, smaller populations better allowing the “Singapore model” (Zhang, 1998), 
with both principal and agent receiving more reputational feedback if a firm fails, and better social 
standing if it succeeds. They are also more likely to be embedded in similar networks, providing more 
information on each other’s real aims and methods.  
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While central government ownership sees the risk around investment outcomes more “securitised” 
away, split between numerous principals with limited personal incentive for concern, at more local 
levels this securitisation is less pronounced because oversight is less dilute. As described in the case 
of Beijing’s Zhongguancun cluster, local government ownership also removes some disadvantages of 
state ownership while keeping the advantages, including better access to legal protection in local law 
courts. As we will discuss in our hypotheses, firms in provincial-level cities also typically have 
considerable resource, both financially and in their connections to local universities and institutions 
(for innovation generally, there are positive spillovers associated with clustering, such as pools of 
skilled labour, the learning effects created by sharing information, and the effects of technology 
demonstration (Fai, 2005)). In other words closer monitoring, plus expertise, gives an advantage. 
While locally state-owned firms are given less internal resources than centrally state-owned firms, 
they tend to operate in more competitive (and market-oriented) sub-industries (Boeing et al, 2013), 
increasing their incentives for R&D collaboration. Furthermore, the local connections that lead to 
collaboration with other (often locally state-owned) firms in the same area may lead to particularly 
high collaborative benefits; being owned by the same provincial government can also decrease 
transaction costs (Boeing et al, 2013).  
As China’s private firms are usually exposed to higher levels of competition than their state-owned 
counterparts (Boeing et al, 2013), they will have greater need for innovation (Boeing et al find that 
having included dummies for ownership type as general control variables they do not observe 
productivity differences between private and state-owned firms, which demonstrates the need for 
more exact measures of variations between private and state ownership, such as ours). Moving down 
the political hierarchy from central to municipal government is “equivalent to [reducing] government 
owners’ control and transferring [SOEs] from social political orientated organisation to market 
oriented one” (Da, 2010, 47), and as we have seen, the reform period gave local governments 
“economic incentives to become entrepreneurial, especially in the fiscal reforms that let them retain 
tax revenue” (Da, 2010, 47). Being granted rights to the residual (fiscal surplus) illustrates Wong’s 
(2000, 8) finding that “under a range of conditions, the principal’s optimal incentive structure for the 
agent is one in which the latter receives some share of the residual in payment for his effort, thus 
giving him a direct stake in the outcome [my italics]”. Like the venture capital cases where private 
capital can be pulled in instances of failure, some local governments have this capacity, whereas the 
potential for nepotism and blurred aims of the central state is likely to hinder the action of such 
mechanisms in that ownership context.  
 
 
Regarding the effects of sub-central government shareholdings in the majority: 
We have established that a central state majority shareholding provides relatively abundant 
resources, while a private shareholding provides incentives and a principal-agent chain more 
conducive to pro-innovation management decisions. Should this majority state shareholding be sub-
central, resource availability is likely not as abundant, although the principal-agent chain is liable to 
be more effective than in the central case. Having established the potential of private shareholding, 
should this be a minority, its potential for incentivising innovation, while present, may therefore not 
be as effective as in the majority-private case.    
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Regarding the effects of completely private shareholdings: 
Private entrepreneurs, as we have discussed, have stronger incentives to innovate, while operating 
under the hard-budget constraints that promote “more exacting cost-benefit calculations in their 
investment decisions” (Nee, 2005, 60). Nee implies however that private entrepreneurs are the best 
incentivised to innovate, but lack the resources of the hybrid firm agent (who may take the lead in 
innovation because of his position vis-à-vis the state). This inability to protect patented IP in the 
Chinese legal system combines with their much more limited access to resources, meaning that 
despite their incentives they often simply lack the necessary resource to both invest in R&D and secure 
innovation outcomes.  
 
Regarding the effects of the addition of foreign shareholding: 
Foreign shareholding constitutes an infusion of private shareholding, as described above, but with 
added characteristics. Even more than other types, foreign ownership implies investment in firms 
whose products are intended to compete in the global market, requiring innovation to maintain 
production of this standard of competitive product.  
The vast majority of foreign ownership in the sector is of Chinese firms which are listed on foreign 
stock exchanges, which have more demanding corporate governance reporting requirements 
(including R&D information). Foreign markets’ superior reporting requirements limit these firms’ 
agents’ opportunity to leverage asymmetric information to create moral hazard (hidden action). While 
the Chinese state carries out its own monitoring to gain control of these information flows, the limited 
personal interest of cadre-principals compared to foreign private owners (and the potential for 
nepotistic relations within the state system) limits the effectiveness of this monitoring. 
While the Chinese state has conflicting interests at work in the firms of which it is an owner, such as 
maintaining employment, foreign principals do not have to invest in any firm. This allows superior 
“ultimatum bargaining” (Sappington, 1991) from principal to agent over the investment of resource, 
which combined with tighter reporting requirements helps stop agents gaming principals through 
wasteful investment. Although most state principals will be able to “securitise” risks up to a higher 
level to some extent, foreign principals will be unable to do so. A foreign private investor has the 
incentive to monitor risks, as he will bear the burden of failed investment; the foreign takeover market 
also provides the aforementioned “discipline of last resort”.  
The globalised competition facing foreign principals also forces more interest in genuinely 
competitive, ideally world-beating, innovation. This leaves them with little or no interest in the 
“quantitative patenting” on which Chinese state owners have judged their firms’ performance, which 
allows the amassing of utility patents in particular. Meanwhile, local government cadres have been 
keen to boost the GDP figures on which they are graded (and promoted) by central government. This 
has led them to fund solar PV manufacturing firms’ production facilities for volume production, 
maintaining jobs and output, which may be at the expense of technologically competitive product in 
the longer-term. Foreign private investors will likely have little interest in these metrics.  
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Indeed, Eberhardt et al (2011, 21) study the characteristics of recent patenting by Chinese firms, and 
find that a few firms in the ICT equipment sector account for the vast majority of patents, a 
concentration that is even more pronounced in USPTO filings: these firms “are very large, relatively 
young, more R&D intensive, and strongly export oriented”. For such firms, “a substantial share of 
patents covers product innovation, albeit of relatively low-tech character. Process innovations and 
combinations of product and process innovation covered by patents held by these companies appear 
to be technologically more innovative and potentially valuable”20. Their results suggest that these few, 
patent-active firms are not just “innovation castles in the air” created by “Chinese public policy 
directed at increased patenting, but (at least to some extent) innovative companies highly integrated 
into the global economy”. However, as to whether this is evidence for wider technological take-off 
among Chinese firms, their analysis suggests patenting is concentrated in very few industries and even 
within them is undertaken by very few companies. While “a number of Chinese companies appear to 
be truly innovative, potentially even pushing the technology frontier beyond China”, there are “very 
few such companies, and some of the most active among them are foreign-invested. Most companies 
are thus likely to concentrate on incremental process innovation rather than the generation of “new-
to-the-world” innovation” (Eberhardt et al, 2011, 21). This small number appears to be unlike in those 
Asian economies that have successfully escaped the middle income trap. 
 
Regarding the effects of central government shareholding in the majority, on the patenting of different 
types of technology: 
For the purposes of these hypotheses, we divided all the types of solar PV technology patented into 
three categories: core, blue-sky, and related. Core technologies refer to the crystalline silicon 
technologies, including silicon refining, ingot, wafer, cell, and module manufacture, which form the 
bulk of the current commercial solar PV market. Blue-sky technologies are those in thin film and other 
advanced areas which do not yet have a large market, but may in future. Related technologies are 
those mores straightforward areas, such as technologies which have both PV and solar thermal 
applications, and which see PV technologies applied to such items as public lighting and architectural 
features.     
So-called “blue-sky” technologies are an area where R&D remains relatively speculative, due to very 
limited current commercial payoffs. With the market for solar PV currently dominated by poly- and 
mono-crystalline modules, thin films and other advanced technologies (whether silicon-based or non-
silicon such as gallium arsenide films) remain too expensive for market uptake, despite their 
frequently high efficiency conversion (as a highly developed silicon supply chain has helped maintain 
low prices for crystalline silicon-based products). Although there will still likely be a good deal of 
wasted investment, and the same state principal-agent monitoring problems apply, the very fact that 
few non-state principals will be as interested in these highly speculative areas means that what 
innovation there is in these fields will be relatively state-dominated.  
The result of the speculative nature of these technologies is that they will, at present, be a limited 
focus for commercial companies’ R&D laboratories, as those working on them will need to be less 
                                                          
20 Bocken Qin (BP Ventures, Beijing), also states that “China’s innovation advantage looks to be in process and 
product, rather than science” (interview, September, 2012). 
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motivated by predictable revenue streams. These are the innovations in the technological “valley of 
death”, typically the target of government-funded research. These areas, though currently expensive 
to research, and difficult fields in which to predict future market-winning innovations, can produce 
paradigm-shifting innovations. As such, at the early stage they are often better suited to national than 
commercial competition, as governments (often through state firms) try to capture the future 
dividends of technological ownership.  
The principal-agent advantages of the private sector are less useful here; these investments are by 
their nature relatively output-inefficient, and reducing moral hazard to give a principal more 
information on agent activity is less likely to lead to desired outcomes, given that principals will have 
little knowledge advantage over agents. Meanwhile, the advantages of state protection remain useful, 
as innovators will still require considerable resource and wish to protect patents. Furthermore, 
although China has been said to have too much “insurance” for SOE employees, this is one area in 
which it may be useful, as secure employment may encourage experimentation in speculative 
projects. The role of state organisations in these fields is also demonstrated by other nations’ R&D 
investments (in the US, Defense Department-funded research is investigating smart grid technologies 
for solar, while Japan is funding research into vanadium technologies).  
However, innovation may be limited by firms being urged to follow quantitative innovation targets, 
while China’s central government has also established a quantitative system of measuring academic 
output, grading researchers on numbers of papers published (which may affect university-established 
firms). The “research culture” this has produced may not be conducive to time-consuming research 
into complex, groundbreaking, speculative innovations. Although we are not investigating universities 
or institutes, but state-owned firms (and other firms), this research system is likely also to have a 
marked effect on SOEs, as they are likely to partner with these institutes. 
 
Regarding the effects of sub-central government shareholding in the majority, on the patenting of 
different types of technology: 
In describing minority-SOEs where sub-central government is the major state shareholder, we have 
established that these firms are those most likely to demonstrate high inventive output. Given their 
more global market-oriented product positions, they are likely to be focused on building core 
technological competences, and better able to do so through the more effective principal-agent 
relations described. This means both R&D input and inventive output will be focused on the core 
technological areas of solar PV, and away from the “related” areas that involve the simpler spin-out 
products that are only loosely based on these core technologies. 
 
7.3 Sub-samples and data available 
The listed firms comprise 28 firms: this sample comprises all the listed Chinese firms in the solar PV 
sector (listed both in and outside China), and a number of firms which have been listed and have since 
de-listed.  
The unlisted firms comprise the remainder of the sample, which is to say 122 firms.  
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Data availability is better for listed firms in certain regards, notably: 
1) For listed firms, the data on the ownership of shares (private, foreign, state, and different 
levels of state) is of a high enough quality to present these as continuous variables; for unlisted 
firms, the data on share ownership only allows the assignment of firms to categories. These 
are: POE (entirely private), MISOE (minority state-owned), MASOE (majority state-owned), or 
SOE (entirely state-owned). As we have seen, for MISOEs, MASOEs, and SOEs, these categories 
have also been subdivided by the level of government which is the owner or the largest owner 
of a stake (central, provincial, super-municipal, and municipal). (Please note also that we have 
checked that using this relatively small sample of listed firms is appropriate: Pisano (1994) for 
example also used a similar sample, of 23 observations, and 5 variables. In our tests the 
significance values naturally take into account the required degrees of freedom, which are 
accounted for in any “pass”.)  
 
2) For listed firms, data is available on turnover for all relevant years. For unlisted firms, data is 
only available on staff numbers and not turnover; furthermore, the staff number data is only 
for the most recent period. This means that where it is necessary to use size as a control 
variable in testing hypotheses, the potential problem of reverse causation needs to be tested: 
instead of, or as well as, size affecting patent performance (lagged by two or three years), 
what will be registered may be partly the effect of patent performance on size (with a lag of 
some kind). We can test for such an effect however, because we have time series data for the 
size (by turnover and in most cases by staff numbers) for listed firms. So it is possible to test 
for the effect of patent performance on size, by looking at the change in size over time in listed 
firms, and its correlation with previous patent performance. If necessary, this can be used to 
modify the size data used (this is an example of the way that a sub-sample - listed firms - with 
rich data, can be used to improve the data available for a larger sample). 
 
3) For listed firms there is sufficiently high quality data for R&D to be presented as a continuous 
variable for the majority of these firms. (This is derived from R&D expenditure data for most 
of that majority. For the remainder there is data for R&D staff numbers, from which R&D 
expenditure is imputed.) For unlisted firms there is no data from which R&D expenditure can 
be calculated. This raises the possibility of omitted variable bias when patent performance is 
regressed on the ownership variables. This is discussed in 7.4 below.   
 
 
We now set out the core arguments underlying the hypotheses, and the hypotheses themselves. 
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7.4 Core arguments and hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be tested are presented in groups below, with the core arguments on which they 
are based. 
Resources and R&D 
We have found that the higher the proportion of shares held by the state, the greater the resources 
available for innovation. Likewise the higher the level of the state which owns a given shareholding, 
the greater the resources available for innovation.  We can thus predict that: 
Hypothesis 1a: The higher the state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend on R&D absolutely.  
Hypothesis 1b: The higher the state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend on R&D relative to 
turnover.  
Hypothesis 2a: The higher the level of government which holds the largest state shareholding, the 
higher the rate of spend on R&D absolutely.   
Hypothesis 2b: The higher the level of government which holds the largest state shareholding, the 
higher the rate of spend on R&D relative to turnover. 
These hypotheses are testable only on Listed Firms. R&D expenditure is usable as a dependent variable 
(DV), or numerator of the DV. The assumed lag of DV on independent variables (IV) is one year. For 
hypothesis 2 (H2), the levels of government can be shown by dummy variables; so the predicted 
coefficient on the central government dummy would be highest, the predicted coefficient on the 
provincial government dummy next, etc.  Alternatively the levels of government can be conflated into 
central and sub-central and the respective shareholdings treated as continuous variables.  
 
Productivity of R&D 
We have predicted that the higher the private shareholding, the greater the efficiency with which 
resources are used for innovation. 
Likewise, the more local the level of government which holds any state shareholding, the greater the 
efficiency with which resources are used for innovation. 
This gives us the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the private (domestic) shareholding, the better the patenting 
performance for each unit of R&D spent.  
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the foreign shareholding, the better the patenting performance for each 
unit of R&D spent.  
These too can only be tested on Listed Firms, with Patent Productivity (PatPro: that is, PatPer divided 
by R&D) as DV. The assumed lag of the DV on IV is three years: Ownership at t=0, R&D at t=1, Pat Per 
at t=3.).  
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It is notable that this formulation, with PatPro as DV, in effect treats any of the ownership variables as 
a moderating variable for R&D: it moderates the effect of R&D on patenting performance. (To see this 
one must do a simple transformation of the equation: multiply PatPro by its denominator, R&D, to get 
PatPer as DV; and then of course multiply all the terms on the other side of the equation by R&D, 
which replaces the ownership variables by interaction terms, and introduces R&D multiplied by the 
constant.) This is true also for H3e and H4 below, which also use PatPro as DV.   
Alternatively, PatPer can be used as dependent variable, with or without R&D as one of the 
independent variables: 
Hypothesis 3c: The higher the combined private and foreign shareholding (total private 
shareholding), and the higher the R&D spent, the better the patenting performance. 
Hypothesis 3d: The higher the combined private and foreign shareholding (total private 
shareholding), the better the patenting performance. 
These represent two of the standard tests required to find whether R&D can be treated as a mediating 
variable (see below).  
Hypotheses 3a and 3b are also combined in another version:  
Hypothesis 3e: The higher the combined private and foreign shareholding (total private 
shareholding), the better the patenting performance for each unit of R&D spent. 
We generate also Hypothesis 4: The lower the level of government which holds any state 
shareholding, the better the patenting performance for each unit of R&D spent.  
Again this is testable only on Listed Firms, with PatPro as DV. As for H2, the levels of government can 
be shown by dummy variables; so the predicted coefficient on the central government dummy would 
be highest, the predicted coefficient on the provincial government dummy next, etc.  Alternatively the 
levels of government can be conflated into central and sub-central and the respective shareholdings 
treated as continuous variables. What we have chosen to do is to take the total state share as 100 and 
divide it between central and sub-central government. We have then used sub-central government’s 
share as the independent variable.  
(Lags as Hypothesis 3.) 
 
 
Ownership and Patenting Performance 
We now proceed to the hypotheses which can be tested with the full sample of listed and unlisted 
firms – and therefore without R&D as an independent variable.  
First, we have noted that foreign shareholding is likely to be associated with a stronger focus on 
innovation of international relevance. This yields  
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Hypothesis 5: (the effect of foreign shareholding): The higher the foreign shareholding, the higher 
the output of more inventive patents. (The DV is the “more inventive” PatPer factor divided by the 
“less inventive” factor. Lags as Hypothesis 3.) 
Next, it is true by definition that Patent Performance is equal to the quantity of R&D multiplied by its 
productivity in terms of patents. We have argued that the quantity of R&D is a function of ownership, 
such that state shareholding, and specifically central state shareholding, makes for higher R&D.  
Among the unlisted firms this is likely to be highly non-linear, since POEs have very poor access to 
funding. (It will be argued below that listed POEs are untypical in this respect.) There is one the other 
hand no reason to think that 100% SOEs have much better access to funding than MASOEs (majority 
SOEs) or even MISOEs: if there is a strong state shareholding then that makes the essential connection 
with banks or other sources of funding. We have argued likewise that the productivity of R&D is also 
a function of ownership, but with a quite different relationship: in this case it is the existence of a 
strong private shareholding which makes for high productivity.  Again the effect is likely to be non-
linear: a SOE (entirely state-owned) firm is likely to be highly unproductive, and a MASOE (majority 
state-owned) may well be, but there is no strong reason to believe that a MISOE (in which the private 
shareholding is dominant) will be significantly less productive than a POE.  It follows (taking quantity 
and productivity together) that we have  
 
Hypothesis 6: Patent performance is a non-linear function of the ratio of state to private 
shareholding, therefore highest for intermediate values.  
One should recall that for the full sample we do not have data such that this ration can be expressed 
as a continuous variable. In any case there may well be threshold effects, between our four categories 
of POEs, MISOEs, MASOEs, and SOEs. We therefore have 
Hypothesis 6a: The output of “less inventive” patents is a non-linear function of the ratio of 
state to private shareholding, highest for MISOEs. (Using dummy variables for shareholding 
categories, with the predicted coefficient highest for MISOEs. Lags as Hypothesis 3.)  
Hypothesis 6b: The total output of patents is a non-linear function of the ratio of state to 
private shareholding, therefore highest for MISOEs. (Using dummy variables for shareholding 
categories, with the predicted coefficient highest for MISOEs. Lags as Hypothesis 3.) 
Hypothesis 6c: The output of “more inventive” patents is a non-linear function of the ratio 
of state to private shareholding, therefore highest for MISOEs. (Testable on All Firms, with Pat Per as 
the DV, and using dummy variables for shareholding categories, with the predicted coefficient highest 
for MISOEs. Lags as Hypothesis 3.) 
We also generate a relatively “agnostic” pair of hypotheses on the effect of level of government, from 
the two opposing tendencies – for central government shareholding to increase quantity of R&D, and 
sub-central government to increase its productivity: 
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Hypothesis 7:  The effect of level of government on patenting performance.  
Hypothesis 7a: The total output of patents is the higher, the higher the level of government 
which has the largest state shareholding. 
Hypothesis 7b: The total output of patents is the higher, the lower the level of government 
which has the largest state shareholding. 
(Lags as Hypothesis 3).  
 
Ownership and Direction of Patenting Performance. 
Solar PV patents can be divided into three broad categories: “core”, “blue sky”, and “related”.  “Core” 
patents are in the areas which can be expected to generate most profit in the short and medium term 
(i.e. up to five years), but accordingly are difficult fields in which to generate a competitive edge, and 
therefore these patents will be gained most by firms which are being driven hard for profit and at the 
same time are reasonably well-resourced (the technologies that fall into this category are silicon and 
ingot manufacturing, wafers, modules, and system components such as inverters). “Blue sky” patents 
will pay off, if at all, in the longer term (e.g. thin film PV), and are therefore the most likely to be 
sought, and obtained, by very well-resourced firms which are not under much immediate pressure for 
profit. “Related” patents are in areas which are relatively low-tech, and as such will be registered by 
relatively low-tech firms, and by firms which are seeking to gain patents simply for the sake of patents, 
i.e. to make a good impression on their principals. They include apparatus that is simply derived from 
solar PV, such as solar PV street lights and suchlike.  
 
Hypothesis 8: The effect of level of government on the direction of patenting performance.  
 
Hypothesis 8a: Majority or 100% state-owned enterprises (MASOEs or SOEs) where central 
government is the major shareholder will be associated with a relatively high proportion of patent 
output in “blue sky” technology categories. 
 
Hypothesis 8b: Minority SOEs where sub-central government is the major state shareholder 
will be associated with a relatively high proportion of patent output in “core” technology categories. 
 
Hypothesis 8c: Minority SOEs where sub-central government is the major state shareholder 
will be associated with a relatively low proportion of inventive output in “related” technology 
categories. 
 
(PatPer (suitably subdivided into categories) as the DVs. Lags as Hypothesis 3.) 
 
It has been suggested that (in particular) the regression whose results support H6a, might suffer from 
omitted variable bias. In statistics, we can state that omitted-variable bias occurs when a model 
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incorrectly leaves out one or more important causal factors. The bias occurs when the model 
compensates for the missing factor by overestimating or underestimating the effect of another factor. 
The suspicion here will be that the omitted variable in question is R&D, and that the overestimation 
will be of the effect of ownership type: more specifically, that the superiority of MISOEs in generating 
PatPer has been overestimated. It is clearly probable that R&D is an important causal factor in PatPer 
(and it is shown to be in the test of H3c). It is possible that R&D is relatively highly correlated with 
ownership type (this turns out not to be the case for listed firms, but as was explained, the kind of 
private firm that manages to become listed is rather exceptional). The majority of unlisted POEs will 
be considerably underfunded, which will inevitably reduce their R&D. However, we can “cover 
ourselves” by considering the two possibilities: 
R&D is substantially correlated with ownership type (plausibly, it is lower for POEs). 
R&D is not substantially correlated with ownership type. 
 
We can then follow through on both assumptions in turn:  
If R&D is substantially correlated with ownership type, we need to consider why this is. Is it because 
ownership type affects R&D, or is it because R&D affects ownership type? Or is it because another 
factor affects both? 
 
Does R&D affect ownership type? We have a lag of one year with R&D – R&D in t+1 for ownership in 
year t, which is some protection against causation in this direction, but a better argument is the 
obvious implausibility of this question. Ownership is a relatively stable and entrenched factor, which 
cannot change on a whim, which means there is no clear reason why changes in R&D should lead to 
changes in ownership. (Although one could create a scenario in which an increase in R&D leads to 
some innovative success which could make a firm more attractive to buy, there can be no clear 
prediction regarding what ownership direction this would mean, and the process would take years, 
meaning an increase in R&D in t+1 could not cause an ownership change in t.)  
Is there another factor which affects both R&D and ownership? This is less implausible: age and 
location could in principle do so: however, they are used frequently as control variables, and their 
correlations with R&D and ownership are not high. Size clearly affects R&D, but it is difficult to see 
how it can affect ownership, even if ownership could affect size. Again, we use it as a control variable, 
so it is not itself an omitted variable, so it can then matter little that R&D is left out. (We can also keep 
in mind that where a common factor A affects both B and C, the resulting correlation between B and 
C is likely to be weaker than between A and B, and A and C: roughly the product of the two.)  
The only reasonable suggestion is that ownership type affects R&D, because we have a clear causal 
chain: being private, other things being equal, severely reduces access to funding (strongly supported 
by the literature), and having severely reduced access to funding reduces R&D (also clear, and strongly 
supported by the literature). It is only because of the existence of this well-known causal chain that 
we predict the substantial correlation: if one disbelieves this, one has no reason to expect there to be 
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a substantial correlation, and we move to the alternative assumption. But if the correlation arises thus, 
it is not logical to conclude that the effect of ownership type on PatPer has been over-estimated. What 
the correlation would pick up is the effect of ownership type on R&D. Since we already assume that 
R&D affects PatPer, we would then have an effect of ownership type on PatPer through R&D – in other 
words R&D would be a mediating variable.  
Tests exist to establish that “X” is a mediating variable, e.g. a procedure through induction that we do 
not need to follow, because we proceed through deduction. These tests were followed for the listed 
firms, in the following order: in H1 we regress R&D on the independent variable (ownership) alone, in 
H3c we regress PatPer on the independent variable with R&D, and in H3d we regress PatPer on the 
independent variable alone (please see the note following the regression for Hypothesis 3d for an 
explanation of what occurs).  
We do not need to establish however that it is mediating: we merely need to consider what follows if 
it is, and with mediating variables the position is clear: we are entitled to remove the mediating 
variable to examine the effect of the (mediated) independent variable. If we leave the mediating and 
mediated variables in together this is not an appropriate test of the total effect of the mediated 
variable – some of its effect will be “stolen” by the mediating variable.  
In this case if we had R&D data for the whole sample, then used it as another independent variable, 
alongside ownership dummies and controls, then, following assumption 1 above, this would lead to 
an underestimation of the effect of ownership on PatPer, because R&D would “steal” some of the 
effect of ownership; as a test of a hypothesis on the effects of ownership on total patent performance, 
the equation would be inappropriate. It would be a more appropriate test of a different hypothesis: 
the effects of ownership on the efficiency with which R&D is used.  
Let us make the alternative assumption: 
R&D is not substantially correlated with ownership type.  
Then it is unlikely that it will have any substantial effect, one way or the other, on the apparent 
impact of ownership on Pat Per.  There is then no omitted variable bias21 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 To quote from a recent article by Clarke (2005, 348-9): “If the logic of control variables is flawed, experimental 
control must be achieved in another way. How this can be done is no mystery. In their seminal econometrics 
text, Hanushek and Jackson (1977) discuss how to use research design in place of using control variables to 
address potential omitted variable bias. These include basing specification on theory”, as I have, and “finding 
“natural” experiments, and “controlling” for unmeasured effects through careful sample stratification”. The 
article also states: “To these we can add the explicit use of competing theories and the choice of research 
hypothesis (Rosenbaum, 1999; Freedman, 1991).” I have done this by considering the possible explanations of 
correlation with an omitted variable. 
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8.      Data Analysis 
 
The following section details how we use the quantitative data to test the hypotheses. 
 
 
8.1    Preparatory econometric data analysis 
8.1.1 Coding 
Prior to entering data (into SPSS) to begin quantitative analysis, all variables were coded in the correct 
format. This involved coding the names of each variable, and assigning numbers to all the responses 
which were not already in numerical form. These variables were as follows:  
The first variable in the dataset was ID, and a number was assigned to each case (i.e. each solar PV 
firm), from 1 to 150 (please refer to the appendices for the list of firm IDs and other coding details). 
Next, the independent variables were coded, in the following way. 
The shareholding-related variables were coded as follows: 
 
Variable:     Code:    Value: 
Percentage of firm private domestic  PrivDomPercent   [Percent as number] 
Percentage of firm foreign    FPercent   [Percent as number] 
Percentage of firm central state held  StateCentralPercent  [Percent as number] 
Percentage of firm provincial state held  StateProvPercent   [Percent as number] 
Percentage of firm super-municipally state held StateSuperMuniPercent  [Percent as number] 
Percentage of firm municipal state held  StateMuniPercent  [Percent as number] 
 
These shareholding-related variables were therefore coded for each year along this same pattern, for 
example: PrivDomPercent2006, etc. 
The variables for the outcome of shareholding for each firm (i.e. the result in ownership of the 
combined percentages for a given year) were coded as follows: 
 
Outcome:   Code:      Value: 
Private    POE     1 
Central state fully owned  CentralSOE    2 
Central state majority owned  CentralMASOE    3 
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Central state minority owned CentralMISOE    4 
Provincial state fully owned ProvSOE     5 
Provincial state majority owned ProvMASOE    6 
Provincial state minority owned ProvMISOE    7 
Municipal state fully owned MuniSOE    8 
Municipal state majority owned MuniMASOE    9 
Municipal state minority owned MuniMISOE    10 
Super-municipal state owned SuperMuniSOE    11 
Super-muni state majority owned SuperMuniMASOE   12 
Super-muni state minority owned SuperMuniMISOE   13 
 
As above, the outcome variables were coded for each year using this pattern: e.g. Outcome2006, etc. 
Meanwhile, when we need to avoid categorising firms by the 13 categories above (where combining 
data on state shareholding proportion and data on state level as above creates too much noise), we 
separate them in the following way (please note that we have done this for firms’ ownership averages 
for 2005-2009, due to the requirements of Hypothesis 8 in which they are used): 
To test a firm’s state shareholding along the state ownership level:  
OwnaveStateLevel20052009 
Outcome:     Value: 
Central      1 
Provincial     2 
Municipal     3 
Super-municipal     4 
 
To test the proportion of state shareholding: 
OwnaveStateProportion20052009 
Outcome:     Value: 
SOE      1 
MASOE      2 
MISOE      3 
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POE      4 
 
To test R&D-related variables, the following codes were used: 
Variable:     Code:    Value: 
R&D staff number    RDStaff    [Number] 
Total staff     TtalStaff    [Number] 
R&D staff as percentage of total staff  RDStaffofTtalStaff  [Number] 
 
The variables were coded for each year along the same pattern, e.g. RDStaff2006, etc. 
 
 
To test the control variables: 
Variable:     Code:    Value: 
Location by province    LocationProvIncome  [Number] 
Current age of firm    AgFirm    [Number] 
Subsidiary     Subsid    [Yes (1) or No (0)] 
Listed       Listed    [Yes (1) or No (0)] 
Agglomeration     Agglom    [Yes (1) or No (0)] 
 
Here, only listed firms needed to be coded for each year, e.g. Listed2006, etc. 
 
The patent-related variables were coded as follows: 
Variable:     Code:    Value: 
Total patents for the firm     PatentTtal   [Number] 
Inventive patents for the firm   PatentInvent   [Number] 
Non-inventive patents for the firm   PatentNonInvent   [Number] 
Forward citations of patents for the firm   PatentCite   [Number] 
Patent family registrations per firm (domestic) PatentFam   [Number] 
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Patent family registrations outside China (non-US) PatentFamF    [Number] 
Patent family registrations outside China (US) PatentFamUS   [Number] 
 
As above, the patent-related codes were coded for each year along the same pattern, for example: 
PatentTtal2006, etc. 
 
Abbreviated variable names: 
For ease of understanding the output, the names of the variables above were abbreviated as 
follows. 
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The following table illustrates the variable names used in the output tables below, (the third column, 
Abbreviated variable name in output), with the Original variable name in SPSS regressions, and the 
Meaning of variable.   
 
 
Original variable name in SPSS regressions Meaning of variable Abbreviated variable 
name in output 
   
   
State proportion 2004-6 1= SOE, 2= MASOE, 3= 
MISOE 4=POE 
State proportion (2004-
6) 
State proportion 2008-9 
  
1= SOE, 2= MASOE, 3= 
MISOE 4=POE 
State proportion (2008-
9) 
Average percentage of ownership by the state for 
each firm (averaged for 2007-2009) 
State shareholding as a 
percentage 
State percentage 
(2007-2009) 
SOEs Entirely state-owned 
enterprises 
SOEs 
MASOEs Majority state-owned 
enterprises 
MASOEs 
MISOEs Minority state-owned 
enterprises 
MISOEs 
POEs Entirely privately-owned 
enterprises 
POEs 
 
State level 2004-6 
1= Central, 2= Provincial, 3= 
Super-municipal, 4=Municipal 
Level of state (2004-6) 
 
State level 2008-9 
 
1= Central, 2= Provincial, 3= 
Super-municipal, 4=Municipal 
 
Level of state (2008-9) 
 
OwnaveStateLevel4CodesCentral 
 
In category if firm has state 
ownership and a majority of this 
ownership is central state 
 
Level of state Central 
 
OwnaveStateLevel4CodesProvincial 
 
In category if firm has state 
ownership and a majority of this 
ownership is provincial state 
 
Level of state 
Provincial 
OwnaveStateLevel4CodesSuperMuni In category if firm has state 
ownership and a majority of this 
ownership is super-municipal 
state 
Level of state Super-
municipal 
OwnaveStateLevel4CodesMuni In category if firm has state 
ownership and a majority of this 
ownership is municipal state 
Level of state Municipal 
CENTRAL is Average largest shareholder by 
level of the state for each firm (averaged for 
2007-2009) (As CATEGORICAL DUMMY 
variable) 
Central state is the largest 
shareholder (2007-9) (as a 
categorical variable) 
Central state largest 
shareholder (2007-9) 
(categorical) 
 
NON-CENTRAL is Average largest shareholder 
by level of the state for each firm (averaged for 
2007-2009) (As CATEGORICAL DUMMY  
CENTRAL VS NON-CENTRAL variable) 
 
Non-central state is the largest 
shareholder (2007-9) (as a 
categorical variable) 
 
Non-central state 
largest shareholder 
(2007-9) (categorical) 
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Percent of the firm owned by the central state 
average 2007-2009 
 
Central state shareholding as a 
percentage 
 
Central state 
percentage (2007-9)  
Percent of the firm owned by the non-central 
state average 2007-2009 
Non-central state shareholding 
as a percentage 
Non-central state 
percentage (2007-9)  
Average percentage of ownership by private 
shareholders for each firm (averaged for 2007-
2009) 
Private shareholding as a 
percentage 
Private percentage 
(2007-9) 
 
Foreign shareholding 2004-6 
 
Foreign shareholding as a 
percentage 
 
Foreign percentage 
(2004-6) 
Foreign shareholding 2008-9 Foreign shareholding as a 
percentage 
Foreign percentage 
(2008-9) 
Average percentage of ownership by foreign 
shareholders for each firm (averaged for 2007-
2009) 
 
Foreign shareholding as a 
percentage 
Foreign percentage 
(2007-9) 
Shareholding percentage foreign annual average 
2005-2009, using only the years for which some 
shareholding is registered for the firm 
 
Average percentage of ownership by private plus 
foreign shareholders for each firm (averaged for 
2007-2009) 
Foreign shareholding as a 
percentage 
 
 
Private plus foreign 
shareholding as a percentage 
Foreign percentage 
(2005-6) 
 
 
Private plus foreign 
shareholding as a 
percentage (2007-9) 
   
Annual average output of factor 1 for each firm 
2008-2012 
Annual average output of factor 
1 for each firm 2008-2012 
Ave factor 1 output 
(2008-12) 
Annual average output of factor 2 for each firm 
2008-2012 
Annual average output of factor 
2 for each firm 2008-2012 
Ave factor 2 output 
(2008-12) 
Annual average output of both factors for each 
firm 2010-12 
Annual average output of both 
factors for each firm 2010-12 
Ave both factors output 
(2010-12) 
 
Annual average output of both factors for each 
firm 2010-12 divided by R&D spend 2008-10 in 
million RMB 
 
Annual average output of both 
factors for each firm 2010-12 
divided by the firm's R&D 
spend 2008-2010 in million 
RMB 
 
Ave both factors output 
(2010-12) per R&D 
spend (RMBm 2008-
10)  
 
Factor 1 for firms with historic staff numbers for 
2006-2009 
 
Total output of factor 1 for 
those firms with staff figures for 
2006-2009 
 
Factor 1 when staff 
numbers (2006-2009) 
 
Factor 2 for firms with historic staff numbers for 
2006-2009 
 
Total output of factor 2 for 
those firms with staff figures for 
2006-2009 
 
Factor 2 when staff 
numbers (2006-2009) 
 
F1&2 combined 2003-5 
 
Total output of factors 1 and 2 
combined for 2003-2005 
 
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
F1&2 combined 2008-9 Total output of factors 1 and 2 
combined for 2008-2009 
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2008-9) 
The percentage of both factors made up by tech 
type C 
The percentage of the output of 
both factors made up by tech 
type C 
Percent factors tech 
type C 
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The percentage of both factors made up by tech 
type R 
The percentage of the output of 
both factors made up by tech 
type R 
Percent factors tech 
type R 
   
   
Firm R&D budget average 2008 to 2010 Firm R&D budget average 
2008 to 2010 
R&D budget (2008-10) 
Firm R&D budget as a percentage of revenue 
2008 to 2010 
Firm R&D budget as a 
percentage of revenue 2008 to 
2010 
R&D budget as percent 
of revenue (2008-10) 
   
   
Total number of staff in the firm 2008 Total number of staff in the firm 
2008 
Firm staff (2008) 
Average staff numbers for 2006-2009 for firms 
with historic data 
Average annual number of staff 
for 2006-2009 for firms with this 
historic data 
Firm staff (2006-9) 
 
Total number of staff in the firm (current), or total 
for PV arm of firm if also non-PV 
 
Total number of staff in the firm 
(current), or total for PV arm of 
firm if also non-PV (current) 
 
Firm staff or firm PV 
arm staff (current) 
 
Age of the firm in 2009 
 
Age of the firm in 2009 
 
Firm age (2009) 
 
Annual GDP per capita for firm HQ province 
 
Annual GDP per capita for firm 
HQ province 
 
Firm HQ province GDP 
per capita 
Agglomeration ratings for each firm (how many 
firms inc. that one from the sample within 100 
miles) 
Agglomeration ratings for each 
firm (from our sample how 
many firms, including the firm 
itself, present within 100 miles) 
 
Firm agglomeration 
rating 
 
Table 6: Variable Names in Output 
                             
 
8.1.2 Creating the data file 
This process created the SPSS workbook called VariablesMain, which involved the upload of all 
variables onto an SPSS workbook, and labelling the coded variables with a descriptive label for 
reference purposes. Continuous data was set as “Scale” measures, and categorical data was set as 
“Nominal” measures.  
 
8.1.3 Screening the data: checking categorical and continuous variables 
The next stage was to check the dataset for errors. Primarily, this involved checking for values that 
were outside the possible range of values for a given variable.  
Categorical variables were checked by analysing minimum and maximum values for acceptability, then 
checking for valid and missing cases. Continuous variables are analysed for acceptable minimum and 
maximum values, then for undistorted mean values.   
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8.1.4 Preliminary analyses: categorical variables and continuous variables (skewness and 
kurtosis) 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 
Please note the Cronbach’s Alpha testing was not deemed necessary in our case. Cronbach’s Alpha 
exists to assess consistency, or whether scales “hang together”, but this is usually applied to relatively 
nebulous measures (such as what may be measured by “life satisfaction” scales (Pallant, 2013), i.e. 
rather debatable metrics). Our data however is known to “hang together”, because it is measuring 
something more straightforward: patent measures are indeed related, as are shareholding, etc.  
 
8.1.5 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis was used to converge the data in the patent variables into “clumps”, i.e. groups among 
the intercorrelations of a set of variables. This is done to reduce variables to a smaller, more 
manageable set, prior to their use in multiple regression techniques (or, for example, analysis of 
variance). First, for the factor analysis I used averages for the 2009-2012 measurements for inventive 
patents, non-inventive patents, patent citations, patent families (domestic), patent families (foreign 
non-US) and patent families (foreign US). This was done to allow for later three-year time lag analysis, 
as we will discuss. 
The six items, for all 150 cases, were subjected to principal components analysis (PCA), using SPSS 
version 21, but before performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. 
Inspection of the correlation matrix showed the presence of numerous coefficients of .3 and above. 
Upon carrying out Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (or KMO, Kaiser, 1970, 1974) testing and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954), the KMO value was .672, exceeding the recommended minimum value of 
.6, and the Bartlett’s value was significant (Sig) at .000, below the required minimum of .05 on the Sig 
value, both therefore supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix.  
Principal components analysis revealed the presence of 2 components with eigenvalues above 1, 
explaining 60.086% and 23.319% of the variance respectively. An inspection of the screeplot revealed 
a break after the second component. Using Catell’s (1966) scree test, it was decided to retain two 
components for further investigation. Having conducted the scree test, and given that only two 
components had been selected, it was decided not to use parallel analysis, as principal components 
analysis and the scree test were sufficient (Pallant, 2013).  
The two-component solution explained a total of 83.405% of the variance, with Component 1 
contributing 60.086% and Component 2 contributing 23.319%. Meanwhile, the Component 
Correlation Matrix showed that there was a mildly positive correlation between the two factors (r= 
.315). 
As this value is above .3, to aid in the interpretation of these two components, Oblimin rotation was 
performed. In the Pattern Matrix, the rotated solution revealed, in the Pattern Matrix, three variables 
loading only on Component 1 (Non-Inventive Patents, Inventive Patents, and Patent Citations, at .969, 
.886, and .745 respectively); and two variables loading only on Component 2 (US patent families; and 
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Foreign patent families, at .949 and .926 respectively). It also reveals one variable loading on both 
Component 1 and Component 2 (Domestic patent families, at .675 and .420 for Component 1 and 2 
respectively).    
In the Structure Matrix, Oblimin rotation demonstrated one variable loading only on Component 1 
(Non-inventive patents, at .876); four variables loading on both Component 1 and 2 (Inventive Patents, 
Patent families, Patent citations, and Foreign patent families, at .930, .808, .792, .419 for Component 
1, and .418, .633, .384, .966 for Component 2); and one variable loading on only Component 2 (US 
Patent families, at .930).     
As Pallant (2013) notes, as factor analysis is a data exploration technique, the interpretation of its 
outcomes are open to interpretation under our own judgment, instead of following hard and fast 
statistical rules. As such, we follow the outcome of the Pattern Matrix table, which gives three 
variables loading on Component 1, and two variables loading on Component 2 (please refer to the 
Pattern Matrix table below in reference to the following passages). The variable which could be 
debated is Domestic patent families, loading at .675 and .420 for Components 1 and 2 respectively. 
Therefore, we elected not to place this variable into either component. 
In conclusion, the interpretation of the two components showed the variables Non-inventive patents, 
Inventive patents, and Patent citations loading on Component 1, and the variables Patent families 
foreign, and Patent families US loading on Component 2. The results of this factor analysis support the 
use of the two factors as separate scales, the first factor referring to lower inventiveness, the second 
factor to higher inventiveness. The following table demonstrates the factor analysis described.  
 
 Component 1 Component 2 
Non-inventive patents for the firm average 2009-
2012 
0.969  
Inventive patents for the firm average 2009-2012 0.886  
Patent citations for the firm average 2009-2012 0.745  
Patent family entries average 2009-2012 0.675 0.42 
US patent family entries average 2009-2012  0.949 
Foreign patent family entries average 2009-2012  0.926 
 
Table 7: Oblimin Rotation: Pattern Matrix 
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8.1.6 Reverse Causation 
Finally, before testing the hypotheses, it was necessary to check for reverse causality on certain 
variables to be used in some of the hypotheses below (here we follow the reverse causation test 
recommended by Antonakis et al (2010), instead of the Granger test more commonly used for time 
series data, which is not appropriate here due to our data for each test involving only two time 
periods). This began with the “staff numbers” variable, for which we take the current number of staff 
for each firm (or, if the firm is a conglomerate with various arms, the solar PV arm of the firm). This is 
because the current staff number is available for the vast majority of firms, whereas due to the 
limitations of Chinese data, historical data is not always available; the risk of using the control variable 
in this form is that we do not allow for the possible effect that higher historical PatPer may have on 
the staff numbers through causing a firm to grow, thus employing more people. Therefore, using a 
representative sub-sample of 20 firms for which this historical staff data was available, reverse 
causality tests were carried out as follows. 
The tests were carried out separately for Factor 1 and Factor 2. Multiple regressions were carried out 
firstly with average staff numbers 2006-9 as the dependent variable, and Factor 1 in 2011 as the 
independent variable (please note that although the variable is described as “Factor 1 when staff 
numbers (2006-2009)”, this means the factor for 2011 is only sought for these firms, not that the 
factor itself is for the years 2006-2009); then the regression was carried out vice-versa. The same 
procedure was then used for Factor 2.  
The same reverse causation tests were then repeated for: PatPer and foreign shareholding; PatPer 
and proportion of state shareholding; and PatPer and the level of state shareholding (the hypotheses 
involving different technology types are not tested for reverse causality, given that the effects on 
patenting are already tested with PatPer and state level, and PatPer and state proportion, and 
technology type is simply a subset of PatPer).  
In the first regression, Factor 1 had a significance of .798, demonstrating no significant impact on staff 
numbers (the full coefficients were: unstandardised B: 17.890; unstandardised standard error: 68.719; 
standardised coefficient beta: .061; t: .260; significance: .798); Factor 2 generated a result of .909, also 
showing no significance (the full coefficients were: unstandardised B: -20.969; unstandardised 
standard error: 181.613; standardised coefficient beta: -.027; t: -.115; significance: .909). Mahalanobis 
and Cook’s distances (heteroscedasticity tests) were judged not to be relevant here.  
 
The results were as follows:
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Test number Test name Dependent variable Independent variable Beta Sig. N 
1 PatPer & Company size Firm staff (2006-9) Factor 1 when staff numbers (2006-2009) .061 .798 20 
2 PatPer & Company size Firm staff (2006-9) Factor 2 when staff numbers (2006-2009) -.027 .909 20 
3 PatPer & Foreign shareholding Foreign percentage (2008-9) Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) -.038 .690 150 
4 PatPer & State shareholding State proportion (2008-9) Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) -.050 .595 150 
5 
PatPer & Level of state 
shareholding Level of state (2008-9) Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) .061 .617 150 
 
Table 8: Reverse causation results summary table 
 
 
The results were also judged to be logically satisfactory, because although Chinese solar PV firms are being pushed to patent by government in the expectation 
that this will help drive future growth, until now these firms have been buffeted by various other phenomena, such as trade tariffs and an ongoing price war, 
that the influence of patenting alone has not yet been significant, which means reverse causality is avoided. As described, reverse causality also had to be 
tested for: PatPer and foreign shareholding; PatPer and proportion of state shareholding; and PatPer and the level of state shareholding. All tests were passed 
without detecting reverse causality (see appendices for full reverse causation test tables).  
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8.1.7 Interpolated figures 
 
Total staff: 
 
Because a small proportion of our firms did not have total staff numbers available, it was necessary to 
create interpolated figures for these firms (this only applied to 15 firms in total). From investigation 
via these firms’ websites, telephoning the firms, and from interview data, these firms were judged to 
be either small or large, with a current staff figure of 200 used for small, and 2500 for large firms, 
derived from firms for which data was available.    
 
R&D budgets: 
Of the listed firms, some have published full R&D data for the relevant years (2008-2010), and others 
are interpolated straightforwardly from their full 2008-2010 R&D staff data. A minority of firms require 
more detailed interpolation. As there is too much industry variance to interpolate crudely from an 
industry mean, this has had to follow more exact procedures. 
For some of the firms I have good R&D staff data for the relevant years (which can be averaged for 
2008-10); for others I have good R&D data for the relevant years; for others I have R&D budget and/or 
R&D staff data that covers other years. Where possible I interpolate first from available R&D budget 
figures; otherwise I interpolate from R&D staff figures if they are available for 2008-2010. I do not 
create interpolations for those firms lacking either any R&D budget figures whatsoever or lacking R&D 
staff figures. The interpolations were as follows:  
Firm ID 18 (row 7 in SPSS): I improve the interpolated averaged R&D budget 2008-2010 figure I have 
by calculating the 2008-10 R&D staff average; then use the mean of the standard staff to budget ratio 
to create a new 2008-2010 average R&D budget figure for this firm.  
Firm ID 20 (row 8): the available R&D budget figure for this firm was for 2011, so the firms with both 
2011 R&D budget data and 2008-2010 R&D budget data were used and a ratio created for the change 
from the 2008-2010 average to 2011. An average of these ratios was created, then this was applied to 
this firm to establish the new figure.  
Firm ID 26 (row 12): the same procedure was used. 
Firm ID 32 (row 13): the interpolation has two methods. First, the firm’s full 2008-10 R&D staff 
numbers are averaged, then the R&D staff to R&D budget mean ratio for all firms is used to create an 
average R&D budget figure. Then this firm’s available 2010 R&D budget figure was used in the same 
procedure as the two firms above. An average was then made of these two budget figures, and this 
was used. 
Firm ID 74 (row 23): this is imputed from the 2010 R&D staff number. I first took the firms with full 
2008-2010 R&D staff numbers; I then established their staff number average for 2010. An average 
ratio was then created of the 2008-2010 R&D staff to the 2010 R&D staff. I applied this ratio to this 
firm’s 2010 staff number, and took this new average 2008-2010 staff figure, applying the standard 
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mean ratio of the R&D staff to R&D budget for the 2008-2010 period to obtain the new R&D budget 
figure.  
Firm row ID 84 (row 27): using the R&D staff number for 2009, the same process as for the firm above 
was used.  
Firm ID 88 (row 28): this firm has R&D budget figures available for 2010-13, so the 2010 R&D budget 
figure was used, and an average for 2008-10 was created using the average ratio of the 2010 R&D 
budget and the 2008-2010 R&D budget.   
Firm ID 90 (row 29): using the R&D staff number for 2009, the above procedure was followed as for 
the firms with ID 74 and ID 84. 
Firm ID 108 (row 31): using the published data for R&D staff for 2008-9, those firms with full 2008-10 
R&D staff data were used to generate the ratios between their 2009 and 2010 figures. This ratio was 
averaged, then applied to my 2009 figure to create the interpolated 2010 figure. This was used to 
create a new average of this 2008-10 staff figure set, and the standard mean R&D staff to R&D budget 
ratio was applied to obtain the R&D budget. 
Firm ID 113 (row 32): the firm’s available R&D staff figure for 2011 was used, following the same 
procedure as for firm ID 74.   
 
  
8.2 Hypotheses: calculations and results 
Before we explain the calculation of Hypothesis 1 (and the other hypotheses), we should describe the 
assembly of the data that is specific to hypotheses 1 to 4 in particular (hypotheses 1-4 being tested 
only on listed firms). This falls into the independent variables, which are in ownership (shareholding) 
data; control variables; and the dependent variables, being R&D and patenting information.  
First we should deal with the time-lags involved. Although this data is unsuitable for panel usage, we 
employ a lag to allow for the manifestation of the effect of the independent variable/s (and controls) 
on dependent variables. In hypotheses 1 to 4, we follow a lag from the independent variable 
(ownership) and controls at t0, to R&D at t+1, to patent output at t+3. Given that using patent data 
for the years 2010-2012 gives the richest output data, which reduces noise, this means R&D data for 
2008-2010 is used, and ownership data for 2007-2009. Furthermore, averaging is necessary if these 
years are to be used, given that each variable is thus using a three-year sample of data.  
The necessary patent data for 2010 to 2012 was created by taking the numbers of inventive patents, 
non-inventive patents, and citations for the relevant years for each firm (making up factor 1), and the 
foreign patent families (non-US) and US patent families (making up factor 2), multiplying by the 
relevant factor weightings, and creating averages for each firm for the sample period (of factor 1 
output; factor 2 output; and combined factor output).   
Regarding the control variables, some adjustment must be made between any control variables that 
had been assembled for current data, and the need for previous time periods. For age of the firm this 
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was straightforward. For agglomeration, it was judged that although the numbers of firms in an exact 
locale may differ slightly in previous time periods, the distribution of firms in different regions in China 
will not differ significantly, and as such the current agglomeration variable can be applied just as well. 
For the number of staff in a firm (the firm size control variable), staff numbers for 2008 (given the R&D 
variable being an average for 2007-2009) are used (and in the minority of cases where an exact staff 
number for a firm for that year was not known, an imputation was made by generating the average 
ratio for change in staff number from 2008 to the most recent figure – using firms where both are 
known – and applying this to the firms where the 2008 figure needs to be obtained). 
Please note that some of the hypotheses see a slightly lower number of firms tested than others, due 
to the lack of data availability on some metrics; also, in some regressions certain control variables 
show lower N numbers than other variables, which is due to that data not being available for all firms. 
Given that we have checked the reliability of all listed firms in our relatively small listed firm sample, 
we only remove firms that breach recommended Mahalanobis or Cook’s values if this is stated and 
explained. In the hypotheses outputs, the following tables will be shown, unless stated otherwise: 
Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Coefficients. 
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Hypothesis 1 
First, the regression for hypothesis 1 in the following form will be tested: 
Hypothesis 1a: The higher the state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend on R&D, absolutely 
Then the hypothesis in the second form will be run:  
Hypothesis 1b: The higher the state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend on R&D, relative to 
turnover 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The higher the state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend on R&D, absolutely 
The hierarchical multiple regression was carried out as follows: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Testing the Relationship between State Shareholding and Absolute R&D Spend:  
Table 9: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 28) 
   
 Mean 
Standard 
deviations 
R&D 
budget 
(2008-
10) 
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
Firm 
age 
(2009) 
Firm 
staff 
(2008) 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
State 
percentage 
(2007-
2009) 
R&D budget 
(2008-10) 
21476216.77 25984056.33 1.000      
Firm HQ 
province GDP 
per capita 
57996 18006.071 -.345* 1.000     
Firm age 
(2009) 
14.36 9.546 -.048 -.204 1.000    
Firm staff 
(2008) 
2927.33 2445.038 .365* -.395* -.307* 1.000   
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
22.68 20.497 -.165 .668* -.345* .091 1.000  
State 
percentage 
(2007-2009) 
27.49798 36.664138 .234 -.256* .368* -.156 -.231 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 1a  
Table 10: Coefficients 
 
Coefficients   
   Model 1      Model 2     
  
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
  
(Constant) 
30366443.26
9 
31365975.81
8 
 .968 .343 
17578727.80
4 
32243217.219  .545 .591 
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
-257.173 469.535 -.179 -.548 .589 -97.841 476.224 -.068 -.205 .839 
Firm age 
(2009) 
-59346.640 582373.953 -.022 -.102 .920 -258577.035 590966.180 -.095 -.438 .666 
Firm staff 
(2008) 
3134.645 2717.481 .295 
1.15
4 
.261 3864.394 2724.363 .364 1.418 .170 
Firm 
agglomeratio
n rating 
-101392.289 376964.018 -.080 -.269 .790 -153402.837 372401.711 -.121 -.412 .684 
  
State 
percentage 
(2007-2009) 
     198223.491 146851.341 .280 1.350 .191 
 R square .184     .246     
 
R square 
change 
.184     .062     
  Sig F change .301     .191     
  a. Dependent Variable: R&D budget (2008-10)       
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Therefore, as the table demonstrates, the result of the regression was that the effect of the independent variable was supported to significance, giving a 
Beta value of .280 and a Significance value of .191.   
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Hypothesis 1b: The higher the state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend on R&D, relative to turnover 
The hierarchical multiple regression for this second version of the hypothesis was as follows (first the regression with all control variables is illustrated, then 
with only the one qualifying control variable remaining): 
Hypothesis 1b: Testing the Relationship between State Shareholding and R&D Spend Relative to Turnover 
 
Hypothesis 1b  
Table 11: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 25) 
 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
R&D 
budget as 
percent of 
revenue 
(2008-10) 
Firm 
age 
(2009) 
Firm 
agglomer
ation 
rating 
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
Firm 
staff 
(2008) 
State 
percenta
ge 
(2007-
2009) 
R&D budget 
as percent of 
revenue 
(2008-10) 
2.29699 
3.63344
8 
1.000      
Firm age 
(2009) 
14.36 9.716 .185 1.000     
Firm 
agglomeratio
n rating 
25.24 20.218 .017 -.384* 1.000    
Firm HQ 
province GDP 
per capita 
59444.6
8 
18224.0
36 
.108 -.290* .662* 1.000   
Firm staff 
(2008) 
2864.81 
2219.68
3 
-.329* -.201 .144 -.331* 1.000  
State 
percentage 
(2007-2009) 
30.5777
3 
37.6727
59 
.250 .391* -.357* -.344* -.159 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 1b  
Table 12: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 3.224 4.573  .705 .489 1.696 4.869  .348 .731 
Firm age (2009) .061 .086 .162 .700 .492 .040 .089 .107 .446 .661 
Firm agglomeration rating .033 .058 .185 .571 .575 .033 .059 .186 .571 .575 
Firm HQ province GDP per 
capita 
-1.671E-05 .000 -.084 -.244 .810 -1.201E-06 .000 -.006 -.017 .987 
Firm staff (2008) -.001 .000 -.350 -1.331 .198 .000 .000 -.300 -1.114 .279 
State percentage (2007-
2009) 
     .022 .023 .225 .936 .361 
R square 0.139     0.177     
R square change 0.139     0.038     
Sig F change 0.534     0.361  
   
a. Dependent Variable: R&D budget as percent of revenue (2008-10)    
161 
 
Hypothesis 1b  
Table 13: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for reduced control variables (N= 25) 
 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
R&D budget 
as percent of 
revenue 
(2008-10) 
Firm 
age 
(2009) 
Firm 
agglomeratio
n rating 
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
State 
percenta
ge (2007-
2009) 
R&D budget 
as percent of 
revenue 
(2008-10) 
2.29699 3.633448 1.000     
Firm age 
(2009) 
14.36 9.716 .185 1.000    
Firm 
agglomeratio
n rating 
25.24 20.218 .017 -.384* 1.000   
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
59444.68 18224.036 .108 -.290* .662* 1.000  
State 
percentage 
(2007-2009) 
30.57773 37.672759 .250 .391* -.357* -.344* 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 1b  
Table 14: Coefficients for reduced control variables 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -1.090 3.286  -.332 .743 -2.214 3.394  -.652 .522 
Firm age (2009) .087 .086 .233 1.017 .321 .057 .089 .152 .641 .529 
Firm agglomeration rating -.003 .053 -.017 -.057 .955 .004 .052 .020 .068 .946 
Firm HQ province GDP per 
capita 
3.721E-05 .000 .187 .662 .515 4.681E-05 .000 .235 .831 .416 
State percentage (2007-2009)      .027 .023 .279 1.175 .254 
R square .063     .124     
R square change .063     .061     
Sig F change .706     .254  
   
a. Dependent Variable: R&D budget as percent of revenue (2008-10)    
 
As the table demonstrates, the hypothesis was not supported, giving a Beta value of .279, with a Significance value of .254.  
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Hypothesis 2 
As for hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 was tested in its two versions. First we test the first version of this 
hypothesis, being: 
Hypothesis 2a: The higher the level of government which holds the largest state shareholding, the 
higher the rate of spend on R&D absolutely. 
Then the second version, being: 
Hypothesis 2b: The higher the level of government which holds the largest state shareholding, the 
higher the rate of spend on R&D relative to turnover. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The higher the level of government which holds the largest state shareholding, the 
higher the rate of spend on R&D absolutely. 
(Please note that repeated regressions to account for control variables that do not reach required 
correlations are not set out from this point, for the remainder of the listed firms’ hypotheses 1 to 4). 
The first version was tested using a hierarchical multiple regression, as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Testing the Relationship Between Level of State and Absolute R&D Spend 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 20) 
 
 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
R&D 
budg
et 
(2008
-10) 
Firm 
age 
(2009) 
Firm 
agglomerat
ion rating 
Central 
state 
largest 
shareholde
r (2007-9) 
(categorica
l) 
Non-
central 
state 
largest 
shareholde
r (2007-9) 
(categorica
l) 
R&D budget 
(2008-10) 
25336772.28
10 
28943177.118
72 
1.000     
Firm age 
(2009) 
11.20 10.685 -.061 1.000    
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
21.70 19.609 -.227 -.448* 1.000   
Central state 
largest 
shareholder 
(2007-9) 
(categorical) 
.60 .503 -.064 .270 .169 1.000  
Non-central 
state largest 
shareholder 
(2007-9) 
(categorical) 
.40 .503 .064 -.270 -.169 -1.000* 1.000 
 
*= Significant at 5% 
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As the table below demonstrates, although the hypothesis was supported by the Beta value, with non-central shareholdings giving a Beta value of -.055, the 
significance value was lower than required, at .837. 
 
Hypothesis 2a  
Table 16: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 41706566.714 15256162.685  2.734 .014 44337496.182 20134302.220  2.202 .043 
Firm age (2009) -551747.294 703227.321 -.204 -.785 .443 -616336.931 787208.807 -.228 -.783 .445 
Firm agglomeration rating -469629.155 383196.053 -.318 -1.226 .237 -499125.234 418984.809 -.338 -1.191 .251 
Non-central state largest 
shareholder (2007-9) 
(categorical) 
     -3168765.858 15176022.874 -.055 -.209 .837 
R square 0.085     0.087     
R square change 0.085     0.002     
Sig F change 0.472     0.837     
a. Dependent Variable: R&D budget (2008-10)    
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Hypothesis 2b: The higher the level of government which holds the largest state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend on R&D relative to turnover. 
The second version was tested using a hierarchical multiple regression as follows. Please note that as shown in the table, the independent variable was also 
expressed as Central vs. Non-central, using dummy variables, for the reasoning described above.  
Hypothesis 2b: Testing the Relationship Between Level of State and R&D Spend Relative to Turnover 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 20) 
 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
R&D budget 
as percent of 
revenue 
(2008-10) 
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
Firm 
age 
(2009) 
Firm 
staff 
(2008) 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
Central state 
largest shareholder 
(2007-9) 
(categorical) 
Non-central state 
largest shareholder 
(2007-9) 
(categorical) 
R&D budget as percent 
of revenue (2008-10) 
2.926 3.981 1.000       
Firm HQ province GDP 
per capita 
58177.000 18997.812 .166 1.000      
Firm age (2009) 10.895 10.888 .171 -.308 1.000     
Firm staff (2008) 2318.695 1841.788 -.272 -.626* -.149 1.000    
Firm agglomeration 
rating 
22.789 19.512 .109 .646* -.434* -.173 1.000   
Central state largest 
shareholder (2007-9) 
(categorical) 
.632 .496 .277 -.081 .322* -.237 .106 1.000  
Non-central state 
largest shareholder 
(2007-9) (categorical) 
.368 .496 -.277 .081 -.322* .237 -.106 -1.000* 1.000 
 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 2b  
Table 18: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
  B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 2.770 7.157  .387 .705 .126 8.350  .015 .988 
Firm HQ province GDP per capita -5.739E-06 .000 -.027 -.058 .955 2.577E-05 .000 .123 .229 .822 
Firm age (2009) .075 .111 .205 .675 .510 .054 .118 .147 .457 .655 
Firm staff (2008) .000 .001 -.228 -.600 .558 .000 .001 -.115 -.270 .791 
Firm agglomeration rating .036 .074 .176 .483 .637 .010 .085 .051 .122 .905 
Central state largest shareholder 
(2007-9) (categorical) 
     1.667 2.547 .207 .654 .524 
R square 0.111     0.14     
R square change 0.111     0.428     
Sig F change 0.778     0.524     
a. Dependent Variable: R&D budget as percent of revenue (2008-10)    
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Therefore this hypothesis was not supported satisfactorily. As the table demonstrates, although the Beta value reached only .207, the significance value was 
low, at just .524. 
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Hypothesis 3a 
Hypothesis 3a stated that the higher the private shareholding, the better the patenting performance for each unit of R&D spent. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we needed to divide patent performance (PatPer) by R&D budget. This was done by arranging each R&D budget (choosing 
the 2008-2010 average figure) in millions of RMB, then dividing the patent performance (the combined output of Factors 1 & 2 for 2010-2012) by this figure. 
As the control variables did not reach the recommended correlation values, the hierarchical multiple regression was then tested without them. This was 
tested as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: Testing the Relationship Between Private Shareholding and Patenting Performance for Each Unit of R&D Spent 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 24) 
 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Ave both factors output 
(2010-12) per R&D 
spend (RMBm 2008-
10) Firm age (2009) 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
Firm HQ 
province GDP 
per capita 
Firm 
staff 
(2008) 
Private 
percentage 
(2007-9) 
Ave both factors output 
(2010-12) per R&D spend 
(RMBm 2008-10) 
.946 1.539 1.000      
Firm age (2009) 13.750 9.857 .012 1.000     
Firm agglomeration rating 22.958 20.677 .000 -.316* 1.000    
Firm HQ province GDP per 
capita 
56381.083 18553.645 .124 -.289* .723* 1.000   
Firm staff (2008) 3230.216 2486.561 -.175 -.247 .051 -.352* 1.000 . 
Private percentage (2007-9) 53.367 34.492 .233 -.442* .031 .211 .122 1.000 
 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 3a  
Table 20: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) .581 2.197  .264 .794 .283 2.196  .129 .899 
Firm age (2009) -.001 .040 -.004 -.015 .988 .017 .043 .111 .407 .689 
Firm agglomeration rating -.009 .027 -.118 -.320 .753 .002 .029 .033 .084 .934 
Firm HQ province GDP per 
capita 
1.410E-05 .000 .170 .414 .684 3.418E-07 .000 .004 .010 .993 
Firm staff (2008) -6.809E-05 .000 -.110 -.377 .710 .000 .000 -.185 -.621 .542 
Private percentage (2007-9)      .013 .012 .302 1.135 .271 
R square 0.04     0.104     
R square change 0.04     0.064     
Sig F change 0.935     0.271     
Dependent Variable: Average both factors output (2010-12) per R&D spend (RMBm 2008-10) 
 
 
The regression shown by the table above means the hypothesis remained unproven, with a Beta value of .302, and a Significance value of .271.  
170 
 
 
Hypothesis 3b 
Hypothesis 3b stated that the higher the foreign shareholding, the better the patenting performance for each unit of R&D spent.  
To test this hypothesis, we also needed to divide patent performance (PatPer) by R&D budget. This was done by arranging each R&D budget (choosing the 
2008 figure) in millions of RMB, then dividing the patent performance (the combined output of Factors 1 & 2 for 2010-2012) by this figure.   
This hypothesis was tested first with the same control variables used above. Again, these did not reach the recommended correlation values, so the hypothesis 
was then tested without them, as described in the table below. This hierarchical multiple regression was carried out as follows. 
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Hypothesis 3b: Testing the Relationship Between Foreign Shareholding and Patenting Performance 
Per R&D Spend 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 23) 
 
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Ave both 
factors 
output 
(2010-12) 
per R&D 
spend 
(RMBm 
2008-10) 
Firm 
age 
(2009) 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
Firm 
HQ 
provinc
e GDP 
per 
capita 
Firm 
staff 
(200
8) 
Foreign 
percentage 
(2007-9) 
Ave both 
factors output 
(2010-12) per 
R&D spend 
(RMBm 
2008-10) 
.987 1.560 1.000      
Firm age 
(2009) 
13.522 10.013 .027 1.000     
Firm 
agglomeratio
n rating 
23.913 20.593 -.030* -.300 1.000    
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
56480.
435 
18964.10
4 
.122* -.288* .736 1.000   
Firm staff 
(2008) 
3347.9
69 
2473.080 -.213 -.228 -.001 -.368* 
1.00
0 
 
Foreign 
percentage 
(2007-9) 
16.366 20.838 .226 -.072* .437 .058 .242 1.000 
  
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 3b  
Table 22: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) .654 2.216  .295 .771 -.310 2.134  -.145 .886 
Firm age (2009) -1.515E-05 .040 .000 .000 1.000 -.003 .038 -.021 -.086 .932 
Firm agglomeration rating -.014 .028 -.181 -.485 .634 -.045 .031 -.599 -1.448 .166 
Firm HQ province GDP per 
capita 
1.687E-05 .000 .205 .489 .631 3.837E-05 .000 .467 1.121 .278 
Firm staff (2008) -8.686E-05 .000 -.138 -.473 .642 .000 .000 -.168 -.616 .546 
Foreign percentage (2007-9)      .037 .020 .500 1.893 .075 
R square 0.06     0.224     
R square change 0.06     0.164     
Sig F change 0.883     0.075     
Dependent Variable: Ave both factors output (2010-12) per R&D spend (RMBm 2008-10) 
 
 
As the table demonstrates, with a Beta value of .500 and a Significance of .075, the hypothesis was supported to significance.  
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Hypothesis 3c 
For hypothesis three, the first of two tests was carried out regressing PatPer as the dependent variable, with R&D spend and Private & Foreign shareholding 
(% of total) as two separate independent variables (with the control variables as above). This hierarchical multiple regression was as follows:   
Hypothesis 3c: Testing the Relationship Between Foreign & Private Shareholding and R&D and Patenting Performance 
 
Table 23 Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 24) 
 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Ave both 
factors 
output 
(2010-12) 
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
Firm age (2009) 
Firm 
staff 
(2008) 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
Private plus foreign 
shareholding as a 
percentage (2007-9) 
R&D 
budget 
(2008-
10) 
Ave both factors output 
(2010-12) 
5.198 8.534 1.000       
Firm HQ province GDP 
per capita 
56381.083 18553.645 .000 1.000      
Firm age (2009) 9.792 9.811 .001 -.297* 1.000     
Firm staff (2008) 3230.216 2486.561 .170 -.352* -.238 1.000    
Firm agglomeration 
rating 
22.958 20.677 .177 .723* -.322* .051 1.000   
Private plus foreign 
shareholding as a 
percentage (2007-9) 
69.033 38.591 .317* .222 -.441* .254 .271 1.000  
R&D budget (2008-10) 27446992.826 35026816.467 .555* -.430* .002 .470* -.127 -.091 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 3c  
Table 24: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 4.495 11.474  .392 .700 -10.705 8.956  -1.195 .248 
Firm HQ province GDP per capita .000 .000 -.165 -.408 .688 .000 .000 .090 .294 .772 
Firm age (2009) .071 .218 .082 .327 .747 .207 .165 .238 1.257 .226 
Firm staff (2008) .000 .001 .115 .402 .692 -.001 .001 -.235 -1.064 .302 
Firm agglomeration rating .131 .150 .316 .873 .393 .069 .109 .167 .632 .536 
Private plus foreign shareholding as a 
percentage (2007-9) 
     .108 .041 .487 2.613 .018 
R&D budget (2008-10)      .000 .000 .769 3.950 .001 
R square .076     .570     
R square change .076     .495     
Sig F change .814     .001     
Dependent Variable: Ave both factors output 
(2010-12) 
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This means that as the table shows, with a Beta value of .769, and a strong Significance value of .001, R&D expenditure (and combined private and foreign 
shareholding) were both supported to significance as independent variables.  
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Hypothesis 3d 
Again for hypothesis three, the second of two tests was carried out, regressing PatPer as the dependent variable, with Private & Foreign shareholding (% of 
total) as the independent variable (with the control variables as above). This hierarchical multiple regression was as follows:   
Hypothesis 3d: Testing the Relationship Between Foreign & Private Shareholding and Patenting Performance 
 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 32) 
 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Ave both 
factors output 
(2010-12) 
Firm HQ 
province GDP 
per capita 
Firm age (2009) 
Firm 
staff 
(2008) 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
Private plus foreign 
shareholding as a 
percentage (2007-9) 
Ave both factors output 
(2010-12) 
4.412 7.494 1.000      
Firm HQ province GDP per 
capita 
57843.500 17677.677 -.019 1.000     
Firm age (2009) 8.594 8.933 .036 -.278* 1.000    
Firm staff (2008) 2799.636 2415.554 .192 -.309* -.081 1.000   
Firm agglomeration rating 25.125 21.234 .108 .643* -.237* .118 1.000  
Private plus foreign 
shareholding as a 
percentage (2007-9) 
75.363 35.276 .233* .235* -.463* .122 .280* 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 3d  
Table 26: Coefficients 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 1.746 7.515  .232 .818 -2.669 8.084  -.330 .744 
Firm HQ province GDP per capita .000 .000 -.017 -.060 .953 .000 .000 -.038 -.132 .896 
Firm age (2009) .061 .167 .073 .365 .718 .159 .179 .190 .888 .382 
Firm staff (2008) .001 .001 .179 .804 .428 .000 .001 .151 .686 .499 
Firm agglomeration rating .041 .096 .115 .424 .675 .028 .095 .078 .292 .773 
Private plus foreign shareholding as a 
percentage (2007-9) 
     .062 .045 .290 1.357 .186 
R square .050     .112     
R square change .050     .063     
Sig F change .840     .186     
Dependent Variable: Ave both factors output (2010-12) 
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Therefore with a Beta value of .290, and a Significance value of .186, combined private and foreign shareholding was also supported as significant in isolation.  
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Hypothesis 3e 
The final test on the listed firm regressions (hypotheses 1 to 4) involved testing ownership as a 
moderating variable (moderating the impact of R&D expenditure on innovation). This was 
demonstrated using the hierarchical multiple regression below, in which the impact on the dependent 
variable PatPro (patent performance divided by R&D expenditure) of the independent variable 
(domestic) private and foreign ownership combined was regressed.  
 
Hypothesis 3e  
Table 27: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N=24) 
 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Ave 
both 
factors 
output 
(2010-
12) per 
R&D 
spend 
(RMB
m 
2008-
10) 
Firm 
HQ 
provinc
e GDP 
per 
capita 
 Firm 
age 
(2009
) 
Firm 
staff 
(2008
) 
Firm 
agglomeratio
n rating 
Private plus 
foreign 
shareholdin
g as a 
percentage 
(2007-9) 
Ave both 
factors output 
(2010-12) per 
R&D spend 
(RMBm 2008-
10) 
.94614 1.538667 1.000 .124 .009 -.175 .000 .338 
Firm HQ 
province GDP 
per capita 
56381.0
8 
18553.64
5 
.124 1.000 -.297 -.352 .723 .222 
Firm age 
(2009) 
9.79 9.811 .009 -.297 1.000 -.238 -.322 -.441 
Firm staff 
(2008) 
3230.22 2486.561 -.175 -.352 -.238 1.000 .051 .254 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
22.96 20.677 .000 .723* -.322 .051 1.000 .271 
Private plus 
foreign 
shareholding 
as a 
percentage 
(2007-9) 
69.03 38.591 .338 .222 -.441* .254 .271 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 
 
 
Hypothesis 3e 
Table 28: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) .584 2.108  .277 .785 -.233 2.006  -.116 .909 
Firm HQ 
province GDP 
per capita 
1.406E-05 .000 .169 .412 .685 5.360E-06 .000 .065 .167 .869 
Firm age 
(2009) 
-.001 .040 -.005 -.020 .984 .023 .039 .146 .586 .565 
Firm staff 
(2008) 
-6.838E-05 .000 -.111 -.380 .708 .000 .000 -.233 -.838 .413 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
-.009 .027 -.118 -.320 .753 -.009 .026 -.117 -.341 .737 
Private plus 
foreign 
shareholding 
as a 
percentage 
(2007-9) 
     .019 .010 .479 1.980 .063 
R square .040      .212        
R square 
change 
.040      .172        
Sig F change .935         .063      
Dependent Variable: Ave both factors output (2010-12) per R&D spend (RMBm 2008-10) 
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The impact of private and foreign shareholding combined showed a Beta value of .479, and a Significance value of .063. The moderating effect of ownership 
was therefore supported to significance.    
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Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4, the lower the level of government which holds any state shareholding, the better the patenting performance for each unit of R&D spent, 
was tested first with the control variables used above, and as these did not reach recommended correlation values, tested without, as shown in the table 
below. Patent Performance (PatPer) was divided by the R&D spend as for hypothesis 3a and 3b above, the dependent variable therefore being Ave both 
factors output (2010-12) per R&D spend (RMBm 2008-10). The hierarchical multiple regression was carried out as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Testing the Relationship Between Level of State and Patenting Performance Per R&D Spend 
Table 29: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (N= 20) 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Ave both 
factors 
output 
(2010-12) 
per R&D 
spend 
(RMBm 
2008-10) 
 
Firm HQ 
province 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Firm age (2009) 
Firm 
staff 
(2008) 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
Central state 
percentage 
(2007-9) 
Non-central 
state 
percentage 
(2007-9) 
Ave both factors 
output (2010-12) 
per R&D spend 
(RMBm 2008-10) 
.522 .944 1.000 
 
      
Firm HQ province 
GDP per capita 
57972.950 18513.616 -.023 
 
1.000      
Firm age (2009) 11.200 10.685 -.213 
 -.311* 1.000     
Firm staff (2008) 2256.619 1814.033 -.012  -.611* -.165 1.000    
Firm agglomeration 
rating 
21.698 19.609 -.158 
 
.637* -.448* -.128 1.000   
Central state 
percentage (2007-
9) 
.600 .503 -.434* 
 
-.064 .270 -.182 .169 1.000  
Non-central state 
percentage (2007-
9) 
.400 .503 .434* 
 
.064 -.270 .182 -.169 -1.000* 1.000 
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 *= Significant at 5% 
 
Hypothesis 4  
Table 30: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Model 1         Model 2         
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 1.371 1.647  .832 .418 1.754 1.598  1.098 .291 
Firm HQ province GDP per 
capita 
.000 .000 .012 .027 .979 .000 .000 -.287 -.605 .555 
Firm age (2009) -.034 .026 -.386 -1.331 .203 -.024 .026 -.268 -.927 .369 
Firm staff (2008) .000 .000 -.114 -.315 .757 .000 .000 -.318 -.855 .407 
Firm agglomeration rating -.017 .017 -.354 -1.013 .327 -.003 .018 -.064 -.166 .870 
Non-central state percentage 
(2007-9) 
     .801 .523 .427 1.532 .148 
R square .139     .263     
R square change .139     .124     
Sig F change .664     .148     
Dependent Variable: Ave both factors output (2010-12) per R&D spend (RMBm 2008-10) 
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This means that with a Beta value of .427 and a Significance of .148 in the table, the impact of the independent variable was supported to significance. 
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Hypothesis 5 
The first hypothesis for all firms (listed and unlisted) was hypothesis H5. This proposed that the higher the foreign shareholding, the higher the output of 
more inventive patents (the dependent variable being the “more inventive” PatPer factor, Factor 2). This also lags as in hypothesis three. This was tested as 
follows.     
A measure was created for all firms of their foreign shareholding as a percentage of total shareholding, averaged 2005-2009, but using only those years for 
each average for which some shareholding is registered (these are the years from which there is a +3 year time lag to patenting for that particular firm). The 
dependent variable was an average annual output of Factor 2, averaged for each firm for 2008-12.  
A hierarchical multiple regression was carried out using the following control variables: annual GDP of firm province, staff number, age of firm, and the 
agglomeration rating previously described. Although total staff had the strongest Sig. value of .000, which is to be expected, the independent variable of 
foreign shareholding maintained a significance value of .011, passing our required value of .1, with result that the hypothesis was confirmed. 
No outliers, assessed by either Mahalanobis or Cook’s distances were removed; this was because for those firms with an apparently excessive Mahalanobis 
distance (that is firm IDs 15, 19, 32, 51 and 72), none had an excessive leverage (i.e. none had a Cook’s distance of 1.0 or over). Meanwhile the only firm with 
a high Cook’s distance (firm ID 2, at 1.06543), had a low Mahalanobis value of 8.65704 (it should be noted that future hypotheses see these outliers removed 
if they show high Mahalanobis values, suggesting excessive leverage on the outcome).  
The results of the hierarchical multiple regression are outlined as follows: 
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Hypothesis 5: Testing the Relationship Between Foreign Shareholding and Output of More Inventive Patents 
Table 31: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
Ave factor 2 
output (2008-
12) 
Firm HQ province 
GDP per capita 
Age of 
the firm 
Firm staff or firm 
PV arm staff 
(current) 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
Foreign 
percentage 
(2005-6) 
Ave factor 2 output 
(2008-12) 
.062 .377 150 1.000      
 
Firm HQ province GDP 
per capita 
61084.08 17708.45 150 .042 1.000     
 
Age of the firm 
10.37 8.59 140 .080 -.179* 1.000    
Firm staff or firm PV 
arm staff (current) 
1997.63 3668.379 150 .182* -.102 .238* 1.000   
Firm agglomeration 
rating 
25.31 19.727 150 .170* .533* -.156* .075 1.000  
Foreign percentage 
(2005-6) 
8.403 19.242 145 .243* .071* -.093 .158* .102 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 5  
Table 32: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa                   
 Model 1     Model 2     
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -.051 .132  -.385 .701 -.073 .129  -.568 .571 
Firm HQ province GDP per 
capita 
.000 .000 -.030 -.290 .773 .000 .000 -.039 -.392 .696 
Age of the firm .003 .004 .068 .760 .448 .004 .004 .095 1.079 .283 
Firm staff or firm PV arm staff 
(current) 
.000 .000 .149 1.676 .096 .000 .000 .108 1.216 .226 
Firm agglomeration rating .004 .002 .185 1.808 .073 .003 .002 .175 1.745 .083 
Foreign percentage (2005-6)      .004 .002 .220 2.578 .011 
R square .063     .109     
Adjusted R square .034     .074     
a. Dependent Variable: Ave factor 2 output (2008-12)               
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However, as the Correlations table above reveals, none of the control variables we used had the 
required relationship with the dependent variable (preferably above .3). As such we are justified in 
running the regression again, as a simple linear regression without the control variables. This gave a 
significance value of 0.003, which is significant at both 2-tailed and 1-tailed significance values (as 
shown in table 34 below).  
This was carried out as follows: 
 
 
Hypothesis 5  
Table 33: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for reduced control variables 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
Ave factor 2 
output (2008-12) 
Foreign percentage 
(2005-6) 
Ave factor 2 
output (2008-12) 
.062 .377 150 1.000  
Foreign 
percentage 
(2005-6) 
8.403 19.242 145 .243* 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 5  
Table 34: Coefficients for reduced control variables 
 
 
Coefficientsa       
 
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
    
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) .022 .033  .648 .518      
Foreign 
percentage 
(2005-6) 
.005 .002 .243 2.997 .003      
R square .059          
Adjusted R 
square 
.053          
a. Dependent Variable: Ave factor 2 output 2008-10       
 
  
Next, the Casewise Diagnostics table highlighted firms with ID 2 and 21 as outliers; Firm ID 2 has a 
problematic Cook’s distance of 2.48474, and 21 an acceptable distance of .35914 (following the 
removal of Firm ID 2, one firm in the new Casewise Diagnostics table, now at ID 20, had a Cook’s value 
above 1, but this was only 1.083, so it was left in place). The final significance value (in the table below) 
was thus .110, significant at 1-tailed significance values (the full coefficients were: unstandardised B: 
.002; unstandardised standard error: .001; standardised coefficient beta: .134; t: 1.606; significance: 
.110). The hypothesis was therefore supported to significance.  
The results were as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 5  
Table 35: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for reduced control variables with outliers 
removed 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
Ave factor 2 
output (2008-12) 
Foreign percentage 
(2005-6) 
Ave factor 2 
output (2008-12) 
.038 .243 148 1.000  
Foreign 
percentage 
(2005-6) 
7.406 17.238 143 .134* 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 5  
Table 36: Coefficients for reduced control variables with outliers removed 
  
Coefficientsa       
 
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
    
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) .024 .022  1.098 .274      
Foreign 
percentage 
(2005-6) 
.002 .001 .134 1.606 .11      
R square .018          
Adjusted R 
square 
.011          
a. Dependent Variable: Ave factor 2 output (2008-12)       
 
 
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6a 
The hypothesis was that the total output of factor 1 patenting is a non-linear function of the ratio of 
state to private shareholding, therefore highest for intermediate values (and especially MISOEs), i.e. 
that firms with a combination of private and state shareholding would demonstrate a higher output 
than purely private or purely state firms. We tested this hypothesis using standard multiple regression. 
This was tested as follows.  
 
Standard Multiple Regression: 
A multiple regression was carried out by dividing the state proportion variable into 4, using separate 
ownership variables for each category, of SOE, MASOE, MISOE, and POE. As the table below 
demonstrates, for the dependent variable Ave factor 1 output (2008-12), a significance value of .078 
was revealed for MISOEs (reaching valid significance below .1), followed by SOEs at .253 (note that 
the SOE significance value was negative, meaning SOE ownership had a negative impact on output), 
and POEs at .347. (The full coefficients for MISOEs were: unstandardised B: .666; unstandardised 
standard error: .366; standardised coefficient beta: .164; t: 1.819; significance: 0.71). The hypothesis 
was therefore supported to significance.   
In dealing with outliers, the following occurred: as it is only necessary to remove outliers with a Cook’s 
distance value over 1 (see Pallant, 2013; only these are liable to have excessive leverage on the rest 
of the sample), Yingli (firm ID 3) and CECEP (firm ID 19) were the only firms with Cook’s distance values 
over 1. Upon removing Yingli and CECEP, the Cook’s distance value for Trina (firm ID 1) rose to over 1. 
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Upon removing Trina, no further firms’ Cook’s distance values were over 1, and MISOEs retained their 
superior absolute and relative significance value, which was then .071 (as shown in the coefficients 
table below), with significance value reaching recognised absolute levels (followed by .335 for POEs 
and .750 for SOEs). This working is illustrated below:  
 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Testing the Relationship Between Patent Output and the Ratio of State to Private 
Shareholding 
Table 37: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
Ave factor 1 
output 
(2008-12) 
Firm staff or 
firm PV arm 
staff 
(current) 
SOEs MASOEs MISOEs POEs 
Ave 
factor 1 
output 
(2008-
12) 
 
1.664 2.75 150 1.000      
Firm 
staff or 
firm PV 
arm staff 
(current) 
1997.63 3668.379 150 .436* 1.000     
 
SOEs 
 
.11 
 
.319 
 
149 
 
-.066 
 
.176* 
 
1.000 
   
MASOEs .33 .471 147 -.142* -.174* -.252* 1.000   
MISOEs .15 .363 149 .212* .177* -.153* -.292* 1.000  
POEs .41 .493 149 .020 -.083* -.299* -.578* -.356* 1.000 
 
*= Significant at 5% 
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Hypothesis 6a  
Table 38: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
 
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
    
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) .750 .362  2.073 .040      
Firm staff or 
firm PV arm 
staff 
(current) 
.000 .000 .432 5.634 .000      
SOEs -.818 .713 -.095 
-
1.147 
.253      
MISOEs 1.138 .641 .150 1.776 .078      
POEs .450 .477 .081 .943 .347      
R square .228          
Adjusted R 
square 
.206          
a. Dependent Variable: Ave factor 1 output (2008-12)       
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Summary of final regression with outliers removed: 
 
Hypothesis 6a  
Table 39: Coefficients with outliers removed 
 
Coefficientsa       
 
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
    
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) .916 .206  4.441 .000      
Firm staff or 
firm PV arm 
staff 
(current) 
.000 .000 .300 3.676 .000      
SOEs -.128 .402 -.028 -.319 .750      
MISOEs .666 .366 .164 1.819 .071      
POEs .260 .268 .088 .968 .335      
R square .135          
Adjusted R 
square 
.110          
a. Dependent Variable: Ave factor 1 output (2008-12)       
 
 
Hypothesis 6b: 
For the dependent variable Annual average output of both factors for each firm 2008-2012, a 
significance value of .115 was revealed for MISOEs (illustrated below), followed by SOEs at .242 and 
POEs at .268.  
In dealing with outliers, the following occurred: as it is only necessary to remove outliers with a Cook’s 
distance value over 1 (see Pallant, 2013; only these are liable to have excessive leverage on the rest 
of the sample), Yingli (firm ID 3) and CECEP (firm ID 19) were the only firms with Cook’s distance values 
over 1. Upon removing Yingli and CECEP, the Cook’s distance value for Trina (firm ID 1) rose to over 1. 
As the table below shows, upon removing Trina, no further firms’ Cook’s distance values were over 1, 
and MISOEs retained their relative significance value at .166 (followed by .250 for POEs and .705 for 
SOEs). In ascending order of impact on PatPer, the categories were: SOEs, MASOEs, POEs, and MISOEs. 
The full coefficients for MISOEs were: unstandardised B: .579; unstandardised standard error: .416; 
standardised coefficient beta: .126; t: 1.392; significance: .166. The hypothesis was therefore 
supported to significance, although not strongly.   
This working is illustrated below:  
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Hypothesis 6b  
Table 40: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for second regression (both factors) 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
Annual 
average 
output of 
both 
factors for 
each firm 
2008-2012 
Firm staff 
or firm PV 
arm staff 
(current) 
SOEs MASOEs MISOEs POEs 
Annual 
average 
output of 
both factors 
for each 
firm 2008-
2012 
 
1.726 2.894 150 1.000      
Firm staff or 
firm PV arm 
staff 
(current) 
1997.63 3668.379 150 .438* 1.000     
 
SOEs 
.11 .319 149 -.069 .176* 1.000*    
MASOEs .33 .471 147 -.146* -.174* -.252* 1.000*   
MISOEs .15 .363 149 .193* .177* -.153* -.292* 1.000*  
POEs .41 .493 149 .040 -.083 -.299* -.578* -.356* 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
 
 
Hypothesis 6b  
Table 41: Coefficients for second regression (both factors) 
 
Coefficientsa       
 
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
    
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) .741 .381  1.947 .054      
Firm staff or 
firm PV arm 
staff 
(current) 
.000 .000 .439 5.720 .000      
SOEs -.882 .750 -.097 
-
1.176 
.242      
MISOEs 1.069 .674 .134 1.585 .115      
POEs .558 .502 .095 1.112 .268      
R square .228          
Adjusted R 
square 
.207          
a. Dependent Variable: Annual average output of both factors for each firm 2008-
2012       
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Summary of final regression with outliers removed: 
 
 
Hypothesis 6b  
Table 42: Coefficients for second regression (both factors) with outliers removed 
 
Coefficientsa       
 
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
    
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) .889 .234  3.795 .000      
Firm staff or 
firm PV arm 
staff 
(current) 
.000 .000 .322 3.952 .000      
SOEs -.173 .457 -.033 -.379 .705      
MISOEs .579 .416 .126 1.392 .166      
POEs .352 .305 .105 1.155 .250      
a. Dependent Variable: Annual average output of both factors for each firm 2008-
2012       
 
 
Please note that although the measures for MISOEs reach significance in the first regression, the other 
measures (e.g. against SOEs and POEs) are still valid for this hypothesis, as we are assessing the relative 
outcomes of each shareholding category against the others. Note also that the staff number control 
variable was used alone due to the correlations with other controls (illustrated in the Appendix 
Hypothesis 6b full correlations table). 
 
 
Hypothesis 6c 
Hypothesis 6c stated that that the output of “more inventive” patents is a non-linear function of the 
ratio of state to private shareholding, therefore highest for intermediate values. However this was not 
supported to significance (for the dependent variable Ave factor 2 output (2008-12), positive 
significance was not reached for any category of the ownership independent variable). 
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Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7: suggested that the effect of level of government on patenting performance.  
Hypothesis 7a predicted that the total output of patents is the higher, the higher the level of 
government which has the largest state shareholding; Hypothesis 7b predicted that the total output 
of patents is the higher, the lower the level of government which has the largest state shareholding. 
Neither of these hypotheses were supported to significance. 
 
Hypothesis 8 
Hypothesis 8a predicted that majority or 100% state-owned enterprises (MASOEs or SOEs) where 
central government is the major shareholder will be associated with a relatively high proportion of 
patent output in “blue sky” technology categories. This hypothesis was not supported to significance.  
  
Hypothesis 8b: Core technologies: 
The proposition was that, among firms with some state ownership, a smaller proportion of the 
combined patent factors (Factors 1 and 2) were made up of “core technologies” among those with 
central state ownership than among those with local state ownership, tested with four codes (central, 
provincial, super-municipal, and municipal), i.e. central state shareholding was “worse” at generating 
core patents. This was demonstrated in the following manner (please note that the ANOVAs carried 
out are simply exploratory, preceding the regressions). 
A one-way between-groups measures ANOVA (analysis of variance) with planned comparisons was 
conducted to compare the scores of central, provincial, super-municipal, and municipal state 
shareholding (the independent variable) on the proportion of the combined patent factors (Factor 1 
and 2), obtained through the factor analysis, that is composed of “core technologies” (this being the 
dependent variable). In the planned comparison, the groups were given the following coefficients: 
Group 1 (Central): -3 
Group 2 (Provincial): 1 
Group 3 (Super-Municipal): 1 
Group 4 (Municipal): 1 
These groups refer to the four types of state shareholding, by central, provincial, super-municipal, and 
municipal government (super-municipal referring to the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Chongqing, sometimes called the “provincial-level” cities).  
The ANOVA test obtained a significance value of 0.61. Please note that, as with other hypotheses, the 
significance value is placed at .1 (instead of the more common .05) due to the relatively small sample 
size. Therefore there was a significant result for the influence of the independent variable.  
Although ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) is typically carried out to establish the effect of covariants 
(which in this case would be the age of the firm, size of the firm, and GDP of the province in which the 
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firm is headquartered), this would not be revealing in this case. This is because these control variables 
would be entered to judge whether they were helping firms gain achievements in patenting beyond 
other firms (for instance, how a firm’s age might help it accrue special competence). However, in 
analysing core technologies we analyse the “standard” area of solar PV manufacture, as opposed to 
blue sky technologies which, falling in the fields of gallium and cadmium compounds and amorphous 
silicon for example, will on the whole represent greater scientific advancement (in other words, while 
blue sky technologies represent generally greater technological advancement, core technologies do 
not, representing simply the more “standard” focus of commercially-oriented solar PV 
manufacturing). As a result, for a firm to be, for example, larger or older than its peers would be a 
question for the proportion of its patenting in blue sky technologies, but not the standard core fields. 
Furthermore, we are not analysing the absolute numbers of core patents generated (which could also 
be influenced by the control variables), but the proportion. The hypothesis was therefore supported 
to significance.      
The results are displayed in Appendix 21: ANOVA testing for Hypothesis 8b core technologies. 
 
Hypothesis 8c: related technologies: 
The proposition was that, among firms with some state ownership, a larger proportion of the 
combined patent factors (Factors 1 and 2) were made up of “related technologies” among those with 
central state ownership than among those with local state ownership tested with three codes (central, 
provincial, and combined municipal). This was demonstrated as follows.    
A one-way between-groups measures ANOVA (analysis of variance) with planned comparisons was 
conducted to compare the scores of central, provincial, and combined municipal state shareholding 
(the independent variable) on the proportion of the combined patent factors (Factor 1 and 2), 
obtained through the factor analysis, that is composed of “related technologies” (the dependent 
variable). In the planned comparison, the groups were given the following coefficients: 
Group 1 (Central): 2 
Group 2 (Provincial): -1 
Group 3 (combined Municipal, being Super-Municipal and Municipal): -1 
 
These groups refer to the three types of state shareholding, by central, provincial, and combined 
super-municipal and municipal government (i.e. all city government taken as one type).   
The ANOVA test obtained a significance value of .097 Please note that, as with other hypotheses, the 
significance value is place at .1 (instead of the more common .05) due to the relatively small sample 
size. Therefore there was a significant result for the influence of the independent variable.  
As with hypothesis 8b core technologies, ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) was not carried out in this 
case. The reasoning is the same, and in this case that high proportions of related technologies are not 
an achievement beyond other firms, given that they are the most technologically basic solar PV area, 
being composed of equipment (such as household items, street lights, and garden lamps) that contains 
spun-off solar PV technologies. As above, we are also analysing a proportion, not absolute numbers. 
The hypothesis was therefore supported to significance.  
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The results are displayed in Appendix 22: ANOVA testing for Hypothesis 8c related technologies. 
 
 
Standard Multiple Regressions: 
Following the ANOVA testing, hypotheses 8a and 8b above were tested using standard multiple 
regression.  
 
Hypothesis 8b: 
First, for Hypothesis 8b, the correlations between the dependent variable and the possible control 
variables were tested. This confirmed our decision not to use control variables for the ANOVA testing 
above. 
Following the correlations check, the multiple regression was used on the categorical dependent 
variable that, as in Hypothesis 6, had been split into four dummy variables to allow multiple regression 
testing to analyse the different coefficients between shareholding levels (as a simple linear 
regression). The regression demonstrated a greater minus significance value for central shareholding, 
thus confirming that local (non-central) shareholdings are more likely to generate core patents. Please 
note that although absolute significance (on a 2-tailed basis) was not reached for central shareholding 
in this case, as we are assessing the relative significances of the different shareholding levels. 
Meanwhile as the table below demonstrates, significance is reached on a 1-tailed basis. Therefore the 
hypothesis is still supported to significance. (The full coefficients for central shareholdings were: 
unstandardised B: -19.880; unstandardised standard error: 8.344; standardised coefficient beta: -.288; 
t: -2.383; significance: .019). 
The multiple regression was carried out as follows: 
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Hypothesis 8b: Testing the Relationship Between Level of Government and Patenting of Tech Type C 
Table 43: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
Percent 
factors 
tech type 
C 
Level of 
state 
Central 
Level of 
state 
Provincial 
Level of 
state Super-
municipal 
Level of 
state 
Municipal 
Percent 
factors tech 
type C 
78.401 31.675 150 1.000     
Level of 
state 
Central 
 
.3 .459 88 -.239* 1.000    
Level of 
state 
Provincial 
.34 .477 88 .188* -.466* 1.000*   
 
Level of 
state Super-
municipal 
.14 .345 88 -.016 -.257* -.286* 1.000  
 
Level of 
state 
Municipal 
.23 .421 88 .061 -.351* -.390* -.215* 1.000 
 
*= Significant at 5% 
Hypothesis 8b  
Table 44: Coefficients 
 
 
Coefficientsa       
 
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
    
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) 86.635 5.685  15.238 .000      
 
Level of 
state  
Central 
-
19.880 
8.344 -.288 -2.383 .019      
 
Level of 
state 
Super-
municipal 
-9.491 10.636 -.103 -.892 .375      
 
Level of 
state 
Municipal 
-4.688 8.989 -.062 -.521 .603      
R square .067          
Adjusted R 
square 
.033          
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a. Dependent Variable: Percent factors tech type C       
 
 
Hypothesis 8c related technologies: 
Next, for Hypothesis 8c: related technologies, the correlations between the dependent variable and 
the possible control variables were tested. This also confirmed our decision not to use control 
variables for the ANOVA testing above. 
Following the correlations check, as with core technologies, the multiple regression was used on the 
categorical dependent variable that, as in Hypothesis 6, had been split into four dummy variables to 
allow multiple regression testing to analyse the different coefficients between shareholding levels 
(also a simple linear regression). The regression demonstrated a greater significance value for central 
than non-central (local) shareholdings, i.e. that this form of shareholding is more likely to generate 
(the generally less technologically advanced) related technologies. Please note that although absolute 
significance (on a 2-tailed basis) was not reached for central shareholding in this case, as we are 
assessing the relative significances of the different shareholding levels. Meanwhile, significance is 
reached on a 1-tailed basis. Therefore the hypothesis is still supported by the table. (The full 
coefficients for central shareholdings were: unstandardised B: .9530; unstandardised standard error: 
6.132; standardised coefficient beta: .190; t: 1.554; significance: .124).  
Furthermore, although the absolute significance value shown in the ANOVA table (in the appendices) 
appears relatively poor, this testing of the related technologies question aims to establish by 
implication the shareholding type that is most likely to cause higher proportions of the blue-sky 
technology type (demonstration of which is problematic given the relatively small numbers for blue-
sky patenting in a sample of our size). As we have demonstrated the causation by central state 
shareholding of both core and related technology types, it follows that non-central (local) technology 
types cause the only remaining technology type into which solar PV patents can fall, blue-sky 
technologies.  
The multiple regression was carried out as follows: 
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Hypothesis 8c: Testing the Relationship Between Level of Government and Patenting of Tech Type R  
Table 45: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
  
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
N 
Percent 
factors 
tech type 
R 
Level of 
state 
Central 
Level of 
state 
Provincial 
Level of 
state Super-
municipal 
Level of 
state 
Municipal 
Percent 
factors tech 
type R 
10.841 22.989 150 1.000     
Level of 
state 
Central 
.3 .459 88 .174* 1.000    
 
Level of 
state 
Provincial 
.34 .477 88 -.106 -.466* 1.000   
 
Level of 
state Super-
municipal 
.14 .345 88 .061 -.257* -.286* 1.000  
 
Level of 
state 
Municipal 
.23 .421 88 -.119 -.351* -.390* -.215* 1.000 
*= Significant at 5% 
Hypothesis 8c  
Table 46: Coefficients 
 
Coefficientsa       
 
Model 
1 
    
Model 
2 
    
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
 B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) 7.467 4.179  1.787 .078      
Level of 
state 
Central 
9.53 6.132 .190 1.554 .124      
 
Level of 
state 
Super-
municipal 
6.86 7.817 .103 .878 .383      
 
Level of 
state 
Municipal 
-1.66 6.607 -.030 -.251 .802      
R square .043          
Adjusted R 
square 
.009          
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a. Dependent Variable: Percent factors tech type R       
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Table 47 
Hypotheses output summary table 
 
Hypothesis 
number 
Independent variable Dependent variable ß value Sig value 
Supported to 
significance 
Y/N 
1a State shareholding 
Rate of R&D spend 
absolutely 
.280 .191 Y 
1b State shareholding 
Rate of R&D spend 
relative to turnover 
.279 .254 N 
2a Level of government 
Rate of R&D spend 
absolutely 
-.055 .873 N 
2b Level of government 
Rate of R&D spend 
relative to turnover 
.207 .542 N 
3a Private shareholding 
Patenting performance 
for each unit of R&D 
spent 
.302 .271 N 
3b Foreign shareholding 
Patenting performance 
for each unit of R&D 
spent 
.500 .075 Y 
3c 
Private and foreign 
shareholding and R&D 
Patenting performance  .769 .001 Y 
3d 
Private and foreign 
shareholding 
Patenting performance .290 .186 Y 
3e 
Private and foreign 
shareholding 
Patenting performance 
for each unit of R&D 
spent 
.479 .063 Y 
4 Level of government 
The lower the level of 
government which 
holds any state 
shareholding, the 
better the patenting 
performance for each 
unit of R&D spent 
.427 .148 Y 
5 Foreign shareholding 
The higher the foreign 
shareholding, the 
higher the output of 
more inventive patents 
.134 .110 Y 
6a factor 1 
(showing values 
for MISOEs vis-à-
vis MASOEs) 
Ratio of state to private 
shareholding 
Output of patents 
(factor 1, less 
inventive) 
.164 .071 Y 
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6b both factors 
(showing values 
for MISOEs vis-à-
vis MASOEs) 
Ratio of state to private 
shareholding 
Total output of patents .126 .166 Y 
6c* (showing 
values for 
MISOEs vis-à-vis 
MASOEs) 
Ratio of state to private 
shareholding 
Output of patents 
(factor 2, more 
inventive) 
-.151 .107 N 
7a† Level of government Total output of patents n/a† n/a† N 
7b† Level of government Total output of patents n/a† n/a† N 
8a† 
Central SOEs or 
MASOEs 
"Blue sky" technologies n/a† n/a† N 
8b Non-central MISOEs "Core" technologies -.288 .019 Y 
8c Central MISOEs "Related" technologies .190 .124 Y 
 
* = ß values for the other shareholding types ranged from -.146 to -.110 
† = Various regressions attempted  
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9.        Discussion and Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This research was motivated by a desire to understand both China’s government’s need to avoid more 
“missed opportunities” in technological development (Wen Jiabao, in McGregor, J., 2012a, 36), and 
the national innovation system that it has created. In analysing innovation as manifested through the 
patenting landscape of one important industry, solar photovoltaics, we have sought to understand the 
impacts – and the “pathologies” – of this system in a sector that Beijing sees as at the core of China’s 
technological “thrust”.  
The author has investigated the phenomena at work in this Chinese industry, establishing how 
shareholding of these Chinese firms influences their patenting, but especially more neglected 
questions such as the impact of the locality of government shareholding on innovation. In this chapter 
we shall revisit the questions asked by the hypotheses, and establish the findings of the research, its 
contributions and practical implications, as well as which avenues remain open for related further 
research.  
 
 
9.2 Results and Contributions 
Before discussing what the outcomes of the hypotheses imply for the Chinese economy and its firms, 
their contribution to scholarship, and their possible practical applications to policy-makers and 
business, we will outline simply which hypotheses have been upheld, and which have not. Following 
this we will also suggest various reasons why some hypotheses were not supported: in particular, 
some of these hypotheses showed a tendency towards being supported, but lacked the required 
significance value. We have discussed above how the author went about sourcing data, establishing a 
dataset, constructing the hypotheses, and testing these. In the next subsection we shall discuss likely 
reasons for these results, their implications, and contributions. This thesis sought to test the 
hypotheses above, the outcomes of which we describe: we begin with the first four hypotheses, tested 
on listed firms specifically, a subset of our total sample. Their results were as follows.  
Hypothesis 1a, which suggested that the higher the state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend 
on R&D, absolutely, was supported to significance (but the coefficients had the predicted sign, with a 
t value well over 1); Hypothesis 1b, that the higher the state shareholding, the higher the rate of spend 
on R&D, relative to turnover was not supported to significance.  
Hypothesis 2a stated that the higher the level of government which holds the largest state 
shareholding, the higher the rate of spend on R&D absolutely. This hypothesis, and Hypothesis 2b, 
that the higher the level of government which holds the largest state shareholding, the higher the rate 
of spend on R&D relative to turnover, were not supported to significance. 
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Hypothesis 3a stated that the higher the private shareholding, the better the patenting performance 
for each unit of R&D spent, which was supported to significance. Hypothesis 3b, that the higher the 
foreign shareholding, the better the patenting performance for each unit of R&D spent was supported 
to significance. That higher combined private and foreign shareholding (total private shareholding), 
and a higher R&D spend led to better patenting performance was supported to significance in 
hypothesis 3c; hypothesis 3d showed that ownership in isolation (without the presence of R&D) did 
reach significant impact on PatPer, and was supported to significance. Regarding Hypothesis 3e, that 
higher combined private and foreign ownership leads to more PatPro (a moderating variable test) was 
supported. Hypothesis 4 predicted that the lower the level of government which holds any state 
shareholding, the better the patenting performance for each unit of R&D spent. This was supported 
to significance.  
To explain at least some of the unsupported results, we should understand at this point what is 
peculiar about the listed firm sample used for hypotheses 1 to 4 compared to the whole sample 
including unlisted firms. Regarding the former sample, in order to be listed in the first place, a private 
firm will almost certainly have had to be relatively successful. This means that whereas in the unlisted 
sample, private firms are likely to suffer from poor access to finance, listed private firms will likely not, 
which means their R&D spend will not be reduced to the same extent compared to other types of 
firm. Some listed private firms also have considerable foreign ownership, which is liable to provide 
more resource, again skewing the results. With the difference between private and state impacts on 
R&D spending reduced, hypothesis 1b therefore becomes harder to support to significance. 
Furthermore, the listed firm sample is relatively small, which makes significance harder to reach. 
The second group of four hypotheses could be tested on all firms, listed and unlisted. Their results 
were as follows. First, hypothesis 5 stated that the higher the foreign shareholding, the higher the 
output of more inventive patents, which was supported to significance.  
Hypothesis 6a and 6b, that the total output of patents (and the output of factor 1 patenting) is a non-
linear function of the ratio of state to private shareholding, therefore highest for MISOEs, in other 
words that firms with a combination of private and state shareholding would demonstrate a higher 
output than purely private or purely state firms, were supported to significance. However, Hypothesis 
6c, which applied this hypothesis to more inventive patents, was not supported to significance. (Again 
there was a problem with small numbers. The number of firms who had any of the “more inventive” 
patents was small.)   
Meanwhile, both Hypothesis 7a, that the total output of patents is the higher, the higher the level of 
government which has the largest state shareholding, and hypothesis 7b, that the total output of 
patents is the higher, the lower the level of government which has the largest state shareholding, 
were not supported to significance. However hypothesis 7a is presumably affected by the impact of 
worsening governance that we have discussed further up the levels of state, while hypothesis 7b may 
see access to finance worsening further down the levels of state, leading to the “stand-off” we observe 
in these hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 8a stated that majority or 100% state-owned enterprises (MASOEs or SOEs) where central 
government is the major shareholder will be associated with a relatively high proportion of patent 
output in “blue sky” technology categories, which was not supported to significance. However 
Hypothesis 8b, that among firms with some state ownership, a smaller proportion of patent output 
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would be in “core technologies” among those with central state ownership than among those with 
local state ownership (i.e. that central state shareholding was worse at generating “core” patents), 
was supported to significance. Furthermore, that a larger proportion of patent output would be in 
“related technologies” among those with central state ownership than among those with local state 
ownership (this being Hypothesis 8c, i.e. that central state shareholding was more likely to generate 
so-called “related” patents) was supported to significance.  
 
We should consider the meanings of these results and how they contribute to our understanding of 
the field. We will also discuss the likely practical implications for policy-makers and business 
practitioners.  
 
In the round, our results are entirely consistent with the proposition that higher state shareholding 
leads to higher R&D spending. Furthermore, although we could not test the proposition directly, zero 
state shareholding in unlisted firms is likely to be associated with very low R&D. On the other hand, 
the patent productivity of R&D is decisively superior for higher private shareholding (combining 
domestic and foreign). We found this for listed firms, and we have no reason to doubt it will also be 
true for their unlisted counterparts. Among state shareholding, innovation (as patent performance 
per R&D expenditure) was superior for local than central state ownership; firms combining private 
and state shareholding, with the private dominant – minority state-owned firms (MISOEs) – were also 
superior innovators than purely privately-owned or purely state-owned firms. For more innovative 
patenting, foreign shareholding was demonstrated to be beneficial. Finally, central state ownership 
was more likely to lead to the generation of the less challenging “related” technologies, while local 
state ownership was more likely to lead to “core” technologies being patented. All these findings were 
as predicted.  
 
We should conclude by asking what these outcomes mean, and why they matter. We should first ask 
why the outcomes matter for China, then for its PV firms in the rapidly changing global PV market. So 
the relevance of this research for China is as follows.  
In the most straightforward way, our findings reveal a mismatch between the commitment of 
resource, which is easier for firms with more state – perhaps especially central state – ownership to 
obtain, and the ability to spend constructively on innovation, which is not at all concentrated among 
these firms. This means the firms that appear best able to innovate are denied the same resources as 
those firms where, as we suggested, principal-agent problems appear to inhibit innovation outcomes.  
Meanwhile, the hypothesis six regressions showed the result of this. Total patent output is highest for 
minority state-owned firms. These seem able to combine the incentivisation and engagement 
associated with private management with the resource provision associated with state shareholding. 
Furthermore, as foreign shareholding rises, so too does the output of more inventive patenting.  
Outlining the impact of shareholding by different levels of the state, the hypothesis eight results 
demonstrated that central government ownership was associated with a relatively high proportion of 
patenting of related technologies, rather than core or blue sky technologies. This indicates that 
shareholding by the central state tends to lead to the more straightforward areas of patenting, 
particularly for the least advanced of these three areas, related technologies.  
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Therefore, rather than pointing simply to the superior innovative ability of “hybrid” firms, our results 
also indicate a new outcome: the superior innovative ability of the local state (specifically how its 
shareholdings drive superior innovative output as measured by patenting), especially by municipal 
(non-provincial) government (shown to be more likely to lead to patenting “core” technologies, and 
less likely to lead to “related” technologies).  
Conversely, we have supported the notion that the concentration of shareholding by the central state 
leads to patenting both in relatively simple technological fields (related, as opposed to blue sky or core 
technologies) and less innovative patenting in general across types of technologies. With poor 
governance and superficial monitoring manager-agents choose the easiest way of making a good 
impression. (Indeed, although in Hypothesis 8a, it was predicted that central government as the major 
shareholder would lead to a higher proportion of blue sky technologies, it appears that the short-
termism created in state managers’ investment decisions outweighs any innovative experimental 
freedom that may be created by their softer budget constraints.)  
These conclusions can be understood with regard to our theoretical template. The short-term 
incentives of state principals, particularly of the central state, have been shown to create a tendency 
to pursue innovation, and register patents, in the fields more likely to allow more immediate rewards, 
and rewards that are more visible to other state actors. However, although private (and especially 
foreign) shareholders have a different landscape of incentives, more attuned to the longer-term 
rewards of commercial success that, they intend, will arrive with successful investment in innovation, 
these principals must operate in China in a politico-legal environment in which patented innovation is 
harder to guarantee protection, and especially in the domestic private case, in which largesse for R&D 
is frequently harder to secure.  
The multi-principal scenario we described at the outset of this thesis, and one in which the state 
principals within it are tied to local government (with its stronger reputational feedback for principals, 
and more informed relationships with agents), has been supported in this unique environment for 
principal-agent theory as being more conducive to innovation among high-tech firms. These forms of 
principal-agent arrangement in firms have thus also been supported as better adapted to the very 
particular limitations imposed by the Chinese environment, in other words the environment that 
forms our principal-agent template. 
Principal-agent theory has been used to analyse innovation deficits, and short-termism, but not before 
to demonstrate grand state conflict of interest in an attempt at technological development itself. 
Indeed I propose that this thesis has fundamentally extended the scope of principal-agent theory, and 
done so in various directions simultaneously. This multi-dimensional extension of principal-agent 
theory places the theory in the Chinese context, but also applies it to state vs. private principal-agent 
relationships, central vs. local state relationships, foreign vs. domestic relationships, relationships 
involving larger and smaller numbers of principals and agents, and more and fewer ‘tiers’.  
I have applied the theory so that it shows that within these relationships, the very attempt to close 
the information asymmetry gap to deal with an innovation problem compounds the problem. The 
application of principal-agency theory has also shown how the Chinese innovation system 
disincentivises from innovating those with the greatest financial incentive to do so by denying them 
reliable recourse to law; this principal-agent framework provides innovation funds to those with less 
long-term incentive to use them; and the theory has shown how the system creates short-termist 
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career incentives, while using metrics that skew output towards ultimately less productive assets for 
Chinese firms.     
Some of the other hypotheses where significance was not reached also require discussion. The 
problem of the relatively small patent numbers was created by the necessity of studying a young 
Chinese industry. The lack of significance for hypothesis 6c (that output of “more inventive” patents 
is a non-linear function of the ratio of state to private shareholding, highest for intermediate values) 
may be influenced by relatively low numbers of actual inventive patents in the data overall (despite 
the output showing a tendency in the direction suggested by hypothesis 6c). This tendency suggests 
that hypothesis 6c was accurate, but significance could not be reached because of the relatively small 
dataset.   
The lack of significant support for Hypothesis 1a (that the higher the state shareholding, the higher 
the rate of spend on R&D absolutely) may also be due to the presence of foreign (and therefore non-
state) shareholders encouraging relatively high spending on R&D, pushing up the absolute R&D spend 
for non-state shareholders (although Hypothesis 1b, that the higher the state shareholding, the higher 
the rate of spend on R&D relative to turnover, was demonstrated). For Hypothesis 3a however (the 
higher the domestic private shareholding, the better the patenting performance for each unit of R&D 
spent), the lack of significance reached appears to have been caused by the absence of foreign 
shareholders: other things being equal, the more domestic private shareholders, the fewer foreign 
private shareholders. Having given the reasoning for the outcomes of the hypotheses, we now present 
the practical implications for policy and businesses.   
 
 
9.3 Practical Implications 
The importance of our findings should be understood for these firms specifically and the Chinese 
economy as a whole. Generating patent IP is becoming crucial to the growth of Chinese solar PV firms, 
as well as other areas of technological innovation. This is not simply because the ability to do so gives 
these firms an advantage in the global marketplace, increases their value, and puts them in a position 
to extract – not simply pay – licensing fees. It is also because of the particular national phenomenon 
that these firms can more easily secure funding from China’s state finance institutions. However, the 
hypotheses demonstrate that the firms most able to do this are those already embedded, at least to 
some extent, in the state system.  
While private firms, lacking the softer budgets of their state-owned peers, may have the stronger 
incentive to generate patent IP for much-needed commercial growth, should they take on state 
shareholdings they seem more likely to receive help in securing the resources needed to succeed in 
doing so, as well as the legal security needed to defend whatever IP they generate. This situation of 
relative IP insecurity also appears to be discouraging private firms from investing in innovation. 
It is highly doubtful that this situation (in which the entrepreneurs who can secure these state 
shareholdings are liable to be already better connected to the state, such as being former cadres), is 
allowing the efficient allocation of resources to innovation. Indeed, while absolute levels of patenting 
in China have risen rapidly, the actual quality of the patenting underlying this growth has been severely 
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questioned. We have demonstrated that at least part of the cause is that those firms which have some 
state shareholding are better able to generate high quality patent IP than their private, or better-
funded entirely state-owned counterparts.  
In other words, in the direction of China’s economy, the pathologies introduced by China’s continuing 
single party, state-dominated system appear to explain a considerable part of the country’s slower 
innovative development (by contrast to those countries whose innovation-driven growth helped them 
escape the middle income trap, Japan and South Korea, when these countries were at the equivalent 
level of GDP per capita).  
This is evident not only in the fall in the proportion of patent applications classed as inventive since 
the launch of the Indigenous Innovation drive in 2003. The implication also appears to be that, as the 
sectors determined by Beijing to be SEIs (Strategic Emerging Industries) have tended to see the 
emergence of a concentration of state shareholding, the latter initiative risks becoming at least to 
some extent self-defeating. We have shown that concentrations of state shareholding in one of these 
sectors, solar photovoltaics, when it enters the majority, and especially if this is central state 
shareholding, creates disadvantageous principal-agent phenomena. Although these problems are 
mitigated through local government, and especially municipal local government shareholding, the 
assessments and monitoring of state managers (or agents) by state principals disincentivise the long-
term investments required for successful innovation. With Leninist-type output assessments applied 
with the aim of creating a reward system in patenting, a highly complex area of the modern 
technological economy, and the combination of intra-party assessments with those for commercially-
oriented innovation, monitoring and control by state principals erodes agents’ incentives to pursue 
long-term or radical innovation. However, as government has invested more heavily in the strategic 
technological fields we have described, the incentive for state-owned firms to move into these areas 
appears to have been considerable.  
Our hypotheses support the suggestion that preserving majority private shareholding (with a minority 
state share) in these firms helps innovation, especially if the minority state share is held by a local 
government. However, some equally capable private entrepreneurs and private firms which may have 
considerable innovation potential will lack the connections to even the local state enjoyed by some 
among their peers, and the unequal access to resources and legal protection this implies are liable to 
retard the growth of innovation.       
The implication for foreign investors is clear, with the more secure share acquisitions in Chinese 
technology firms, and licensing of patent IP, liable to be in and to the firms with the ownership 
arrangements vis-à-vis the state that we have described. For China itself however, the country may 
have a finite time period during which it can escape the middle-income trap, which is a question 
distinct from this thesis. However, with innovation-led growth now broadly accepted as being both 
necessary to replace labour-led growth, and urgent, we can deduce that the impact of the forms of 
innovation financing we have analysed in this thesis is to hinder this process. China’s trajectory of 
technological development is thus liable to differ radically from its northeast Asian neighbours, and 
from the West, should its economy remain dominated by the state in this fundamental form.   
Categorised under a Strategic Emerging Industry, solar photovoltaics has allowed us to analyse these 
phenomena, and to assess China’s innovation in the field. Although caution must be used when 
applying the conclusions of this thesis to other emerging countries, especially much smaller ones 
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(because of China’s very particular institutional arrangements and politico-economic history), the 
impact of the phenomena we have analysed in China alone, given its population of 1.36bn, is likely to 
be profound.  
However as profits across high technology industries have moved in the last decades to those who 
own, and can license-out, patent intellectual property with the location of the manufacturing itself is 
becoming steadily less important, we can apply our conclusions to other industries, especially those 
that China has prioritised and considers vital for its future economic growth. These are likely to 
include, for instance, wind turbines and their components, nuclear power, biomass power, smart 
grids, various forms of electric cars and batteries, areas of agriculture and advanced materials, and 
indeed may encompass the most profitable advanced technology industries in general of the coming 
decades. This means our analysis is not intended to be applied only to solar PV, but should help us 
understand the severe hindrances to Chinese industry across the board. It is also possible that in areas 
such as wind turbines, for example, where more state industrial planning occurred in the embryonic 
stages of industrial development and state ownership is even more ubiquitous, that the phenomena 
this research has analysed will be more severe. Indeed, our analysis may be applied to the costs, writ-
large, of such pathologies as the pre-direction by state principals and their hindrance of innovative 
capability through the state (and the central state in particular), the imposition of managerial short-
termism in innovation investment, as well as the diminution of the financing and legal protection 
ability of private firms under the state’s economic and legal system.   
 
It is worth briefly reconsidering the scholarly paradigm into which I am introducing this research. 
Although some scholars (e.g. Lewis, 2014) have studied the emergence of large-scale Chinese 
patenting, including in new energy industries, these studies have tended to describe the overall 
growth of patenting (e.g. as a “success” (Lewis, 2014, 548)). For example in China’s wind turbine 
industry, Lewis (2014, 548) suggested that: “On the Chinese side, there has been a discernible focus 
on producing tangible metrics with potential commercial value such as patents, reflecting the 
incentives put in place”. Wang, Qin and Lewis (2012) develop this in a study of the Ministry of Science 
and Technology subsidising China’s wind energy industry R&D to help manufacturers develop new 
technologies and products (Wang, Qin and Lewis, 2012, 82). These authors aim to assess China’s 
technical progress in this technology by examining “the origin of the technological innovation and 
intellectual property being utilized by Chinese firms”. Before 2008, most Chinese firms wishing to 
develop wind power technology acquired turbine designs in licensing arrangements with foreign 
companies. But more recently, China’s firms have improved their capacity to “conduct independent 
innovation and R&D, both in developing new designs and in assimilating and building upon licensed 
foreign designs” (Wang, Qin and Lewis, 2012, 83).  
However beyond discerning an “improvement” in capacity, the authors do not investigate which firms, 
or types of firms, are driving most of this improvement, the role of private vs. state ownership or 
central vs. local state ownership, or the realities of patent quality in this overall improvement. Instead, 
the authors suggest that China’s wind turbine manufacturers have “made great strides” in developing 
advanced wind turbine technology, adding that “challenges remain, however, in raising the 
technological level of Chinese wind turbines to that of the global leaders” (Wang, Qin and Lewis, 2012, 
85). Indeed the statement: “there have not been reports of systemic wind equipment failures in China 
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to date” appears to be contradicted by “Blades, gearboxes, generators, converters and pitch control 
systems have broken down, or in some cases have experienced dangerous failures” (Wang, Qin and 
Lewis, 2012, 86). This thesis however has analysed why the question of political relationships in 
determining the nature and pathologies of innovation is vital, not only to understand the present 
innovative landscape, but why these fault-lines indicate a potential middle-income trap, and 
retardation of technology-driven economic growth.  
Meanwhile, under the recommendation “Conduct targeted R&D”, Wang, Qin and Lewis (2012, 87) 
recognise that China’s wind turbine industry has seen a good deal of attention given to developing 
state-of-the-art turbine designs on a large scale, “often at the expense of basic research on 
fundamental wind power technology challenges”. Their recommended solutions however are more 
generic, including: “A renewed effort to focus R&D on improving designs to meet higher technical and 
safety standards should be encouraged… Chinese turbine designs should also be encouraged to meet 
international standards so that Chinese turbine manufacturers can be well positioned for exports to 
overseas markets in the future”. Although they touch on problems within the structure of innovation 
investment, their suggestion is that: “Research partnerships and consortiums between industry and 
academics in the area of wind power technology research should be encouraged and expanded with 
government R&D support” (Wang, Qin and Lewis, 2012, 87). We have seen however that this would 
mean continuing the large-scale delivery of R&D funding through state, especially central state, 
routes. This would mean channelling more money into the conflict between personal short-term 
incentives, including to register low-quality patents, and against the need for longer-term, engaged, 
and patient technology investment.  
Although we have described briefly the possible difference between the solar PV industry and wind 
turbines, for example, it is worth summarising the question here. While the wind industry is beyond 
the remit of this thesis, the sector is generally more state-dominated than solar. This means, first, that 
the wind industry is likely to be even more severely impacted by the detrimental effects of state-
ownership and majority state ownership on higher-level innovation outcomes than solar. In turn, this 
means that instead of the phenomena this thesis has uncovered in the solar industry applying less 
elsewhere, they are likely to be even more pronounced, in terms of incentive structures and 
managerial short-termism for example (just as in a more privately-owned sector the lack of resource 
available for innovation would likely be more serious). 
It is worth asking whether the relative concentration of solar PV firms in the coastal provinces – more 
developed, and with a greater concentration of entrepreneurs – make this industry unrepresentative. 
However, these coastal provinces are almost invariably the location of the technology industries on 
which China is depending for future growth. This means it would in fact be unrepresentative not to 
focus on these provinces, even if they are somewhat more market-oriented provinces than more 
inland regions. Meanwhile important phenomena such as there being fewer agent-managers to 
monitor are likely to apply at least as strongly away from the coast (although innovative business will 
likely be hindered by limited resource, as well as other factors such as poor infrastructure). 
 
The trade conflict over solar PV itself (involving the US and EU) does not appear to have hindered 
significantly the rise of solar PV installation, which has grown from 40,000 to over 105,000 MW of 
global installed capacity even since this thesis began. Yet as China’s PV industry begins to consolidate, 
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and foreign installation subsidies begin to fall, the importance of more innovative product is growing, 
especially in driving improved generation efficiency, energy storage, and lifetime balance of system 
cost. While Chinese firms have risen to dominate the industry in module output, as this subsector has 
become broadly loss-making, future profitable firms are more likely to be those whose patented 
products – and patent IP holdings – allow them to command higher revenue streams from licensing, 
or modules, or the components therein. It is extremely unlikely that this pattern will be limited to solar 
PV. It is in this microcosm of the solar PV industry that we have been able to identify the troubling 
associated phenomena at work more broadly in China’s system of innovation finance. I suggest that 
the findings of this thesis should be concerning to Chinese policy-makers, and to anyone concerned 
with what this techno-economic system means for the potential of a third of the human population 
to innovate, generate wealth, and help drive human achievement. 
 
9.4 Limitations and Recommended Future Research 
Any study of China in this depth must contend first with the constraints the context places on data 
gathering. Not only are many Chinese firms and managers relatively secretive about the information 
they give in interviews and through other qualitative sources, but they will also often provide only 
limited quantitative information (even if legally mandated to do so by official government surveys). 
Meanwhile, the data required to list on mainland China’s stock exchanges are less onerous than in 
many other jurisdictions. For this thesis, these data constraints were felt most strongly in R&D data, 
where annual reports were one of the few R&D data sources, and even these at times had limited 
information.  
The challenges of collecting patent data were somewhat different however. Although the patent data 
resources available to researchers have recently begun to grow, the patent data challenge consisted 
not only of the time-consuming process of finding a reliable source of a large amount of patent data, 
but also a specialist firm that would give me the tools to analyse this data in depth. As Chinese (and 
other) firms have in various fora exaggerated the numbers of patents they have applied for and been 
granted, and have confused their dates of patent application and patent granting, finding a reliable 
source was vital. While obtaining every single patent for every firm or technology type can never be 
guaranteed from any single source, I found no reason to suspect that the source I chose would have 
created a sample biased in any given direction.  
For those hypotheses where significance was not demonstrated, we believe that a major contributory 
factor was the data sample (specifically total patent numbers) being somewhat smaller than required. 
One should also add that the very youth of China’s solar PV industry means that the industry is 
relatively neglected in scholarship, despite its strategic importance making it important to analyse: 
but it also means however that the available sample of both firm and patent numbers is lower than 
we might desire. Yet this also means that the possible areas of associated future research are 
manifold. First, the patent questions above mean that patenting and innovation in this industry will 
need future study in the medium term, to establish the new directions patenting will have taken, as 
well as how ownership will continue to impact innovation. In particular, this will be equally important 
should the Chinese politico-economic system undergo drastic change.  
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Future research would also be fruitful into other agency questions around the impacts of ownership, 
such as investigating in the Chinese context Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) observation that managers 
having an ownership stake in a firm will decrease managerial opportunism, and may increase 
innovative capacity in cases such as this. Other possible extensions include the impact of different 
types of Chinese fund, or using an industry that allows an expanded data sample, allowing us to re-
test the impacts of private shareholding for example. Away from solar photovoltaics, the urgency of 
innovation in other areas of China’s energy system is apparent, including in developing shale gas and 
other non-conventional oil and gas sources, as China takes the place of the US in becoming reliant on 
imports of Middle Eastern fossil fuels.  
Research may also take the conclusions of this thesis and apply them elsewhere, analysing for instance 
how the local state may be a better driver of innovation through ownership than the central state in 
other countries and economies, or how its findings can be applied to other high-tech industries within 
China. Researchers may also wish to investigate the outcomes of university-affiliated enterprises 
specifically, and the impact of continuing relatively high direct government science and technology 
funding in eastern China in particular.  
Finally, further research into the impacts of ownership and shareholding on innovation is also vital in 
the developed economies of the western world. China’s is not the only financial system to create 
obstacles to innovative firm growth, and thus to future economic wellbeing. In the United Kingdom in 
particular, aspects of the current highly centralised financial system built around the City of London 
appear neglectful, and ignorant, of the requirements of long-term R&D for innovation among large 
and small technology firms. Understanding the role that a better type of technological capitalism can 
play in these systems is vital. Indeed, it is at the heart of future economic prosperity.       
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11. Appendices 
Appendix 1: Table of interviews 
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Role of 
interviewee 
Date of 
interview Location 
Interviewee type 
(legal, technology, 
politico-economy, 
investor) 
Interview 
type 
(exploratory, 
focused, pin-
point) 
General subject 
and aims of 
interview 
Alexander 
Gladstone 
Reporter, Merger 
Market/Financial 
Times Aug-12 China Politico-economy Focused 
Cases of IP 
infringement 
and company 
backgrounds 
Benjamin 
Qiu 
Lawyer, Coolley 
LLP Aug-12 China Legal Focused 
Coming 
development 
and recent 
occurrences in 
Chinese IP law 
and policy 
Bocken Qin 
Principal, BP 
Ventures, Beijing May-12 China Investor Focused 
Investment 
preferences in 
the Chinese 
energy sphere 
Charmaine 
Shi and 
Michelle 
Zhang 
Vice President 
and Associate, 
Conduit Ventures 
Shanghai Apr-12 China Investor Focused 
Chinese state 
and political 
relations for 
technology 
ventures and 
investors 
Chris Bailey 
IP Legal 
Consultant, 
Rouse Legal, 
Guangzhou Oct-12 China Legal Pin-point 
Cases of IP 
infringement 
and company 
backgrounds 
Alan Boyd 
Founding Board 
Member, 
Microsoft; CEO, 
Youling May-12 China Investor/technology Focused 
Chinese state 
investment 
priorities for 
technology 
Daniel 
Prud'homme 
Researcher, EU 
Chamber of 
Commerce, 
Shanghai 
October 
2012 and 
June 
2013 China Politico-economy Pin-point 
Political and IP 
system, 
procurement, 
and 
international 
trade 
Dom 
Edmondson 
IP Legal 
Consultant, 
Rouse Legal, 
Beijing Sep-12 China Legal Pin-point 
Domestic and 
foreign 
entrepreneurs 
in the Chinese 
legal system 
Dominique 
Patton 
Journalist, 
ReCharge and 
Thomson Reuters Aug-12 China Technology Focused 
Solar firms and 
technological 
development, 
pressures and 
constraints 
Matthew 
Downing 
and Fan Rui 
Head of 
Economic Section 
and UKTI Senior 
Trade Officer, 
British Embassy, 
Beijing Aug-12 China Politico-economy Focused 
Political 
pressures on the 
development of 
the Chinese IP 
legal system 
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Eric Peeters 
Vice President 
Electronics, Dow 
Corning Jul-12 China Technology Focused 
Technological 
development in 
Chinese solar PV 
industry, threats 
to foreign 
innovators, IP 
infringement 
risks 
Fred Rappan 
GM Komax Solar 
China Sep-12 China Technology Focused 
Chinese solar PV 
market and 
technology 
development 
Ian Harvey 
Chairman, UK 
Intellectual 
Property 
Association 
Oct 2010 
(and 
multiple 
dates) UK Legal Exploratory 
Development of 
the Chinese IP 
legal system 
Ilian Iliev 
Founder and 
CEO, Cambridge 
IP and 
EcoMachines 
Incubator 
Oct 2010 
(and 
multiple 
dates) UK Legal Exploratory 
Patent-
registration 
patterns, 
functioning of 
SIPO in Beijing, 
and the use of 
patent searches 
for academic 
and commercial 
studies 
James 
Bickford 
Director of China 
Sales, Tigo Energy Sep-12 China Technology Focused 
The solar PV 
technology 
value chain, and 
IP infringement 
risks in China 
Jason 
Shengce Ren 
Associate 
Professor of 
Innovation and 
IPR, Shanghai 
Maritime 
University Dec-12 UK Legal Focused 
Chinese firms' 
approaches to 
patenting and IP 
protection 
Jeff Wang 
Partner, Kaiwu 
Capital, Beijing Sep-12 China Investor Focused 
IP protection 
and challenges 
for portfolio 
firms 
Jan-Marc 
Luchies 
R&D Director, 
Tempress 
Systems Jun-12 Belgium Technology Pin-point 
Non-Chinese 
firms and 
technology 
investment 
since Chinese 
export 
dominance 
Joe 
McDonald 
Reporter, Wall 
Street Journal 
Asia, Beijing May-12 China Politico-economy Focused 
IP infringement 
cases and 
variation in risk 
between 
technology 
areas 
Clark Zhang 
and Thomas 
Howard 
Head of Strategic 
Partnerships and 
MD of Global 
Business 
Development, 
DTI Capital, 
Beijing May-12 China Investor Exploratory 
Technology 
investment in 
China 
Josh Chaim 
Account 
Executive, Aug-12 China Technology Focused 
Chinese solar PV 
market and 
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Photon 
Consulting 
technology 
development 
Laurentius 
Metaal 
COO, Sunchine 
Beijing Jul-12 China Technology Focused 
Chinese solar PV 
market and 
technology 
development 
Paul Wyers 
Director of Solar 
Photovoltaics, 
Energy Centre of 
the Netherlands Jun-12 Netherlands Technology Focused 
Solar PV 
technology 
development in 
China and 
abroad, views 
on technological 
challenges for 
China 
Luke 
Minford CEO, Rouse Legal Jul-11 UK Legal Pin-point 
Chinese legal 
system for 
entrepreneurs, 
foreigners and 
the state 
Martin 
Bloom 
Chairman, 
Renesola Ltd, 
China Jan-13 
UK; China 
(Phone) Technology Focused 
Company 
development 
strategy in 
Chinese solar PV 
and export 
market 
Marianne 
Xian Wang 
Principal, 
California 
Cleantech Fund Sep-12 China 
Politico-
economy/investor Focused 
Political 
influence on 
R&D among 
Chinese 
entrepreneurs 
Markus 
Eberhardt 
Associate 
Professor, 
Nottingham 
University Dec-12 UK Politico-economy Pin-point 
R&D and 
patenting 
among Chinese 
technology 
firms 
Matthew 
Townsend 
Associate 
(International 
Arbitration), 
Fulbright and 
Jaworski Jul-12 China Legal Focused 
Chinese trade 
and IP law 
Mikko 
Puhakka 
Founding 
Partner, Lion 
Partners Jun-12 China Investor Exploratory 
Investor risks 
among new 
ventures and 
joint ventures in 
China 
Minnan 
Wang 
Associate, 
Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance, 
Beijing Nov-12 
China 
(Phone) 
Technology/politico-
economy Focused 
Ongoing 
Chinese state 
governance of 
solar PV sector 
Nicoletta 
Marigo 
Operations 
Manager, 
Film4Sun Jul-12 Italy (Phone) Technology Focused 
Solar PV 
apparatus and 
functioning 
Omid 
Shojaei 
CEO, INDEOTec 
SA Oct-11 
Switzerland 
(Phone) Technology Focused 
Patenting by 
solar PV 
ventures in 
Europe 
Ni Weidou 
Professor and 
Vice-Chairman, 
BP Clean Energy 
Institute, 
Tsinghua 
University Jun-12 China 
Politico-
economy/technology Focused 
R&D among 
Chinese state 
and private 
firms, Chinese 
energy strategy 
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John 
Smirnow 
Vice President of 
Trade and 
Competitiveness, 
Solar Energy 
Industries 
Association 
(United States) May-13 US (Phone) Politico-economy Pin-point 
Trade relations 
and impact on 
innovation 
within solar 
firms in China 
and abroad 
Richard 
Matsui 
CEO and Co-
Founder, kWh 
Analytics Jul-12 US (Phone) Technology Pin-point 
Solar PV 
ventures with 
safe IP 
positions, 
technology 
development in 
China 
Stan Abrams 
Professor of 
Intellectual 
Property Law, 
Central University 
of Finance and 
Economics, 
Beijing; Legal 
Counsel Asia, 
Bentley Systems Oct-12 China Legal Pin-point 
Chinese IP law 
system and 
foreign trade 
Steven 
Thomas 
Regional Sales 
Manager, North 
Asia, REC Solar May-12 China Investor/technology Focused 
IP infringement 
risks in Chinese 
solar PV 
Tom Duke 
IP Attaché, British 
Embassy, Beijing Sep-12 China Legal Pin-point 
Chinese legal 
system, 
functioning and 
changes 
Tom 
Hutchinson 
Director, Diverso 
Private Equity 
Management, 
Shanghai Apr-12 China Investor Focused 
Investing in 
Chinese 
technology 
businesses, 
business type 
and technology 
preferences 
Thomas 
Oldham 
Commodities 
Trader, Glencore, 
Beijing Apr-12 China Politico-economy Focused 
Chinese energy 
constraints and 
desired 
technological 
solutions 
Trevor 
McCormick 
Managing 
Partner, Foster & 
Partners Jul-12 China 
Politico-
economy/technology Focused 
Major players in 
the Chinese 
solar industry, 
technological 
structure and 
value chain 
Wee Theng 
Tan 
Former 
President, Intel 
China Sep-12 China 
Technology/politico-
economy Focused 
Standard-
setting, 
procurement, 
lending, and 
differences 
between 
Chinese and 
foreign firms in 
approaches to 
these issues 
Xiaoting 
Wang 
Associate, 
Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance, 
Beijing Nov-12 
China 
(Phone) 
Technology/politico-
economy Focused 
Ongoing 
Chinese state 
governance of 
solar PV sector 
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Yves de 
Backer 
Business 
Development 
Manager, 
Enfinity; former 
Senior Market 
Intelligence 
Manager, 
Beckaert Jun-12 Belgium Technology Focused 
Foreign firms in 
Chinese solar 
sector 
Zachary 
Gidwitz 
Director of Data 
Services, Smart 
Agriculture 
Analytics Sep-12 China 
Politico-
economy/technology Exploratory 
R&D constraints 
for Chinese tech 
firms 
Chiara 
Candelise 
Energy 
Economist, 
Imperial College 
London May-12 UK Politico-economy Exploratory 
Global solar 
market trends 
Ned Ekins-
Daukes 
Senior Lecturer, 
Physics, 
Grantham 
Institute for 
Climate Change, 
Imperial College 
London Feb-12 UK Technology Focused 
Solar PV 
technology and 
global trends 
David Evans 
Chairman, 
Technology 
Strategy Board, 
UK Government Feb-12 UK 
Technology/politico-
economy Focused 
Foreign 
responses to 
Chinese trade 
and export 
positions, in 
solar PV and 
other 
technological 
fields 
Eric 
Machiels 
CEO, Infinis 
Energy Holdings Feb-11 US (Phone) Investor Exploratory 
Strategy for 
reducing IP 
infringement 
risks in China 
Gerard Reid 
Founder and MD, 
Alexa Capital, 
Berlin Mar-12 
Germany 
(Phone) Technology/investor Exploratory 
Technological 
range of the 
contemporary 
solar PV 
industry, likely 
successful 
developments 
Jason Pinto 
Principal, 
Amadeus 
Ventures Feb-12 UK Technology/investor Focused 
Solar PV 
ventures with 
safe IP 
positions, IP 
protection 
tactics in China 
and abroad 
Justin Smith 
Business 
Development and 
Marketing 
Associate, Crane 
& Co Dec-10 UK Technology Exploratory 
Solar PV 
technology and 
Chinese exports 
Kim Berknov 
Managing 
Director, 
Evergreen Capital 
Partners Dec-10 UK Investor Exploratory 
IP protection 
methods by 
portfolio firms 
Lloyd West 
Vice President, 
Aureos Capital Jan-11 UK Investor Exploratory 
Foreign 
investment in 
China 
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Rob Carroll 
Managing 
Director at 
Catapult Venture 
Managers Jan-12 UK Investor Focused 
IP protection 
methods by 
portfolio firms 
St.John 
Hoskyns 
Head, 
International 
Renewables, 
Department of 
Energy and 
Climate Change, 
UK Government Mar-12 UK Politico-economy Focused 
Global energy 
relations 
Steven 
Levecke 
Capricorn 
Venture Partners, 
Investment 
Manager Nov-11 
Belgium 
(Phone) Investor Focused 
IP protection 
methods by 
portfolio firms 
Gao Xudong 
Professor, School 
of Economics and 
Management, 
Tsinghua 
University Apr-12 China Politico-economy Exploratory 
Innovation and 
R&D by 
technological 
sector in China 
 
 
246 
 
 
247 
 
Appendix 2: Literature review tables 
 
Table 1 - Reporting search strings 
Search protocol for Business Source Complete                     
Search string Scope Date of search Date range Number of 
entries 
  
Principal-agent AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract and 
Full text 
28/06/2013 1960-2013 1657   
Moral hazard AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
Abstract and  
Full text 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
2085 
 
  
Patents AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
R&D AND (Management OR Economics)                                                                                                                     
 
Research and Development AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Patent valuation AND (Management OR Economics) 
Intellectual property AND value AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract and 
Full text 
Abstract and 
Full text 
 
Abstract and 
Full text 
 
Abstract and 
Full text 
Abstract and 
Full text 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
1960-2013 
308 
 
491 
 
424 
 
 
21 
12 
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Intellectual property AND citation AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Patents AND R&D AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
 
Abstract and 
Full text 
 
Abstract and 
Full text 
 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
15 
 
 
192 
Incentives AND information AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Incentives AND innovation AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract and  
Full text 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
2085   
Information asymmetry AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract and  
Full text 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
2263   
   
 
   
   
 
   
Innovation capacity AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract and  
Full text 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
203   
Indigenous innovation AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract and  
Full text 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
41   
Innovation system AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
Abstract and  
Full text 
 
28/06/2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1664 
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Innovation AND shareholding AND (Management OR 
Economics)  
 
Innovation AND ownership AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Innovation AND institutions AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Technology transfer AND (Management OR Economics) 
Abstract and 
Full text 
 
Abstract and 
Full text 
Abstract and 
Full text 
 
Abstract and 
Full text 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
8 
 
3549 
 
 
3950 
 
2032 
 
 
   Number 
relevant: 5901 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 
 
 
Table 2 - Reporting search strings 
Search protocol for Science Direct 
Search string Scope Date of search Date range Number of 
entries 
  
Principal-agent AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract  28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
604   
Moral hazard AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract  28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
82   
   
 
   
Incentives AND information AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Incentives AND innovation AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  
 
Abstract  
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
218 
 
67 
 
  
Information asymmetry AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
104   
Patents AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
R&D AND (Management OR Economics)                                                                                                                     
 
Research and Development AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract 
 
Abstract  
 
Abstract  
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
61 
 
102 
 
94 
 
  
251 
 
 
Patent valuation AND (Management OR Economics) 
Intellectual property AND value AND (Management 
OR Economics) 
 
Intellectual property AND citation AND (Management 
OR Economics) 
 
Patents AND R&D AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
 
Abstract  
Abstract  
 
 
Abstract  
 
Abstract  
 
28/06/2013 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
1960-2013 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
9 
18 
 
20 
 
 
75 
   
 
   
Innovation capacity AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
102   
Indigenous innovation AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
3   
Innovation system AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
Innovation AND shareholding AND (Management OR 
Economics)  
 
Abstract  
 
Abstract  
 
 
Abstract  
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
584 
 
12 
 
 
35 
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Innovation AND ownership AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Innovation AND institutions AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Technology transfer AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
 
Abstract  
 
 
Abstract  
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
100 
 
 
163 
    Number relevant: 
684 
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Table 3 - Reporting search strings 
Search protocol for Emerald 
Search string Scope Date of search Date range Number of 
entries 
  
Principal-agent AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract 05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
1657   
Moral hazard AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract 05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
758   
   
 
   
Incentives AND information AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Incentives AND innovation AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  
 
Abstract  
05/11/2012 
 
05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
32 
 
16 
  
Information asymmetry AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
25395   
Patents AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
R&D AND (Management OR Economics)                                                                                                                     
 
Research and Development AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Abstract 
 
Abstract 
 
Abstract 
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
498 
 
505 
 
593 
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Patent valuation AND (Management OR Economics) 
Intellectual property AND value AND (Management 
OR Economics) 
 
Intellectual property AND citation AND (Management 
OR Economics) 
 
Patents AND R&D AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
 
Abstract  
Abstract 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Abstract 
 
28/06/2013 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
1960-2013 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
29 
12 
 
 
23 
 
 
152 
   
 
   
Innovation capacity AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
3730   
Indigenous innovation AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  05/11/2012 
1960-2011 
380   
Innovation system AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
Innovation AND shareholding AND (Management OR 
Economics)  
 
Innovation AND ownership AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract  
 
Abstract  
 
 
Abstract  
 
05/11/2012 
 
05/11/2012 
 
 
05/11/2012 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
3730 
 
0 
 
 
13 
 
  
255 
 
 
Innovation AND institutions AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Technology transfer AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
Abstract  
 
 
Abstract  
 
05/11/2012 
 
 
05/11/2012 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
11699 
    Number relevant: 
7779 
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Table 4 - Reporting search strings 
Search protocol for JStor 
Search string Scope Date of search Date range Number of 
entries 
  
Principal-agent AND (Management OR Economics) Abstract and  Full text 05/11/2012 1960-2013 58   
Moral hazard AND (Management OR Economics) 
Abstract and  Full text 
05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
56   
 
 
 
 
   
Incentives AND information AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Incentives AND innovation AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract and  Full text 
 
Abstract and Full text 
05/11/2012 
 
05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
181 
 
36 
  
Information asymmetry AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract and  Full text 
05/11/2012 
 
1960-2013 
38   
Patents AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
R&D AND (Management OR Economics)                                                                                                                     
 
Research and Development AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract and Full text 
 
Abstract and Full text 
 
Abstract and Full text 
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
28/06/2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
83 
 
115 
 
105 
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Patent valuation AND (Management OR Economics) 
Intellectual property AND value AND (Management 
OR Economics) 
 
Intellectual property AND citation AND (Management 
OR Economics) 
 
Patents AND R&D AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
 
Abstract and Full text 
Abstract and Full text 
 
 
Abstract and Full text 
 
 
Abstract and Full text 
 
28/06/2013 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
 
28/06/2013 
 
1960-2013 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
27 
11 
 
 
18 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
 
   
Innovation capacity AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract and  Full text 
05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
59   
Indigenous innovation AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
Abstract and  Full text 
05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
18   
Innovation system AND (Management OR Economics) 
 
Innovation AND shareholding AND (Management OR 
Economics)  
 
Abstract and  Full text 
 
Abstract and  Full text 
 
Abstract and  Full text 
05/11/2012 
 
05/11/2012 
 
 
05/11/2012 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
 
1960-2013 
162 
 
0 
 
 
28 
  
258 
 
Innovation AND ownership AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
 
Technology transfer AND (Management OR 
Economics) 
 
 
 
Abstract and  Full text 
 
 
 
 
 
05/11/2012 
 
 
 
1960-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
    Number 
relevant: 412 
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Table 5 - Paper types  
N Criteria Reason for inclusion 
1 Theoretical papers Provide the assumptions used to create the theoretical 
model 
2 Working papers Ensure coverage of current research 
3 All sectors Examine the theoretical paradigm across technological 
paradigms  
4 US/ Canada/Europe/China/India/Taiwan Ensure the fullest range of cross-country contexts 
5 Quantitative and qualitative studies Find all possible empirical evidence 
7 Additional sources and papers Articles from the fullest range of sources to be added 
where recommended 
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Table 6 - Quality assessment: inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Level 
 0-Absence 1-Low 2-Medium 3-High N/A 
Theory robustness Insufficient information 
to judge this criterion 
Low theory validity  Basic grasp of relevant area. 
Weak relation to data 
Broad knowledge of literature. 
Theory relevant to research. 
Strong relationship between 
theory and data 
Element is 
inapplicable to the 
study 
Implication for 
practice 
Insufficient information 
to judge this criterion 
Difficult to implement 
concepts presented. 
Irrelevant for 
professionals/ 
practitioners 
Potential for implementation of 
ideas suggested, needs some 
revisions 
Clear benefits from putting 
ideas into practice 
Element is 
inapplicable to the 
study 
Methodology. Data 
supporting 
arguments 
Insufficient information 
to judge this criterion 
Inaccurate data, and/or 
unrelated to theory. 
Research design poor 
Data related to questions 
despite some gaps. Research 
design could be improved 
Arguments strongly supported 
by data. Robust research design, 
in terms of rigorous sampling, 
data gathering, and data 
analysis 
Element is 
inapplicable to the 
study 
Generalisability – 
Statistical power 
Insufficient information 
to judge this criterion 
Relevant only to one 
locality, not generalisable 
Applicable to those 
organisations with comparable 
characteristics 
Highly generalisable  Element is 
inapplicable to the 
study 
Contribution Insufficient information 
to judge this criterion 
Makes a very limited or 
unimportant 
contribution. Advances 
made are unclear 
Uses others’ ideas but adds to 
existing theory 
Evidently develops knowledge, 
expands the explanations of the 
issue at hand 
Element is 
inapplicable to the 
study 
 Papers                                                                    Excluded                                                                                                  Included 
 Adapted from Pittaway, Robertson et al. (2004)  
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Table 7 - Summary of systematic review articles and retrieval analysis  
 
  
 Database           Number of documents     Number of relevant documents     Total relevant documents 
 
Stage I: database analysis 
 
Business Source Complete                   28,658                    5,901      5,901  
Science Direct      2,331                  684      6,585 
Emerald                      54,951                  7,779      14,364 
JStor      1,106                                   412      14,776 
 
         Excluded documents     Total relevant documents 
Stage II: title analysis 
Duplicates         6,190      8,586 
Books             79      8,507 
Reviews                                          943      7,564 
Not meeting inclusion criteria       8,807        1,243 
 
 
Stage III: keyword filter in endnote                        751                        492 
 
  Primary       Secondary             Peripheral              Not relevant     Total 
Stage IV: breakdown of abstract analysis 
Part 1: abstract review                  
                      238             51    147    56  492 
Part 2: after endnote coding 
      195             65    188    44  492 
 
Stage V: breakdown of article analysis 
Part 1: before article review 
        169             89    39    195  492 
Part 2: after article review 
       163                 89    39    189  492      
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Table 8 - Top fifteen journals reviewed 
Rank  Journal  Field  Primary 
Citations  
Reviewed 
Abstracts  
1  American Economic Review Economics, principally 
macroeconomics 
7 39 
2 American Sociological Review Sociological theory and 
practice 
6 28 
3  Econometrica  Economics and econometrics 5 16 
4 RAND Journal of Economics aka Bell Journal of Economics 
(1970-1974); Economics and 
industrial organization 
5 20 
5 Academy of Management 
Review 
Management, theory and 
practice 
4 27 
6  Industrial and Corporate 
Change 
Economics, theory and 
sociology of organisations, 
political science 
4 25 
7  Journal of Political Economy Political economy 4 21 
8 Quarterly Journal of Economics Economics, especially 
theoretical macroeconomics 
and micro-theory 
4 18 
9 American Journal of Sociology Sociological theory, history 
and practice 
3 12 
10 Intellectual Property and 
Technology Law 
Intellectual property law and 
trends therein 
3 37 
11 International Journal of 
Technology Management  
Technology and R&D 
management 
3 12 
12 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 
Economic and public policy 
research 
3 9 
13 Journal of Economic Theory Economic theory 3 11 
14 Journal of Law and Economics Economic and political 
analysis of law and 
regulation; corporate finance 
3 19 
15 Strategic Management Journal Strategic Management 3 10 
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Table 9 - Papers reviewed (abstracts) according to year of publication 
 
Year No. of 
publications 
Year No. of 
publications 
Year No. of 
publications 
Year  No. of 
publications 
Year No. of 
publications 
    1960 1     1979 4     1990 6 2000 6 2010 7 
1963 1 1980 2 1991 5 2001 4 2011 6 
1968 1 1982 1 1992 2 2002 6 2012 4 
1970 1 1983 5 1993 4 2003 4 2013 2 
1971 1 1984 2 1994 2 2004 3   
1972 1 1985 3 1995 2 2005 4   
1973 2 1986 1 1996 9 2006 5   
1975 1 1987 3 1997 5 2007 10   
1976 2 1988 4 1998 6 2008 14   
1977 3 1989 2 1999 2 2009 6   
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Table 10 - Summary of major sources for moral hazard 
 
Author 
 
 
Data used in study 
 
Dates 
 
Location of 
study 
 
Determinants 
 
Key findings 
Arrow, K. Theory- historical review of 
chemical industry with focus on the 
economic theory of patents 
1963 US Extent to which services 
(esp. hospitals) are paid for 
by insurance 
That insurance may, through moral hazard itself, 
increase the use of costly services.    
 
 
 
Baker, T. A meta-study of moral hazard from 
Victorian insurance origins. 
1996 UK/US N/A Moral hazard may increase the occurrence, 
magnitude, or cost of that which is insured against. 
Pauly, M. Insurance and service prices 1965 US Price subsidies provided by 
insurance 
Moral hazard simply a rational response to a 
subsidised price, whose social effect was an example 
of game theory’s prisoner’s dilemma: the individual 
rational strategy (increasing use) dominates the 
collective rational strategy (limiting use). 
 
      
Alchian, A.A. and 
Demsetz, H.D. 
 
 
 
Milgrom, P. and 
Roberts, J. 
 
Theory- the management and 
monitoring of team production 
contracts 
 
 
Agent effort-level information and 
incentive-intensity levels 
1972 
 
 
1992 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
US 
Agent (owner) ability to 
detect shirking enhanced by 
individual contracts for joint 
input producers 
 
Alignment of monitoring 
levels and shared aims with 
incentive structures for 
agents  
Flow of information to the central party allows the 
firm to act as an efficient market, as information from 
individuals about joint inputs becomes freely 
available. 
 
Optimal contract design depends on information on 
effort levels, while performance-related pay imposes 
extra risk on agents, which affects their 
responsiveness to incentives, which must be 
understood; incentive intensity however will require a 
high monitoring intensity; and tasks and benefits 
valued by employers should match those valued by 
employees.    
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Table 11 - Summary of sources for principal-agent theory 
 
Author 
 
 
Data used in study 
 
Dates 
 
Location of 
study 
 
Determinants 
 
Key findings 
Weber, M.  Theory- how the political “master” 
may control the “expert” agent in 
politico-institutional contexts.   
1925 Germany The level of information 
asymmetry between the 
agent and the principal. 
The asymmetry of the relationship in which power is 
on one side and information on the other. 
 
 
 
      
Fehr,  et al  Reciprocity actions between two 
parties. 
1997 N/A Ability of one or both sides 
to show reciprocity, and 
subsequent reciprocity 
effects and efficiency gains.  
If only one of two parties can reciprocate, the impact 
of reciprocity on contract enforcement depends on 
the details of the pecuniary incentive system. If both 
sides can reciprocate, robust reciprocity effects occur, 
causing efficiency gains.  
 
 
Miller, G.J. 
 
 
 
 
Laffont, J.J. and 
Martimort, D. 
Principal-agent models and their 
political evolution; the range of 
fields and institutions where these 
models can be used. 
 
Theory- “take it or leave it” 
contract offers, in environments 
with reliable courts of law. 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
 
2002 
US 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
The six features required to 
be present for a principal-
agent model to exist. 
 
Ability of principals to 
create sufficiently 
controlling contracts to 
define agent behaviour 
outcomes 
 
 
 
 
The preference of the agent for an incentive package 
with slightly more than their own opportunity cost. 
 
 
Without information asymmetry, principals can 
control agents, even those with different objectives, 
by creating appropriate contracts.  
 
 
 
 ` 
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Table 12 - Summary of sources for innovation and ownership 
 
Author 
 
 
Data used in study 
 
Dates 
 
Location of 
study 
 
Determinants 
 
Key findings 
      
      
      
Da, T. Central and local state 
shareholdings and firm profitability  
2010 China Concentration and type of 
government ownership 
from central to local 
government and firm 
outcomes 
Levels of profitability positively correlated to 
increasingly local levels of the state in China.  
      
Feng, K. Level of technological learning and 
firms supported or unsupported by 
the state 
2010 China Effect of state budgetary 
support on firms’ 
technological learning 
State budgetary support has a negative correlation 
with a firm’s growth in technological learning.  
      
Girma, S. and 
Gong, Y. 
 
 
Kshetri, N. 
 
 
 
 
 
Perez, C. and 
Soete, L. 
 
Executive appointments and R&D 
expenditure 
 
 
Rate of firms’ IP creation and 
government lobbying for court 
system improvement  
 
 
 
Rate of technological growth and 
industry stage of maturity  
2008 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
1988 
 
 
China 
 
 
 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
Appointment of firms’ 
executives by the state and 
level of investment in R&D 
 
Propensity of firms to 
register intellectual 
property and to exert 
pressure on government for 
ability to protect 
 
Rate of advancement of a 
technology and stage of 
maturity of that technology  
Firms whose executives were state-appointed saw on 
average lower expenditures on R&D. 
 
 
IP generation has led to increased pressure on the 
government to speed the improvement of the 
domestic court system.  
 
 
 
Improvements achieved slowly in first stages, then 
accelerate, before slowing down again. 
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Table 13 - Summary of sources for patenting and R&D studies 
 
Author 
 
 
Data used in study 
 
Dates 
 
Location of 
study 
 
Determinants 
 
Key findings 
      
Cockburn, I.M. 
and Griliches, Z 
Industry and appropriation in stock 
market valuation of R&D and 
patents  
1987 US/general Tendencies to patent per 
R&D spending; inter-
industry differences 
therein.  
Lower tendency to patent per R&D spend is seen not 
only in higher spending industries, but also in those 
industries featuring heavy government financial 
support for R&D. 
      
Fai, F.M. IP data in the analysis of Chinese 
technological capabilities  
2005 China Patent rates revealing 
motivations for patenting 
itself, or as indicators of 
underlying technological 
change.  
Patents may be used as a proxy for the underlying 
realities of technological change, rather than just as a 
crude measure of “inventions”; this deals with 
problems of differing motivations for patent 
application.  
      
Griliches, Z., 
Pakes, A. and 
Hall, B.H. 
Patents used as data for inventive 
study; their value as useful data in 
indicating inventive activity 
1986 US Indicators of innovative 
ability within firms and the 
substitutability of R&D by 
patent data.  
Patents can be used in tandem with, or should it be 
lacking, as a substitute for, R&D information; can be 
used to measure not only particular instances of 
innovation, but levels of innovation ability within 
organisations. 
      
Levin, R.C., 
Klevorick, A.K., 
Nelson, R.R. and 
Winter, S.G.  
 
Rivette, K.G. and 
Kline, D.  
 
 
 
Schmookler, J.  
The returns from industrial 
research and development  
 
 
 
Patent landscaping and clustering 
to determine new opportunities 
within firms 
 
 
The connection of invention and 
rates of invention to economic 
growth  
1987 
 
 
 
 
2000 
 
 
 
 
1952 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
US/general 
 
 
 
 
US/general 
The appropriability quality 
of patents and the incentive 
for firms to carry out R&D.  
 
 
Patent data in determining 
acquisition values. 
 
 
 
Patents use as activity 
indicators 
 
 
The authors find a positive correlation, that the ability 
of patents to provide an appropriability mechanism 
provides a marked incentive for firms to carry out 
R&D.   
 
The use by firms of patent registration information (in 
this case USPTO) to understand acquisition targets’ 
technological capability; also to help in price setting 
for IP, which had not normally entered accounts. 
 
Patents as an index of inventive “activity”, meaning 
an index of input, instead of inventive output; a 
narrow definition that excluded development, and 
being the search for new knowledge specifically. 
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Appendix 3: Mindmap of solar photovoltaic technologies 
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Appendix 4: Patent search terms 
 
Search Terms          
           
title:("")    abstract:("")      
           
Silicon processing and ingot manufacturing       
czochralski/czochralsky czochralski/czochralsky    
Siemens   Siemens     
bed reactor   bed reactor     
Fluidized   Fluidized     
silicon manufacture/manufacturing silicon manufacture/manufacturing    
silicon process    silicon process       
solar grade   solar grade      
Purify    Purify       
high purity   high purity      
Purification   Purification      
Smelt    Smelt       
Ribbon           
Waste    Waste       
Crucible    Crucible       
Sand    Sand       
Raw    Raw       
zinc chloride   zinc chloride      
Silicide    Silicide       
Ingot    Ingot       
Seed    Seed       
    Quartz       
    Casting       
    Bridgman       
Doping    Doping       
ingot manufacture   ingot manufacture      
ingot manufacturing  ingot manufacturing     
    Refining       
    Mortar       
ingot fabrication   ingot fabrication      
           
Wafer manufacturing         
    Wafer       
wafer manufacturing  wafer manufacturing     
Cutting    Cutting       
Kerf    Kerf       
Polishing    Polishing       
Slicing    Slicing       
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Wire    Wire       
saw     Saw       
Wash    Wash       
wafer cleaning   wafer cleaning      
Sawdust    Sawdust       
Recover    Recover       
Arsenic    Arsenic       
Slice           
Chip           
Tapetum           
Antimony    Antimony       
           
Cells           
Cell           
Sputter    Sputter       
cell fabrication   cell fabrication      
diamond linear   diamond linear      
slice adhesion          
Ribbon           
    
chemical vapour 
chemical vapor      
Texture    Texture       
Printing    Printing       
Coat           
    Triple       
    Boat       
    Tin       
    Etch       
    cell manufacture      
Laser    Laser       
Boron    Boron       
Phosphorus   Phosphorus      
Scrape    Scrape       
Cushion           
Tool           
Aerosol    aerosol       
Battery           
Ion           
           
Modules           
    junction box      
coupling device          
Welding           
Assembly           
Module           
Illuminator          
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Inverter           
Converter          
Cover           
light on the solar cell         
Folding           
Frameless          
Frame    frame       
Wiring           
MPP           
MPPT           
tracking/tracker          
EVA    EVA       
hot mark           
Vent    vent       
    panel       
    Encapsulation      
           
Systems           
Tank           
battery fixing device         
Antenna           
detector for laser          
Shaft    shaft       
Array           
Mount           
    horizontal bracket      
Storage           
MPP    MPP       
MPPT    MPPT       
Column    column       
maximum power          
Pole           
Balancer    balancer       
Network           
Cable           
Weather           
Surge    surge       
Motor           
Cleaning           
BIPV    BIPV       
Cooling           
Lens           
           
Thin film and next generation PV         
    thin film       
    thin-film       
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Gallium    Gallium       
Indium    Indium       
    gold       
    sulphur       
    sulfur       
    zinc       
    tellurium       
    cobalt       
    titanium       
    Zirconium      
    hafnium       
    niobium       
    Vanadium      
    nickel       
    Molybdenum      
    Manganese      
    bismuth       
    Beryllium      
    antimony       
    Berrylium      
    thallium       
    PECVD       
    InxGal       
    TF-Si       
    DSC       
    InAs       
    CIS       
    CdTe       
    a-Si       
    tantalum       
Selenide    selenide       
Cadmium    Cadmium       
Germanium   Germanium      
Dye    dye       
    Amorphous      
Excitonic    excitonic       
    tandem       
Organic           
Dot           
Quantum    quantum       
    Microcrystalline      
    Nanocrystalline      
    molecular beam epitaxy     
Rubidium    Rubidium       
    chemical vapour      
    nanocrystal       
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    chemical vapor      
    black silicon      
CIGS    CIGS       
           
Concentrating PV          
Concentrator          
Station           
Fresnel           
Chimney    chimney       
Heliostat    heliostat       
    tower       
Stirling    stirling       
Dish    dish       
Parabolic    parabolic       
Trough    trough       
Collector           
Condensation          
optical superposition         
light-focusing          
Mirror           
Cassegrain   Cassegrain      
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Total Patent Boolean searches 
(silicon! W/3 process! AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (silicon! W/3 process! AND solar AND PV)  
(silicon! W/3 manufactur! AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (silicon! W/3 manufactur! AND solar AND PV)  
(manufactur! PRE/3 silicon! AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (manufactur! PRE/3 silicon! AND solar AND PV)  
(silicon! W/3 purif! AND solar) OR (silicon! W/3 purif! AND photovoltaic) (purif! PRE/3 silicon! AND solar) OR 
(purif! PRE/3 silicon! photovoltaic)  
 
(silicon! W/3 ingot! AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (silicon! W/3 ingot! AND solar AND PV) (ingot! PRE/3 
silicon! AND solar AND PV) OR (ingot! PRE/3 silicon! AND solar AND photovoltaic) 
(silicon! W/3 czochralski AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (silicon! W/3 czochralski AND solar AND PV) 
(czochralski PRE/3 silicon! AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (czochralski PRE/3 silicon! AND solar AND PV) 
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(solar AND PV W/3 wafer) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! W/3 wafer) 
(wafer PRE/3 solar AND PV) OR (wafer PRE/3 solar AND photovoltaic!) 
(multi! AND wafer AND solar) OR (multi! AND wafer AND photovoltaic!) 
(poly! AND wafer AND solar) OR (poly! AND wafer AND photovoltaic!) 
(mono! AND wafer AND solar) OR (mono! AND wafer AND photovoltaic!) 
 
(silicon W/3 doping AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (silicon W/3 doping AND solar AND PV) 
(doping PRE/3 silicon AND solar AND photovoltaic) OR (doping PRE/3 silicon AND solar AND PV) 
 
(solar AND PV w/3 cell) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! W/3 cell) 
(silicon W/3 cell AND solar) OR (silicon W/3 cell AND photovoltaic!) 
 
(solar AND PV W/3 module) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! W/3 module) 
(module PRE/3 solar AND PV) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! PRE/3 solar) 
(solar AND PV AND module AND process!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND module AND process!) 
 
(solar AND PV W/3 array) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! W/3 array) 
(array PRE/3 solar AND PV) OR (array PRE/3 solar AND photovoltaic!) 
 
(solar AND PV AND mount!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND mount!) 
(solar AND PV AND track!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND track!) 
(solar AND PV AND MPP!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND MPP!) 
(solar AND PV AND maximum!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND maximum!) 
(solar AND PV W/5 inverter) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! W/5 inverter) 
(solar AND PV AND junction W/3 box) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND junction W/3 box) 
(solar AND PV W/3 wiring) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! W/3 wiring) 
(solar AND PV PRE/3 wiring) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! PRE/3 wiring) 
(solar AND PV AND surge W/3 protect!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND surge W/3 protect!) 
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(solar and PV W/3 concentrat!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! W/3 concentrat!) 
(solar AND PV PRE/3 concentrat!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! PRE/3 concentrat!) 
 
(solar AND PV AND thin W/3 film) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND thin W/3 film) 
(solar AND PV AND cadmium W/3 telluride) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND cadmium W/3 telluride) 
(solar AND PV AND amorphous) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND amorphous) 
(solar AND PV AND copper W/3 indium W/3 gallium W/3 selenide) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND copper 
W/3 indium W/3 gallium W/3 selenide) 
(organic W/3 solar AND PV) OR (organic W/3 photovoltaic! AND solar) 
(solar AND PV AND dye!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND dye!) 
(solar AND PV AND quantum W/3 dot) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND quantum W/3 dot) 
 
(solar AND PV AND polymer!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND polymer!)  
(solar AND PV AND hybrid!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND hybrid!)  
(solar AND PV AND excitonic!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND excitonic!)  
(solar AND PV AND triple junction!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND triple junction!)  
(solar AND PV AND protocrystalline!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND protocrystalline!)  
(solar AND PV AND germanium!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND germanium!)  
(solar AND PV AND arsenide!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND arsenide!)  
(solar AND PV AND phosphide!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND phosphide!)  
(solar AND PV AND molecular!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND molecular!) 
(solar AND PV AND etching!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND etching!) 
(solar AND PV AND saw!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND saw!)  
(solar AND PV AND depos!) OR (solar AND photovoltaic! AND depos!) 
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Appendix 6: Chinese patent Kind Codes 
China 
(CN) 
  
 A8 CORRECTED FIRST PAGE OF PATENT APPLICATION [FROM 07-04-2010 
ONWARDS] 
 A9 CORRECTED FULL SPECIFICATION OF PATENT APPLICATION [FROM 07-04-2010 
ONWARDS] 
 B EXAMINED APPLICATION [FROM 01-04-1985 - 31-12-1992] or GRANTED PATENT 
FOR INVENTION 
 B8 CORRECTED FIRST PAGE OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 B9 CORRECTED FULL SPECIFICATION OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 07-04-2010 
ONWARDS] 
   
 C1 FIRST RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 07-
04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 C2 SECOND RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 
07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 C3 THIRD RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 07-
04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 C4 FOURTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 
07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 C5 FIFTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 07-
04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 C6 SIXTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 07-
04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 C7 SEVENTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF GRANTED PATENT [FROM 
07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 K1 NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF CN -A DOCUMENT, NOT ISSUED BY PATENT 
OFFICE 
 K2 NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF CN -B DOCUMENT, NOT ISSUED BY PATENT 
OFFICE 
 K3 NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF CN -C DOCUMENT, NOT ISSUED BY PATENT 
OFFICE 
 K4 NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF CN -U DOCUMENT, NOT ISSUED BY PATENT 
OFFICE 
 K5 NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF CN -Y DOCUMENT, NOT ISSUED BY PATENT 
OFFICE 
 K6 NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF CN -S DOCUMENT, NOT ISSUED BY PATENT 
OFFICE 
 S DESIGN APPLICATION [FROM 01-04-1985 - 28-08-2007] or REGISTERED DESIGN 
 S1 FIRST RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN [FROM 
07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 S2 SECOND RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 
[FROM 07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 S3 THIRD RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN [FROM 
07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 S4 FOURTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 
[FROM 07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 S5 FIFTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN [FROM 
07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 S6 SIXTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN [FROM 
07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 S7 SEVENTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 
[FROM 07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
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 S9 CORRECTED FULL SPECIFICATION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN [FROM 07-04-2010 
ONWARDS] 
   
 U8 CORRECTED FIRST PAGE OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 U9 CORRECTED FULL SPECIFICATION OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 07-04-2010 
ONWARDS] 
   
 Y1 FIRST RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 07-04-
2010 ONWARDS] 
 Y2 SECOND RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 07-
04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 Y3 THIRD RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 07-
04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 Y4 FOURTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 07-
04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 Y5 FIFTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 07-04-
2010 ONWARDS] 
 Y6 SIXTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 07-
04-2010 ONWARDS] 
 Y7 SEVENTH RE-ISSUE AFTER PARTIAL INVALIDATION OF UTILITY MODEL [FROM 
07-04-2010 ONWARDS] 
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Appendix 7: International Patent Classification (IPC) code examples 
 
Source: Cambridge IP 
 
 
 
Appendix 8: Complete information provided in a patent 
A registered patent provides the following information to the reader: 
a) Title – to what the patent refers 
b) Publishing date – The date a granted patent enters the public domain and becomes prior art. 
A patent can be published twice, as it is automatically published 18 months after the earliest 
given priority date and again after the patent is granted. 
c) Inventor(s) – Names the inventor of the patent, the person(s) who contributes to the claims 
of the patent. In the US the patent must be filed under the name of the inventor, while 
inventorship is not classified as a patentability criterion under European patent law 
d) Applicant(s) – The person/entity which makes the application for the invention and will 
become the assignee and own the property right to the patent. In the US this is often the 
inventor. 
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e) Classification codes – Categorises the patents into a specific area of technology according to 
one of various hierarchical classification systems. The classification codes have levels of 
increasing detail. The most common classification systems are the International Patent 
Classification (IPC, which we use), European Classification (ECLA), the United States Patent 
Classification (USPC), and the Derwent classification (used in the private DWPI patent 
database owned by Thompson Reuters).  
f) Application number – Reference number given to the patent application. 
g) Priority number – The priority number is the number of the application in respect of which 
priority is claimed, i.e. it is the same as the application number of the claimed priority 
document. 
h) Also published as – Gives the other publication/application numbers assigned to the patent, 
usually as a result of the patent being granted in other territories. This can be useful when the 
patent published in one instance doesn’t give the claims, or gives the claims in a foreign 
language as it may be published with the full claims in English under a different publication 
number. 
i) Cited documents – Gives the reference numbers of the documents cited by the patent as prior 
art. 
j) The computerised display of a patent also gives the following information: 
k) Description – Gives a detailed explanation of the patent and the background behind it. Doesn’t 
define the scope of the patent in any legal sense  
l) Claims – Defines the scope of the protection granted by the patent in technical terms. This is 
the crucial part of the patent for application and potential future litigation 
m) Mosaics – Any figures, technical drawings, or other images that accompany the patent. 
n) Original Document – A scan of the original patent with its accompanying documents, when it 
was first published. 
o) INPADOC legal status – Gives information as to whether the patent has been granted, expired, 
etc.  
p) Patent families – Patents are grouped into patent families. Members of a family are either the 
same patent published in a different country or patents that refer to the same invention, such 
as utility patents, patents that cover one part of a larger invention, etc. 
q) Prior art – The previous knowledge in a field that patented inventions have built on, including 
previous patents and information in the public domain. A new patent must declare its prior 
art and distinguish itself from it. 
r) Priority right – Allows the owner of a patent to apply for a patent in a different country and 
claim the same “priority date” as the original patent application. This means that the new 
patent will be valid from the same date as the previously filed patent. It allows the subsequent 
patent to claim the same prior art as the earlier patent and thus avoids having to take into 
account any prior art that have been published in the intervening time.  
s) Open for Public Inspection (OPI) – the part in a patents file which members of the public can 
inspect from the date of publication of the application. 
t) Citations – References to other patents. Backward citations are references to previous patents 
(prior art), forward citations are subsequent patents that reference the given patent. 
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Appendix 9: Agglomeration rating compilation 
City Total firms in city Total firms in our sample within 100 miles  
Shanghai 15  35     
Changzhou 9  42     
Beijing 9  17     
Suzhou 8  56     
Ningbo 8  21     
Hangzhou 6  45     
Wuhan 5  6     
Jiangyin 5  56     
Nantong 4  55     
Tianjin 4  17     
Shenzhen 4  9     
Nanjing 3  42     
Wuxi 3  61     
Taizhou 3  41     
Baoding 2  18     
Jinan 2  4     
Changsha 2  5     
Xinyu 2  5     
Zhenjiang 2  42     
Hohhot 2  2     
Quanzhou 2  3     
Jiaxing 2  66     
Dongguan 2  9     
Shaoxing 2  32     
Dongying 2  4     
Xian 2  3     
Hefei 1  6     
Chaoyang 1  1     
Mudanjiang 1  1     
Gaobeidian 1  17     
Shantou 1  1     
Wuyishan 1  2     
Yinchuan 1  1     
Foshan 1  9     
Baoji 1  3     
Nanan 1  3     
Leshan 1  2     
Rugao 1  38     
Nanyang 1  1     
Guangzhou 1  9     
Yantai 1  3     
Zhuji 1  22     
285 
 
Chengdu 1  2     
Langfang 1  17     
Urumqi 1  1     
Taiyuan 1  2     
Shijiazhuang 1  4     
Luoyang 1  3     
Huangshi 1  6     
Huzhou 1  64     
Xuzhou 1  3     
Jiangyan 1  45     
Xiangtan 1  5     
Jinshan 1  48     
Suqian 1  3     
Weihai 1  3     
Wuhu 1  18     
Yingtan 1  2     
Qinyang 1  3     
Chizhou 1  3     
Yangzhou 1  41     
Zhuhai 1  9     
Pinghu 1  65     
Zhengzhou 1  3     
Dalian 1  3     
Linyi 1  3     
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Appendix 10: Coding of variables for SPSS 
Variable                Code      Coding instructions 
 
ID for each firm     ID    Number 
TRINA SOLAR LTD 1 
CANADIAN SOLAR INC 2 
YINGLI 3 
NINGBO ULICA 4 
CEEG 5 
SHANGHAI CHAORI SOLAR 6 
NINGBO XINYOU PHOTOVOLTAIC INDUSTRY CO., LTD. 7 
CHINALAND SOLAR ENERGY CO., LTD. 8 
LIAONING SUNRISE SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 9 
WUHAN RIXIN TECHNOLOGY 10 
MUDANJIANG XUYANG SOLAR TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 11 
LINUO SOLAR POWER CO., LTD. 12 
EOPLLY NEW ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO LTD 13 
JIFU NEW ENERGY TECH SHANGHAI 14 
CETC SOLAR 15 
JETION SOLAR CHINA CO LTD 16 
TIANJIN JINNENG SOLAR CELL CO., LTD. 17 
LDK SOLAR 18 
CECEP SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY 19 
ASTRONERGY SOLAR 20 
SUNTECH 21 
CHINA SUNERGY 22 
LIGHTWAY GREEN NEW ENERGY CO.,LTD. 23 
GUANGDONG GOLDEN GLASS TECHNOLOGIES LTD 24 
INNER MONGOLIA SHENZHOU SILICON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CO LTD 25 
GCL 26 
CHANGZHOU HUAMEI PHOTOVOLTAIC 27 
WUYISHAN XINTAI PHOTOELECTRIC CO., LTD. 28 
GOLDEN SUN FUJIAN SOLAR 29 
QUANZHOU INTECH SOLAR TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 30 
WUHAN LINGYUN PHOTOELECTRONIC SYSTEM CO., LTD. 31 
NINGXIA YINXING ENERGY CO., LTD. 32 
NINGBO CHUANGYUAN PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGY CO 33 
BEIJING KINGLONG NEW ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 34 
SHANGHAI SOLAR ENERGY 35 
HUNAN RED SOLAR NEW ENERGY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CO LTD 36 
SHENZHEN TRONY SOLAR CORP 37 
JA SOLAR 38  
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SOLARFUN 39 
AIKO SOLAR 40 
ALTENERGY POWER 41 
GIANTION 42 
SHANGHAI TOPSOLAR GREEN ENERGY CO., LTD. 43 
NANJING NANZHOU NEW ENERGY RES & DEV CO LTD 44 
JIAWEI SOLAR ENERGY CO., LTD. 45 
JULI NEW ENERGY CO., LTD. 46 
TIANJIN TIANHUAN PHOTOVOLTAIC SOLAR POWER CO., LTD. 47 
JINKO SOLAR 48 
TIANJIN HUAN-OU SEMI-CONDUCT MATERIAL TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 49 
BEIJING JINGYI RENEWABLE ENERGY ENGINEERING CO.,LTD. 50 
SHAANXI CHANGLING PV LTD 51 
BEIJING JINGXIN ELECTRICAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CO.,LTD. 52 
NANAN SANJING SUNSHINE 53 
WUHAN NARI CO., LTD. OF STATE GRID ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE 54 
BEIJING CHINER NEW ENERGY 55 
BEIJING TIANPU SOLAR 56 
GUANGDONG EAST UPS 57 
CHANGZHOU RONGSOLAR NEW MATERIAL CO LTD 58 
SHENZHEN JINGUANGNENG SOLAR ENERGY LTD 59 
ZHEJIANG SUNFLOWER LIGHT ENERGY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 60 
NINGBO BEIDA SOLAR LTD 61 
HANGZHOU YONGYING 62 
SICHUAN YONGXIANG SILICON CO LTD 63 
WUXI JIACHENG SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 64 
JIANGSU JIUDING SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEM CO LTD 65 
LIDA OPTICAL AND ELECTRONIC CO LTD 66 
GUANGZHOU RUXING TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 67 
ZHEJIANG RENESOLAR NEW MATERIAL TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 68 
SOPRAY 69 
CNPV 70 
NINGBO SHENBO ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD. 71 
GENERAL SOLAR POWER (YANTAI) CO., LTD. 72 
ZHEJIANG GUANGYI 73 
RISEN ENERGY CO., LTD. 74 
TONGWEI SOLAR CO., LTD. 75 
ENN SOLAR ENERGY 76 
REFINE SOLAR TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 77 
ZHEJIANG GLOBAL PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 78 
SHANGHAI JINGTAI PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD. 79 
RAYSPOWER BEIJING NEW ENERGY CO LTD 80 
CHANGZHOU YOUZE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 81 
SHANGHAI SUNHI SOLAR CO., LTD. 82 
DONGYING FUDA SOLAR POWER CO., LTD. 83 
XINJIANG NEW ENERGY CO., LTD. 84 
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SHANXI NYKE SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO LTD 85 
NINGBO THUMB NEW ENERGY CO LTD 86 
JIANGYIN EVERISE PHOTOVOLTAIC 87 
JINGLONG INDUSTRY & COMMERCE GROUP CO., LTD. 88 
XINYUANJING PV TECHNOLOGY LUOYANG CO LTD 89 
HUANGSHI DONGBEI ELECTROMECHANICAL GROUP SOLAR ENERGY CO LTD 90 
ZHEJIANG HENGJI PV-TECH ENERGY CO., LTD. 91 
WUHAN SUNIC PHOTOELECTRICITY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURE CO., LTD. 92 
AIDE SOLAR ENERGY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,JIANGSU 93 
ZHEJIANG KINGDOM SOLAR ENERGY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 94 
NINGBO BEST SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO LTD 95 
SUZHOU GAIA INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGY CO LTD 96 
TOPRAY SOLAR CO LTD 97 
CHANGZHOU NESL SOLARTECH CO LTD 98 
JIANGYIN SHENGTONG PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD. 99 
JIANGSU AIDUO PV 100 
JIANGSU SHIGUANG OPTOVOLTAIC CO LTD 101 
ZHENJIANG HUANTAI SILICON TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 102 
HUNAN TLNZ SOLAR TECHNOLOGY 103 
SHANGHAI PRAIRIESUN SOLAR TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 104 
SIMAX (SUZHOU) GREEN NEW ENERGY CO.,LTD. 105 
ZHEJIANG JINSHAN SOLAR 106 
JIANGXI SOLAR PV CORPORATION 107 
ZONEPV JIANGSU CO LTD 108 
INVOLAR NEW ENERGY TECHNOLOGY (SHANGHAI) CO., LTD. 109 
JIANGSU WHITE RABBIT CO., LTD. 110 
SHANGHAI PROPOWER CO., LTD. 111 
TIANJIN LANTIAN SOLAR TECH CO., LTD. 112 
JIANGSU XIUQIANG PV Division 113 
WEIHAI CHINA GLASS SOLAR CO., LTD. 114 
WUHU MINGYUAN NEW ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 115 
LEADSOLAR ENERGY CO. LTD 116 
UGREN TECHNOLOGY 117 
JIANGXI JINTAI NEW ENERGY CO LTD 118 
HAREON SOLAR 119 
HENAN SUCCEED PHOTOVOLTAIC MATERIALS CORPORATION 120 
HENGHUI NEW ENERGY 121 
BEIJING RUIYANGANKE 122 
ANHUI EHE 123 
BEIJING JINGYUNTONG 124 
JIANGSU SHUNDA 125 
SUZHOU ZHONGCHAO 126 
SUZHOU KUAIKE 127 
SINGYES SOLAR 128 
CHANGZHOU EGING 129 
SHAANXI GSOLAR 130 
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SHANDONG HUAYI 131 
DONGGUAN HUAYUAN 132 
ZHEJIANG FORTUNE 133 
HENAN ARGUS 134 
UPSOLAR TECHNOLOGY (SHANGHAI) 135 
HANGZHOU WEISHENG 136 
SHANGHAI SINO SOLAR 137 
SUZHOU JIEBO 138 
ZIXU SOLAR 139 
JIANGSU SHUNFENG PHOTOVOLTAIC 140 
DALIAN MINE ENERGY 141 
SHANGHAI LIANFU 142 
LINYI JUHUANG 143 
XIAN HUANGHE 144 
HANGZHOU SOLAR 145 
ZHEJIANG ERA SOLAR 146 
SHANGHAI TIANQI NEW ENERGY 147 
HANGZHOU VERSOL SOLAR 148 
SUZHOU OMNIK 149 
INNER MONGOLIA RIYUE 150 
 
 
 
The shareholding-related variables were coded as follows: 
Variable:     Code:    Value: 
Percentage of firm private domestic  PrivDomPercent   [Number] 
Percentage of firm foreign    FPercent   [Number] 
Percentage of firm central state held  StateCentralPercent  [Number] 
Percentage of firm provincial state held  StateProvPercent   [Number] 
Percentage of firm municipal state held  StateMuniPercent  [Number] 
Percentage of firm super-municipally state held StateSuperMuniPercent  [Number] 
 
As such, the shareholding-related variables were coded for each year along the same pattern, for 
example: PrivDomPercent2006, etc. 
 
The variables for outcome of shareholding for each firm were coded as follows: 
Outcome:   Code:      Value: 
290 
 
Private    POE     1 
Central state fully owned  Central SOE    2 
Central state majority owned  Central MASOE    3 
Central state minority owned Central MISOE    4 
Provincial state fully owned Prov SOE    5 
Provincial state majority owned Prov MASOE    6 
Provincial state minority owned Prov MISOE    7 
Municipal state fully owned Muni SOE    8 
Municipal state majority owned Muni MASOE    9 
Municipal state minority owned Muni MISOE    10 
Super-municipal state owned Super Muni SOE    11 
Super-muni state majority owned Super Muni MASOE   12 
Super-muni state minority owned Super Muni MISOE   13 
 
As above, the outcome variables were coded for each year along the same pattern: e.g. Outcome2006, 
etc. 
 
The R&D-related variables were coded as follows: 
Variable:     Code:    Value: 
R&D staff number    RDStaff    [Number] 
Total staff     TtalStaff    [Number] 
R&D staff as percentage of total staff  RDStaffofTtalStaff  [Number] 
 
These variables were then coded for each year along the same pattern: RDStaff2006 etc. 
 
The patent-related variables were coded as follows: 
Variable:     Code:    Value: 
Total patents for the firm     PatentTtal   [Number] 
Inventive patents for the firm   PatentInvent   [Number] 
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Non-inventive patents for the firm   PatentNonInvent   [Number] 
Forward citations of patents for the firm   PatentCite   [Number] 
Patent family registrations per firm (domestic) PatentFam   [Number] 
Patent family registrations outside China (non-US) PatentFamF    [Number] 
Patent family registrations outside China (US) PatentFamUS   [Number] 
 
As above, the patent-related codes were coded for each year along the same pattern, for example: 
PatentTtal2006, etc. 
 
The other variables were coded as follows: 
Variable:     Code:    Value: 
Location by province    LocationProvIncome  [Number] 
Current age of firm    AgFirm    [Number] 
Subsidiary     Subsid    [Yes (1) or No (2)] 
Listed       Listed    [Yes (1) or No (2)] 
 
Among these variables, only Listed needed to be coded for each year, as Listed2006, etc. 
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Appendix 11: Factor Analysis full output 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett’s Sphericity Tests 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .672 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 762.805 
Df 15 
Sig. .000 
Correlation Matrix 
 Inventive 
patents for the 
firm average 
2009-2012 
Non-inventive 
patents for the 
firm average 
2009-2012 
Patent citations 
for the firm 
average 2009-
2012 
Patent family 
entries average 
2009-2012 
Foreign patent 
family entries 
average 2009-
2012 
US patent 
family entries 
average 2009-
2012 
Correlation Inventive patents for the firm average 2009-2012 1.000 .733 .627 .856 .497 .316 
Non-inventive patents for the firm average 2009-2012 .733 1.000 .596 .506 .127 .054 
Patent citations for the firm average 2009-2012 .627 .596 1.000 .567 .427 .348 
Patent family entries average 2009-2012 .856 .506 .567 1.000 .707 .436 
Foreign patent family entries average 2009-2012 .497 .127 .427 .707 1.000 .840 
US patent family entries average 2009-2012 .316 .054 .348 .436 .840 1.000 
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Principal Components Analysis 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadingsa 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 3.605 60.086 60.086 3.605 60.086 60.086 3.146 
2 1.399 23.319 83.405 1.399 23.319 83.405 2.522 
3 .506 8.434 91.839     
4 .317 5.285 97.124     
5 .114 1.896 99.020     
6 .059 .980 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Screeplot 
 
 
 
Component Correlation Matrix 
 
Component Correlation Matrix 
Component 1 2 
1 1.000 .315 
2 .315 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
Oblimin Rotation: Pattern Matrix 
 
Pattern Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 
Non-inventive patents for the firm average 2009-
2012 
.969  
Inventive patents for the firm average 2009-2012 .886  
Patent citations for the firm average 2009-2012 .745  
Patent family entries average 2009-2012 .675 .420 
US patent family entries average 2009-2012  .949 
Foreign patent family entries average 2009-2012  .926 
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Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
 
Oblimin Rotation: Structure Matrix   
Structure Matrix 
 Component 
1 2 
Inventive patents for the firm average 2009-2012 .930 .418 
Non-inventive patents for the firm average 2009-
2012 
.876  
Patent family entries average 2009-2012 .808 .633 
Patent citations for the firm average 2009-2012 .792 .384 
Foreign patent family entries average 2009-2012 .419 .966 
US patent family entries average 2009-2012  .930 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Appendix 12: Reverse causation test 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics (N= 20) 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Firm staff (2006-9) 3730.4
8 
3459.442 
Factor 1 when staff numbers (2006-2009) 6.397 11.843 
 
 
Correlations (N= 20) 
 Firm staff 
(2006-9) 
Factor 1 
when staff 
numbers 
(2006-2009) 
Pearson Correlation Firm staff (2006-9) 1.000  
Factor 1 when staff numbers (2006-2009) .061 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Firm staff (2006-9) . .399 
Factor 1 when staff numbers (2006-2009) .399 . 
    
   
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Factor 1 when staff numbers (2006-2009)b . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .061a .004 -.052 3547.566 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 1 when staff numbers (2006-2009) 
b. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 852958.199 1 852958.199 .068 .798b 
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Residual 226534041.037 18 12585224.502   
Total 227386999.237 19    
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 1 when staff numbers (2006-2009) 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3616.045 906.905  3.987 .001 
Factor 1 when staff numbers 
(2006-2009) 
17.890 68.719 .061 .260 .798 
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Factor 1 when staff numbers 
(2006-2009) 
1 1 1.485 1.000 .26 .26 
2 .515 1.697 .74 .74 
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
Predicted Value 3616.05 4417.41 3730.48 211.879 20 
Std. Predicted Value -.540 3.242 .000 1.000 20 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
795.315 2755.310 1018.95 481.505 20 
Adjusted Predicted Value 3160.04 4410.95 3734.49 293.765 20 
Residual -
3167.881 
10417.37 .000 3452.947 20 
Std. Residual -.893 2.936 .000 .973 20 
Stud. Residual -.922 3.013 -.001 1.002 20 
Deleted Residual -
3373.867 
10969.96 -4.008 3660.266 20 
Stud. Deleted Residual -.917 4.160 .071 1.208 20 
Mahal. Distance .005 10.511 .950 2.498 20 
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Cook's Distance .000 .241 .029 .056 20 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .553 .050 .131 20 
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
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Appendix 13: Reverse Causation test 2 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (N= 20) 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Firm staff (2006-9) 3730.5 3459.442 
Factor 2 when staff numbers (2006-2009) 1.3271 4.488 
 
 
Correlations (N= 20) 
 Firm staff 
(2006-9) 
Factor 2 
when staff 
numbers 
(2006-2009) 
Pearson Correlation Firm staff (2006-9) 1.000  
Factor 2 when staff numbers (2006-2009) -.027 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Firm staff (2006-9) . .455 
Factor 2 when staff numbers (2006-2009) .455 . 
    
   
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Mod
el 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 Factor 2 
when staff 
numbers 
(2006-2009)b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Mod
el 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .027a .001 -.055 3552.923 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 2 when staff numbers (2006-2009) 
b. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 168285.294 1 168285.294 .013 .909b 
Residual 227218713.9 18 12623261.89   
Total 227386999.2 19    
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 2 when staff numbers (2006-2009) 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 (Constant) 3758.306 830.210  4.527 .000 
Factor 2 
when staff 
numbers 
(2006-
2009) 
-20.969 181.613 -.027 -.115 .909 
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Factor 2 when staff numbers 
(2006-2009) 
1 1 1.290 1.000 .35 .35 
2 .710 1.348 .65 .65 
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
Predicted Value 3336.15 3758.31 3730.5 94.112 20 
Std. Predicted Value -4.190 .296 .000 1.000 20 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
799.367 3506.408 959.61 599.539 20 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2546.20 3948.48 3690.2 335.180 20 
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Residual -
3292.806 
10371.69
3 
.000 3458.161 20 
Std. Residual -.927 2.919 .000 .973 20 
Stud. Residual -.953 3.002 .002 1.001 20 
Deleted Residual -
3482.982 
10970.71
0 
40.265 3661.727 20 
Stud. Deleted Residual -.951 4.129 .071 1.201 20 
Mahal. Distance .012 17.556 .950 3.909 20 
Cook's Distance .001 .260 .029 .059 20 
Centered Leverage Value .001 .924 .050 .206 20 
a. Dependent Variable: Firm staff (2006-9) 
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Appendix 14: Reverse Causation test 3 
 
 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING PAIRWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS BCOV R ANOVA COLLIN TOL ZPP 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT ForShareholding20082009 
  /METHOD=ENTER Factor12Combined20032005 
  /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED) 
  /RESIDUALS NORMPROB(ZRESID) 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
 
The full coefficient results were: unstandardised B: -2.467; unstandardised standard error: 6.163; 
standardised coefficient beta: -.038; t: -.400; significance: .690. 
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Regression 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Foreign percentage (2008-9) 10.075 21.246 112 
Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) .047 .328 150 
 
 
Correlations 
 Foreign 
percentage 
(2008-9) 
Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
Pearson Correlation Foreign percentage (2008-9) 1.000  
Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) -.038 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Foreign percentage (2008-9) . .345 
Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) .345 . 
N Foreign percentage (2008-9) 112 112 
Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) 112 150 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5)b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Foreign percentage (2008-9) 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
  
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .038a .001 -.008 21.327 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) 
b. Dependent Variable: Foreign percentage (2008-9) 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 72.864 1 72.864 .160 .690b 
Residual 50032.346 110 454.840   
Total 50105.210 111    
a. Dependent Variable: Foreign percentage (2008-9) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 (Constant) 10.189 2.035  5.006 .000 
Factor 
1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
-2.467 6.163 -.038 -.400 .690 
a. Dependent Variable: Foreign percentage (2008-9) 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
1 Correlations Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
1.000 
Covariances Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
37.980 
a. Dependent Variable: Foreign percentage (2008-9) 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
1 1 1.141 1.000 .43 .43 
2 .859 1.152 .57 .57 
a. Dependent Variable: Foreign percentage (2008-9) 
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Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Foreign 
percentage 
(2008-9) 
Predicted Value Residual 
72 4.211 100.000 10.189 89.811 
a. Dependent Variable: Foreign percentage (2008-9) 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 1.034 10.189 10.075 .810 150 
Residual -10.189 89.811 .0129 21.231 112 
Std. Predicted Value -11.158 .142 .000 1.000 150 
Std. Residual -.478 4.211 .001 .995 112 
a. Dependent Variable: Foreign percentage (2008-9) 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Appendix 15: Reverse Causation test 4 
 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING PAIRWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS BCOV R ANOVA COLLIN TOL ZPP 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT StateProportion20082009 
  /METHOD=ENTER Factor12Combined20032005 
  /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED) 
  /RESIDUALS NORMPROB(ZRESID) 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
 
The full coefficient results were: unstandardised B: -.169; unstandardised standard error: .317; 
standardised coefficient beta: -.050; t: -.533; significance: .595. 
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Regression 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
State proportion (2008-9) 2.84 1.098 113 
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
.047 .328 150 
 
 
Correlations 
 State proportion 
(2008-9) 
Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
Pearson Correlation State proportion (2008-9) 1.000  
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
-.050 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) State proportion (2008-9) . .298 
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
.298 . 
N State proportion (2008-9) 113 113 
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
113 150 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5)b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: State proportion (2008-9) 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .050a .003 -.006 1.102 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) 
b. Dependent Variable: State proportion (2008-9) 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .344 1 .344 .284 .595b 
Residual 134.788 111 1.214   
Total 135.133 112    
a. Dependent Variable: State proportion (2008-9) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.849 .105  27.205 .000 
Factor 
1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
-.169 .317 -.050 -.533 .595 
a. Dependent Variable: State proportion (2008-9) 
 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
1 Correlations Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
1.000 
Covariances Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
.100 
a. Dependent Variable: State proportion (2008-9) 
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Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
1 1 1.141 1.000 .43 .43 
2 .859 1.152 .57 .57 
a. Dependent Variable: State proportion (2008-9) 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.22 2.85 2.84 .055 150 
Residual -1.849 1.256 .002 1.097 113 
Std. Predicted Value -11.158 .142 .000 1.000 150 
Std. Residual -1.678 1.140 .002 .996 113 
a. Dependent Variable: State proportion (2008-9) 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Appendix 16: Reverse Causation test 5 
 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING PAIRWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS BCOV R ANOVA COLLIN TOL ZPP 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT StateLevel20082009 
  /METHOD=ENTER Factor12Combined20032005 
  /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED) 
  /RESIDUALS NORMPROB(ZRESID) 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
 
The full coefficient results were: unstandardised B: .209; unstandardised standard error: .416; 
standardised coefficient beta: .061; t: .502; significance: .617. 
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Regression 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Level of state (2008-9) 2.16 1.120 69 
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
.0465 .328 150 
 
 
Correlations 
 Level of state 
(2008-9) 
Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
Pearson Correlation Level of state (2008-9) 1.000  
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
.061 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Level of state (2008-9) . .309 
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
.309 . 
N Level of state (2008-9) 69 69 
Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
69 150 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5)b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Level of state (2008-9) 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .061a .004 -.011 1.126 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) 
b. Dependent Variable: Level of state (2008-9) 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .319 1 .319 .252 .617b 
Residual 84.927 67 1.268   
Total 85.246 68    
a. Dependent Variable: Level of state (2008-9) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Factor 1&2 combined (2003-5) 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.150 .137  15.702 .000 
Factor 
1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
.209 .416 .061 .502 .617 
a. Dependent Variable: Level of state (2008-9) 
 
  
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
1 Correlations Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
1.000 
Covariances Factor 1&2 combined 
(2003-5) 
.173 
a. Dependent Variable: Level of state (2008-9) 
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Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Factor 1&2 
combined 
(2003-5) 
1 1 1.141 1.000 .43 .43 
2 .859 1.153 .57 .57 
a. Dependent Variable: Level of state (2008-9) 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.15 2.92 2.16 .069 150 
Residual -1.273 1.850 -.008 1.118 69 
Std. Predicted Value -.142 11.158 .000 1.000 150 
Std. Residual -1.131 1.643 -.007 .993 69 
a. Dependent Variable: Level of state (2008-9) 
 
 
 
Charts 
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Appendix 17: Hypothesis 6b full correlations 
 
Correlations 
 Annual average 
output of both 
factors for each 
firm 2008-2012 
Firm staff or 
firm PV arm 
staff 
(current) 
SOEs MASOEs MISOEs POEs Firm HQ 
province 
GDP per 
capita 
Age of 
the 
firm 
Firm 
agglomeration 
rating 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Annual average 
output of both factors 
for each firm 2008-
2012 
1.000         
Firm staff or firm PV 
arm staff (current) 
.438 1.000        
SOEs -.076 .143 1.000       
MASOEs -.144 -.173 -.258 1.000      
MISOEs .194 .197 -.157 -.289 1.000     
POEs .042 -.079 -.306 -.572 -.352 1.000    
Firm HQ province 
GDP per capita 
-.010 -.103 -.083 -.050 .020 .082 1.000   
Age of the firm .106 .230 .387 -.053 -.069 -.155 -.179 1.000  
Firm agglomeration 
rating 
.109 .082 -.159 -.160 -.010 .266 .533 -.156 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Annual average 
output of both factors 
for each firm 2008-
2012 
. .000 .178 .041 .009 .303 .452 .105 .093 
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Firm staff or firm PV 
arm staff (current) 
.000 . .041 .018 .008 .168 .105 .003 .159 
SOEs .178 .041 . .001 .027 .000 .155 .000 .026 
MASOEs .041 .018 .001 . .000 .000 .272 .270 .026 
MISOEs .009 .008 .027 .000 . .000 .403 .210 .454 
POEs .303 .168 .000 .000 .000 . .159 .034 .001 
Firm HQ province 
GDP per capita 
.452 .105 .155 .272 .403 .159 . .017 .000 
Age of the firm .105 .003 .000 .270 .210 .034 .017 . .033 
Firm agglomeration 
rating 
.093 .159 .026 .026 .454 .001 .000 .033 . 
N Annual average 
output of both factors 
for each firm 2008-
2012 
150 150 150 148 150 150 150 140 150 
Firm staff or firm PV 
arm staff (current) 
150 150 150 148 150 150 150 140 150 
SOEs 150 150 150 148 150 150 150 140 150 
MASOEs 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 138 148 
MISOEs 150 150 150 148 150 150 150 140 150 
POEs 150 150 150 148 150 150 150 140 150 
Firm HQ province 
GDP per capita 
150 150 150 148 150 150 150 140 150 
Age of the firm 140 140 140 138 140 140 140 140 140 
Firm agglomeration 
rating 
150 150 150 148 150 
 
150 150 140 150 
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Appendix 18: ANOVA testing for Hypothesis 8b core technologies. 
 
Descriptives 
Percent factors tech type C   
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 28 67.93 32.224 6.090 55.43 80.42 0 100 
2 30 86.30 27.171 4.961 76.15 96.45 0 100 
3 12 76.75 34.014 9.819 55.14 98.36 0 100 
4 19 81.16 30.325 6.957 66.54 95.77 0 100 
Total 89 78.13 30.866 3.272 71.63 84.64 0 100 
 
NB: the means above, as with all the related figures, refer to percentages. 
 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Percent factors tech type C   
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
1.229 3 85 .304 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Percent factors tech type C   
 Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
5113.449 3 1704.483 1.840 .146 
Within Groups 78724.933 85 926.176   
Total 83838.382 88    
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Robust Test of Equality of Means 
Percent factors tech type C   
 Statistic
a 
df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch 1.805 3 35.974 .164 
Brown-
Forsythe 
1.748 3 58.151 .167 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
 
 
 
Contrast Coefficients 
Contras
t 
Firm average ownership from 2005 to 2009 (by level of state from 
central to super-muni) 
1 2 3 4 
1 -3 1 1 1 
 
 
 
Contrast Tests 
  
Contrast Value of 
Contrast 
Std. 
Error 
t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Percent factors tech 
type C 
Assume 
equal 
variances 
1 40.42 21.319 1.896 85 .061 
Does not 
assume 
equal 
variances 
1 40.42 22.432 1.802 49.434 .078 
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Appendix 19: ANOVA testing for Hypothesis 8c related technologies. 
 
Descriptives 
Percent factors tech type R   
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 28 17.75 27.151 5.131 7.22 28.28 0 100 
2 30 7.73 21.310 3.891 -.22 15.69 0 100 
3 31 9.55 22.705 4.078 1.22 17.88 0 100 
Total 89 11.52 23.879 2.531 6.49 16.55 0 100 
 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Percent factors tech type R   
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
2.409 2 86 .096 
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ANOVA 
Percent factors tech type R   
 Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
1637.431 2 818.715 1.451 .240 
Within Groups 48538.794 86 564.405   
Total 50176.225 88    
 
 
 
 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
Percent factors tech type R   
 Statistic
a 
df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch 1.260 2 56.040 .292 
Brown-
Forsythe 
1.434 2 79.840 .245 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
 
 
 
Contrast Coefficients 
Contrast Firm average ownership from 2005 to 2009 (by 3 
codes, central, prov, muni) 
1 2 3 
1 2 -1 -1 
 
 
 
Contrast Tests 
  
Contrast Value of 
Contrast 
Std. 
Error 
t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Percent factors tech 
type R 
Assume 
equal 
variances 
1 18.22 10.847 1.680 86 .097 
Does not 
assume 
equal 
variances 
1 18.22 11.708 1.556 43.916 .127 
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